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THE

HISTORY

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

VOL. IV.

THE

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OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY M. A. THIERS.

TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

FROM THE MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

BY FREDERICK SHOBERL.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

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HISTORY

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE NINTH OF THERMIDOR—RELEASE OF THE SUSPECTED—MODIFICATIONS MADE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT — MOUNTAINEERS AND THERMIDORIANS—GENERAL STATE OF THE FINANCES, AGRICULTURE, AND COMMERCE, AFTER THE REIGN OF TERROR.

The events of the 9th and 10th of Thermidor had produced a joy which continued undiminished for several days. The excitement was universal. A great number of persons who had left the country to conceal themselves in Paris hurried to the public vehicles, to carry to their homes the tidings of the general deliverance. People stopped them in all the places through which they passed, to learn the particulars. As soon as they were apprized of the happy events, some returned to their dwellings which they had long since quitted; others, buried in subterraneous hiding-places, ventured forth again into the light of day. The inmates of the numerous prisons in France began to hope for liberty, or at least they ceased to dread the scaffold.*

* "One day, while I was standing with Madame d'Aiguillon at the prison window, I perceived a poor woman who knew us, and who was making a number of signs, which at first I could not understand. She constantly held up her gown (*robe*), and, seeing that she had some object in view, I called out '*Robe*,' to which she answered, 'Yes.' She then lifted up a stone and put it in her lap, which she lifted up a second time. I then called out '*Pierre*,'

People did not yet investigate the nature of the Revolution which had just taken place; they did not inquire how far the surviving members of the committee of public welfare were disposed to persist in the revolutionary system, or how far the Convention was disposed to enter into their views: they saw, they comprehended, only one thing—the death of Robespierre. It was he who had been the head of the government. It was he to whom were imputed the imprisonments, the executions, indeed all the acts of the late tyranny. It seemed that with Robespierre's death every thing must be changed and take a new direction.*

After any important event, the public expectation eagerly demands to be satisfied as to its results. After two days spent in receiving congratulations; in listening to addresses, in each of which were repeated the words, *Catiline is no more,† the Republic is saved;* in rewarding acts of courage; in voting monuments to perpetuate the memory of the great event of the 9th—the Convention at length directed its attention to the measures which its situation required.

The popular commissions instituted for the trial of prisoners, the revolutionary tribunal composed by Robespierre, the bar of Fouquier-Tinville, still retained their functions, and needed but a sign of encouragement to continue their terrible operations. In

whereupon she evinced the greatest joy at perceiving that her signs were understood. Joining then the stone to her robe, she eagerly imitated the motion of cutting off the head, and immediately began to dance, and evince the most extraordinary joy. This singular pantomime awakened in our minds a vague hope that possibly Robespierre might be no more. At this moment, while we were fluttering with hope and fear, we heard a great noise in the corridor, and the terrible voice of our gaoler, who said to his dog, giving him at the same time a kick, 'Get on, you cursed Robespierre.' That coarse phrase at once taught us that we had nothing to fear, and that France was saved."—*Memoirs of Josephine.* E.

* "Men looked hopelessly towards the Convention, rather like the corpse of a legislative assembly, actuated, during its apparent activity, like the supposed vampire, by an infernal spirit not its own, which urged it to go forth and drink blood, but which, deserted by the animating demon, must sink to the ground in helpless incapacity. But, in spite of these discouraging circumstances, the feelings of humanity and a spirit of self-protection, dictating a determined resistance to the renovation of the horrid system under which the country had so long suffered, began to show itself both within the Convention and without doors."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

† We find the following anecdote of this modern Catiline in the "Annual Register" of 1794. It is of so atrocious a character that we can with difficulty bring ourselves to give credence to it: "A lady of the name of St. Amarante, thinking to secure the safety of her family by polite attentions to Robespierre, invited him to dine with her and some friends. Robespierre accepted the invitation, and was accompanied by one of his greatest intimates. Next day, his friend told him that he (Robespierre), having drunk more freely than ordinary at dinner, had let drop some things which it would have been better to conceal. Having paused a little, Robespierre required a list of the names of all who were of the company, and also of the servants who waited at table. A list was immediately sent to him. In four-and-twenty hours Madame St. Amarante, her family, friends, and domestics, all perished on the scaffold!" E.

the very sitting of the 11th, the purification of the popular commissions was proposed and decreed. Elie Lacoste called the attention to the revolutionary tribunal, and proposed its suspension until it should be reorganized upon different principles, and composed of other persons. Lacoste's suggestion was adopted, and, in order not to delay the trial of Robespierre's accomplices, it was agreed to appoint, before the Assembly broke up, a temporary commission to supersede the revolutionary tribunal. In the evening sitting, Barrère, who continued to officiate as reporter, communicated another victory, the entrance of the French into Liege, and he then addressed the Assembly on the subject of the committees which had been mutilated on several different occasions, and reduced by the scaffold or by missions to a small number of members. Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon had expired on the preceding day. Herault-Sechelles, had shared the fate of Danton. Jean-Bon-St.-André and Prieur of La Marne were absent on missions. There remained only Carnot who was wholly occupied with the war department, Prieur of the Côte d'Or with the furnishing arms and ammunition, Robert Lindet with supplies of provision and commerce, Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois with the correspondence and the administrative bodies; lastly, Barrère with the reports. Thus there were only six out of twelve. The committee of general welfare was more complete, and it was quite adequate to the business that it had to transact. Barrère proposed to appoint three members in the place of those three who had expired on the preceding day on the scaffold, until the general renewal of the committees, which was fixed for the 20th of every month, but which had been discontinued ever since the tacit consent given to the dictatorship. This was starting important questions. Were they to change not only men but things, to modify the form of the committees, to take precautions against their too great influence, to limit their powers—in short, to operate a complete revolution in the administration? Such were the questions raised by Barrère's proposition. In the first place, fault was found with that hasty and dictatorial mode of proceeding which consisted in proposing and appointing the members of the committees in the same sitting. A motion was made for the printing of the list and the adjournment of the nomination. Dubois-Crancé went still farther, and inveighed against the prolonged absence of the members of the committees. If, he argued, they had appointed a successor to Herault-Sechelles, and had not suffered Prieur of La Marne and Jean-Bon-St.-André to be continually absent on missions, they would have been more certain of having a majority, and not have hesitated so long about attacking the triumvirs. He then asserted that men became wearied out by power, and contracted dangerous tastes from the possession of it. He proposed, in consequence, to decree that thenceforward no member of the committees should be authorized to go on mission,

and that one-fourth of the members of each committee should be renewed every month. Cambon, carrying the discussion still farther, said that the entire government ought to be reorganized. The committee of public welfare had, in his opinion, usurped every thing; the consequence was that its members, were they even to labour night and day, could not perform their task, and that the committees of finance, of legislation, and of general safety, were reduced to mere ciphers. It was necessary to make a new distribution of powers, so as to prevent the committee of public welfare from being overloaded, and the others from being annulled.

The discussion being once commenced, a disposition was manifested to lay hands on all the departments of the revolutionary government. Bourdon of the Oise, whose opposition to Robespierre's system was well known, since he was to have been one of its first victims, checked this inconsiderate movement. He said that they had hitherto had an able and vigorous government; that they were indebted to it for the salvation of France and for glorious victories; that they ought to hesitate before they laid imprudent hands on its organization; that all the hopes of the aristocrats were likely to revive; and that, while guarding against a new tyranny, they ought to modify, but with caution, an institution to which they owed such important results. Tallien, the hero of the 9th, was nevertheless desirous that certain questions at least should be taken up, and perceived no danger in deciding them immediately. Wherefore, for instance, not decree at the moment that one-fourth of the committees should be renewed every month? This proposition of Dubois-Crancé's, supported by Tallien, was received with enthusiasm, and adopted amidst shouts of *The Republic for ever!* To this measure Delmas was desirous of adding another. "You have just dried up the source of ambition," said he to the assembly: "to complete your decree, I propose that you decide that no member shall be eligible to serve in a committee, till he has been out of it a month." This proposition, which was received with the same favour as the other, was immediately adopted. These principles being admitted, it was agreed that a commission should present a new plan for the organization of the committees of government.

On the following day, six members were chosen to fill the places of the dead or absent members of the committee of public welfare. On this occasion, the presentation made by Tallien was not confirmed. The Assembly nominated Tallien, to reward him for his courage, Bréard, Thuriot, Treilhard, members of the first committee of public welfare, lastly, the two deputies Laloi and Echasseriaux senior, the latter of whom was well versed in matters of finance and political economy. The committee of general safety also underwent changes. Severe censures were thrown out in all quarters against David, who was said to be a

creature of Robespierre's, and against Jagot and Lavicomterie, who were accused of having been atrocious inquisitors. A great number of voices demanded their removal. It was decreed. Several of the champions who had distinguished themselves on the 9th were appointed to succeed them, and, to complete the committee of general safety, Legendre, Merlin of Thionville, Goupilleau of Fontenai, André Dumont,* Jean Débry, and Bernard of Saintes. The law of the 22nd of Prairial was then unanimously repealed. Members inveighed with indignation against the decree which permitted a deputy to be imprisoned before he had been first heard by the Convention—a pernicious decree which had consigned to death illustrious victims present to the recollection of all, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Herault-Sechelles, &c. The decree was repealed. It was not sufficient to change things only: there were men whom the public resentment could not forgive. "All Paris," exclaimed Legendre, "demands of you the justly merited punishment of Fouquier-Tinville."† This suggestion was instantly followed, and Fouquier-Tinville was placed under accusation. "It is impossible to sit any longer beside Lebon," cried another voice; and all eyes were fixed on the proconsul who had drenched the city of Arras with blood, and whose excesses had provoked complaints even in the time of Robespierre.‡ Lebon was immediately decreed to be under arrest. The Assembly resumed the consideration of the case of David, whom it had at first merely excluded from the committee of general safety, and he too was put under arrest. The same measure was adopted in regard to Heron, the principal agent of the police instituted by Robespierre; to General Ros-

* "André Dumont, deputy to the Convention, voted for the King's death without appeal. He persecuted the Girondins with the utmost severity. Being sent to the department of the Somme, he caused two hundred persons, sixty-four of whom were priests, to be thrown into the river. In 1794 he declared violently against Robespierre, and was afterwards president of the Convention, and member of the committee of public safety. In the December of 1794 he proposed that the punishment of death should no longer be inflicted, except on royalists. In the year 1796 he was elected to the council of Five Hundred, and, after the 18th of Brumaire, was appointed sub-prefect of Abbeville."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

† "At this so-dreaded name a general murmur burst from the Assembly. Fréron, making himself the organ of the common indignation, exclaimed, 'I demand that the earth may be at length freed from this monster, and that Fouquier, now drunk with the blood which he has spilled, may be sent to hell, to sleep himself sober."—*Mignet.* E.

‡ "Lebon was accused before the Convention by a deputation from Cambray. On his trial, the monster acknowledged that, an aristocrat being condemned to the guillotine, he had kept him lying in the usual posture on his back, with his eyes turned up to the axe, which was suspended above his throat—in short, in all the agonies which can agitate the human mind—until he had read to him at length the Gazette, which had just arrived, giving an account of a victory gained by the republican armies."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

signol, already well known; and to Hermann, president of the revolutionary tribunal before Dumas, and who had become, through Robespierre's influence, the chief of the commission of the tribunals.

Thus the revolutionary tribunal was suspended, the law of the 22nd of Prairial was repealed, the committees of public welfare and general safety were in part recomposed, and the principal agents of the late dictatorship were arrested and prosecuted. The character of the late revolution was pronounced. Scope was given to hopes and to complaints of all kinds. The persons under confinement, who filled the prisons, and their families, fondly imagined that they were at length about to enjoy the results of the event of the 9th. Before that happy moment, the relatives of the suspected durst not remonstrate even for the purpose of urging the most legitimate reasons, either for fear of awakening the attention of Fouquier-Tinville, or from apprehension of being imprisoned themselves for having solicited in behalf of aristocrats. The Reign of Terror was past. People again met in the sections. Abandoned before to *sans-culottes* who were paid forty sous per day, they were immediately filled by persons who had just made their appearance again in public, by relatives of the prisoners, by fathers, brothers, or sons, of victims sacrificed by the revolutionary tribunal. A desire to deliver their kinsmen animated some, revenge actuated others. In all the sections, the liberation of the prisoners was demanded, and deputations repaired to the Convention to obtain it from that assembly. These demands were referred to the committee of general safety, which was directed to verify the application of the law relative to suspected persons. Though it still comprehended the greater number of the individuals who had signed the orders of arrest, yet the force of circumstances and the junction of new members could not fail to incline it to clemency. It began, in fact, with pronouncing a multitude of liberations. Some of its members, Legendre, Merlin, and others, went through the prisons, to receive petitions, and diffused joy there by their presence and their words; others, sitting night and day, received the petitions of relatives, who thronged to apply for releases. The committee was directed to inquire whether the persons called suspected had been imprisoned on the motives of the law of the 17th of September, and if those motives were specified in the warrants of arrest. This was only returning to a more precise execution of the law of the 17th of September;* still it was sufficient to empty the prisons almost entirely. Such, in fact, had been the precipitation of the revolutionary

* "In the space of eight or ten days after the fall of Robespierre, out of ten thousand suspected persons, not one remained in the prisons of Paris." —*Lacretelle*. E.

agents that they had arrested without stating motives, and without demanding the communication of them to the prisoners. These were released, as they had been confined, that is, *en masse*. Joy, less turbulent, then became more real: it was diffused among families, which recovered a father, a brother, or a son, of whom they had long been deprived, and whom they had even regarded as doomed to the scaffold. Men whose lukewarmness or whose connexions had rendered them suspected by a jealous authority, and those for whose opposition even an attested patriotism could not obtain forgiveness, were seen coming forth from the prisons. That youthful general, who, uniting the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine on one of the sides of the Vosges, had raised the blockade of Landau by a movement worthy of the greatest commanders—Hoche—imprisoned for his resistance to the committee of public welfare, was liberated and restored to his family and to the army, which he was destined to lead again to victory. Kilmaine, who had saved the army of the North by breaking up from Cæsar's Camp in August, 1793, who had been thrown into confinement for that admirable retreat, was also set at liberty. That young and beautiful female, who had acquired such empire over Tallien, and who, from the recesses of her prison, had not ceased to stimulate his courage, was delivered by him, and became his wife. Though releases were multiplied every day, still applications poured in upon the committee in undiminished numbers. "Victory," said Barrère, "has just marked an epoch when the country can be indulgent without danger, and consider uncivic faults as atoned for by an imprisonment for some time. The committees are incessantly engaged in deciding upon the releases demanded; they are continually engaged in repairing individual errors or acts of injustice. Very soon all traces of private revenge will be effaced from the soil of the republic; but the concourse of persons of both sexes about the doors of the committee of general safety only serves to retard labours so beneficial to the citizens. We make due allowance for the very natural anxiety of families; but why retard, by solicitations reflecting upon the legislators, and by too numerous assemblages, the rapid march which national justice ought to take at this period?"

The committee of general safety was, in fact, beset with solicitations of all kinds. The women, in particular, exerted their influence to obtain acts of clemency, even in behalf of known enemies of the revolution. More than one deception was practised upon the committee. The dukes of Aumont and Valentinois were liberated under fictitious names, and a great many others escaped by means of the same subterfuge. In this there was but little harm; for, as Barrère had observed, victory had marked the epoch when the republic could become mild and indulgent. But the rumour which was circulated that the com-

mittee was setting at liberty a great number of aristocrats was likely to revive revolutionary distrust, and to break the sort of unanimity with which measures of clemency and peace were welcomed.

The sections were agitated, and became tumultuous. It was not possible, in fact, that the relatives of prisoners or of victims, that the suspected persons recently liberated, that all those, in short, to whom freedom of speech was restored, should limit their demands to the reparation of old severities, and that they should not demand vengeance also. Almost all were furious against the revolutionary committees, and complained loudly of them. They were for recomposing, nay, even for suppressing them, and these discussions produced some disturbances in Paris. The section of Montreuil came to denounce the arbitrary acts of its revolutionary committee; that of the French Pantheon declared that its committee had lost its confidence; that of the Social Contract likewise took severe measures in regard to its committee, and appointed a commission to examine its registers.

This was only a natural reaction of the moderate class, long reduced to silence and to terror by the inquisitors of the revolutionary committees. These movements could not fail to strike the attention of the Mountain.

That terrible Mountain had not perished with Robespierre. It had survived him. Some of its members had remained convinced of the uprightness, of the integrity of Robespierre's intentions, and did not believe that he ever meant to usurp. They looked upon him as the victim of Danton's friends, and of the corrupt party whose remains he had not been able to destroy; but it was a very small number who held this opinion. The great majority of the Mountaineers, stanch, enthusiastic republicans, regarding with horror every scheme of usurpation, had lent their assistance to the 9th of Thermidor, not so much with a view to overthrow a sanguinary system as to strike a nascent Cromwell. No doubt they looked upon revolutionary justice, such as Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon, Fouquier, and Dumas had made it, as iniquitous; but they had no intention to diminish in the least the energy of the government, or to give any quarter to what were called the aristocrats. They were mostly known to be pure and rigid men, who had no hand in the dictatorship and its acts, and were in no way interested in supporting it; but, at the same time, jealous revolutionists, who would not suffer the 9th of Thermidor to be converted into a reaction, and turned to the advantage of a party. Among those of their colleagues who had united to overthrow the dictatorship, they saw with distrust men who had the character of rogues, of peculators, friends of Chabot's and Fabre-d'Eglantine's, members, in short, of the rapacious, stockjobbing, and corrupt party. They had seconded

them against Robespierre, but they were ready to combat them, if they perceived in them any tendency either to enervate the revolutionary energy, or to turn the late events to the advantage of any faction whatever. Danton had been accused of corruption, of federalism, of Orleanism, and of royalism. It is not surprising that suspicions of the like nature should spring up against his victorious friends. No attack was yet made; but the numerous releases, and the general excitement against the revolutionary system, began to awaken apprehensions.

The real authors of the 9th of Thermidor, to the number of fifteen or twenty, the principal of whom were Legendre, Fréron, Tallien, Merlin of Thionville, Barras, Thuriot, Bourdon of the Oise, Dubois-Crancé, and Lecointre of Versailles, were not more favourably disposed than their colleagues to royalism and counter-revolution; but, excited by danger and by the struggle, they spoke out more decidedly against the revolutionary laws. They had, moreover, much of that tendency to leniency which had ruined their friends, Danton and Desmoulins. Surrounded, applauded, and solicited, they were hurried away more than their colleagues of the Mountain into the system of clemency. Many of them possibly sacrificed their own opinions to their new position. To render services to distressed families, to receive testimonies of the warmest gratitude, to efface the remembrance of old severities, was a part which could not fail to tempt them. Already those who distrusted their complaisance, as well as those who confided in it, gave them a particular appellation: they called them the *Thermidorians*.

Warm discussions frequently took place on the subject of the release of prisoners. On the recommendation of a deputy, who said that he knew one of them, an individual of his department, the committee ordered his liberation. Another deputy of the same department immediately complained of this release, and declared that an aristocrat had been set at liberty. These disputes, and the appearance of a multitude of well-known enemies of the revolution, who boldly showed their joyous faces, provoked a measure which was adopted, but to which no great importance was at first attached. It was decided that a list of all the persons released by order of the committee of general safety should be printed, and that beside the name of each individual so released should be printed the names of the persons who had petitioned in his behalf and who answered for his principles.

This measure produced a most unpleasant sensation. Suffering from the recent oppression which they had undergone, many of the citizens were afraid to see their names entered in a list which might be employed for the exercise of fresh severities, if the system of terror should ever be re-established. Many of those who had already solicited and obtained releases were sorry for it, and many others would not apply for more. Bitter complaints were made in the sections of this return to measures

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This measure produced a most unpleasant sensation. Suffering from the recent oppression which they had undergone, many of the citizens were afraid to see their names entered in a list which might be employed for the exercise of fresh severities, if the system of terror should ever be re-established. Many of those who had already solicited and obtained releases were sorry for it, and many others would not apply for more. Bitter complaints were made in the sections of this return to measures

which disturbed the public joy and confidence, and their repeal was demanded.

On the 26th of Thermidor the attention of the Assembly was occupied by the agitation prevailing in the sections of Paris. The section of Montreuil had come to denounce its revolutionary committee. It had been answered that it ought to address itself to the committee of general safety. Duhem, deputy of Lille, who had no hand in the acts of the late dictatorship, but was a friend of Billaud's, sharing all his opinions, and convinced that it was not expedient for the revolutionary authority to relax its severity, violently inveighed against aristocracy and moderatism, which, he said, already lifted their audacious heads, and imagined that the 9th of Thermidor had been brought about for their benefit. Baudot and Taillefer, who had shown a courageous opposition under the rule of Robespierre, but who were as stanch Mountaineers as Duhem, and Vadier, a distinguished member of the old committee of general safety, asserted also that the aristocracy was stirring, and that although the government ought certainly to be just, it ought at the same time to be inflexible. Granet, deputy of Marseilles, who sat with the Mountain, made a proposition which increased the agitation of the Assembly. He insisted that the prisoners already released, if the persons who answered for them did not come forward to give their names, should be immediately re-incarcerated. This proposition excited a great tumult. Bourdon, Lecointre, and Merlin of Thionville, opposed it with all their might. The discussion, as it almost always happens on such occasions, extended from the lists to the political state of the country, and the parties briskly attacked one another on account of the intentions already imputed by each to the other. "It is high time," exclaimed Merlin of Thionville, "that all the factions should renounce the use of the steps of Robespierre's throne. Nothing ought to be done by halves, and it must be confessed that, in the affair of the 9th of Thermidor, the Convention has done many things by halves. If it has left tyrants here, they ought at least to hold their tongues." General applause succeeded these words of Merlin's, addressed particularly to Vadier, one of those who had spoken against the movements of the sections. Legendre spoke after Merlin. "The committee," said he, "is well aware that it has been tricked into the release of some aristocrats; but their number is not great, and they will soon be imprisoned again. Why should we accuse one another, why look upon each other as enemies, when our intentions are the same? Let us calm our passions, if we would ensure and accelerate the success of the Revolution. Citizens, I demand of you the repeal of the law of the 23rd, which orders the printing of the lists of the citizens who have been set at liberty. That law has dispelled the public joy and frozen all hearts." Tallien followed Legendre, and was listened to with the greatest attention, as the principal of the

Thermidorians. "For some days past," said he, "all good citizens have seen with pain that attempts are making to divide you, and to revive those animosities which ought to be buried in the grave of Robespierre. On entering this place a note was put into my hands, which intimates that several members were to be attacked in this sitting. No doubt it is by the enemies of the republic that such rumours are circulated: let us beware of seconding them by our divisions." Plaudits interrupted Tallien; he resumed: "Ye who would play the part of Robespierre," he exclaimed, "hope not for success: the Convention is determined to perish, rather than endure a new tyranny. The Convention wills an inflexible but a just government. It is possible that some patriots have been mistaken respecting certain prisoners; we are no believers in the infallibility of men. But let the persons improperly released be denounced, and they shall be again incarcerated. For my own part, I can sincerely declare that I had rather see twenty aristocrats released to-day, who may again be apprehended to-morrow, than a single patriot left in confinement. What! can the republic, with its twelve hundred thousand armed citizens, be afraid of a few aristocrats! No; it is too great; it will find means to discover and to chastise its enemies!"

Tallien, although frequently interrupted by applause in the course of his speech, was still more tumultuously cheered on concluding it. After these general explanations, the Assembly returned to the consideration of the law of the 23rd, and to the new clause which Granet wished to add to it. The partisans of the law maintained that the people ought not to be afraid of showing themselves while performing a patriotic act, such as that of claiming the release of a citizen unjustly detained. Its adversaries replied that nothing could be more dangerous than the lists; that those of the twenty thousand and of the eight thousand had been the cause of continual disturbance; that those whose names were inscribed in them had lived in dread; and that, were there no longer any tyranny to fear, the persons included in the new lists would have no more rest. At length a compromise took place. Bourdon proposed to print the names of the prisoners released, without adding the names of those who answered for them and solicited their liberation. This suggestion was favourably received, and it was decided that the names of the released persons only should be printed. Tallien, who was not pleased with this middle course, immediately ascended the tribune. "Since you have decreed," said he, "to print the list of the citizens restored to liberty, you cannot refuse to publish that of the citizens at whose instigation they were imprisoned. It is but just that the public should know those who denounced and caused good patriots to be incarcerated." The Assembly, taken by surprise, at first deemed Tallien's proposition just, and forthwith decreed it. Scarcely had it come to

this decision, before several members of the Assembly changed their opinion. "Here is a list," said one, "which will be opposed to the preceding: *it is civil war.*" This expression was soon repeated throughout the hall, and several voices exclaimed: *It is civil war!*—"Yes," rejoined Tallien, who had again mounted the tribune, "yes, *it is civil war.* I am of your opinion. Your two decrees will array against one another two classes of men who never can forgive each other. But, in proposing the second decree, I wished to make you sensible of the inconveniences of the first. Now I propose to you to repeal both." There was a cry from all quarters of "Yes, yes, the repeal of the two decrees!" Amar himself joined in it, and the two decrees were repealed. The printing of any list was therefore set aside, thanks to the clever and bold surprise which Tallien had practised upon the Assembly.

This sitting restored a feeling of security to a great number of persons who began to lose it, but it proved that all excitement was not extinguished—that all struggles were not yet terminated. The parties had all been struck in their turn: the royalists on several occasions, the Girondins on the 31st of May, the Dantonists in Germinal; the ultra-Mountaineers on the 9th of Thermidor. But, if the most illustrious leaders had perished, their parties survived, for parties are not cut off at a single blow, and their remains bestir themselves long afterwards. These parties were again about to dispute by turns the direction of the Revolution, and to recommence an arduous and bloodstained career. It was, in fact, expedient that minds which had arrived through the excitement of the danger at the highest degree of exasperation, should return progressively to the point from which they had started. During this return, power was destined to pass from hand to hand, and the same conflicts of passions, systems, and authority, were to take place.

After having thus bestowed its first attention on the ameliorating of many severities, the Convention had to return to the organization of the committees and of the provisional government, which was, as we know, to rule France till the general peace. A first discussion had arisen, as we have just seen, concerning the committee of public welfare, and the question had been referred to a commission charged to present a new plan. It was of urgent necessity to attend to this matter; and the Assembly did so very early in Fructidor. It was placed between two opposite systems and rocks: the fear of weakening the authority charged with the salvation of the Revolution, and the fear of reconstituting tyranny. It is usual among men to be afraid of dangers when they are past, and to take precautions against what cannot occur again. The tyranny of the late committee of public welfare had originated in the necessity for duly performing an extraordinary task, amidst obstacles of all kinds. A few men had stepped forward to do what an assembly could not—durst not—do itself;

and, amidst the prodigious toils to which they had submitted for fifteen months, they had not been able either to explain the motives of their operations, or to render an account of them to the Assembly, unless in a very general manner. They had not even time to deliberate together, but each performed, as absolute master, the duty that had devolved upon him. They had thus become so many compulsory dictators, whom circumstances, rather than ambition, had rendered all-powerful. Now that the task was almost finished, that the extreme dangers which they had had to encounter were past, such a power was no longer to be dreaded, because there was no further occasion for its existence. It was puerile to take such precautions against a danger which had become impossible; nay this prudence was even attended with a serious inconvenience, that of enervating authority and of robbing it of all its energy. Twelve hundred thousand men had been raised, fed, armed, and sent to the frontiers; but it was necessary to provide for their maintenance, for their direction, and this was again a task that required great application, extraordinary capacity, and very extensive powers.

The principle of renewal at the rate of one-fourth every month had been already decreed; and it had been moreover decided that the members going out could not obtain readmission before the expiration of a month. These two conditions, while they prevented a new dictatorship, prevented also any good administration. It was impossible that there could be any sequence, any constant application, any secrecy, in a ministry thus continually renewed. No sooner had a member gained an insight into business than he was forced to leave it; and if a decided capacity was manifested, like that of Carnot for war,* of Prieur of the Côte-d'Or and Robert Lindet for administration, and of Cambon for the finances, it could not be secured for the state, and its services would be lost at the appointed term. An absence, even compulsory, of a month, rendered the advantages of the ulterior re-election absolutely null.

But a reaction was not to be avoided. An extreme concentration of power was to be succeeded by a dissemination equally extreme and dangerous, but in a different way. The old committee, invested with the supreme power in regard to every thing

* "For Carnot I feel great respect. In some points he is the greatest man of this century. When he invents a new system of tactics to oppose the old armies of Europe, hastens to the army, teaches how to be victorious with them, and returns to Paris, he appears great indeed. However, I differ from his political views, there is a republican greatness about him which commands respect. Had I nothing in the wide world but a piece of bread left, I should be proud of sharing it with Carnot. Carnot invented new tactics; he had an innate capacity for war, and showed how to fight and conquer. While he was engaged in making giant plans for the five armies, he wrote a mathematical work of the highest character, and composed at the same time some very agreeable little poems. He was a mighty genius indeed!"—*Niebuhr*. E.

that concerned the welfare of the state, had a right to summon the other committees and to require an account of their operations; it had thus taken into its own hands all that was essential in the duties of each of them. To prevent in future such inconveniences, the new organization separated the functions of the committees, and rendered them independent of one another. There were established sixteen:

1. The Committee of public welfare;
2. The Committee of general safety;
3. The Committee of finances;
4. The Committee of legislation;
5. The Committee of public instruction;
6. The Committee of agriculture and the arts;
7. The Committee of commerce and provisions;
8. The Committee of public works;
9. The Committee of conveyance by post;
10. The Military Committee;
11. The Committee of the navy and the colonies;
12. The Committee of public succour;
13. The Committee of division;
14. The Committee of minutes and archives;
15. The Committee of petitions, correspondence, and despatches;
16. The Committee of the inspectors of the National Palace.

The Committee of public welfare was composed of twelve members; it had still the direction of the military and diplomatic operations; it was charged with the levy and equipment of armies, the selection of generals, the plans of campaign, &c., but it was limited to these duties. The committee of general safety, composed of sixteen members, had the direction of the police; that of the finances, composed of forty-eight members, had the superintendence of the revenue, the exchequer, the mint, the assignats, &c. The committees were authorized to meet frequently, for the consideration of such matters as concerned them generally. Thus the absolute authority of the former committee of public welfare was divided among a number of rival authorities, liable to embarrass and to jostle one another in their progress.

Such was the new organization of the government. There were other reforms which were deemed not less urgent. The revolutionary committees established in the smallest villages, and empowered to exercise inquisition there, were the most vexatious and the most abhorred of the creations attributed to Robespierre's party. To render their action less extensive and less annoying, their number was reduced to one for each district. There was, however, to be one in every commune of eight thousand souls, whether the chief town of a district or not. In Paris, the number was reduced from forty-eight to twelve. These committees were to be composed of twelve members; it was required that three of these members, at least, should sign a summons to appear, and that seven should sign a warrant of arrest. Like

the committees of government, they were to be renewed by one-fourth every month. To all these arrangements the Convention added others not less important, by deciding that the sections should in future meet but once in each decade, on the Decadi days, and that the citizens present should cease to be paid forty sous for each meeting. To render the popular assemblies less frequent, and above all to cease paying the lower classes for attending them, was confining the demagogue spirit within narrower limits. It was also cutting off an abuse which had been carried to excess in Paris. In each section, twelve hundred members were paid as present, though scarcely three hundred actually attended. The present answered for the absent, and they alternately rendered each other this service. Thus this operative soldiery, so devoted to Robespierre, was dismissed, and sent back to its proper occupations.

The most important measure adopted by the Convention was the purification of all the local authorities, revolutionary committees, municipalities, &c. It was into these bodies that, as we have observed, the most hot-headed revolutionists had insinuated themselves. They had become in each locality what Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon were in Paris, and they had exercised their powers with all the brutality of inferior authorities. The decree of the revolutionary government, in suspending the constitution till the peace, had prohibited elections of all kinds, in order to obviate disturbances and to concentrate authority in the same hands. The Convention, from absolutely similar motives, namely, to prevent conflicts between the Jacobins and the aristocrats, maintained the provisions of the decree, and committed to the representatives on mission the task of purifying the institutions throughout all France. This was the right way to secure to itself the choice and the direction of the local authorities, and to prevent collisions of the two factions. Lastly, the revolutionary tribunal, recently suspended, was again put in activity. The judges and juries were not yet all appointed: those which had already met were to enter upon their functions immediately, and to try agreeably to the laws existing before that of the 22nd of Prairial. These laws were still very rigorous; but the persons selected to administer them, and the docility with which extraordinary courts follow the direction of the government which institutes them, were a guarantee against fresh cruelties.

All these reforms were carried into effect between the 1st and the 15th of Fructidor. One more important institution still remained to be re-established, namely, the liberty of the press.*

* "The restrictions of the press were now removed, and men of talent and literature, silenced during the reign of Robespierre, were once more admitted to exercise their natural influence in favour of civil order and religion. Marmontel, Laharpe and others, who in their youth had been enrolled in the list of Voltaire's disciples, and among the infidels of the Encyclopédie, now

No law marked its boundaries; it was even sanctioned in an unlimited manner in the declaration of rights; but it had nevertheless been proscribed, in fact, under the system of terror. When a single imprudent word was sufficient to compromise the lives of citizens, how could they have dared to write? The fate of the unfortunate Camille-Desmoulins had clearly proved the state of the press at that period. Durand-Maillane, an ex-constituent, and one of those timid spirits who had become mere ciphers during the storms of the Convention, desired that the liberty of the press should be formally guaranteed anew. "We have never been able," said that excellent man to his colleagues, "to express our sentiments in this place, without rendering ourselves liable to insults and threats. If you wish for our opinion in the discussions that shall in future arise, if you wish us to contribute by our intelligence to the general work, you must give new securities to those who may feel disposed either to speak or to write."

Some days afterwards, Fréron, who had been the friend and colleague of Barras in his mission to Toulon, the associate of Danton and Camille-Desmoulins, and since their death the most vehement enemy of the committee of public welfare, joining his voice to that of Durand-Maillane, demanded the unshackled liberty of the press. Those who had lived in constraint during the late dictatorship, and who now wished to give their opinions on all subjects with freedom, those who felt disposed resolutely to promote a reaction against the Revolution, demanded a formal declaration guaranteeing the liberty of speech and writing. The Mountaineers, who anticipated the use that was intended to be made of this liberty, who saw a torrent of accusations preparing against all who had exercised any functions during the reign of terror, nay even many who, without entertainining any personal fear, appreciated the dangerous instrument that would thus be put into the hands of the counter-revolutionists, who were already swarming every where, opposed an express declaration. They assigned as a reason that the declaration of rights established the liberty of the press, that to sanction it anew was superfluous, since it was only proclaiming an already acknowledged right, and that, if any one proposed to render it unlimited, he committed an imprudence. "You would then," said Bourdon of the Oise, and Cambon, "permit royalism to lift its head and to print whatever it pleases against the institution of the republic." All these propositions were referred to the competent committees, to examine if it were expedient to make a new declaration.

Thus the provisional government destined to direct the Revo-

made amends for their youthful errors, by exerting themselves in the cause of good morals and of a regulated government."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

lution till the peace, was entirely modified, agreeably to the new dispositions of clemency and generosity which manifested themselves since the 9th of Thermidor. Committees of government, the revolutionary tribunal, local administrations, were reorganized and purified; the liberty of the press was declared, and every arrangement was made for a new career.

The effects which these reforms could not fail to produce were soon felt. Hitherto, the party of the violent revolutionists had occupied a place in the government itself; it composed the committees and ruled the Convention; it predominated at the Jacobins; it filled the municipal institutions and the revolutionary committees with which all France was covered: now, being displaced, it found itself out of the government, and was about to form a hostile party against it.

The assembling of the Jacobins had been suspended on the night between the 9th and 10th of Thermidor. Legendre had locked up their hall, and laid the keys of it on the bureau of the Convention. The keys were returned, and the society was permitted to reassemble, on condition of purifying itself. Fifteen of the oldest members were chosen to investigate the conduct of all the others during the night between the 9th and 10th. They were to admit such only as on that memorable night had been at their posts as citizens, instead of repairing to the commune to conspire against the Convention. During this scrutiny, the old members were admitted into the hall as provisional members. The investigation commenced. An inquiry concerning each of them would have been difficult. It was deemed sufficient to question them, and they were judged by their answers. It is easy to conceive how indulgent such an examination must have been, since it was the Jacobins sitting in judgment on themselves. In a few days, more than six hundred members were reinstalled, on the mere declaration that during the memorable night they had been at the post assigned to them by their duties. The society was soon recomposed as it had been before, and comprehended all those who had been devoted to Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon, and who regretted them as martyrs of liberty and victims of counter-revolution. Besides the parent society, there still existed that notorious electoral club, to which those retired who had proposals to make that could not be entertained at the Jacobins, and where all the great events of the revolution were planned. It still met at the Evêché, and was composed of old Cordeliers, the most determined Jacobins, and men most compromised during the system of terror. The Jacobins and this club might naturally be expected to become the asylum of those placemen whom the new purification was about to drive from their posts. What was thus foreseen actually happened. The judges and juries of the revolutionary tribunal, the members of the forty-eight revolutionary committees of Paris, amounting to about four

hundred, the agents of the secret police of St. Just and Robespierre, the messengers of the committees who formed the band of the notorious Heron, the clerks of the different administrations, in short all who had held employments of any kind, and been removed from them, joined the Jacobins and the electoral club, as being already members of them, or obtaining admission for the first time. There they vented their complaints and their resentment. They were alarmed for their safety, and dreaded the vengeance of those whom they had persecuted. They regretted, moreover, the lucrative offices which they had lost, especially such of them as, being members of the revolutionary committees, had opportunities of adding peculations of all kinds to their salaries. These could not fail to compose a violent and an obstinate party, to the natural impetuosity of whose opinions was now added the irritation of injured interest. The same thing that happened in Paris was occurring throughout all France. The members of the municipalities, of the revolutionary committees, of the directories of districts, met in the affiliated societies attached to the parent society, and deposited in their bosom their apprehensions and their animosities. They had on their side the populace, also divested of its functions, since it was no longer paid forty sous for attending the sectional assemblies.

Out of hatred to this party, and for the purpose of opposing it, another was formed, or properly speaking, revived. It comprised all those who had suffered or kept silence during the rule of terror, and who thought that the moment had arrived for rousing themselves and for directing in their turn the march of the Revolution. We have seen that, in consequence of the liberation of suspected persons, the relatives of the detained persons or of the victims again made their appearance in the sections, and bestirred themselves, either to cause the prisons to be thrown open, or to denounce and punish the revolutionary committees. The new march of the Convention, those reforms already begun, increased the hopes and the courage of these first opponents. They belonged to all those classes that had suffered, whatever might be their rank, but particularly to commerce, to the *bourgeoisie*, to that industrious, opulent, and moderate third estate, which, monarchical and constitutional with the Constituents, and republican with the Girondins, had been swept away since the 31st of May, and exposed to persecutions of all sorts. In its ranks were concealed the now very rare relics of the nobility which durst not yet complain of its abasement, but which complained of the rights of humanity violated as respected its order, and some partisans of royalty, creatures or agents of the old court, who had not ceased to raise obstacles to the Revolution, by engaging in all the nascent oppositions, whatever might be their system and character. It was, as usual, the young men of these different classes who spoke out with the greatest warmth and energy, for

youth is always the first to rise against an oppressive rule.* A multitude of them filled the sections, the Palais Royal, the public places, and expressed their opinion against the Terrorists, as they were called, in the most emphatic manner. They alleged the noblest motives. Some of them had seen their families persecuted, others were afraid lest they should some day see their own persecuted, if the Reign of Terror were re-established, and they swore to oppose it with all their might. But the secret of the opposition of many of them was the military requisition. Some had escaped it by concealing themselves; others had left the armies on hearing of the 9th of Thermidor. These were reinforced by the writers, who were persecuted of late, and were always as prompt as the young to join in any opposition; they already filled the newspapers and pamphlets with violent diatribes against the system of terror.

The two parties spoke out in the warmest and most hostile manner, on the subject of the modifications introduced by the Convention into the revolutionary system. The Jacobins and the clubbists raised an outcry against the aristocracy. They complained of the committee of general safety which released the counter-revolutionists,† and of the Press of which a cruel use was already made against those who had saved France. The measure which offended them most was the general purification of all the authorities. They could not precisely find fault with the

* "Those who composed this new and irregular militia belonged chiefly to the middle and wealthy classes of society, and adopted a singular costume. Instead of the short jacket of the Jacobins, they wore a square and open-breasted coat; their shoes were very low in the instep, and their hair hanging down on each side, was bound up behind in tresses; they were armed with shorf sticks leaded like bludgeons. A portion of these young people and of the sectionists, were royalists; the rest followed the impulse of the moment which was anti-revolutionary. The latter acted without design and without ambition, and declared for the strongest party, especially when that party, by its triumph, promised the return of order, the desire for which was very general. The former contended under the Thermidorians against the old committees, as the Thermidorians had contended in the old committees against Robespierre; it waited for the moment to act on its own account, and an opportunity occurred after the complete fall of the revolutionary party."—*Mignet.* E.

† "The Jacobins raised great complaints against the liberation of the prisoners, whom they styled aristocrats and counter-revolutionists. The dreadful details of the massacres, however, which were transmitted to the Convention from all parts of France, bore down their opposition. Among the rest, one fact related by Merlin excited particular attention. It was an order signed by a wretch named Lefevre, an adjutant-general, addressed to, and executed by a Captain Macé, to drown at Paimbœuf forty-one persons, of whom one was an old blind man; twelve women of different ages; twelve girls under twenty years; fifteen children, and five still at the breast. The order was expressed in these terms, and rigidly executed: 'It is ordered to Peter Macé, captain of the brig Destiny, to put ashore the woman Bidet; and the remainder of the preceding list shall be taken off Pierre Noire, and thrown into the sea as rebels to the law.'"—*History of the Convention.* E.

renewal of the persons composing those authorities, for that would have been avowing motives too personal, but they inveighed against the mode of re-election. They asserted that the people ought to be reinstated in the right of electing its magistrates, that to authorize the deputies on mission to nominate the members of the municipalities, of the districts, of the revolutionary committees, was a usurpation; that to reduce the sections to one sitting per decade was a violation of the right of the citizens to assemble for the purpose of deliberating on public affairs. These complaints were in contradiction to the principle of the revolutionary government, which forbade any elections till the peace; but parties care not about contradictions when their interest is at stake; the revolutionists knew that a popular election would have brought them back to their posts.

The tradesmen in the sections, the young men at the Palais Royal and in the public places, and the writers in the newspapers, loudly demanded the unlimited freedom of the press, complained of still observing in the existing committees and in the administration too many agents of the late dictatorship; they ventured already to present petitions against the representatives who had fulfilled certain missions; they depreciated all the services which had been rendered, and began to abuse the Convention itself. Tallien, who, in his quality of principal Thermidorian, considered himself as peculiarly responsible for the new direction given to affairs, wished their march to be vigorous and steady, without swerving to one side or to the other. In a speech full of subtle distinctions between the rule of terror and the revolutionary government, the drift of which was to assert that without employing systematic cruelty it was nevertheless necessary to retain sufficient energy — Tallien proposed to declare that the revolutionary government was maintained, that consequently the primary assemblies ought not to be convoked for the purpose of new elections; he also proposed to declare that all the means of terror were proscribed, and that proceedings directed against such writers as had freely expressed their opinions should be considered as means of terror.

These propositions, which involved no precise measure, and which were merely a profession of faith of the Thermidorians, made with a view to place themselves between the two parties without favouring either, were referred to the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, to which every thing that bore upon those questions was referred.

These means, however, were not sufficient to calm the irritation of the parties. They continued to inveigh against one another with the same violence; and what especially contributed to increase the general uneasiness, and to multiply the subjects of complaint and accusation, was the financial situation of France, which was more deplorable perhaps than it had ever yet been at the most calamitous epochs of the Revolution.

In spite of the victories of the republic, the assignats had experienced a rapid fall, and were not worth in commerce more than a sixth or an eighth of their nominal value; which produced a frightful confusion in all kinds of business, and rendered the *maximum* more impracticable and more vexatious than ever. It was evidently no longer the want of confidence that depreciated the assignats, for no apprehensions could now be felt for the existence of the republic; but it was their excessive issue, which kept regularly increasing in proportion to their fall. The taxes, collected with difficulty and paid in paper, furnished scarcely a fourth or a fifth of what the republic required monthly for the extraordinary expenses of the war, and the government was obliged to supply the deficiency by fresh issues. Thus, since the preceding year, the quantity of assignats in circulation, the reduction of which by various combinations to the extent of two thousand millions had been hoped, had risen to four thousand six hundred millions.

With this excessive accumulation of paper-money, and its consequent depreciation, were combined all the calamities resulting either from the war, or from the unprecedented measures which had become necessary in consequence. The reader will recollect that, in order to establish a forced relation between the nominal value of the assignats and merchandise, the law of the *maximum* had been devised; that this law fixed the prices of all commodities, and did not allow the dealers to raise them in proportion to the depreciation of the paper; he will recollect that to these measures had been joined *requisitions*, which empowered the representatives or the agents of the administration to demand all the commodities necessary for the armies and for the great communes, and to pay for them in assignats at the rate fixed by the *maximum*. These measures had saved France, but had introduced extraordinary confusion into business and the circulation.

We have already seen what were the principal inconveniences resulting from the *maximum*—two markets, the one public, in which the dealers exposed only their worst goods and in the least possible quantity; the other clandestine, in which they sold all their best commodities for money and at a free price; a general hoarding of goods, which the farmers contrived to withdraw notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the agents authorized to make requisitions; lastly, derangement and stagnation in manufactures, because the makers were not indemnified by the price fixed upon their productions for the mere cost of fabrication. All these inconveniences of a double commerce, of the hoarding of articles of subsistence, of the stagnation of manufactures, had kept constantly increasing. In every trade two sorts of traffic were established; the one public and insufficient, the other secret and usurious. There were two qualities of bread, two qualities of meat, two qualities of every thing; one for the rich, who could pay in money or afford a higher price than the *maxi-*

mum; the other for the poor, the artisan, and the annuitant, who could only give the nominal value of the assignat. The farmers had become daily more and more ingenious in saving their commodities. They made false declarations; they did not thrash their corn, alleging the want of hands, a want that was really felt, for the war had absorbed more than fifteen hundred thousand men;* they insisted on the shortness of the harvest, which had not turned out so favourable as it had been expected to prove in the early part of the year, when, at the festival of the Supreme Being thanks had been offered up to Heaven, for the victories of the republic and the abundance of the crops. As for the manufacturers, they had entirely suspended their operations. We have seen that, in the preceding year, the law, to avoid being unjust to the shopkeepers, had been obliged to go back to the makers, and to fix the prices of goods on the spot where they were manufactured, adding to these prices the cost of carriage. But this law had in its turn become unjust. The raw material and workmanship having risen like every thing else, the manufacturers could no longer find means to defray their expenses, and had suspended their business. The merchants had done the same. The freight of India goods, for example, had risen from 150 to 400 francs per ton; insurances from 5 and 6 per cent. to 50 and 60; of course, they could no longer sell commodities brought into the ports at the price fixed by the *maximum*, and they declined importing altogether. As we have had occasion to remark elsewhere, if one price was forced, all ought to have been forced, and that was impossible.

Time had disclosed other inconveniences peculiar to the *maximum*. The price of corn had been fixed in a uniform manner throughout all France. But, the production of corn, being unequally costly and abundant in the different provinces, the rate bore no proportion to the localities. The power left to the municipalities to fix the prices of all merchandise produced another kind of disorder. When commodities were scarce in one commune, the authorities raised their prices; goods were then brought thither to the prejudice of the neighbouring communes, so that there was sometimes a glut in one place and dearth in another, at the pleasure of the regulator of the tariff; and the movements of commerce, instead of being regular and natural were capricious, unequal, and convulsive.

The results of the requisitions were still more mischievous. Requisitions were resorted to for the purpose of subsisting the armies, of furnishing the great manufactories of arms and the arse-

* "The republic maintained fourteen different armies. The troops paid were estimated at upwards of fifteen hundred thousand men; but there was no regularity either in the military or in any of the financial departments. The National Convention, in the midst of the revolutionary whirlwind, had no system of finance, and could not possibly have any."—*Ramel's History of the Finances.* E.

nals with what they needed, of provisioning the great communes, and sometimes of supplying manufacturers with such materials as they were in want of. It was the representatives, the commissioners to the armies, the agents of the commission of commerce and provisions, who were empowered to make requisitions. In the pressing moment of danger, requisitions were made with precipitation and confusion. It was frequently the case that persons received more than one requisition for the same objects, and knew not which to comply with. The requisitions were almost always unlimited. Sometimes the whole of a commodity in a commune or a department was laid under requisition. In this case, the farmers or the dealers could not sell to any but the agents of the republic. Commerce was interrupted, the article required lay for a long time without being taken away or paid for, and the circulation was stopped. In the confusion resulting from the emergency, the agents took no account of distances, and laid requisitions upon departments the most remote from the commune or the army which they meant to supply. In this manner, transports had been multiplied. Many rivers and canals were deprived of water by an extraordinary drought. Wheel carriages were the only means of conveyance left, and agriculture was robbed of its horses to draw them. This extraordinary employment, together with a forced levy of forty-five thousand horses for the army, had made them very scarce, and almost exhausted the means of transport. In consequence of these ill calculated and frequently useless movements, enormous quantities of articles of subsistence or other commodities were accumulated in the public magazines, heaped together without care, and exposed to all sorts of peculation. The cattle obtained for the republic were badly fed; they arrived in a lean state at the slaughter-houses, and hence arose a scarcity of fatty substances, suet, tallow, &c. To useless transports were therefore added waste, and frequently the most culpable abuses. Unfaithful agents secretly sold at the highest rate commodities which they had obtained at the *maximum* by means of requisitions. When it was not unfaithful agents who committed this fraud, it was dealers or manufacturers, who had solicited an order of requisition for the purpose of supplying themselves, and who secretly sold at the current price what they had obtained at the *maximum*.

These causes, added to the continental and maritime war, had reduced commerce to a deplorable state. There was no longer any communication with the colonies, which were rendered nearly inaccessible by the English cruisers, and almost all of them ravaged by war. The principal, St. Domingo, was devastated with fire and blood by the different parties who disputed the possession of it. Besides this almost utter impossibility of external communications, another measure had contributed to interdict them entirely. This was the sequestration directed against the property

of foreigners with whom France was at war. It will be recollected that the Convention, in ordering this sequestration, had meant to stop the jobbing in foreign paper, and to prevent capital from abandoning the assignats, and being converted into bills of exchange on Frankfort, Amsterdam, London, and other places. In seizing the paper drawn by the Spaniards, the Germans, the Dutch, and the English, upon France, the government of the latter had provoked a similar measure, and all circulation of bills between France and Europe had ceased. It had no intercourse but with the neutral countries, the Levant, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States; but these communications with neutral countries the commission of commerce and supplies had exclusively appropriated to itself, for the purpose of procuring corn, iron, and various articles necessary for the navy. To this end, it had put all the paper under requisition; it gave the French bankers the amount in assignats, and made use of it in Switzerland, in Sweden, in Denmark, and in America, to pay for the corn and the other commodities which it purchased.

The whole commerce of France was therefore reduced to the supplies which the government obtained in foreign countries by means of paper forcibly required from the French bankers. Scarcely any merchandise brought by free trade reached the French ports; and, when it did, it was immediately laid under requisition, which, as we have just shown, utterly discouraged the merchants, who had paid at an enormous rate for freight and insurance, and were obliged to sell at the *maximum*. The only goods that were at all plentiful in the ports were those taken in prizes from the enemy. But some were withdrawn from circulation by requisitions, others by the prohibitions issued against the productions of hostile nations. Nantes and Bordeaux already ravaged by civil war, were reduced by this state of commerce to absolute inactivity and to extreme distress. Marseilles, which formerly subsisted by its intercourse with the Levant, saw its port blockaded by the English, its principal merchants dispersed by the system of terror, its soap-manufacture destroyed or transferred to Italy; so that all its trade now consisted in a few disadvantageous exchanges with the Genoese. The cities in the interior were in a no less deplorable state. The manufacture of Nîmes had ceased to produce its silks, which it formerly exported to the amount of twenty millions. The opulent city of Lyons, demolished by bombs and mines, now lay in ruins, and no longer furnished those rich stuffs with which it formerly supplied commerce to the amount of more than sixty millions. A decree, which stopped goods destined for the rebel communes, had detained around Lyons a quantity of merchandise, which was either to remain in that city, or only to pass through it on its way to the numerous points to which the southern road leads. The towns of Châlons, Maçon, and Valence had availed them-

selves of this decree to stop the goods travelling along that much frequented road. The manufacture of Sedan had been obliged to give up the fabrication of fine cloths, and to employ itself in making cloth for the troops; and its principal manufacturers were moreover prosecuted as accomplices of the movement planned by Lafayette after the 10th of August. The departments of the North, Pas-de-Calais, the Somme, and the Aisne, so rich by the cultivation of flax and hemp, had been entirely ravaged by the war. Towards the west, in the unfortunate La Vendée, more than six hundred square leagues had been wholly laid waste with fire and sword.* The lands were partly forsaken, and numbers of cattle roved about at random, without pasture, and without shelter. Lastly, wherever particular disasters had not aggravated the general calamities, the war had exceedingly thinned the number of hands, while a considerable quantity of industrious citizens had been withdrawn from or disgusted with labour, some by terror, and others by political pursuits. To their workshops and their fields they greatly preferred the clubs, the municipal councils, the sections, where they received forty sous for making a stir and a commotion.

Thus disorder in all the markets; scarcity of articles of subsistence; interruption in manufactures, owing to the *maximum*, injudicious removals, useless accumulations, and waste of commodities; exhaustion of the means of conveyance, owing to the requisitions; interruption of communication with all the neighbouring nations, in consequence of the war, the maritime blockade, and the sequestration; devastation of manufacturing towns and of several agricultural districts by civil war; want of hands, occasioned by the requisition; idleness owing to the liking contracted for political life—such is the picture presented by France, saved from the sword of foreigners, but exhausted for a moment by the unprecedented efforts that had been required of her.†

* "It is my plan to carry off from that accursed country, La Vendée, all manner of subsistence or provisions for man or beast: all forage,—in a word, every thing—give all the buildings to the flames, and exterminate the inhabitants. Oppose their being relieved by a single grain of corn for their subsistence. I give you the most positive—the most imperious orders. You are answerable for the execution from this moment. In a word, leave nothing in that proscribed country—let the means of subsistence, provisions, forage, every thing—positively every thing, be removed to Nantes."—*Extract from Carrier's Letter to General Haxo.* E.

† "It is impossible not to be struck with the novel and imposing spectacle which France exhibited during the sway of the Convention—of a country ruled by ephemeral governments, each struggling to maintain itself by every art which fraud could suggest to violence; convulsed to the centre by profligate factions; deluged with native blood; with every atom of society out of its proper place; in a state of absolute bankruptcy; with no regular system of finance; with a paper currency incalculable in amount, and at the last ebb of depreciation; yet still maintaining, with unexampled success, a war which

Let the reader figure to himself two parties arrayed against each other after the 9th of Thermidor: one clinging to revolutionary means, as indispensable, and endeavouring to prolong what could be but temporary; the other irritated at the inevitable evils of an extraordinary organization, forgetting the services rendered by that organization, and striving to abolish it as atrocious;—let him figure to himself two parties of this nature arrayed against each other, and he will readily conceive how many subjects of reciprocal accusation they would find in the state of France. The Jacobins complained that all the laws were relaxed; that the *maximum* was continually violated by the farmers, the shopkeepers, and the rich merchants; that the laws against stockjobbing were not enforced; and that the depreciation of the assignats had resumed its course; they therefore renewed the outcry of the Hebertists against the rich, the forestallers, and the stockjobbers. Their adversaries, on the contrary, venturing for the first time to attack the revolutionary measures, inveighed against the excessive issue of the assignats, against the injustice of the *maximum*, against the tyranny of the requisitions, against the disasters of Lyons, Sedan, Nantes, Bordeaux, and lastly, against the prohibitions and shackles of all kinds which paralyzed and ruined commerce. These were, together with the liberty of the press and the mode of nomination of the public functionaries, the usual subjects of the petitions of the clubs or of the sections. All remonstrances of this nature were referred to the committees of public welfare, of finances, and of commerce, to report and present their ideas upon them.

Two parties were thus opposed to each other, seeking and finding in what had been done, and in what was yet doing, continual subjects of attack and recrimination. All that had taken place, whether good or evil, was imputed to the members of the old committees, and they were the butt of all the attacks of the authors of the reaction. Though they had contributed to overthrow Robespierre, it was alleged that they had quarrelled with him only from ambition, and for the sake of a share in the tyranny, but that at bottom they held the same opinions, the same principles, and meant to continue the same system for their own advantage. Among the Thermidorians was Lecointre of Versailles, a man of violent and indiscreet spirit, who expressed himself with an imprudence that was disapproved by his colleagues. He had formed the design of denouncing Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, of the old committee of public welfare; and David, Vadier, Amar, and Vouland, of the committee of general safety, as accomplices and *continuators*

cost more blood and treasure than any ever known in modern times, and finally triumphing over all her continental neighbours."—*Edinburgh Review.* E.

of Robespierre. He could not, and durst not, prefer the same charge against Carnot, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, and Robert Lindet, whom public opinion separated entirely from their colleagues, and who had the reputation of being exclusively occupied in labours to which France owed her salvation. Neither durst he attack all the members of the committee of general safety, because they were not all accused alike by the public opinion. He communicated his design to Tallien and Legendre, who dissuaded him from it. He nevertheless persisted in executing it, and, in the sitting of the 12th of Fructidor (August 29th), he presented twenty-six articles of accusation against the members of the former committees. The purport of these twenty-six articles was to accuse them of being accomplices in the system of terror with which Robespierre had oppressed the Convention and France; of having contributed to the arbitrary acts of the two committees; of having signed the orders of proscription; of having turned a deaf ear to all the remonstrances of citizens unjustly prosecuted; of having greatly contributed to the death of Danton; of having defended the law of the 22nd of Prairial; of having left the Convention in ignorance that this law was not the work of the committee; of not having denounced Robespierre when he seceded from the committee of public welfare; lastly, of not having done any thing on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of Thermidor, to screen the Convention from the designs of the conspirators.

As soon as Lecointre had finished reading these twenty-six articles, Goujon, deputy of the Ain, a young, sincere, fervent republican, and a disinterested Mountaineer, for he had taken no part in the acts for which the late government was reproached—rose and addressed the Assembly with all the appearances of profound grief. "I am deeply afflicted," said he, "when I see with what cold tranquillity men come hither to sow the seeds of dissension, and to propose the ruin of the country. Sometimes you are solicited to brand, by the appellation of the system of terror, all that has been done for a year past; at others it is proposed to you to accuse men who have rendered great services to the Revolution. They may be guilty for aught I know. I was with the armies, and therefore I am incapable of judging; but if I had possessed documents criminating members of the Convention, I would not have produced them, or I should not have brought them forward here without deep pain. With what coolness, on the contrary, some can plunge the dagger into the bosom of men valuable to the country for their important services! Observe, too, that the Convention itself is involved in the charges preferred against them. Yes, it is the Convention that is accused. It is the French people who are brought to trial, since both submitted to the tyranny of the infamous Robespierre. Jean Debry told you just now that it is the aristocrats who bring forward or suggest all these propo-

sitions."—"And the robbers," added some voices. "I move," resumed Goujon, "that the discussion instantly cease." Many deputies opposed this motion. Billaud-Varennes hastened to the tribune, and urgently insisted that the discussion should be continued. "Most assuredly," said he, "if the facts alleged be proved, we are great culprits, and our heads ought to fall. But we defy Lecointre to prove them.* Since the fall of the tyrant we are exposed to the attacks of all the intriguers, and we declare that life is of no value to us, if they are to get the better." Billaud proceeded, and stated that they had long contemplated the 9th of Thermidor; that, if they deferred it, they were obliged by circumstances to do so; that they were the first to denounce Robespierre, and to tear from him the mask with which he covered himself; that, if the death of Danton was to be imputed to them as a crime, he would charge himself first and foremost with the guilt of it; that Danton was an accomplice of Robespierre's, the rallying-point of all the counter-revolutionists, and, if he had continued to live, liberty would have been undone. For some time past," exclaimed Billaud, "we have seen intriguers bestirring themselves, robbers . . ."—"The word is uttered," cried Bourdon, interrupting him; "it remains to be proved."—"I undertake to prove it for one," said Duhem. "We will prove it for others," added several voices of the Mountain. This was the charge which the Mountaineers were always ready to prefer against the friends of Danton, who had almost all become Thermidorians. Billaud, who, amidst this tumult and these interruptions had not left the tribune, demanded the institution of proceedings, that the guilty might be known. Cambon succeeded him, and said that the Convention ought to avoid the snare laid for it; that the aristocrats wished to force it to dishonour itself by dishonouring some of its members; that if the committees were guilty, it was guilty too; "And the whole nation along with it," added Bourdon of the Oise. Amidst this tumult, Vadier appeared in the tribune with a pistol in his hand, saying that he would not survive the calumny, if he were not allowed to justify himself. Several members surrounded him, and obliged him to descend. Thuriot, the president, declared that he would break up the sitting if the tumult were not appeased. Duhem and Amar wished the discussion to be continued, because it was due to the inculpated members. Thuriot, who had been one of the warmest Thermidorians, but who was a stanch Mountaineer, saw with concern that such questions were agitated. He addressed the Assembly from his chair. "On

* "'If the crimes with which Lecointre reproaches us,' said Billaud-Varennes, 'were as real as they are absurd and chimerical, there is not one of us, doubtless, here present, whose blood ought not to stain the scaffold. What do they want, those men who call us the successors of Robespierre? I will tell you, citizens. They want to sacrifice—I repeat it, to sacrifice liberty on the tomb of the tyrant.'"—*Mignet.* E.

one hand," said he, "the public interest requires that such a discussion should finish immediately; on the other, the interest of the inculpated persons requires that it should continue. Let us conciliate the two by passing to the order of the day on Lecointre's proposition, and declaring that the Assembly has received it with profound indignation." The Assembly eagerly adopted the suggestion of Thuriot, and passed to the order of the day, at the same time marking Lecointre's proposition with censure.

All the men sincerely attached to their country had witnessed this discussion with the deepest concern. How, in fact, was it possible to revert to the past, to distinguish the evil from the good, and to discern to whom belonged the tyranny which they had undergone? How ascertain the part of Robespierre and of the committees who had shared the supreme power, that of the Convention which had endured them, and, lastly, that of the nation, which had endured both the Convention, and the committees, and Robespierre? How, besides, was that tyranny to be estimated? Was it a crime of ambition, or the energetic and inconsiderate action of men bent on saving their cause at any price, and shutting their eyes to the means which they employed? How distinguish, in this confused action, the share of cruelty, of ambition, of mistaken zeal, of sincere and energetic patriotism? To enlighten so many obscurities, to judge so many human hearts, was impossible. It was necessary to forget the past, to receive France as she was, saved from the hands of those who had just been excluded from power, to regulate disorderly movements, to soften too cruel laws, and to consider that in politics it behoves men to repair evils and never to revenge them.

Such were the sentiments of discreet men. The enemies of the Revolution exulted in the procedure of Lecointre, and, when they saw the discussion closed, they reported that the Convention was afraid, and durst not grapple with questions too dangerous to itself. The Jacobins, on the contrary, and the Mountaineers, still full of their fanaticism, being in no wise disposed to disavow the system of terror, did not shrink from the discussion, and were enraged at its being closed. The very next day, the 13th of Fructidor, a great number of the Mountaineers rose, saying that the president had, on the preceding day, taken the Assembly by surprise when instigating it to close the discussion; that he had expressed his sentiments without quitting the chair; that, as president, he had no right to give an opinion; that the closing of the discussion was an injustice; that it was a duty owing to the inculpated members, to the Convention itself, and to the Revolution, to give full scope to a discussion which the patriots had no reason to dread. To no purpose did the Thermidorians, Legendre, Tallien, and others, who were accused of having prompted Lecointre, strive to prevent the discussion.

The Assembly, which was not yet weaned from the habit of fearing and giving way to the Mountain, consented to rescind its decision of the preceding day and to begin afresh. Lecointre was called to the tribune to read his twenty-six articles, and to support them by documents.

Lecointre had not been able to collect documents in support of this singular procedure, for it would have been necessary to procure evidence of what had passed in the committees, to judge how far the accused members had participated in what was called the tyranny of Robespierre. On each article Lecointre could only appeal to public notoriety, to speeches delivered at the Jacobins or in the Assembly, to the originals of some orders of arrest, which proved nothing. At every new charge the furious Mountaineers cried, *The documents! the documents!* and they were unwilling to let him speak without producing written proofs. Lecointre, in most cases unable to produce any, appealed to the recollection of the Assembly, asking if it had not always deemed Billaud, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, to have acted in unison with Robespierre. But this proof, the only possible one, showed the impossibility of such a trial. With such proofs it would have been demonstrated that the Convention was the accomplice of the committee, and France of the Convention. The Mountaineers would not suffer Lecointre to finish. "Thou art a calumniator," said they, and they obliged him to proceed to another charge. Scarcely had he read the next before they again cried, *The documents! the documents!* and, as Lecointre had none to produce, they shouted, *To another!* In this manner he came to the twenty-sixth, without being able to prove what he advanced. He had but one reason to urge, namely, that the trial was a political one, and did not admit of the ordinary form of discussion; to which it might fairly have been replied, that it was impolitic to enter upon such a trial. After a long and stormy sitting, the Convention declared his accusation false and calumnious, and thus justified the old committees.

This scene had given to the Mountain all its former energy, and to the Convention some of its former deference for the Mountain. Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois, however, gave in their resignations as members of the committee of public welfare. Barrère went out by lot. Tallien, on his part, voluntarily resigned; and the four were succeeded by Delmas, Merlin of Douai, Cochon, and Fourcroy. Thus the only old members of the great committee of public welfare left, were Carnot, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, and Robert Lindet. One-fourth of the committee of general safety was also renewed. Elie Lacoste, Vouland, Vadier, and Moïse Bayle, went out. David, Jagot, and Lavicomterie, had been previously excluded by a decision of the Assembly. These seven members were succeeded by

Bourdon of the Oise, Colombelle, Méaulle, Clauzel,* Mathieu, Mon-Mayan, and Lesage-Senault.

An unforeseen and purely accidental event increased the agitation which prevailed. The powder-mills of Grenelle took fire and blew up. This sudden and frightful explosion filled Paris with consternation, and it was believed to be the effect of a new conspiracy. The aristocrats were immediately accused, and the aristocrats accused the Jacobins. New attacks took place in the tribune between the two parties, without leading to any result. This event was followed by another. In the evening of the 23rd of Fructidor (September 9th), Tallien was returning home, when a man, muffled up in a great-coat, rushed upon him, saying, "I was waiting for thee—thou shalt not escape me!" At the same moment, being close to him, he fired a pistol, and wounded him in the shoulder. Next day, there was a fresh uproar in Paris: it was said that people could no longer hope for quiet; that two parties, inveterately hostile to each other, had sworn to annoy the republic for ever. Some attributed the attempt on the life of Tallien to the Jacobins, others to the aristocrats; while others again went so far as to say that Tallien, following the example of Grange-Neuve before the 10th of August, had got himself wounded in the shoulder that he might accuse the Jacobins of it, and have occasion to demand their dissolution. Legendre, Merlin of Thionville, and other friends of Tallien's, rushed with vehemence to the tribune, and maintained that the crime of the preceding night was the work of the Jacobins. "Tallien," said they, "has not deserted the cause of the Revolution, and yet furious men allege that he has gone over to the moderates and to the aristocrats. Of course, it is not these who could have any idea of assassinating him; it can be none but the furious wretches who accuse him, that is to say, the Jacobins. Merlin denounced their last sitting, and repeated this expression of Duhem's: "The toads of the Marais are raising their heads; so much the better—they will be the easier to cut off." Merlin demanded, with his accustomed boldness, the dissolution of that celebrated society, which, he said, had rendered the greatest services, which had powerfully contributed to overturn the throne, but which, having no longer any throne to overturn, now wanted to overturn the Convention itself. Merlin's conclusions were not admitted, but, as usual, the facts were referred to the competent committees for them to

* "Clauzel, the younger, mayor of Velanet, was deputy to the National Convention where he voted for the King's death. In 1794 he became one of the committee of public safety, and laid various crimes to the charge of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère. In the same year he was appointed president, and argued against the suppression of all the revolutionary committees. In 1796 he was elected secretary to the council of Ancients; and afterwards declared warmly in favour of the Directory. He died in the year 1804."—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

report upon. References of this kind had already been made upon all the questions which divided the two parties. Reports had been required on the question of the press, on the assignats, on the *maximum*, on the requisitions, on the obstructions of commerce, and, in short, on every thing that had become a subject of controversy and of division. It was then desired that all these reports should be blended into one, and the committee of public welfare was directed to present a general report on the state of the republic. The drawing up of this report was committed to Robert Lindet, the member best acquainted with the state of things, because he belonged to the old committees, and the most disinterested in those questions, because he had been exclusively engaged in serving his country by undertaking the laborious department of supplies and transport. The fourth sans-culottide of the year II (September 20, 1794) was the day fixed for its being read.

People waited with impatience for his report and the decrees which were to result from it, and kept themselves meanwhile in agitation. The young men coalesced against the Jacobins were accustomed to collect in the garden of the Palais-Royal. There they read the newspapers and pamphlets which appeared in great number against the late revolutionary system, which were sold by the booksellers in the galleries. They frequently formed groups there, and thence they started to disturb the sittings of the Jacobins. On the second sans-culottide, one of these groups had formed; it was composed of those young men who, to distinguish themselves from the Jacobins, dressed well, wore high cravats, and were on that account called *Muscadins*. In one of these groups a person said that, if any thing happened, they ought to rally round the Convention, and that the Jacobins were intriguers and villains. A Jacobin would have replied. A quarrel ensued. One party shouted, *The Convention for ever! Down with the Jacobins! Down with Robespierre's tail! Down with the aristocrats and the Muscadins!* cried the other. *The Convention and the Jacobins for ever!* The tumult soon increased. The Jacobin who attempted to speak, and the small number of those who supported him, were severely handled: the guard hastened to the spot, dispersed the assemblage, which was already very considerable, and prevented a general battle.*

On the day after the next, being that fixed for the presentation of the report of the three committees of public welfare, legislation, and general safety, it was read by Robert Lindet. The

* "These quarrels became every day more animated, and Paris was transformed into a field of battle, on which the fate of parties was abandoned to the decision of arms. This state of disorder and of warfare could not last long; and as those parties had not the discretion to come to an understanding, one of them necessarily obtained a victory over the other. The Thermidorians were making great progress daily, and victory belonged to them."—*Mignet.* E.

picture which he had to draw of France was melancholy. Having traced the successive career of the factions and the progress of Robespierre's power till his fall, he exhibited two parties, the one composed of ardent patriots, apprehensive for the Revolution and for themselves; and the other of disconsolate families, whose relatives had been sacrificed or still languished in prison. "Restless spirits," said Lindet, "imagine that the government is likely to be deficient in energy; they employ all possible means to propagate their opinion and their alarm. They send deputations and addresses to the Convention. These fears are chimerical. In your hands the government will retain all its strength. Can the patriots, can the public functionaries, be afraid lest the services that they have rendered should be forgotten? What courage must they not have possessed, to accept and to perform dangerous duties! But now France recalls them to their labours and their professions, which they have too long forsaken. They know that their functions were temporary; that power retained too long by the same hands becomes a subject of uneasiness; and they ought not to be afraid that France will abandon them to resentment and revenge."

Then, proceeding to consider the situation of the party of those who had suffered, Lindet thus continued: "Set at liberty those whom animosities, passions, the mistakes of public functionaries, and the fury of the late conspirators, have caused to be thrown *en masse* into the places of confinement: set at liberty the labourers, the mercantile men, the relatives of the young heroes who are defending the country. The arts have been persecuted; yet it is by them that you have been taught to forge the thunderbolt; it is by them that the art of the Mongolfiers* has served to discover the march of armies; it is by them that the metals are prepared and purified, that hides are tanned and rendered fit for use in a week. Protect them, succour them. Many useful men are still inmates of prisons."

Robert Lindet then drew a sketch of the agricultural and commercial state of France. He exhibited the calamities resulting from the assignats, from the *maximum*, from the requisitions, from the interruption of the communications with foreign countries.† "Labour," said he, "has lost much of its activity,

* "Jaques Etienne Montgolfier, the inventor of the balloon, was born in 1745, and with his elder brother, who was born in 1740, and died in 1810, devoted himself to the study of mathematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry. They carried on the manufactory of their father together, and were the first who invented vellum-paper. The elder brother was the inventor of the water-ram which raises water to the height of six hundred feet. Jaques died in the year 1799."—*Encyclopædia Americana.* E.

† "Since France had become republican, every species of evil had accumulated on its devoted head. There were famine, a total cessation of commerce, justice interrupted, the communication with foreign countries cut off, property spoliated, confiscation rendered the order of the day, the scaffold permanently erected, and calumnious denunciations held in high repute. Nothing was

in the first place, because fifteen hundred thousand men have been sent to the frontiers, while a multitude of others have devoted themselves to civil war; and in the next, because the minds of men distracted by political passions, have been diverted from their habitual occupations. There are new lands brought into cultivation, but many also neglected. The corn is not thrashed, the wool is not spun, the cultivators of flax and hemp neither steep the one, nor peel the other. Let us endeavour to repair evils so numerous and so various. Let us restore peace to the great maritime and manufacturing cities. Put an end to the demolition of Lyons. With peace, prudence, and oblivion of what is past, the people of Nantes, of Bordeaux, of Marseilles, of Lyons, will resume their occupations. Let us repeal the laws destructive to commerce; let us restore circulation to merchandise; let us permit exportation, that such commodities as we need may be brought to us. Let the cities, the departments, cease to complain of the government which they say has exhausted their resources in articles of subsistence, which has not observed very accurate proportions, but imposed the burden of requisitions in an unequal manner. O that those who thus complain could cast their eyes on the descriptions, the declarations, the addresses, of their fellow-citizens of other districts! They would there see the same complaints, the same declarations, the same energy, inspired by the feeling of the same wants. Let us recall peace of mind and labour to the country: let us bring back the artisans to their workshops, the cultivators to their fields. But, above all, let us strive to bring back union and confidence among us. Let us cease to reproach one another with our calamities and our faults. Have we always been, could we always be, what we wished to be in reality? We have all been launched into the same career: some have fought with courage—with judgment; others have dashed themselves, in their headlong ardour, against all the obstacles which they purposed to destroy and overthrow. Who would think of questioning us, and calling us to account for those movements which it is impossible to foresee and to direct! The Revolution is accomplished. It is the work of all. What generals, what soldiers, have never done more in war than what it was right for them to do, and have known how to stop where cool and calm reason would have desired them to stop? Were we not in a state of war with numerous and most formidable enemies? Have not some reverses inflamed our courage—roused our indignation? What has happened to us is but what happens to all men thrown to an infinite distance from the ordinary track of life."

wanting to the general desolation; debauchery was encouraged, arbitrary arrests were universally established, revolutionary armies spread over the country like a devouring flame, and disunion was brought into the bosom of domestic families. Never had a country descended so low; never had a people fallen into a similar state of chaos!"—*History of the Convention.* E.

This report, so judicious, so impartial, and so complete, was received with applause. All approved of the sentiments which it contained, and it had been well if all had been capable of sharing them. Lindet then proposed a series of decrees, which were not less favourably received than his report, and immediately adopted.

By the first decree, the committee of general safety and the representatives on mission were empowered to examine the petitions of traders, labourers, artists, fathers and mothers of citizens in the armies, who were themselves, or had relatives, in prison. By a second, the municipalities and the committees of sections were required to assign the motives of their refusal, when they withheld certificates of civism. This was a satisfaction given to those who were incessantly complaining of the system of terror, and dreading lest they should see it revive. A third decree directed the drawing up of moral instructions, tending to encourage a love of industry and of the laws, and to enlighten the citizens relative to the principal events of the Revolution, and destined to be read to the people on the decadary festivals. A fourth decree ordered the plan of a normal school for training young professors, with a view to the diffusion of education and knowledge throughout France.

To these decrees were added several others, enjoining the committees of finances and of commerce to investigate without delay:

1. The advantages of the free exportation of articles of luxury, on condition of importing into France a like value in merchandise of all kinds;

2. The advantages or disadvantages of the free exportation of the surplus commodities of the first necessity, upon the condition of a return and of various formalities;

3. The most advantageous means of throwing into circulation the commodities destined for communes in rebellion, and detained under seal;

4. Lastly, the remonstrances of the merchants who, by virtue of the law of sequestration, were obliged to deposit in the district chests the sums which they owed to the foreigners with whom France was at war.

We see that these decrees were intended to give satisfaction to those who complained of having been persecuted, and that they comprehended some of the measures capable of improving the state of commerce. The Jacobin party alone had not a decree to itself, but there was not any decree to pass for its benefit. It had not been either persecuted or imprisoned; it had merely been deprived of power; there was no reparation to grant to it. All that could be done, was to give it confidence in the intentions of the government, and it was for this special object that Lindet's report was framed and written. Accordingly, the effect

of this report and of the decrees which accompanied it was most favourable upon all the parties.

The public mind appeared to be somewhat calmed. On the following day, the last of the year, and the fifth sans-culottide of the year II (September 21, 1794), the festival which had long been ordered for placing Marat in the Pantheon and excluding Mirabeau from it was celebrated. Already it was no longer in unison with the state of public opinion. Marat was no longer so holy, neither was Mirabeau so guilty, as that so many honours should be decreed to the sanguinary apostle of terror, and so much ignominy inflicted on the greatest orator of the Revolution; but, in order not to alarm the Mountain, and to avoid the appearance of too speedy a reaction, the festival was not countermanded. On the appointed day, the remains of Marat were conveyed with pomp to the Pantheon, and those of Mirabeau were ignominiously carried out at a side door.

Thus power, withdrawn from the Jacobins and the Mountaineers, was now held by the partisans of Danton and of Camille-Desmoulins, in short, by the *indulgents*, who had become Thermidorians. These latter, however, while they strove to repair the evils produced by the Revolution, while they released the suspected and endeavoured to restore some liberty and some security to commerce, still paid great respect to the Mountain which they had ousted, and decreed to Marat the place which they took from Mirabeau.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

RENEWAL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS—SURRENDER OF CONDE, VALENCIENNES, LANDRECIES, AND LE QUESNOI—PASSAGE OF THE MEUSE—BATTLE OF THE OURTHE AND OF THE ROER—OCCUPATION OF THE WHOLE LINE OF THE RHINE—SITUATION OF THE ARMIES AT THE ALPS AND AT THE PYRENEES—STATE OF LA VENDEE—PUISAYE IN BRETAGNE—CORRESPONDENCE OF THE ROYALIST PARTY WITH THE FRENCH PRINCES.

The activity of the military operations was somewhat relaxed about the middle of the summer. The two great French armies of the North and of the Sambre and Meuse, which had entered Brussels in Thermidor (July), and then proceeded, the one upon Antwerp, the other towards the Meuse, had enjoyed a long rest, waiting for the reduction of the fortresses of Landrecies, Le Quesnoi, Valenciennes, and Condé, which had been lost during the preceding campaign. On the Rhine, General Michaud was engaged in recomposing his army, in order to repair the check of Kaiserslautern, and awaited a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men drawn from La Vendée. The armies of the Alps and of Italy, having made themselves masters of the great chain, encamped on the heights of the Alps, while waiting for the approval of a plan of invasion proposed, it was said, by the young officer who had decided the taking of Toulon and of the lines of Saorgio.* At the eastern Pyrenees, Dugommier, after his success at the Boulou, had stopped for a considerable time to reduce Collioure, and was now blockading Bellegarde. The army of the western Pyrenees was still organizing itself. This long inactivity, which marked the middle of the campaign, and which must be imputed to the important events in the interior and to bad combinations, might have been a drawback upon our successes, had the enemy known how to profit by the occasion. But such indecision prevailed among the allies that our fault was of no benefit to them, and only served to defer a little the extraordinary tide of our successes.

Nothing was worse calculated than our inactivity in Belgium

* "The councils of the republican leaders on the frontiers of Nice were directed by General Bonaparte, whose extraordinary military abilities had already given him an ascendency far beyond his rank."—*Alison*. E.

in the environs of Antwerp, and on the banks of the Meuse. The surest means of accelerating the reduction of the four lost fortresses would have been to remove further and further from them the large armies which could have relieved them. By taking advantage of the disorder into which the victory of Fleurus and the retreat consequent upon it had thrown the allies, it would have been easy soon to reach the Rhine. Unfortunately, people were yet ignorant of the art of making the most of victory, the most important and the rarest of all arts, because it presupposes that victory is not the fruit of a successful attack, but the result of vast combinations. To hasten the surrender of the four fortresses, the Convention had issued a formidable decree, in the same spirit as all those which followed one another from Prairial to Thermidor. Arguing that the allies occupied four French fortresses, and that every thing is allowable to clear one's own territory of an enemy, it decreed that, if the enemy's garrisons had not surrendered within twenty-four hours after they were summoned, they should be put to the sword. The garrison of Landrecies alone surrendered. The commandant of Condé returned this admirable answer, that *one nation has not a right to decree the dishonour of another.* Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes continued to hold out. The committee, sensible of the injustice of such a decree, resorted to a subtlety for the purpose of evading its execution, and at the same time of sparing the Convention the necessity to rescind it.* It assumed that the decree, not having been notified to the commandants of the three fortresses, was yet unknown to them. Before it was formally signified to them, the committee ordered General Scherer to push the works with sufficient activity to give weight to the summons, and to furnish the hostile garrisons with a legitimate excuse for capitulation. Valenciennes accordingly surrendered† on the 12th of Fructidor (August 29th); Condé and Le Quesnoi a few days afterwards. These fortresses, which had cost the allies so much during the preceding campaign, were thus recovered by us without any great efforts, and the enemy retained not a single point of our territory in the Netherlands. On the other hand we were masters of all Belgium as far as Antwerp and the Meuse.

* "The committee of public safety under Carnot's direction, feeling the iniquity of this decree, took advantage of fictitious delays to allow the garrison to capitulate on the usual terms."—*Alison.* E.

† "The stores, provisions, and magazines of every species found in Valenciennes were immense, to say nothing of the military chest containing more than six millions of German florins in specie. All these amounted to a heavy loss to the Emperor of Austria, at a time when his revenues were insufficient for his expenses, and the treasures he had accumulated were exhausted by this unpropitious war. A circumstance that rendered the surrender of Valenciennes to France still more vexatious was, that at least a thousand French emigrants fell into the hands of their enraged countrymen."—*Annual Register.* E.

Moreau had just taken Sluys and returned into line. Scherer had sent Osten's brigade to Pichegru, and rejoined Jourdan with his division. Owing to this junction, the army of the North, under Pichegru, amounted to more than seventy thousand men present under arms, and that of the Meuse, under Jourdan, to one hundred and sixteen thousand. The administration, exhausted by the efforts which it had made for the sudden equipment of these armies, was able to provide but very imperfectly for their supply. Amends were made for the deficiency by requisitions, by foraging parties conducted with moderation, and by the highest military virtues. The soldiers contrived to dispense with the most necessary articles. They no longer encamped under tents, but bivouacked beneath branches of trees. The officers, without appointments or paid with assignats, lived like the common soldier, ate the same bread, marched on foot like him, and with the knapsack at their back. Republican enthusiasm and victory supported these armies, the most discreet and the bravest that France ever had.

The allies were in singular disorder. The Dutch, ill-supported by the English, were dismayed. They formed a cordon before their fortresses, that they might have time to put them in a state of defence—an operation which ought to have been long before finished. The Duke of York, as presumptuous as he was ignorant, knew not how to employ his English troops, and took no decisive part. He retired towards the Lower Meuse and the Rhine, extending his wings sometimes towards the Dutch, at others towards the Imperialists. By joining the Dutch, he might nevertheless have still had fifty thousand men at his disposal, and have attempted, on one or other of the armies of the North or of the Meuse, one of those bold movements which General Clairfayt, in the following year, and the Archduke Charles, in 1796, executed so seasonably and with such honour, and of which a great captain has since given so many memorable examples. The Austrians, intrenched along the Meuse, from the mouth of the Roer to that of the Ourthe, were disheartened by their reverses, and in want of necessary supplies. The Prince of Coburg, whose reputation was ruined by his campaign, had given up his command to Clairfayt, of all the Austrian generals the most worthy to hold it. It was not yet too late to draw nearer to the Duke of York, and to act *en masse* against one of the two French armies; but the Austrians thought of nothing but guarding the Meuse. The cabinet of London, alarmed at the course of events, had sent envoys after envoys to kindle the zeal of Prussia, to claim from her the execution of the treaty of the Hague, and to induce Austria by promises of succour to defend with vigour the line which her troops yet occupied. A meeting of English, Dutch, and Austrian ministers and generals took place at Maestricht, and it was agreed upon to defend the banks of the Meuse.

At length, in the middle of Fructidor (very early in September), the French armies were again in motion. Pichegru advanced from Antwerp towards the mouth of the rivers. The Dutch committed the fault of separating themselves from the English. To the number of twenty thousand men they ranged themselves along Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and Gertruydenberg, backing upon the sea and useless to the fortresses which they meant to cover. The Duke of York, with his English and Hanoverians, retired upon Bois-le-Duc, connecting himself with the Dutch by a chain of posts, which the French army could take the moment it appeared. At Boxtel, on the bank of the Bommel, Pichegru overtook the rear-guard of the Duke of York, surrounded two battalions, and cut them off. Next day, on the banks of the Aa, he fell in with General Abercromby,* took some prisoners from him also, and continued to push the Duke of York, who hastened to cross the Meuse at Grave, under the guns of the place. In this march, Pichegru had taken fifteen hundred prisoners: he arrived on the banks of the Meuse, on the second sans-culottide (the 18th of September).

Meanwhile Jourdan was advancing on his part, and preparing to cross the Meuse. The Meuse has two principal tributaries, the Ourthe, which falls into it near Liege, and the Roer, which joins it near Ruremonde. These streams form two lines, which divide the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and which must be successively carried in order to reach the latter river. The French, masters of Liege, had crossed the Meuse, and already ranged themselves facing the Ourthe; they bordered the Meuse from Liege to Maestricht and the Ourthe from Liege to Comblain-au-Pont, thus forming an angle of which Liege was the apex. Clairfayt had ranged his left behind the Ourthe, on the heights of Sprimont. These heights are bordered on one side by the Ourthe, on the other by the Aywaille, which falls into the Ourthe. General Latour commanded the Austrians there. Jourdan ordered Scherer to attack the position of Sprimont on the side next to the Aywaille, while General Bonnet was to march upon it, after crossing the Ourthe.

* "Sir Ralph Abercromby, a distinguished British general officer, was born in 1738, in Clackmannanshire. His first commission was that of cornet in the dragoon-guards, in the year 1756, and he became a major-general in 1787. On the commencement of the revolutionary war with France, he was employed in Flanders and Holland, with the local rank of lieutenant-general. In 1795 he received the order of the Bath, and was appointed commander-in-chief of the forces in the West Indies. On his return he was made commander-in-chief in Ireland, but was soon afterwards appointed to the corresponding command in Scotland. He next acted under the Duke of York in the attempt upon Holland in 1799. His concluding service was in the expedition to Egypt, of which he was commander-in-chief. He landed, after a severe contest at Aboukir, in 1801, and fought the triumphant battle of Alexandria, in which he was killed."—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

On the second sans-culottide (September 18), Scherer divided his corps into three columns, commanded by Generals Marceau, Mayer, and Hacquin, and proceeded to the banks of the Aywaille, which flows in a deep bed between steep banks. The generals themselves set the example, plunged into the water, and led their soldiers to the opposite bank, in spite of a formidable fire of artillery. Latour had continued motionless on the heights of Sprimont, preparing to fall upon the French columns as soon as they should have crossed the river. But no sooner had they climbed the steep bank, than they fell upon the position without giving Latour time to anticipate them. They attacked him briskly, while General Hacquin was advancing upon his left flank, and General Bonnet, having crossed the Ourthe, was marching upon his rear. Latour was then obliged to decamp and to fall back upon the imperial army.

This attack, well-conceived and executed with spirit, was equally honourable to the general-in-chief and to his army. It gained us thirty-six pieces of cannon and one hundred baggage-waggons; it occasioned the enemy a loss of fifteen hundred men, killed and wounded, and decided Clairfayt to abandon the line of the Ourthe. That general, on seeing his left beaten, was in fact apprehensive lest his retreat upon Cologne should be cut off. In consequence, he quitted the banks of the Meuse and the Ourthe, and fell back upon Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Austrians had nothing left but the line of the Roer, to prevent their being driven back upon the Rhine. They occupied that river from Dueren and Juliers to the influx of the Roer into the Meuse, that is, to Ruremonde. They had relinquished all that part of the course of the Meuse which is comprised between the Ourthe and the Roer, between Liege and Ruremonde; they had left only that portion between Ruremonde and Grave, the point by which they were connected with the Duke of York.

The Roer was the line which it behoved them to defend stoutly, if they would not lose the left bank of the Rhine. Clairfayt concentrated all his forces on the banks of the Roer, between Dueren, Juliers, and Linnich. He had some time since ordered considerable works to secure his line; he had advanced corps beyond the Roer, on the *plateau* of Aldenhoven, where intrenchments were thrown up; he had then the line of the Roer and its steep banks, and he was placed behind this line with his army and a formidable train of artillery.

On the 10th of Vendemiaire, year III (October 1, 1794), Jourdan was in presence of the enemy with all his forces. He ordered General Scherer, who commanded the right wing, to proceed upon Dueren, crossing the Roer at all the fordable points; General Hatry to cross nearly in the centre of the position at Altorp; Championnet's and Morlot's divisions, supported by cavalry, to take the *plateau* of Aldenhoven, situated in advance of the Roer, to scour the plain, to cross the river, and

to mask Juliers, in order to prevent the Austrians from debouching from it; General Lefebvre to make himself master of Linnich, and to cross at all the fords in that neighbourhood; lastly Kleber, who was near the mouth of the Roer, to ascend the river to Ratem, and to pass it at that ill-defended point, for the purpose of covering the battle on the side towards Ruremonde.

Next day, the 11th of Vendemiaire, the French set themselves in motion along the whole line. One hundred thousand young republicans marched at once with an order and a precision worthy of older troops. They had not yet been seen in such number on the same field of battle. They advanced towards the Roer, the goal of their efforts. Unfortunately, they were still far from that goal, and it was not till near midday that they reached it. The general, in the opinion of military men, had committed but one fault, that of taking a point of departure too distant from the point of attack, and not employing another day in approaching nearer to the enemy's line. General Scherer, commanding the right, directed his brigades upon the different points of the Roer, and ordered General Hacquin to cross just above, at the fort of Winden, with a view to turn the left flank of the enemy. It was eleven o'clock when he made these arrangements. It took Hacquin a long time to make the circuit marked out for him. Scherer waited for him to reach the point indicated before he threw his divisions into the Roer; and thus gave Clairfayt time to prepare all his means along the heights on the opposite bank. It was now three o'clock. Scherer would not wait any longer, and set his divisions in motion. Marceau plunged into the water, with his troops, and crossed at the ford of Mirveiller; Lorges did the same, proceeded upon Dueren, and drove the enemy from that place after a sanguinary combat. The Austrians abandoned Dueren for a moment; but, after falling back, they returned in more considerable force. Marceau immediately threw himself into Dueren, to support Lorges's brigade. Mayer, who had crossed the Roer a little above, at Niederau, and had been received by a galling fire of artillery, fell back also upon Dueren. There all the efforts of both sides were concentrated. The enemy, who as yet brought only his advanced guard into action, was formed in rear of that place, upon the heights, with sixty pieces of cannon. He immediately opened a fire, and poured a shower of grape and balls upon the French. Our young soldiers, supported by the generals, stood firm. Hacquin did not yet make his appearance on the left flank of the enemy, a manœuvre which was expected to ensure a victory.

At the same moment, there was fighting at the centre on the advanced *plateau* of Aldenhoven. The French had pushed on thither at the point of the bayonet. Their cavalry had deployed there, and received and withstood several charges. The Austrians,

seeing the Roer crossed above and below Aldenhoven, had abandoned that *plateau* and retired to Juliers, on the other side of the Roer. Championnet, who had pursued them to the very glacis, cannonaded and was in return cannonaded by the artillery of the place. At Linnich, Lefebvre had repulsed the Austrians and reached the Roer, but had found the bridge burned and was engaged in rebuilding it. At Ratem, Kleber had met with sweeping batteries, and answered them by a brisk fire of artillery.

The decisive action, therefore, was on the right about Dueren, where Marceau, Lorges, and Mayer were crowded together, awaiting Hacquin's movement. Jourdan had ordered Hatry, instead of crossing at Altorp, to fall back upon Dueren; but the distance was too great for this column to be of any service at the decisive point. At length, at five in the evening, Hacquin appeared on Latour's left flank. The Austrians, seeing themselves threatened on their left by Hacquin, and having Lorges, Marceau, and Mayer in front, decided upon retreating, and drew back their left wing, which had been engaged at Sprimont. On their extreme right, Kleber threatened them by a bold movement. The bridge, which he had attempted to throw across, being too short, the soldiers had demanded permission to plunge into the river. Kleber, to keep up their ardour, collected all his artillery, and played upon the enemy on the opposite bank. The Imperialists were then obliged to retire at this point, and they determined to retire at all the others. They abandoned the Roer, leaving eight hundred prisoners and three thousand men *hors de combat*.

Next day, the French found Juliers evacuated, and they were able to pass the Roer at all points. Such was the important battle that won us the definitive conquest of the left bank of the Rhine.* It is one of those by which General Jourdan best merited the gratitude of his country and the esteem of military

* "In this important battle which was continued till the 3rd of October, the slaughter on both sides was dreadful and nearly equal. But superiority of numbers and perseverance gave the victory to the French. The principal difficulty they had to overcome was a mountain well fortified, and covered with batteries of heavy metal. It was assaulted four times by the most intrepid of the French troops before it was carried. On the morning of the fifth day of this destructive conflict, a fog arose, which enabled General Clairfayt to conceal the motions which he was now under the necessity of making to mark his retreat. Upwards of ten thousand of his men had fallen; and the remainder of his army was unequal to any further contest. He was followed however so closely by the victors, that no less than three thousand more were added to the slaughter of the day. This was truly an important, a decisive, battle. It was considered in that light by all parties; and all hopes of repairing for a long time the losses of the campaign were extinguished. It appeared even more decisive than the battle of Fleurus, which had commenced the ruin of the Austrian armies in the Low Countries, whence they were now totally expelled, without any prospect of a return."—*Annual Register*. E.

men. Critics have, nevertheless, censured him for not having taken a point of departure nearer to the point of attack, and for not directing the bulk of his force upon Mirveiller and Dueren.

Clairfayt took the high road to Cologne. Jourdan pursued him, and took possession of Cologne on the 15th of Vendemiaire (October 6), and of Bonn on the 29th (October 20). Kleber proceeded with Marescot to besiege Maestricht.

While Jourdan was so valiantly performing his duty, and taking possession of the important line of the Rhine, Pichegru on his part was preparing to cross the Meuse, intending then to proceed towards the mouth of the Wahl, the principal branch of the Rhine. As we have already stated, the Duke of York had crossed the Meuse at Grave, leaving Bois-le-Duc to its own forces. Pichegru, before he attempted the passage of the Meuse, would have to take Bois-le-Duc, which was no easy task, in the state of the season and with an insufficient artillery for a siege. However, the audacity of the French and the discouragement of the enemy rendered every thing possible. Fort Crèvecœur, near the Meuse, threatened by a battery seasonably placed on a point where it was not thought possible to establish one, surrendered. The artillery found there served to forward the siege of Bois-le-Duc. Five consecutive attacks daunted the governor, who surrendered the place on the 19th of Vendemiaire. This unhoped-for success gave the French a solid base and considerable stores for pushing their operations beyond the Meuse and to the bank of the Wahl.

Moreau, who formed the right, had since the victories of the Ourthe and the Roer advanced to Venloo. The Duke of York, alarmed at this movement, had withdrawn all his troops to the other side of the Wahl, and evacuated the whole space between the Meuse and the Wahl, or the Rhine. Seeing, however, that Grave on the Meuse would be left without communications and without support, he recrossed the Wahl, and undertook to defend the space comprised between the two rivers. The ground, as is always the case near the mouths of great rivers, was lower than the bed of the streams. It presented extensive pastures, intersected by canals and causeways, and inundated in certain places. General Hammerstein, placed intermediately between the Meuse and the Wahl, had increased the difficulty of access, by covering the dykes with artillery, and throwing over the canals bridges which his army was to destroy as it retired. The Duke of York, whose advanced guard he formed, was placed in rear, on the banks of the Wahl, in the camp of Nimeguen.

On the 27th and 28th of Vendemiaire (October 18 and 19), Pichegru made two of his divisions cross the Meuse by a bridge of boats. The English, who were under the cannon of Nimeguen, and Hammerstein's advanced guard along the canals and dykes, were too far off to prevent this passage. The rest of the army

landed on the other bank, under the protection of these two divisions. On the 28th, Pichegru decided on attacking the works that covered the intermediate space between the Meuse and the Wahl. He pushed forward four columns, forming a mass superior to the enemy, into those pastures overflowed and intersected by canals. The French defied with extraordinary courage the fire of the artillery, then threw themselves into the ditches up to their shoulders in water, while the sharpshooters, from the margins of the ditches, fired over their heads. The enemy, daunted by their hardihood, retired, without thinking of any thing but saving his artillery. He sought refuge in the camp of Nimeguen on the banks of the Wahl,* whither the French soon followed and defied him every day.

Thus, towards Holland, as well as towards Luxemburg, the French had at length reached that formidable line of the Rhine, which Nature seems to have assigned as a boundary to their fine country, and which they have always felt ambitious to give it for a frontier. Pichegru, indeed, stopped by Nimeguen, was not yet master of the course of the Wahl; and if he thought of conquering Holland, he saw before him numerous streams, fortified places, inundations, and a most unpropitious season; but he was very near the so-ardently desired limit, and with another daring act he might enter Nimeguen or the isle of Bommel, and establish himself solidly upon the Wahl. Moreau, called the general of sieges, had by an act of boldness just entered Venloo; Jourdan was strongly established on the Rhine. Along the Moselle and Alsace, the armies had also just reached that great river.

Since the check of Kaiserslautern, the armies of the Moselle and of the Upper Rhine, commanded by Michaud, had been occupied in obtaining reinforcements of detachments from the the Alps and from La Vendée. On the 14th of Messidor (July 2), an attack had been attempted along the whole line from the Rhine to the Moselle, on the two slopes of the Vosges. This attack was not successful because it was too divided. A second attempt, planned on better principles, had been made on the 25th of

* "The French now resolved to strike a decisive blow against the Duke of York, and compel him to retire from the defence of the United Provinces. With this view, they crossed the Meuse with thirty thousand men, which were to attack the British posts on the right, while another body of no less strength was advancing to reach them on the left. On the morning of the 19th of October, the several divisions of the Duke's army on the right were assailed by the French, who forcing a post occupied by a body of cavalry, a corps of infantry which was stationed near it was thrown into disorder, and compelled to retreat along the dyke on the banks of the Wahl. Unfortunately, they were followed by a body of the enemy's cavalry, which they mistook for their own; nor did they discover their mistake till the enemy came up and attacked them before they could assume a posture of defence. The whole of that body of infantry was either killed, or made prisoners."—*Annual Register.* E.

Messidor (July 13). The principal effort had been directed on the centre of the Vosges, with a view to gain possession of the passes, and had caused, as it always did, a general retreat of the allied armies beyond Frankenthal. The committee had then ordered a diversion upon Treves, of which the French took possession, to punish the elector. By this movement, a principal corps was placed *en flèche* between the Imperial armies of the Lower Rhine and the Prussian army of the Vosges; but the enemy never thought of taking advantage of this situation. The Prussians, however, profiting at length by a diminution of our forces towards Kaiserslautern, had attacked us unawares and driven us back beyond that place. Luckily, Jourdan had just been victorious on the Roer, and Clairfayt had recrossed the Rhine at Cologne. The allies had not then the courage to remain in the Vosges; they retired, leaving the whole Palatinate to us, and throwing a strong garrison into Mayence. Luxemburg and Mayence were consequently the only places that they retained on the left bank. The committee immediately ordered them to be blockaded. Kleber was called from Belgium to Mayence, to direct the siege of that place, which he had assisted to defend in 1793, and where he had laid the foundation of his glory. Thus our conquests were extended on all points, and every where carried as far as the Rhine.

At the Alps, the former inactivity continued, and the great chain was still ours. The plan of invasion, ably devised by General Bonaparte, and communicated to the committee by the younger Robespierre, who was on a mission to the army of Italy, had been adopted. It consisted in uniting the two armies of the Alps and of Italy in the valley of Sturia, for the purpose of overrunning Piedmont. Orders had been given for marching when news of the 9th of Thermidor arrived. The execution of the plan was then suspended. The commandants of the fortresses, who had been obliged to give up part of their garrisons, the representatives, the municipalities, and all the partisans of reaction, alleged that this plan had for its object to ruin the army, by throwing it into Piedmont, to open Toulon again to the English, and to serve the secret designs of Robespierre. Jean-Bon-St.-André, who had been sent to Toulon to superintend the repairs of the ships of war there, and who cherished schemes of his own relative to the Mediterranean, proved himself one of the greatest enemies to this plan. Young Bonaparte was even accused of being an accomplice of the Robespierres, on account of the confidence with which his talents and his projects had inspired the younger of the two brothers.* The army was brought

* "Bonaparte set off for Genoa, and fulfilled his mission. The ninth of Thermidor arrived, and the deputies called Terrorists were superseded by Albitte and Salicetti. In the disorder which then prevailed, they were either

back in disorder to the great chain, where it resumed its positions. The campaign finished, however, with a brilliant advantage. The Austrians, conjointly with the English, determined to make an attempt on Savona, for the purpose of cutting off the communication with Genoa, which, by its neutrality, rendered great service to the commerce in articles of subsistence. General Colloredo advanced with a corps of from eight to ten thousand men, made no great haste in his march, and gave the French time to prepare themselves. Being attacked amid the mountains by the French, whose movements were directed by General Bonaparte, he lost eight hundred men, and retreated disgracefully, accusing the English, who in their turn accused him. The communication with Genoa was re-established, and the army consolidated in all its positions.

At the Pyrenees, a new series of successes opened upon us. Dugommier was still besieging Bellegarde, with the intention of making himself master of that place, before he descended into Catalonia. La Union made a general attack on the French line for the purpose of proceeding to the succour of the besieged; but, being repulsed, at all points he had withdrawn, and the fortress, more discouraged than ever by this rout of the Spanish army, had surrendered on the 6th of Vendemiaire. Dugommier, having no danger whatever to dread on his rear, prepared to advance into Catalonia. At the western Pyrenees, the French, being roused at length from their torpor, overran the valley of Bastan, took Fontarabia and St. Sebastian, and, favoured by the climate, prepared, as at the eastern Pyrenees, to push their successes in spite of the approach of winter.

In La Vendée the war had continued. It was not brisk and dangerous, but slow and devastating. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, had at length shared the command among them. Since the death of Laroche-Jacquelein, Stofflet had succeeded him in Anjou and Upper Poitou; Sapinaud had still retained the little division of the centre; Charette, who had distinguished himself by the campaign of the last winter, when, with forces almost destroyed, he had always contrived to elude the pursuit of the republicans, had the command in Lower Vendée; but he aspired to the general command. The chiefs had met at Jallais, and had entered into a treaty dictated by the Abbé Bernier, *curé* of St. Laud, the councillor and friend of Stofflet, and governing the country in his name. This abbé was as ambitious as Charette, and desired to see a combination effected that should furnish him with the means of exercising over all the chiefs that influence which he possessed over Stofflet. They agreed to form a supreme council,

ignorant of the orders given to General Bonaparte, or persons, envious of the rising glory of the young general of artillery, inspired Albitte and Salicetti with suspicions prejudicial to him. They accordingly drew up a resolution ordering that he should be arrested, and he continued nearly a fortnight under arrest."—*Bourrienne.* E.

by the orders of which every thing was to be done in future. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, reciprocally confirmed to each other their respective commands of Anjou, the centre, and Lower Vendée. M. de Marigny, who had survived the great Vendean expedition to Granville, having infringed one of the orders of this council, was seized. Stofflet had the cruelty to order him to be shot upon a report of Charette's.* This act, which was attributed to jealousy, produced a most unfavourable impression on all the royalists.

The war, without any possible result, was now merely a war of devastation. The republicans had formed fourteen intrenched camps, which enclosed the whole insurgent country. From these camps issued incendiary columns, which, under the chief command of General Turreau, executed the formidable decree of the Convention. They burned the woods, the hedges, the copses, frequently the villages themselves, seized the crops and the cattle, and, acting upon the decree which ordered every inhabitant who had not taken part in the rebellion to retire to the distance of twenty leagues from the insurgent country, treated all whom they met with as enemies. The Vendeans, who, to procure the means of subsistence, had not ceased to cultivate their lands amidst these horrid scenes, resisted this kind of warfare in such a way as to render it everlasting. On a signal from their chiefs, they formed sudden assemblages, fell upon the rear of the camps and stormed them, or, allowing the columns to advance, they rushed upon them when they had got into the heart of the country, and, if they succeeded in breaking them, they put to death all, to the very last man. They then secured the arms and ammunition, which were in great request with them; and, without having done any thing to weaken a very superior enemy, they had merely procured the means of prosecuting this atrocious warfare.

Such was the state of things on the left bank of the Loire. On the right bank, in that part of Bretagne which is situated between the Loire and the Vilaine, a new assemblage had been formed, composed in great part of the remains of the Vendean column destroyed at Savenay, and of the peasants inhabit-

* "Charette and Stofflet, jealous of the power of Marigny, convoked a council of war on some frivolous pretext, and condemned him to death for contumacy. His army felt the utmost resentment at this iniquitous sentence, and swore they would defend their general against all his enemies. For himself, he heard of his condemnation with composure. Soon after it was decreed, Stofflet gave orders to some Germans to go and shoot Marigny. The wretches obeyed. The general had only his domestics with him; he could not believe that so infamous an act was intended. When he saw, however, that his death was resolved on, he asked for a confessor, which was rudely denied. On this, passing into his garden, he said to the soldiers, 'It is for me to command you. To your ranks, chasseurs!' He then called out 'Present—fire,' and fell dead."—*Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein.* E.

ing those plains, M. de Scépeaux was its chief. This corps was nearly of the same force as M. de Sapinaud's, and connected La Vendée with Bretagne.

Bretagne had become the theatre of a war very different from that of La Vendée, but not less deplorable. The Chouans, to whom we have already adverted, were smugglers, whom the abolition of the barriers had left without occupation, young men who had refused to comply with the requisition, and some Vendeans, who, like the followers of M. de Scépeaux, had escaped from the rout of Savenay. They followed the trade of plunder among the rocks and spacious woods of Bretagne, particularly in the great forest of Pertre. They did not form, like the Vendeans, numerous bodies capable of keeping the field, but marched in bands of from thirty to fifty; stopped couriers and the public conveyances; and murdered the justices of peace, the mayors, the republican functionaries, and, above all, the purchasers of national property. As for those who were not purchasers but farmers of such property, they called on them, and obliged them to pay the rent to them. In general, they were particularly careful to destroy bridges, to break up roads, and to cut off the shafts of carts, to prevent the carriage of articles of consumption to the towns. They addressed terrible threats to those who carried their produce to the markets, and they executed those threats by plundering and burning their property. As they could not occupy the country like a regular military force, their object evidently was to distract it by preventing the citizens from accepting any office under the republic, by punishing the acquisition of national property, and by starving the towns. Less united, and less strong, than the Vendeans, they were nevertheless more formidable, and truly deserved the appellation of banditti.

They had a secret chief, whom we have already mentioned, M. de Puisaye, a member of the Constituent Assembly. He had retired after the 10th of August to Normandy, had engaged, as we have seen, in the federalist insurrection, and, after the defeat of Vernon, had fled to Bretagne, to conceal himself, and to collect there the remains of La Rouarie's conspiracy. With great intelligence, and extraordinary skill in uniting the elements of a party, he combined extreme activity of body and mind, and vast ambition. Puisaye, struck by the peninsular position of Bretagne, with the great extent of its coast, with the peculiar configuration of its soil, covered with forests, mountains, and impenetrable retreats; struck, above all, by the barbarism of its inhabitants, speaking a foreign language, deprived, consequently, of all communication with the other inhabitants of France, completely under the influence of the priests, and three or four times as numerous as the Vendeans—Puisaye conceived that he should be able to excite in Bretagne an insurrection much more formidable than that which had for its chiefs a

Cathelineau, a d'Elbée, a Bonchamp, and a Lescure. The vicinity, moreover, of England, and the convenient intermediate situation of the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, suggested to him the plan of inducing the cabinet of London to concur in his designs. It was not his wish, therefore, that the energy of the country should be wasted in useless pillage, and he laboured to organize it in such a manner as that he might be able to hold it entirely under his sway. Assisted by the priests, he had caused all the men capable of bearing arms to be enrolled in registers opened in the parishes. Each parish formed a company, each canton a division; the united divisions formed four principal divisions, those of Morbihan, Finistère, Côtes-du-Nord, and Ille-et-Vilaine, all four dependent on a central committee, which represented the supreme authority of the country. Puisaye, as general-in-chief, was president of the central committee, and, by means of this ramification, he circulated his orders throughout the whole province. He recommended to his followers, until his vast projects should be ripe for execution, to commit as few hostilities as possible, that they might not draw too many troops into Bretagne, and to content themselves with collecting warlike stores, and preventing the carriage of provisions to the towns. But the Chouans, by no means calculated for the kind of general war which he meditated, addicted themselves individually to pillage, which was more profitable to them, and more to their taste. Puisaye therefore hastened to put the finishing hand to his work, and purposed, as soon as he should have completed the organization of his party, to go to London, in order to open a negotiation with the English cabinet and the French princes.

As we have already seen, in the account of the preceding campaign, the Vendeans had not yet had any communication with foreigners. M. de Tinténiac had, indeed, been sent to them to inquire who they were, and what was their number and what was their object, and to offer them arms and assistance if they would make themselves masters of a seaport. It was this offer that had induced them to march to Granville, and to make that attempt, the failure of which we are acquainted with. The squadron of Lord Moira, after cruising to no purpose, had carried to Holland the succours destined for La Vendée. Puisaye hoped to provoke a similar expedition, and to conclude an arrangement with the French princes, who had not yet expressed any gratitude or given any encouragement to, the insurgent royalists in the interior.

The princes, on their side, having little hopes of support from foreign powers, began to cast back their eyes on their partisans in the interior of France. But none of those about them were disposed to turn to account the devotedness of the brave men who were ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of royalty. Some

aged gentlemen, some old friends, had followed Monsieur, who had become regent, and fixed his residence at Verona, since the country near the Rhine was no longer habitable except for military men. The Prince of Condé, a brave man, but of little capacity, continued to collect on the Upper Rhine all who were desirous of attaching themselves to the profession of arms. A number of the young nobility followed the Count d'Artois in his travels, and had accompanied him to St. Petersburg. Catherine had given the prince a magnificent reception; she had presented him with a frigate, a million of money, a sword, and the brave Count de Vauban, to induce him to make good use of it.* She had, moreover, promised effective succours, as soon as the prince should have landed in La Vendée. This landing, however, was not attempted: theCount d'Artoishad returned to Holland, where he was at the head-quarters of the Duke of York.

The situation of the three French princes was neither brilliant nor prosperous. Austria, Prussia, and England had refused to recognise the regent; for to recognise any other sovereign of France than the one who governed it *de facto*, was to intermeddle with domestic affairs, which none of the powers wished to appear to do. Now, in particular, when they were beaten, all of them affected to say that they had taken up arms merely for the sake of their own security. To recognise the regent would have subjected them to another inconvenience. It would have been equivalent to pledging themselves not to make peace till after the destruction of the republic, an event on which they began to give up reckoning. Meanwhile the powers tolerated the agents of the princes, but did not acknowledge them under any public character. The Duke d'Harcourt in London, the Duke d'Havré at Madrid, the Duke de Polignac at Vienna, transmitted notes that were scarcely read and seldom listened to, and were rather the intermediate dispensers of the very scanty succours granted to the emigrants, than the organs of an avowed power. Hence great dissatisfaction with the foreign powers prevailed in the three courts where the emigrants resided. They began to discover that the generous zeal of the coalition for royalty had been merely a disguise of the most violent enmity to France. Austria, by hoisting her flag at Valenciennes and Condé, had, in the opinion of the emigrants, provoked the outburst of French pa-

* "Catherine behaved with marked cordiality to the emigrant French princes, and was one of the most strenuous opponents of the Revolution. The Jacobin emissaries, it seems, were making some progress among the lower orders of the people in St. Petersburg; on which, says Sir John Carr, Catherine had them all seized one evening, and carried to the lunatic asylum, where they were properly shaved, blistered, starved, and physicked. After fourteen days of this wholesome regimen, they were restored to the public view, and universally shunned as insane. Had this harmless experiment failed, she had another mode of treatment in store, and prepared for its adoption by quickly building a state-prison."—*Edinburgh Review.* E.

triotism. Prussia, of whose pacific dispositions they were already aware, had, they said, failed in all her engagements. Pitt, who was the most positive and the most supercilious towards them, was also the most hateful to them. They called him by no other name than the treacherous Englishman, and said that they ought to take his money and cheat him afterwards, if they could. They pretended that Spain alone could be relied on; she alone was a faithful kinswoman, a sincere ally, and towards her they ought to turn their hopes.

The three petty fugitive courts, so far from harmonizing with the powers on whom they had placed their hopes, were not on better terms with one another. The Court of Verona, indisposed to take an active part, giving to the emigrants orders that were ill-obeyed, making communications to the cabinets that were little heeded, by agents who were not recognised, was filled with distrust of the two others, felt jealous of the active part performed by the Prince of Condé on the Rhine, and of the kind of consideration which his unenlightened but energetic courage gained him with the cabinets, and envied even the travels of the Count d'Artois in Europe. The Prince of Condé, on his part, as brave as he was deficient in intelligence, would not engage in any plan, and cared but little about the two courts that would not fight. Lastly, the little court collected at Arnheim, shunning both the life that was led on the Rhine and the superior authority to which it was obliged to submit at Verona, tarried at the English head-quarters, under the pretext of various designs upon the coasts of France.

Cruel experience having taught the French princes that they could not depend upon the enemies of their country for the re-establishment of their throne, they were fond of observing that they must thenceforward rely only on their partisans in the interior and on La Vendée. Since terror had ceased to reign in France, the violent agitators had unfortunately begun to breathe, as well as honest men. The correspondence of the emigrants with the interior was renewed. The court of Verona, through the medium of Count d'Entraigues, corresponded with one Lemaitre, an intriguer, who had been successively advocate, secretary to the council, pamphleteer, and prisoner in the Bastille, and who finished with the profession of agent of the princes. With him were associated a man named Laville-Heurnois, formerly *maître des requêtes*, and a creature of Calonne's, and an Abbé Brothier, preceptor of the nephews of the Abbé Maury. Application was made to these intriguers for particulars concerning the situation of France, the state of parties, and their dispositions, and for plans of conspiracy. In reply, they transmitted intelligence most of which was false. They boasted of intercourse which they had not with the heads of the Government, and strove to the utmost of their power to persuade the French princes that every thing was to be expected from a movement in the interior.

They were directed to correspond with La Vendée, and especially with Charette, who, from his long resistance, was the hero of the royalists,* but with whom they had not yet been able to open any negotiation.

Such was then the situation of the royalist party in and out of France. It waged in La Vendée a war less alarming for its dangers than afflicting for its ravages. It formed in Bretagne extensive but yet distant projects, subject moreover to a very difficult condition—the union and the concert of a multitude of persons. Out of France it was divided, held in little consideration, and scantily supported. Convinced at length, of the futility of all hope of foreign succour, it kept up a puerile correspondence with the royalists of the interior.

The republic had therefore little to fear from the efforts of Europe and of royalty. Setting aside the subject of pain which it found in the ravages of La Vendée, it had cause to congratulate itself on its splendid triumphs. It had been saved in the preceding year from invasion, this year it had revenged itself by its conquests. Belgium, Dutch Brabant, the countries of Luxemburg, Liege, and Juliers, the electorate of Treves, the Palatinate, Savoy, Nice, a fortress in Catalonia, and the valley of Bastan, had been won, thus threatening Holland, Piedmont, and Spain at the same time. Such were the results of the prodigious efforts of the celebrated committee of public welfare.

* "During this horrible war, the royalist hero, Charette, acquired immortal glory. The boldness of his measures, his fertility of resources, and his constancy, never subdued in the most desperate situations, mark him as a really great man. Wounded, pursued from place to place, with scarcely twelve companions left, this famous royalist chief was still such an object of dread to the republicans, as to induce them to offer him a million of livres and a free passage to England; but he refused, choosing to persevere in the unequal struggle, till he was taken and put to death."—*Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein.* E.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

WINTER OF THE YEAR III—SALOONS AND CHANGE IN MANNERS —DECREE CONCERNING POPULAR SOCIETIES — MODIFICATIONS IN THE MAXIMUM AND REQUISITIONS — TRIAL OF CARRIER — THE JACOBIN CLUB SHUT UP — RETURN OF THE SEVENTY-THREE — COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BILLAUD-VARENNES, COLLOT-D'HERBOIS, AND BARRERE.

WHILE these events were occurring on the frontiers, the Convention continued its reforms. The representatives commissioned to renew the administrations travelled through France, every where reducing the number of the revolutionary committees, composing them of other individuals, causing those to be apprehended as accomplices of Robespierre whose too atrocious excesses did not permit them to be left unpunished, appointing fresh municipal functionaries, reorganizing the popular societies, and purging them of the most violent and the most dangerous men. This operation was not always executed without impediment. At Dijon, the revolutionary organization was found more compact than any where else. The same persons, members at one and the same time of the revolutionary committee, of the municipality, and of the popular society, made all in that city tremble. They imprisoned arbitrarily both travellers and inhabitants, entered in the list of emigrants all whom they were pleased to place there, and prevented them from obtaining certificates of residence by intimidating the sections. They had formed themselves into regiments under the title of a revolutionary army, and obliged the commune to allow them pay. They did nothing, attended the meetings of the club, themselves and their wives, and spent in orgies, where it was not allowed to drink out of any thing but goblets, the double produce of their appointments and their rapine. They corresponded with the Jacobins of Lyons and Marseilles, and served them as a medium for communicating with those of Paris. Calès, the representative, had the greatest difficulty in dissolving this coalition. He dismissed all the revolutionary authorities, selected twenty or thirty of the most moderate members of the club, and committed to them the task of its purification.

When driven from the municipalities, the revolutionists did as in Paris, and usually retired to the Jacobin club. If the club had been purified, they forced themselves into it again after the departure of the representatives, or formed another. There they made more violent speeches than ever, and gave way to all the

frenzy of rage and fear, for they beheld vengeance every where. The Jacobins of Dijon sent an inflammatory address to those of Paris. At Lyons, they formed a no less dangerous body; and, as the city was still under the weight of the terrible decrees of the Convention, the representatives found it very difficult to repress their fury. At Marseilles they were more audacious. Adding the excitement of their party to the warmth of local character, they formed a considerable assemblage, beset a room where the two representatives, Auguies and Serres, were at table, and sent deputies to them who, sword and pistol in hand, demanded the release of the imprisoned patriots. The two representatives displayed the greatest firmness, but, being ill-supported by the gendarmerie, who had invariably seconded the cruelties of the late system, till at length they began to think themselves accomplices of and responsible for it, they narrowly escaped being murdered. However, several Parisian battalions, which were at that moment at Marseilles, came to the relief of the two representatives, disengaged them from the mob, and dispersed the assemblage. At Toulouse, also, the Jacobins excited commotions. In that city four persons, a director of the posts, a district secretary, and two actors, had set themselves up for chiefs of the revolutionary party. They had formed a committee of *surveillance* for the whole of the South, and extended their tyranny far beyond Toulouse. They opposed the reforms and the imprisonments ordered by Artigoyte and Chaudron-Rousseau, the representatives, raised the popular society, and had the audacity to declare through it, that those two representatives had lost the confidence of the people. They were vanquished, however, and confined, together with their principal accomplices.

These scenes were repeated every where, with more or less violence, according to the character of the provinces. The Jacobins were nevertheless every where subdued. Those of Paris, the chiefs of the coalition, were in the greatest alarm. They saw the capital adverse to their doctrines; they learned that in the departments public opinion, less prompt to manifest itself than in Paris, was not less decided against them. They knew that they were every where called cannibals, partisans, accomplices of Robespierre's, men who aspired to be the agents in continuing his system. They found themselves supported, it is true, by the multitude of dismissed placemen, by the electoral club, by a violent and frequently victorious minority in the sections, by a portion of the members of the Convention, some of whom still sat in their society; but they were not the less alarmed at the direction of the public mind, and pretended that a plot was formed for dissolving the popular societies, and after them, the republic.

They drew up an address to the affiliated societies as a reply to the attacks which were made upon them. "People are striving," said they, "to destroy our fraternal union; they are striving to break the fasces so formidable to the enemies of equality

and of liberty. We are accused, we are assailed by the blackest calumnies. Aristocracy and the advocates of moderation are raising their audacious heads. The fatal reaction occasioned by the fall of the triumvirs is perpetuated, and from amidst the storms engendered by the enemies of the people, a new faction has sprung up, which tends to the dissolution of all the popular societies. It harasses and strives to excite the public opinion; it carries its audacity to such a length as to hold us forth as a rival power to the national representation—us, who always rally round and fight along with it in all the dangers of the country. It accuses us of continuing Robespierre's system, and we have in our registers the names of those only who, in the night between the 9th and 10th of Thermidor, occupied the post which the danger of the country assigned to them. But we will reply to these vile calumniators by combating them without ceasing. We will reply to them by the purity of our principles and of our actions, and by an unshaken attachment to the cause of the people which they have betrayed, to the national representation which they aim at dishonouring, and to equality which they detest."

They affected, as we see, a high respect for the national representation. They had even, in one of their sittings, given up to the committee of general safety one of their members, for having said that the principal conspirators against liberty were in the very bosom of the Convention. They circulated their address in all the departments, and particularly in the sections of Paris.

The party which was opposed to them became daily bolder. It had already adopted distinguishing colours, manners, places, and watchwords. It was, as we have stated, young men, either belonging to persecuted families, or who had evaded the requisition, that had begun to form this party. The women had joined them; they had passed the last winter in consternation; they determined to pass the present in festivities and amusements. Frimaire (December) approached. They were eager to relinquish the appearances of indigence, of simplicity, nay even of squalidness, which had long been affected during the Reign of Terror, for brilliant dresses, elegant manners, and entertainments.* They made common cause with the young enemies of a ferocious democracy; they excited their zeal, they made politeness and attention to dress a law with them. Fashion began again to exercise its sway. It required the hair to be plaited in

* "The manners of the people during these days of reviving order, exhibited an extraordinary mixture of revolutionary recklessness, with the reviving gaiety and elegance of the French character. In the saloons of the Thermidorians, none but the most humane measures were proposed, or the most generous sentiments uttered. One of the most fashionable and brilliant assemblies was called, The Ball of the Victims, the condition of entrance to which was the loss of a near relation by the guillotine. Between the country dances they said, 'We dance on the tombs;' and a favourite dress for the hair was adopted from the way in which it had been arranged immediately before execution."—*Alison.* E.

tresses, and fastened at the back of the head with a comb. This practice was borrowed from the soldiers, who arranged their hair in that manner to parry sword-cuts; and it was intended to intimate that the wearers had borne a part in the victories of our armies. It was also requisite to wear large cravats, black or green collars, according to the custom of the Chouans, and above all, crape round the arm, as the relative of a victim of the revolutionary tribunal. We see what a singular medley of ideas, recollections, and opinions presided over the fashions of the *gilded youth*—for that was the name which was given to it at the time. In the evening, in the drawing-rooms, which again began to be brilliant, praises rewarded those young men who had displayed their courage in the sections, at the Palais Royal, in the garden of the Tuileries, and those writers who, in the thousand pamphlets and publications of the day, had launched the keenest sarcasms against the *revolutionary canaille*. Fréron had become the most distinguished of the journalists. He was the editor of the *Orateur du Peuple*, which soon acquired celebrity. This was the journal read by the gilded youth, and in which it sought its daily instructions.

The theatres were not yet opened: the actors of the Comédie Française were still in prison. For want of this place of resort, people went to show themselves at concerts given at the Théâtre Feydeau, where was to be heard a melodious voice which began to charm the Parisians—that of Garat. There assembled what might be called the aristocracy of the time: some nobles who had not quitted France, opulent men who dared show themselves again, and contractors who no longer dreaded the terrible severity of the committee of public welfare. The women appeared there, in a costume, which, according to the practice of the time, was meant to be antique, and was copied from David. They had long relinquished powder and hoops: at these new entertainments they wore fillets round their hair; the form of their gowns approached as nearly as possible to the simple tunic of the Greek women; instead of high-heeled shoes, they wore that covering for the foot which we see in ancient statues, a light sandal, fastened by ribbons crossing one another round the leg. The young men, with hair turned up and black collar, filled the pit of the Feydeau, and sometimes applauded the elegant and singularly dressed females who came to embellish those assemblies.

Madame Tallien was the most beautiful and the most admired of those ladies who introduced the new taste. Her drawing-room was the most brilliant and the most frequented. Being the daughter of Cabarus, the Spanish banker, the wife of a president at Bordeaux, and recently married to Tallien, she was connected with the men both of the old and of the new *régime*. She was indignant against the system of terror, as well from resentment as from goodness of heart; she had sympathized with all the unfortu-

nate, and, whether at Bordeaux or in Paris, she had not ceased for a moment to act the part of petitioner in their behalf, a part which she performed, we are told, with irresistible grace. It was she who had softened the proconsular severity displayed by her husband in the Gironde, and who had brought him back to more humane sentiments. She wished to give him the part of peacemaker, of repairer of the evils of the Revolution; she drew around her all those who had contributed with him to the 9th of Thermidor, and strove to win them by flattering them, and by making them hope for the public gratitude, for oblivion of the past, which many of them needed, and for power which was now promised to the adversaries rather than to the partisans of terror. She was surrounded by amiable women, who contributed to this plan of such a pardonable seduction. Among them shone the widow of an unfortunate general, Alexandre Beauharnais, a young Creole,* fascinating not on account of her beauty, but her extreme

* "Josephine Rose-Tascher de la Pagerie, Empress of the French, Queen of Italy, was born in Martinique in 1763. While very young, her father took her to France, to marry her to the Viscount Beauharnais. She was then in the prime of her beauty, and met with great success at court. She bore her husband two children, Eugene and Hortense, and in 1787 returned to Martinique to attend the bedside of her invalid mother. She took her daughter with her, and passed three years in that island. The troubles, however, which then suddenly broke out, compelled her to return to France, where she arrived, after narrowly escaping great perils. A singular prophecy had been made to her when a child, which she used to mention, when it was apparently fulfilled in her high destiny. During the Reign of Terror, her husband who had defended France at the head of its armies, was thrown into prison and executed. Josephine also was imprisoned, but, on the death of Robespierre, she was liberated by Tallien, and was indebted to Barras for the restoration of a part of her husband's property. At his house she became acquainted with Bonaparte, who married her in 1796. She exerted her great influence over him, invariably on the side of mercy; protected many emigrants, and encouraged arts and industry. Napoleon used often to say to her, 'If I win battles, you win hearts.' When he ascended the imperial throne, Josephine was crowned with him, both at Paris and at Milan. She loved pomp and magnificence and was very extravagant in her tastes. A few years after her coronation, the Emperor divorced her, when she retired to Malmaison. She was soon afterwards doomed to see the destruction of that throne on which she had sate. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia paid her frequent visits at Malmaison, but the fate of Napoleon undermined her strength, and, having exposed herself, while in a feeble state of health, by walking out with Alexander, she caught cold, and died in the arms of her children in May, 1814."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

"Josephine was really an amiable woman—the best woman in France. She was the greatest patroness of the fine arts which that country had known for years. She was grace personified. Every thing she did was with peculiar elegance and delicacy. I never saw her act otherwise than gracefully during the whole time we lived together. Her toilet was a perfect arsenal, and she effectually defended herself against the assaults of time."—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

"Josephine possessed personal graces and many good qualities. Benevolence was natural to her, but she was not always prudent in its exercise. Her taste for splendour and expense was excessive. This proneness to luxury became a habit, which seemed constantly indulged without any motive. What

gracefulness. To these parties were invited simple and enthusiastic men, who led a life of austerity and turmoil. They were caressed, sometimes rallied on their dress, on their manners, and on the severity of their principles. They were placed at table by men whom they would lately have persecuted as aristocrats, enriched speculators, and plunderers of the public property; they were thus forced to feel their own inferiority beside models of the ancient politeness and *bon ton*. Many of them, in narrow circumstances, lost their dignity together with their rudeness; others who, from the strength of their understanding, knew how to keep up their rank and to gain those advantages of the drawing-room so frivolous and so soon acquired, were nevertheless not proof against delicate flattery. Many a member of a committee, adroitly solicited at a dinner-party, rendered a service or suffered his vote to be influenced.

Thus a woman, sprung from a financier, married to a magistrate, and who had become, like one of the spoils of the old state of society, the wife of an ardent revolutionist, undertook to reconcile simple, sometimes coarse, and almost always fanatical, men with elegance, taste, pleasures, ease of manners, and indifference as to opinions. The Revolution, brought back from that extreme point of fanaticism and coarseness, from which it was certainly beneficial to bring it back, advanced nevertheless too rapidly towards the oblivion of republican manners, principles, and, we may almost say, resentments. The Thermidorians were reproached with this change. They were accused of giving way to it, of producing it, of accelerating it, and the reproach was just.

The revolutionists kept aloof from these drawing-rooms and from these concerts. If some few of them ventured to appear there, they left them only to go to their tribunes to inveigh

scenes have I not witnessed when the moment for paying the tradesmen's bills arrived! She always kept back one-half of their claims, and the discovery of this exposed her to new reproaches. When fortune placed a crown upon her head, she told me that the event, extraordinary as it was, had been predicted. It is certain that she put great faith in fortune-tellers."—*Bourrienne*. E.

"Eugene Beauharnais was not more than fourteen or fifteen years of age when he ventured to introduce himself to Bonaparte, for the purpose of soliciting his father's sword, of which he understood the general had become possessed. The countenance and frank air of Eugene pleased Napoleon, and he immediately granted him the boon he sought. As soon as the sword was placed in the boy's hands he burst into tears, and kissed it. This feeling of affection for his father's memory increased Bonaparte's interest in his young visiter. His mother, Josephine, on learning the kind reception which the general had given her son, thought it her duty to call and thank him. Napoleon returned her visit, and, the acquaintance thus commenced, speedily led to their marriage."—*Memoirs of Constant*. E.

"At the period of her marriage with Bonaparte, Josephine was still a fine woman. Her teeth, it is true, were already frightfully decayed; but when her mouth was closed, she looked, especially at a little distance, both young and pretty."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

against *the Cabarus*, against the aristocrats, against the intriguers and the contractors, whom she drew along in her train. They, for their part, had no other meetings than their clubs and their assemblies of sections, to which they resorted, not to seek pleasure but to give vent to their passions. Their wives, who were called the *furies of the guillotine*, because they had frequently formed a circle round the scaffold, appeared in popular costume in the tribunes of the clubs, to applaud the most violent motions. Several members of the Convention still attended the sittings of the Jacobins; some carried thither their celebrity, but they were silent and gloomy; such were Collot-d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, and Carrier. Others, as Duhem, Crassous, Lanot, went thither from attachment to the cause, but without the personal reason of defending their revolutionary conduct.

It was at the Palais-Royal, around the Convention, in the tribunes, and in the sections, that the two parties came into collision. In the sections, in particular, where they had to deliberate and to discuss, extremely violent quarrels took place. The address of the Jacobins to the affiliated societies was just at that time carried about from one to another, and some insisted on having it read there. A decree enjoined also the reading of the report of Robert Lindet on the state of France, a report which presented so faithful a picture of it, and expressed so precisely the sentiments with which the Convention and all honest men were animated. The reading of these documents furnished occasion every Decadi for the warmest disputes. The revolutionists called loudly for the address of the Jacobins, and their adversaries for Lindet's report. A frightful uproar was the consequence. The members of the old revolutionary committees took down the names of all those who mounted the tribune to oppose them, and, as they wrote them, they exclaimed, "We will exterminate them." The habits which they had contracted during the Reign of Terror had made the words to kill, to guillotine, so familiar to them, that they had them constantly in their mouths. They thus gave occasion for its being said that they were making new lists of proscription, and intended to revive the system of Robespierre. Fights frequently took place in the sections; sometimes victory was undecided, and there had been no possibility of reading any thing when ten o'clock arrived. The revolutionists, who did not scruple to exceed the lawful hour, would then wait till their adversaries, who affected to obey the law, had withdrawn, when they read what they pleased, and deliberated on any subjects which they wished to discuss.

Scenes of this kind were daily reported to the Convention, and complaints were made against the old members of the revolutionary committees, who were it was said the authors of all these disturbances. The electoral club, more noisy of itself than all the sections put together, had just urged the patience of the

Assembly to the utmost, by an address of the most dangerous kind. It was, as we have said, in this club that the men most compromised always met, and that the most daring schemes were conceived. A deputation from this club came to demand that the election of the municipal magistrates should be restored to the people; that the municipality of Paris, which had not been re-established since the 9th of Thermidor, should be reconstituted; and lastly, that instead of a single meeting per decade, each section should be allowed to hold two. On this last petition a great number of deputies rose, made the most vehement complaints, and demanded measures against the members of the old revolutionary committees, to whom they attributed all the disturbances. Legendre, though he had disapproved Lecointre's first attack upon Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, said that it was necessary to go further back, that the source of the evil was in the members of the former committees of government, that they abused the indulgence which the Assembly had shown them, and that it was high time to punish their ancient tyranny, in order to prevent a new one.

This discussion excited a fresh tumult, more violent than the first. After long and deplorable recriminations, the Assembly, meeting with only such questions as were dangerous or not to be solved, passed a second time to the order of the day. Various means were successively suggested for repressing the extravagances of the popular societies and the abuse of the right of petition. It was proposed to annex to Lindet's report an address to the French people, expressing in a still more precise and energetic manner the sentiments of the Assembly and the new course which it intended to pursue. This idea was adopted. Richard, who had just returned from the army, insisted that this was not enough; that it was necessary to govern vigorously; that addresses signified nothing, because all the makers of petitions would not fail to reply to them; and that people ought not to be suffered to use at the bar such language as in the streets would cause those who dared to utter it to be apprehended. "It is high time," said Bourdon of the Oise, "to address useful truths to you. Do you know why your armies are constantly victorious?—because they observe strict discipline. Have a good police in the state, and you will have a good government. Do you know whence proceed the everlasting attacks directed against yours?—from the abuse by your enemies of all that is democratic in your institutions. They take delight in reporting that you will never have a government—that you will be for ever involved in anarchy. It may then be possible that a nation constantly victorious should not know how to govern itself. And would the Convention, knowing that this alone prevents the completion of the Revolution, neglect to provide for it? No, no; let us undeceive our enemies. It is by the abuse of the

popular societies and of the right of petition that they aim at destroying us. It is this abuse that must be repressed."

Various expedients were submitted for repressing the abuse of popular societies without destroying them. Pelet, in order to deprive the Jacobins of the support of several Mountaineer deputies who belonged to their society, and especially Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and other dangerous leaders, proposed to forbid members of the Convention from becoming members of any popular society. This suggestion was adopted. But a great number of remonstrances arose from the Mountain. It was urged that the right of meeting, for the purpose of enlightening themselves on the subject of the public interests, was a right belonging to all the citizens, and of which a deputy could no more be deprived than any other member of the state; that consequently the decree adopted was a violation of an absolute and unassailable right. The decree was rescinded. Dubois-Crancé made another motion. Explaining the manner in which the Jacobins had purified themselves, he showed that this society contained within its bosom the very same persons who had misled it in the time of Robespierre. He maintained that the Convention had a right to purify it afresh, in the same way as it proceeded, by means of its commissioners in regard to the societies in the departments; and he proposed to refer the question to the competent committees, that they might devise a suitable mode of purification, and the means of rendering the popular societies useful. This new motion was also adopted.

This decree produced a great uproar at the Jacobins. They cried out that Dubois-Crancé had deceived the Convention; that the purification ordered after the 9th of Thermidor had been strictly executed; that nobody had a right to require a repetition of it; that among them all were worthy to sit in that illustrious society, which had rendered such services to the country; that, they did not shrink from the severest scrutiny, and were ready to submit to the investigation of the Convention. They decided, in consequence, that a list of all their members should be printed and carried to the bar by a deputation.

On the following day, the 13th of Vendemiaire, they were less tractable. They declared that the decision adopted the preceding evening was inconsiderate; that to deliver a list of the members of the society to the Assembly was to admit that it possessed the right of purification, which belonged to nobody; that, as all the citizens had a right to meet without arms, to confer together on questions of public interest, no individual could be declared unworthy of forming part of a society; that, consequently, purification was contrary to all rights, and no list ought to be furnished. "The popular societies," exclaimed Giot, a vehement Jacobin, and one of those who held appointments about the

armies, "the popular societies belong exclusively to themselves. Were it otherwise, the infamous court would have thinned that of the Jacobins, and you would have seen benches which ought to be occupied by virtue alone sullied by the presence of Jaucours and Feuillants. Now, the court itself, which spared nothing, durst not attack you, and shall that which the court dared not attempt be under taken at the moment when the Jacobins have sworn to overthrow all tyrants, be they who they may, and to be ever submissive to the Convention? I have just come from the departments; I can assure you that the existence of the popular societies is extremely endangered; I have been treated as a villain because the designation of Jacobin was inserted in my commission. I was told that I belonged to a society composed entirely of banditti. Secret intrigues are at work to separate from you the other societies of the republic. I have been so fortunate as to prevent the separation, and to strengthen the bonds of fraternity between you and the society of Bayonne, which Robespierre calumniated in your bosom. What I have said of one commune applies to all. Be prudent, continue to adhere to principles and to the Convention, and, above all, allow to no authority the right of weeding you." The Jacobins applauded this speech, and decided that they would not carry this list to the Convention, but await its decrees.

The electoral club was much more tumultuous. Since its last petition, it had been expelled from the Evêché, and had taken refuge in a room of the Museum, close to the Convention. There, in a nocturnal sitting, amid the furious shouts of those who attended it, and the yells of the women who filled the tribunes, it declared that the Convention had overstepped the duration of its powers; that it had been commissioned to try the late King and to frame a constitution; that it had done both; and that, consequently, its task was performed, and its powers were at an end.

These scenes at the Jacobins and at the electoral club were also denounced to the Convention, which referred the whole to the committees charged to submit to it a plan relative to the abuses of the popular societies. It had voted an address, agreeably to the suggestion made to it a few days before, and sent it to the sections and to all the communes of the republic. This address, couched in firm yet discreet language, repeated, in a more precise and positive manner, the sentiments expressed in Lindet's report. It became the subject of fresh struggles in the sections. The revolutionists wished to prevent its being read, and opposed the voting in reply of addresses of adhesion. They obtained the adoption, on the contrary, of addresses to the Jacobins, to assure them of the interest that was taken in their cause. It frequently happened that, after they had decided this vote, their adversaries received reinforcements, when they were expelled, and the section, thus renewed, came to a contrary de-

cision. Thus, too, there were several sections which presented two contrary addresses, one to the Jacobins, the other to the Convention. In one, the addressers extolled the services of the popular societies, and expressed wishes for their conservation; in the other, they said that the section, delivered from the yoke of anarchists and terrorists, came at length to express its free sentiments to the Convention, to offer its arms and its life, to put down at once those who would continue the system of Robespierre and the agents of royalism. The Convention listened to these addresses till the plan relative to the police of the popular societies should be promulgated.

It was presented on the 25th of Vendemiaire. Its principal object was to break the coalition formed in France by all the societies of the Jacobins. Affiliated with the parent society, corresponding regularly with it, they composed a vast party, skilfully organized, which had one centre and one direction. This it was that the plan in question aimed to destroy. The decree forbade "all affiliations and federations, as well as all correspondence under a collective name between popular societies." It purported, moreover, that no petitions or addresses could be made in a collective name, in order to put a stop to those imperious manifestoes, which the deputies of the Jacobins or of the electoral club brought and read at the bar, and which, in many instances, had become orders to the Assembly. Every address or petition was to be individually signed. The means of prosecuting the authors of dangerous propositions would thus be secured, and it was hoped that the necessity of signing would make them cautious. A list of the members of every society was to be prepared immediately, and hung up in its place of meeting. No sooner was this decree read to the Assembly, than a great number of voices were raised to oppose it. The authors of it, said the Mountaineers, aim at destroying the popular societies, forgetting that they have saved the Revolution and liberty, forgetting that they are the most powerful medium of uniting the citizens and keeping up their energy and patriotism: by forbidding their correspondence, they attack the essential right belonging to all the citizens of corresponding together, a right as sacred as that of meeting peaceably to confer on questions of public interest.

Lejeune, Duhem, and Crassous, all Jacobins, all deeply interested in setting aside this decree, were not the only deputies who thus expressed themselves. Thibaudeau,* a sin-

* "Antoine-Claire Thibaudeau was appointed, in 1792, deputy to the National Convention, where he voted for the King's death. After the fall of Robespierre he became one of the chiefs of that party which declared equally against the Montaineers and the Royalists. He presided in the Convention, was named secretary, and in October, 1794, procured the recall of Paine to that Assembly. In the following year he showed the greatest courage in repulsing the partial insurrections of the sections which took place. In 1796

cere republican, a stranger both to the Mountaineers and to the Thermidorians, appeared himself to dread the consequences of this decree, and moved its adjournment, apprehensive lest it might strike at the very existence of the popular societies. We wish not to destroy them, replied the Thermidorians, the authors of the decree; we only want to place them under the eye of the police. Amidst this conflict, Merlin of Thionville exclaimed, "President, call the opposers to order. They allege that we want to suppress the popular societies, whereas, all that is aimed at is to regulate their present relations." Rewbel, Bentabolle, Thuriot, demonstrated that there was no intention of suppressing them. Are they prevented, said they, from assembling peaceably and without arms, to confer on the public interests? Assuredly not; that right remains intact. They are only prevented from forming affiliations, federations, and no more is done in regard to them than has been already done in regard to the departmental authorities. These latter, according to the decree of the 14th of Frimaire, which institutes the revolutionary government, cannot correspond or concert together. Can the popular societies be allowed to do what has been forbidden to the departmental authorities? They are forbidden to correspond collectively, and no right is thereby violated: every citizen can assuredly correspond from one end of France to the other; but do the citizens correspond through a president and secretary? It is this official correspondence between powerful and constituted bodies that the decree aims, and with good reason, at preventing, in order to destroy a federalism more monstrous and more dangerous than that of the departments. It is by these affiliations, and by this correspondence, that the Jacobins have contrived to gain a real influence over the government, and a part in the direction of affairs, which ought to belong to the national representation alone.

Bourdon of the Oise, one of the leading members of the committee of general safety, and, as we have seen, a Thermidorian, frequently in opposition to his friends, exclaimed, "The popular societies are not the people. I see the people in the primary assemblies only. The popular societies are a collection of men, who have chosen themselves, like monks, and who have succeeded in forming an exclusive a permanent aristocracy, which assumes the name of the people, and which places itself beside the national representation, to suggest, to modify, or to

Thibaudeau was appointed president of the council of Five Hundred, and warmly opposed Tallien and his party. He retired from the legislative body in the year 1798, and was made prefect of the department of Gironde. In 1803 he was decorated with the cross of a Legionary, and subsequently appointed prefect of Marseilles, which office he held in 1806. He was the author of many works of no great note." — *Biographie Moderne.* His History of the Consulate of the Empire, lately published, in 10 vols. 8vo, is, however, a valuable performance. E.

oppose, its resolutions. By the side of the Convention, I see another representation springing up, and that representation has its seat at the Jacobins." Bourdon was here interrupted by applause. He proceeded in the following terms: "So little am I influenced by passion on this subject, that, in order to secure unity and peace, I would cheerfully say to the people, 'Choose between the men whom ye have appointed to represent you, and those who have arisen by the side them. What signifies it, so ye have a single uniform representation?'" Fresh applause interrupted the speaker. He resumed: "Yes," he exclaimed, "let the people choose between you and the men who have wanted to proscribe the representatives possessing the national confidence, between you and the men who, in connexion with the municipality of Paris, aimed a few months since at assassinating liberty. Citizens, would you make a durable peace? would you attain the ancient boundaries of Gaul? Present to the Belgians, to the people bordering the Rhine, a peaceable revolution, a republic without a double representation, a republic without revolutionary committees stained with the blood of citizens. Say to the Belgians, to the people of the Rhine, 'Ye wanted a partial liberty, we give it you entire, only sparing you the cruel calamities preceding its establishment, sparing you the sanguinary trials through which we have ourselves passed.' Consider, citizens, that, in order to deter the neighbouring nations from uniting with you, people declare that you have no government, and that, if they would treat with you, they know not whether to address themselves to the Convention or to the Jacobins. Give, on the contrary, unity and harmony to your government, and you will see that no nation is hostile to you and your principles; you will see that no nation hates liberty."

Duhem, Crassous, and Clausel, proposed at least the adjournment of the decree, saying that it was too important to be passed so suddenly. They all claimed permission to speak at once. Merlin of Thionville demanded leave to speak against them, with that ardour which he displayed in the tribune, as well as in the field of battle. The president decided that they should be heard in succession. Dubarran, Lavasseur, Romme,* also spoke

* "G. Romme, a farmer at Gimeaux, and an ancient professor of mathematics and philosophy, was born in 1750, and was deputed to the Convention, where he voted for the death of Louis, and showed himself a violent Jacobin. On the overthrow of the Mountain, he dissembled his principles for some time, but could not help showing, in the affair of Carrier, his disapprobation of the system of retribution which then prevailed. In the year 1795 Romme devoted himself more than ever to the cause of the Jacobins, and when the faubourgs rose in insurrection he showed himself one of their most ardent chiefs, and loudly demanded a return to the system of terror. For this, a decree of arrest was passed against him, and a military council condemned him to death. At the moment, however, when his sentence was read, he stabbed himself, and was supposed to be dead, which was the reason why he

against the decree; Thuriot in favour of it. At length Merlin again mounted the tribune. "Citizens," said he, "when the establishment of the republic was discussed, you decreed it without adjournment and without report. The question now before you is nothing less than to establish it a second time, by saving it from the popular societies which have coalesced against it. Citizens, we must not be afraid to enter that cavern in spite of the blood and the carcasses which obstruct the entrance. Dare to penetrate it, dare to drive out of it the villains and the murderers, and leave behind only the good citizens to weigh peacefully the great interests of the country. I exhort you to pass this decree, which saves the republic, as you did that which created it—that is, without adjournment or report."

Merlin was applauded, and the decree voted immediately, article by article. It was the first blow given to that celebrated society, which, up to this day, had struck terror into the Convention, and served to impart to it a revolutionary direction. It was not so much the provisions of the decree, which might be easily evaded, as the courage to pass it, that was of consequence here, and which could not but forewarn the Jacobins of their approaching end. Upon meeting in the evening in their hall, they commented on the decree and the manner in which it had been passed. Lejeune, the deputy, who in the morning had opposed its adoption with all his might, complained that he had not been seconded. He said that few members of the Assembly had spoken in defence of the society to which they belonged. "There are," said he, "members of the Convention, celebrated for their revolutionary and patriotic energy, who this day maintained a reprehensible silence. Those members are either guilty of tyranny, of which they are accused, or they have laboured for the public welfare. In the first case, they are culpable, and ought to be punished; in the second, their task is not finished. After they have prepared by their toils the successes of the defenders of the country, they ought to defend principles and the rights of the people when attacked. Two months ago, you talked incessantly in this tribune about the rights of the people, you, Collot and Billaud; why have ye now ceased to defend them? Why are ye silent, now that a multitude of objects claim the exercise of your courage and your intelligence?"

Ever since the accusation preferred against them, Billaud and Collot had observed a sullen silence. Being called upon by their colleague, Lejeune, and charged with having neglected to defend the society, they declared, in reply, that if they kept silence it was from prudence and not from weakness; that they

was not sent to the scaffold. It has since been believed that his friends, having taken him to some retreat, their cares restored him to life, and that he then went secretly into Russia, where he lived in utter obscurity. At the time of his condemnation Romme was forty-five years of age."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

were fearful of injuring by their support the cause which the patriots upheld; that, for some time past, the apprehension of doing mischief to the discussions had been the only motive of their reserve; that, moreover, being accused of domineering over the Convention, they meant to reply to their accusers by abstaining from all interference; that they were delighted to find themselves called upon by their colleagues to emerge from this voluntary nullity, and authorized, as it were, to devote themselves again to the cause of liberty and of the republic.

Satisfied with this explanation, the Jacobins applauded, and resumed the consideration of the law passed in the morning: they consoled themselves with saying that they would correspond with all France by means of the tribune. Goujon exhorted them to respect the law just enacted. They promised to do so, but one Terrasson proposed an expedient for carrying on their correspondence without violating the law. He recommended that a circular letter should be prepared, not written in the name of the Jacobins and addressed to other Jacobins, but *signed by all the free men meeting in the hall of the Jacobins, and addressed to all the free men in France meeting in popular societies.* The plan was adopted with great joy, and a circular of this kind was resolved upon.

We see how little the Jacobins cared about the threats of the Convention, and how far they were from a disposition to profit by the lesson that it had just given them. While waiting till new facts should provoke further measures in regard to them, the Convention set about the task which Robert Lindet had marked out for it in his report, and the discussion of the questions which he had proposed. That task consisted in repairing the mischievous effects of a violent system upon agriculture, commerce, and finances, in restoring security to all classes of society, and in reviving in them a love of order and industry. On these points the representatives were as divided in system, and as disposed to lose their temper, as on all other subjects.

The requisitions, the *maximum*, the assignats, the sequestration of the property of foreigners, provoked not less violent attacks upon the old government than the imprisonments and the executions. The Thermidorians, extremely ignorant on matters of public economy, made a point, from a spirit of reaction, of censuring in severe and insulting terms all that had been done in that department; and yet if, in the general administration of the state during the past year, there was any thing irreproachable and completely justified by necessity, it was the administration of the finances, provisions, and supplies. Cambon, the most influential member of the committee of finances, had brought the Exchequer into the best order; he had, it is true, caused a great quantity of assignats to be issued, but this was the only resource; and he had quarrelled with Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon, because he opposed various revolutionary

expenses. As for Lindet, who superintended the department of transport and requisitions, he had laboured with admirable zeal to obtain from abroad, or by requisitions in France the necessary supplies, and to convey them either to the armies or to the great communes. The medium of requisitions which he had been obliged to employ was violent, but it was admitted to be the only possible one, and Lindet had taken care to use it with the greatest tenderness. He could not be answerable either for the fidelity of all his agents or for the conduct of all those who had a right to levy requisitions, such as the municipal functionaries, the representatives, and the commissioners to the armies.

The Thermidorians, and Tallien in particular, made the most silly and the most unjust attacks on the general system of raising the means, and the mode of employing them. The primary cause of all the evils was, according to them, the too abundant issue of assignats; that inordinate issue had depreciated them, and they were now in excessive disproportion to the necessaries of life and commodities in general. Hence it was that the *maximum* had become so oppressive and so disastrous, because it obliged the seller or the reimbursed creditor to accept a nominal value, which was daily becoming more and more illusory. In all this there was nothing very new, nothing very useful; every body knew as much; but Tallien and his friends attributed the excessive issue to Cambon, and seemed thus to impute to him all the calamities of the state. To him they likewise attributed the sequestration of foreign property, a measure which, having provoked reprisals against the French, had suspended all circulation of paper, and every sort of credit, and had ruined commerce. As for the commission of supplies, the same censors accused it of having harassed France by requisitions, of having expended enormous sums abroad in purchasing corn, and of having nevertheless left Paris in a destitute state, at the approach of a severe winter. They proposed to call it to a severe account.

Cambon was a man whose integrity was acknowledged by all parties. With ardent zeal for the due administration of the finances, he united an impetuous temper, which an unjust reproach drove beyond all bounds. He had sent word to Tallien and his friends that he would not attack them if they left him alone, but that, if they hazarded a single calumny, he would give them no quarter. Tallien had the imprudence to add newspaper articles to his attacks from the tribune. Cambon could refrain no longer, and, in one of the numerous sittings spent in the discussion of these subjects, he rushed to the tribune, and thus apostrophized Tallien: "What! dost thou attack me? wouldst thou throw a cloud over my integrity? Well, then, I will prove that thou art a robber and a murderer. Thou hast not rendered thy accounts as secretary of the commune, and I have proof of this at the committee of the finances; thou hast authorized an expenditure of fifteen hundred thousand francs for an object

which will cover thee with infamy; thou hast not rendered thy accounts for thy mission to Bordeaux, and of all this too I have proof at the committee. Thou wilt ever be suspected of conniving at the crimes of September, and, by thine own words, I will prove to thee this connivance, which must for ever doom thee to silence." Cambon was interrupted: he was told that these personalities had nothing to do with the discussion, that nobody denied his integrity, that it was only his financial system that was censured. Tallien stammered out a few faltering words, and said that he would not reply to what related to himself personally, but only to so much as bore upon the general question. Cambon then demonstrated that the assignats had been the only resource of the Revolution; that the expenditure had amounted to three hundred millions per month; that, amidst the disorder which prevailed, the receipts had furnished scarcely one-fourth of that sum; that it was necessary to make up the deficiency every month with assignats; that the quantity in circulation was no secret, and amounted to six thousand four hundred millions; that, on the other hand, the national domains were worth twelve thousand millions, and afforded ample means for acquitting the republic; that he had, at the peril of his life, saved five hundred millions for expenses proposed by Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon; that he had long opposed the *maximum* and the sequestration; and that, as for the commission of commerce being obliged to pay for corn abroad at the rate of twenty-one francs per quintal and to sell it in France for fourteen, it was not wonderful that it should have incurred an enormous expense.

These controversies, so imprudent on the part of the Thermidorians, who, whether right or wrong, had not the most unblemished reputation, and who attacked a man of the purest honour, extensive information, and extremely violent temper, caused the Assembly a great waste of time. Though the Thermidorians had ceased these attacks, Cambon had no peace, but daily repeated in the tribune, "Accuse me! vile rabble! Come, then, examine my accounts, and judge of my conduct."—"Be quiet," cried one or the other to him; "nobody denies your integrity:" but he reverted to the subject every day. Amidst this conflict of personalities, the Assembly pursued, as far as lay in its power, the measures best adapted to repair or to mitigate the evil.

It ordered a general statement of the finances, exhibiting the receipts and the expenditure, and a memorial on the means of withdrawing a portion of the assignats, but still without recurring to demonetisation, in order not to discredit them. On the motion of Cambon, it renounced a paltry financial shift, which gave rise to many extortions, and disgusted the prejudices of many of the provinces—that of melting the Church plate. This plate had been at first estimated at one thousand millions. In

reality it did not amount to more than thirty. It was decided that it should no longer be allowed to be touched, and that it should remain in the custody of the communes. The Convention then strove to correct the most serious inconveniences of the *maximum*. Some voices already cried out for its abolition; but the fear of a disproportionate rise of prices prevented the Assembly from yielding to this impulse of the reactors. It merely considered how to modify the law. The *maximum* had contributed to ruin commerce, because, in conforming to the tariff, the merchants could not recover either the price of freight or that of insurance. In consequence, all colonial goods, all commodities of primary necessity, all raw materials imported from abroad, were released from the *maximum* and from requisitions, and might be sold at a free price to any person whatever. The same favour was granted to merchandise taken in prizes, which lay in the ports without finding a sale. The uniform *maximum* of corn was attended with an extremely serious inconvenience. The production of corn, being more costly and less abundant in certain provinces, the prices received by the farmers in those provinces did not even repay their expenses. It was decided that the price of corn should vary in each department, according to the standard of 1790, but that it should be two-thirds higher. In thus increasing the price of provisions, the intention was to raise the pay, the salaries, the income of small stockholders; but this idea, proposed in all sincerity by Cambon, was opposed as perfidious by Tallien, and adjourned.

The Assembly next turned its attention to the requisitions. That they might no longer be general, unlimited, or confused, that they might no longer exhaust the means of transport, it was decided that the commission of supplies should alone have authority to make requisitions; that it should not have power to lay under requisition the whole of any article, or the whole of the productions of any department, but that it should specify the object, its nature, its quantity, the time of delivery and of payment; that requisitions should be made in proportion to the want, and in the district nearest to that want. The representatives with the armies were alone empowered, in an emergency arising either from a want of provisions or a rapid movement, to make immediately the necessary requisitions.

The question of the sequestration of foreign property was warmly discussed. Some urged that war ought not to be extended from governments to subjects; that subjects ought to be suffered to continue peaceably their intercourse and their exchanges, and armies only ought to be attacked; that the French had seized only twenty-five millions, whereas one hundred millions of theirs had been seized; that they ought to return the twenty-five millions, that their hundred might be restored; that this measure was ruinous to our bankers, since they were obliged to pay into the Treasury what they owed to foreigners, while

they were not paid what foreigners owed them, the governments having seized it by way of reprisals; that this prolonged measure rendered French commerce suspicious even to neutrals; lastly, that, the circulation of paper having ceased, it was necessary to pay in money for part of the goods procured from the neighbouring countries. The others replied that, since it was proposed to separate subjects from governments in war, it would be right in future to direct bullets and cannon-balls at the heads of kings only, and not at those of their soldiers; that it would be necessary to restore to English commerce the vessels taken by our privateers, and to keep only the ships of war; that, if we were to restore the twenty-five millions sequestrated, the example would not be followed by the hostile governments, and the hundred millions of French property would still be retained; and that to re-establish the circulation of bills would only be to furnish the emigrants with the means of receiving funds.

The Convention durst not cut the knot of this question, and merely decided that the sequestration should be taken off in regard to the Belgians, whom conquest had in some measure placed in a state of peace with France, and in regard to the merchants of Hamburg, who were innocent of the war declared by the Empire, and whose bills represented corn sold by them to France.

To all these reparatory measures, adopted for the benefit of agriculture and commerce, the Convention added all those which were likely to restore security and to recall the merchants. A decree outlawed all who had withdrawn themselves either from trial or from the application of a law. Thus the persons condemned by the revolutionary commissions, the suspected who had concealed themselves, could return to their homes. To the suspected who were still detained in confinement the management of their property was restored. Lyons was declared to be no longer in a state of rebellion; its name was restored to it; the demolitions of houses ceased; the goods destined for it, and which had been sequestrated by the surrounding communes, were given up; its merchants no longer needed certificates of citizenship to receive or despatch merchandise; the circulation was therefore renewed for that unfortunate city. The members of the popular commission of Bordeaux and their adherents, that is to say almost all the merchants of that place, had been outlawed: this decree was repealed. A column of disgrace was to be raised at Caen in memory of federalism: it was decided that it should not be erected. Sedan was allowed to manufacture cloths of all qualities. The departments of the North, the Pas-de-Calais, the Aisne, and the Somme, were relieved from the land-tax for four years, on condition of their re-establishing the cultivation of flax and hemp. Lastly, a glance was extended towards unfortunate La Vendée. Hentz and Francastel the representatives, General Tur-

reau, and several others, who had executed the formidable decrees of terror, were recalled. It was alleged, as it was but natural, that they were the accomplices of Robespierre and of the committee of public welfare, who, in employing cruelty, had wished to make the war in La Vendée last for ever. It is not known why the committee should have had such an intention; but parties repay absurdity with absurdity. Vimeux was appointed to command in La Vendée, and young Hoche in Bretagne. Fresh representatives were sent to those countries, with directions to ascertain if it would be possible to induce the inhabitants to accept an amnesty and thus to bring about a pacification.*

We see how rapid and how general was the return to different sentiments. It was but natural that, when turning its attention to all sorts of evils, to all classes of proscribed persons, that the assembly should think also of its own members. For upwards of a year, seventy-three of them had been imprisoned at Port-Libre for having signed a protest against the proceedings on the 31st of May. They had written a letter, demanding a trial. All who were left of the right side, part of the members of what was called the Belly, rose upon a question which concerned the security of voting, and demanded the release of their colleagues. Then one of those stormy and interminable discussions ensued which almost always arise when past transactions are referred to. "You mean, then, to condemn the proceedings of the 31st of May," exclaimed the Mountaineers; "you mean to stigmatize an event which up to this moment you have proclaimed glorious and salutary; you want to raise a faction, which by its opposition had nearly undone the republic; you want to revive federalism!!!" The Thermidorians, authors or approvers of the events of the 31st of May, were embarrassed, and, to postpone the decision, a report upon the seventy-three was ordered.

It is in the nature of reactions to seek not only to repair the mischief done, but also to take revenge. The trial of Lebon and Fouquier-Tinville was every day demanded, as that of Billaud, Collot, Barrère, Vadier, Amar, Vouland, David, members of the old committees, had already been. Time was continually bringing propositions of this kind. The drownings of Nantes, which had long remained unknown, were at length revealed. One hundred and thirty-three inhabitants of that city, sent to

* "When the amnesty was talked of, the Vendean officers came with their arms and white cockades to Nantes; many were so imprudent as to deride publicly the republican habits and opinions, and even to spit upon the tricoloured cockade, and give other rash provocations. The representatives who had come to treat at Nantes, were but slightly offended by these proceedings, and only expressed their fears that such conduct might retard the pacification. Nothing could exceed the attention shown to the Vendeans liberated from prison, or applying for the amnesty, and it was even forbidden on pain of three days' imprisonment, to call them brigands. In the quaint language of the day, the representatives ordered that we should be called 'Misled Brethren.' The amnesty once agreed upon, moderation became the order of the day." —*Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein.* E.

Paris, to be tried by the revolutionary tribunal, not having arrived till after the 9th of Thermidor, had been acquitted, and all the revelations which they had to make respecting the calamities of their city were listened to. Such was the public indignation, that it was found necessary to summon the revolutionary committee of Nantes to Paris. The proceedings disclosed all the usual atrocities of civil war. In Paris, at a distance from the theatre of the war, people had no conception that ferocity had been carried to such a length. The accused had but one plea, which they opposed to all the charges preferred against them—La Vendée at their gates, and the orders of Carrier, the representative. Seeing that the end of the proceedings drew near, they daily inveighed more and more vehemently against Carrier, insisting that he should share their fate and be called to account for the acts which he had ordered. The public in general demanded the apprehension of Carrier and his trial before the revolutionary tribunal. The Convention was obliged to come to some decision. The Mountaineers asked, if, after having already imprisoned Lebon and David, and several times accused Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, it was not intended to prosecute all the deputies who had been sent on missions. To dispel their fears, a decree was passed relative to the formalities to be employed, whenever there was occasion to institute proceedings against a member of the national representation. This decree was long discussed, and with the greatest animosity on both sides. The Mountaineers, in order to prevent a new decimation, were for rendering the formalities long and difficult. Those who were called reactors, wished, on the contrary, to simplify them, in order to render the punishment of certain deputies, who were styled proconsuls, more speedy and more certain. It was finally decreed that every denunciation should be referred to the three committees, of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, that they might decide whether there was ground for inquiry; that, in case of an affirmative decision, a sort of commission of twenty-one members should be formed to make a report; that, after this report and the exculpatory defence of the accused deputy, the Convention should decide whether there was ground for the accusation, and send the deputy before the competent tribunal.

As soon as the decree was passed, the three committees declared that there was ground for examination against Carrier: a commission of twenty-one members was formed; it took possession of the documents, summoned Carrier before it, and commenced the proceedings. After what had passed before the revolutionary tribunal, and the knowledge which every body had acquired of the facts, the fate of Carrier could not be doubtful. The Mountaineers, though they condemned the crimes of Carrier, alleged that the real intention was not to punish those crimes, but to commence a long series of persecutions against the men whose energy had saved France. Their adversaries, on

the contrary, hearing the members of the revolutionary committee daily demand the appearance of Carrier, and observing the procrastination of the commission of twenty-one, cried out that there was a wish to save him. The committee of general safety, apprehensive lest he should escape, had surrounded him with police-agents, who never lost sight of him. Carrier, however, had no thoughts of flight. Some revolutionists had secretly exhorted him to escape, but he had not resolution sufficient to adopt any such step. He appeared to be overwhelmed, and, as it were, paralyzed by the public horror. One day, perceiving that he was followed, he went up to one of the agents, asked why he was watched, and pointed a pistol at him: a scuffle ensued, the armed force interfered, and Carrier was seized and conducted to his abode. This scene excited a great murmur in the Assembly, and violent complaints at the Jacobins. It was said that the national representation had been violated in the person of Carrier, and an explanation was demanded from the committee of general safety. That committee explained how the circumstances happened, and though severely censured, it had at least occasion to prove that there was no intention to favour the escape of Carrier. The commission of twenty-one at length made its report, and concluded that there was ground for accusation before the revolutionary tribunal. Carrier feebly strove to defend himself:* he threw the blame of all the cruelties on the exasperation produced by the civil war, on the necessity of striking terror into La Vendée which still assumed a threatening aspect, lastly, on the impulse communicated by the committee of public welfare, to which he durst not impute the drownings, but to which he attributed that inspiration of ferocious energy which had hurried away several of the commissioners of the Convention. Here dangerous questions, which had already been several times raised, were again revived. The assembly found itself liable to be involved once more in the discussion of the part which each had acted in the violent scenes of the Revolution; the commissioners might throw upon the committees, the committees on the Convention, and the Convention on France, the blame of that inspiration which had produced such frightful but such great results, and which belonged to every body, but above all to a situation without parallel. "Every body and every thing," said Carrier in a moment of despair, "is guilty here, even to the president's bell." The tale of the atrocities committed at Nantes had, however, excited such indignation that not one

* "Carrier laid his cruelties to the account of the cruelties of the Vendeans themselves. 'When I acted,' said he, 'the air seemed still to ring with the civic songs of twenty thousand martyrs, who had repeated, Long live the Republic! in the midst of tortures. How could expiring humanity have made herself heard in those terrible times? What would they who now rise against me have done if they had been placed in my situation? I have saved the republic at Nantes. I have lived for my country alone, and I now know how to die for it."—*Mignet*. E.

member durst defend Carrier, or even thought of screening him by general considerations. He was unanimously decreed to be under accusation, and sent to the revolutionary tribunal.

Thus the reaction was making rapid strides. The blows which its authors had not yet dared to strike at the members of the old committees of government, they were about to aim at Carrier. All the members of the revolutionary committees, all those of the Convention who had fulfilled missions, in short, all the men who had been invested with rigorous functions, began to tremble for themselves.

The Jacobins, already struck by a decree which forbade their affiliation and correspondence in a collective name, had need of prudence; but since the late events it was not probable that they would be able to contain themselves and to avoid a struggle with the Convention and the Thermidorians. What had passed in regard to Carrier led in fact to a stormy meeting of their club. Crassous, a deputy and a Jacobin, drew a sketch of the means employed by the aristocracy to ruin the patriots. "The trial now going forward before the revolutionary tribunal," said he, "is its principal resource, and that on which it places the greatest reliance. The accused are scarcely allowed a hearing before that tribunal; the witnesses are almost all of them persons interested in making a great noise about this affair; some have passports signed by Chouans; the newspaper-writers and the pamphleteers have joined to exaggerate the most trifling facts, to mislead public opinion, and to keep out of sight the cruel circumstances which produced and which explain the misfortunes that happened not at Nantes only but throughout all France. If the Convention does not take care, it will find itself dishonoured by these aristocrats, who make such a noise about this trial merely to throw all the odium of it upon the assembly. It is not the Jacobins who must now be accused of wishing to dissolve the Convention, but those men who have coalesced to compromise and to degrade it in the eyes of France. Let, then, all good patriots beware. The attack on them is already begun. Let them close their ranks and be ready to defend themselves with energy."

Several Jacobins spoke after Crassous, and repeated nearly the same sentiments. "People talk," said they, "of shootings and drownings, but they do not recollect that the individuals for whom they feel pity had furnished succours to the banditti. They do not recollect the cruelties perpetrated on our volunteers, who were hanged upon trees and shot in files. If vengeance is demanded for the banditti, let the families of two hundred thousand republicans, mercilessly slaughtered, come also to demand vengeance." There was great excitement. The sitting became an absolute tumult, when Billaud-Varennes, whom the Jacobins reproached for his sullen silence, took his turn to speak. "The course of the counter-revolutionists," said he, "is known. When,

in the time of the Constituent Assembly, they wanted to bring the Revolution to trial, they called the Jacobins disorganizers, and shot them in the Champ de Mars. After the 2nd of September, when they wanted to prevent the establishment of the republic, they called them quaffers of blood, and loaded them with atrocious calumnies. They are now recommencing the same machinations; but let them not expect to triumph. The patriots have been able to keep silence for a moment; but the lion is not dead when he slumbers, and when he awakes he exterminates all his enemies. The trenches are opened, the patriots are about to rouse themselves, and to resume all their energy: we have already risked our lives a thousand times; if the scaffold yet awaits us, let us recollect that it was the scaffold which covered the immortal Sidney with glory."

This speech electrified all minds. Billaud-Varennes was applauded, and his colleagues thronged around him, vowing to make common cause with the threatened patriots, and to defend themselves to the last extremity.*

In the existing state of parties such a sitting could not fail to excite great attention. These words of Billaud-Varennes's, who had hitherto abstained from showing himself in either of the two tribunes, were a real declaration of war. The Thermidorians actually regarded them as such. Next day, Bentabolle, snatching up the *Journal de la Montagne*, containing a report of the sitting of the Jacobins, denounced these expressions of Billaud-Varennes's: *The lion is not dead when he slumbers, and when he awakes he exterminates all his enemies.* Scarcely had Bentabolle finished reading this sentence, when the Mountaineers took fire, loaded him with abuse, and told him that he was one of those who had procured the release of the aristocrats. Duhem called him a scoundrel. Tallien warmly insisted that Bentabolle should be heard, but the latter, alarmed at the tumult, would have descended from the tribune. He was, however, persuaded to stay, and he then proposed that Billaud-Varennes should be required to explain what he meant by the *awaking of the lion.* Billaud said a few words from his place. "To the tribune!" was shouted from all quarters. He refused, but was at length obliged to ascend and to address the Assembly. "I shall not disavow," said he, "the opinion that I expressed at the Jaco-

* "That ancient revolutionary cavern, the Jacobin club, now once again heard its roof resound with denunciations by which Billaud-Varennes and others devoted to the infernal deities those who, they complained, wished to involve all honest republicans with sanguinary charges brought against Robespierre and his friends. Their threats, however, were no longer rapidly followed by the thunderbolts which used to attend such flashes of Jacobin eloquence. Men's homes were now in comparison safe. A man might be named in a Jacobin club as an aristocrat or a moderate, and yet live."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

bins. While I conceived that the question related to private quarrels only, I kept silence; but I could no longer hold my tongue when I saw the aristocracy rise up more threatening than ever." At the last words, there was a burst of laughter in one of the tribunes, and a noise was made in the other. "Turn out the Chouans!" was shouted from the Mountain. Billaud continued amidst the applause of some and the murmurs of others. He said, in a faltering voice, that well-known royalists had been released and the purest patriots imprisoned; he mentioned Madame de Tourzel, governess of the children of the royal family, who had just been liberated, and who might of herself form a nucleus of counter-revolution. At the concluding words, fresh bursts of laughter arose. He added that the secret conduct of the committees belied the public language of the addresses of the Convention; that, in such a state of things, he was justified in talking of the necessary awaking of the patriots, for it is the sleep of men over their rights that leads them to slavery.

Some cheers were given by the Mountain in favour of Billaud, but part of the tribunes and of the Assembly burst into a violent fit of laughter, and felt only that pity which is excited by prostrate power, stammering forth empty words for its justification. Tallien hastened to succeed Billaud, and to repel his charges. "It is high time," said he, "to reply to those men who would fain direct the hands of the people against the Convention."—"Nobody tries to do so," cried some voices in the hall. "Yes, yes," rejoined others, "there are those who wish to direct the hands of the people against the Convention."—"It is those men," continued Tallien, "who are alarmed at seeing the sword suspended over guilty heads, at seeing light thrown upon all the departments of the administration, the vengeance of the laws ready to alight upon assassins—it is those men who are now bestirring themselves, who pretend that the people ought to awake, who strive to mislead the patriots by persuading them that they are all compromised; and, finally, who hope, by favour of a general commotion, to prevent the prosecution of the accomplices or abettors of Carrier." Universal applause interrupted Tallien. Billaud, indignant at the charge of collusion with Carrier, exclaimed from his place, "I declare that I have never approved the conduct of Carrier." No notice was taken of this protest of Billaud's; Tallien was applauded, and thus resumed: "It is impossible to suffer any longer two rival authorities, to permit members who are silent here to go elsewhere immediately and to denounce all that you have done."—"No, no," cried several voices, "no rival authorities to the Convention."—"People must not," proceeded Tallien, "be allowed to go to any place whatever to pour forth ignominy upon the Convention, and upon those of its members to whom it has committed the government. I shall draw no conclusion," added he, "at this moment. It is

sufficient that this tribune has replied to what has been said in another; it is sufficient that the unanimity of the Convention be strongly expressed against bloodthirsty men."

Fresh plaudits proved to Tallien that the Assembly was determined to second any measures that might be proposed against the Jacobins. Bourdon of the Oise supported the sentiments of the last speaker, though he differed on many questions from his friends the Thermidorians. Legendre also raised his energetic voice. "Who are they," said he, "that blame our operations? —a handful of *men of prey*. Look them in the face. You will see that theirs is covered with a varnish composed of the gall of tyrants." These expressions, alluding to the gloomy and bilious countenance of Billaud-Varennes, were loudly applauded. "What have you to complain of," continued Legendre, "you, who are constantly accusing us? Is it because citizens are no longer sent to prison by hundreds? because the guillotine no longer despatches fifty, sixty, or eighty persons per day? Ah! I must confess that on this point our pleasure differs from yours, and that our manner of sweeping the prisons is not the same. We have visited them ourselves; we have made, as far as it was possible to do so, a distinction between the aristocrats and the patriots; if we have done wrong, here are our heads to answer for it. But while we make reparation for crimes, while we are striving to make you forget that those crimes are your own, why do you go to a notorious society to denounce us, and to mislead the people who attend there, fortunately in no great number? I move," added Legendre, as he concluded, "that the Convention take measures for preventing its members from going and preaching up rebellion at the Jacobins." The Convention adopted Legendre's proposition, and directed the committees to submit those measures to its consideration.

The Convention and the Jacobins were thus arrayed against each other, and in this state, when words were exhausted, there was nothing left but to strike. The intention to destroy that celebrated society* began to be no longer doubtful. It was only necessary that the committees should have the courage to propose that measure. The Jacobins were aware of this, and complained in all their sittings that there was an evident determination to dissolve them. They likened the existing government to Leopold, to Brunswick, and to Coburg, who had demanded their dissolution. One assertion, in particular, made in the tribune,

* "Though the Jacobin society had most essentially served the cause of the republic at a time when it was necessary, in order to repel the attacks of Europe, to place the government in the hands of the multitude, yet, at the present crisis, it could have no other effect than to counteract the existing order of things. Its destruction had now become necessary, for the position of affairs was changed, and it was fit that liberty should succeed to club dictatorship."—*Mignet*. E.

had furnished them with a fertile text for representing themselves as calumniated and attacked. It was alleged that letters had been intercepted containing proofs that the committee of emigrants in Switzerland was in correspondence with the Jacobins of Paris. Had it been said that the emigrants wished for commotions which should obstruct the march of the government, that would no doubt have been correct. A letter seized upon an emigrant stated in fact that the hope of conquering the Revolution by arms was insane, and that its adversaries ought to seek to destroy it by its own disorders. But if, on the contrary, people went so far as to suppose that the Jacobins and the emigrants corresponded and concerted together to attain the same end, they said what was equally absurd and ridiculous, and the Jacobins desired nothing better. Accordingly, they never ceased, for several days, to declare that they were calumniated; and Duhem, at several different times, insisted that those pretended letters should be read from the tribune.

The agitation in Paris was extreme. Numerous groups, some starting from the Palais Royal and composed of young men with double queues and black collars, others from the faubourg St. Antoine, the Rues St. Denis and St. Martin, and all the quarters where the Jacobins preponderated, met at the Carrousel, in the garden of the Tuileries, in the Place de la Révolution. Some shouted, *The Convention for ever! Down with the Terrorists and Robespierre's tail!*—others replied with cries of *The Convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever! Down with the aristocrats!* They had their peculiar songs. The gilded youth had adopted an air which was called the *Réveil du Peuple;* the partisans of the Jacobins sang that old air of the Revolution rendered famous by so many victories: *Allons, enfans de la patrie.* These adverse groups met; they sang their appropriate songs; then set up hostile shouts, and frequently attacked one another with stones and sticks. Blood was spilt, and prisoners were taken and delivered by both parties to the committee of general safety. The Jacobins declared that this committee, composed entirely of Thermidorians, released the young men who were sent to it, and detained the patriots only.

These scenes lasted for several successive days, and at length became so alarming that the committees of government took measures of safety, and doubled the guard at all the posts. On the 19th of Brumaire (November 9, 1794) the assemblages were still more numerous and more considerable than on the preceding days. A party, setting out from the Palais Royal, and passing through the rue St. Honoré, had proceeded to the hall of the Jacobins and surrounded it. The concourse kept continually increasing, all the avenues were choked up, and the Jacobins, who were just then sitting, might fairly conceive themselves besieged. Some groups that were favourable to them had shouted, *The*

Convention for ever! the Jacobins for ever! and had been answered by the contrary cries. A battle ensued, and, as the young men were the stronger, they soon succeeded in dispersing all the hostile groups. They then surrounded the hall of the club, and broke the windows with stones. Large flints had already fallen amidst the assembled Jacobins. The latter, enraged, cried out that they should be murdered; and, availing themselves of the presence of some members of the Convention, they declared that the national representation was about to be slaughtered. The women, who filled their tribunes, and who were called the Furies of the Guillotine, attempted to leave the hall, to escape the danger; but the young men who beset it seized those who endeavoured to get away, subjected them to the most indecent treatment, and even cruelly chastised some of them.* Several had gone back into the hall in a wretched plight, with dishevelled hair, saying that they should be assassinated. Stones were still showered upon the assembly. The Jacobins then resolved to sally forth and fall upon the assailants. The energetic Duhem, armed with a stick, put himself at the head of one of these sorties, and the consequence was a tremendous fray in the rue St. Honoré. Had the weapons on both sides been destructive, a massacre must have ensued. The Jacobins returned with some prisoners whom they had taken: the young men left outside threatened, if their comrades were not set at liberty, to break into the hall and to take signal vengeance on their adversaries.

This scene had lasted several hours before the committees of the government had assembled and could give orders. Several messengers from the Jacobins had brought word to the committee of general safety that the deputies attending the meeting of the society were in danger of their lives. The four committees of public welfare, general safety, legislation, and war, met and resolved to send patroles immediately to extricate their colleagues who were compromised in this scene, which was more scandalous than murderous.

The patroles set out, with a member of each committee, for the scene of the combat. It was then eight o'clock. The members of the committees who were at the head of the patroles did not order them to charge the assailants, as the Jacobins desired; neither would they enter the hall, as their colleagues there urged them to do; they remained outside, exhorting the young men to disperse, and promising to take care that their

* "On this occasion the female Jacobins came to rally and assist their male associates, whereupon several of them were seized and punished in a manner which might excellently suit their merits, but which shows that the young associates for maintaining order were not sufficiently aristocratic to be under the absolute restraints imposed by the rules of chivalry. It is impossible, however, to grudge the flagellation administered on this memorable occasion." *Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

comrades should be released. By degrees they succeeded in dispersing the groups; they then made the Jacobins leave the hall, and sent every body home.

Tranquillity being restored, they returned to their colleagues, and the four committees passed the night in deliberating upon what course to pursue. Some were for suspending the Jacobins, others opposed that measure. Thuriot, in particular, though one of those who had attacked Robespierre on the 9th of Thermidor, began to be alarmed at the reaction, and seemed to lean towards the Jacobins. The committees separated without coming to any resolution.

In the morning (Brumaire 20) a most violent scene took place in the Assembly. Duhem was the first, as it may naturally be supposed, to insist that the patriots had been well-nigh murdered on the preceding evening, and that the committee of general safety had not done its duty. The tribunes, taking part in the discussion, made a tremendous noise, and seemed, on the one hand, to confirm, on the other, to deny, the statements. The disturbers were turned out, and, immediately afterwards, a number of members demanded permission to speak; Bourdon of the Oise, Rewbel,* and Clausel, in behalf of the committee; Duhem, Duroy, Bentabolle, against it. Each spoke in his turn, stated the facts in his own way, and was interrupted by the contradictions of those who had viewed them in a contrary light. Some had only perceived groups maltreating the patriots; others had only met with groups maltreating the young men, and abusing the Convention and the committees. Duhem, who could scarcely contain himself during these discussions, cried out that the blows had been directed by the aristocrats, who dined at the house of Cabarus, and who went a-hunting at Raincy. He was not suffered to speak, and, amidst this conflict of contrary assertions, it was evident that the committees, notwithstanding their readiness to meet and to collect the armed force, had not been able to send it to the spot till very late; that, when the patroles were at length sent towards the rue St. Honoré, they did not attempt to extricate the Jacobins by force, but had been content to disperse the concourse by degrees; that, in short, they had shown a very natural indulgence for groups shouting *The Convention for ever!* and in which it was not asserted that the government was under the sway of

* "Rewbel who inveighed bitterly against the Jacobins, said, 'Where has tyranny been organized? At the Jacobins. Where has it found its supporters and its satellites? At the Jacobins. Who have covered France with mourning, carried despair into families, filled the country with prisons, and rendered the republic so odious, that a slave pressed down by the weight of his irons would refuse to live under it? The Jacobins. Who regret the frightful government under which we have lived? The Jacobins. If you have not now the courage to declare yourselves, you have no longer a republic, because you have Jacobins."—*Mignet*. E.

the counter-revolutionists. What more could have been well expected of them? To preserve their enemies from maltreatment was their duty; but to insist on their charging with the bayonet their own friends, that is to say, the young men who daily came in numbers to support them against the revolutionists, was requiring too much. They declared to the Convention that they had passed the night in discussing the question whether the Jacobins ought to be suspended or not. They were asked if they had yet formed any plan, and, on their reply that they were not yet agreed, the whole was referred to them, that they might come to some decision, and then communicate it to the Assembly.

The 20th was rather quieter, because there was no sitting at the Jacobins; but, on the 21st, the day for their meeting, the assemblages of people indicated that both sides were prepared, and it was evident that they would come to blows in the evening. The four committees immediately met, suspended by an ordinance the sittings of the Jacobins, and ordered the keys of the hall to be brought forthwith to the secretary's office of the committee of general safety.

The order was obeyed, the hall locked up, and the keys carried to the secretary's office. This measure prevented the tumult that was apprehended. The assemblages dispersed, and the night was perfectly quiet. Next day, Laignelot came to communicate to the Convention, in the name of the four committees, the resolution which they had adopted. "We never had any intention to attack the popular societies," said he, "but we have a right to close the doors of places where factions arise, and where civil war is preached up." The Convention hailed him with applause. A call of the Assembly was demanded, and the ordinance was sanctioned almost unanimously, amidst acclamations and shouts of *The Republic for ever! The Convention for ever!*

Such was the end of that society whose name had continued to be so celebrated and so odious, and which, like all the assemblies, like all the men, who successively appeared on the stage, nay, like the Revolution itself, had the merit and the faults of extreme energy.* Placed below the Convention, open to all new comers, it was the arena to which the young revolutionists who had not yet figured, and who were impatient to show themselves, repaired to try their strength, and to accelerate the usually

* "Thus fell the club of the Jacobins, the victim of the crimes it had sanctioned, and the reaction it had produced. Within its walls all the great changes of the Revolution had been prepared, and all its principal scenes rehearsed; from its energy the triumph of the democracy had sprung; and from its atrocity its destruction arose—a signal proof of the tendency of revolutionary violence to precipitate its supporters into crime, and render them at last the victims of the atrocities which they have committed."—*Alison.* E.

slower progress of the revolutionists who had already attained power. So long as there was need of fresh subjects, fresh talents, fresh lives ready to be sacrificed, the society of the Jacobins was serviceable, and furnished such men as the Revolution wanted in that terrible and sanguinary struggle. But, when the Revolution, having arrived at its final term, began to retrograde, the ardent men whom it had produced, and who had survived that violent action, were driven back into the society of the Jacobins. It soon became troublesome by its alarm, and dangerous even by its terrors. It was then sacrificed by the men who sought to bring back the Revolution from the extreme term to which it had been urged, to a middle course of reason, equity, and liberty, and who, blinded by hope, like all the men who act, conceived that they could fix it in that desirable middle track.

They were certainly right in striving to return to moderation; and the Jacobins were right in telling them that they were running into counter-revolution. As revolutions, like a pendulum violently agitated, go from one extreme to another, we have always ground to predict that they will run into excesses, but, fortunately, political societies, after having violently oscillated in a contrary direction, subside at length into an equable and justly limited movement. But, before they arrive at that happy epoch, what time! what calamities! what bloodshed! Our predecessors, the English, had to endure the infliction of a Cromwell and two Stuarts.

The dispersed Jacobins were not the men to shut themselves up in private life, and to renounce political agitation. Some betook themselves to the electoral club, which, driven from the Evêché by the committees, held its meetings in one of the halls of the Museum. Others went to the faubourg St. Antoine, to the popular society of the section of the Quinze-Vingts. There the most conspicuous and the most violent men of the faubourg met. Thither the Jacobins repaired in a body on the 24th of Brumaire, saying, "Brave citizens of the faubourg Antoine! you who are the only supporters of the people, you see the unfortunate Jacobins under persecution. We apply to be admitted into your society. We said to one another, 'Let us go to the faubourg Antoine, we shall there be unassailable; united we shall strike surer blows to preserve the people and the Convention from slavery.'" They were all admitted without examination, made use of the most violent and the most dangerous language, and several times read this article of the declaration of rights: *When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties.*

The committees, which had tried their strength and felt themselves capable of acting vigorously, did not deem it necessary to pursue the Jacobins into their asylum, but allowed them to em-

ploy empty words, holding themselves in readiness to act at the first signal, if those words should be followed up by deeds.

Most of the sections of Paris took courage and expelled from their bosom the Terrorists, as they were called, who retired towards the Temple, and to the faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau. Delivered from this opposition, they prepared numerous addresses congratulating the Convention on the energy which it had just displayed against *Robespierre's accomplices.* Similar addresses poured in from almost all the towns, and the Convention, thus borne along in the direction which it had lately taken, pursued it the more freely. The seventy-three, whose release had been already demanded, were loudly called for every day by the members of the centre and of the right side, who were anxious to reinforce themselves with seventy-three voices, and above all, to ensure the liberty of the vote by recalling their colleagues. They were at length released and reinstated in their seats; the Convention, without explaining its sentiments concerning the events of the 31st of May, declared that people might have differed in opinion on that subject from the majority, without on that account being guilty. They entered in a body, with old Dussaulx at their head. He acted as spokesman, and declared that, in resuming their seats by their colleagues, they laid aside all resentment, and were actuated solely by the wish to promote the public welfare. This step taken, it was too late to stop. Louvet, Lanjuinais,* Henri Larivière, Doulcet, Isnard, all the Girondins who had escaped the proscription, and many of whom were hidden in caverns, wrote and demanded their reinstatement. On this subject a violent scene took place. The Thermidorians, alarmed at the rapidity of the reaction, paused and checked the right side, which, conceiving that it needed them, durst not displease them, and ceased to insist. It was decreed that the proceedings against the outlawed deputies should be dropped, but that they should not return into the bosom of the Assembly.

The same spirit which caused some to be absolved led of necessity to the condemnation of others. An old deputy, named Raffron, exclaimed that it was high time to prosecute all who were guilty, and to prove to France that the Convention was not the accomplice of murderers. He moved that Lebon and David, both of whom had been apprehended, should be immediately brought to trial. What had occurred in the South, and especially at Bédouin, having become known, a report and an act of accusation against Maignet were demanded. A great number of voices insisted on the trial of Fouquier-Tinville, and on the in-

* "Lanjuinais was the bravest and best man that the Revolution produced. He was proscribed with the Girondins, but escaped; and survived to exhibit the independent moderation of his character, through all the phases of the Revolution, even down to the restoration."—*Quarterly Review.* E.

stitution of proceedings against the former minister at war, Bouchotte, who had thrown open the war-office to the Jacobins. The same course was called for against Pache, the ex-mayor, an accomplice, it was alleged, of the Hebertists, and saved by Robespierre. Amidst this torrent of attacks upon the revolutionary leaders, the three principal chiefs, who had long been defended, could not fail at length to fall. Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, being accused anew and in a formal manner by Legendre, could not escape the general fate. The committees could not help receiving the denunciation and giving their opinion. Lecointre, at first declared to be a calumniator, gave notice that the documents with which he was at first not provided, he had since got printed: they were referred to the committees. The latter, hurried along by the force of opinion, durst not resist, and declared that there was ground for investigation in the case of Collot, Billaud, and Barrére, but not against Vadier, Vouland, Amar, and David.

The proceedings against Carrier, which had long been proceeding, before the public that ill disguised the spirit of reaction by which it was influenced, closed at last on the 5th of Nivose (December 25). Carrier and two members of the revolutionary committee of Nantes, Pinel and Grand-Maison, were condemned to death as agents and accomplices of the system of terror.* The others were acquitted, their participation in the drownings being excused on the ground of obedience to their superiors. Carrier, persisting to assert that the entire Revolution, and those who had effected, suffered, and directed it were as guilty as he, was conveyed to the scaffold. He recovered resignation at the fatal moment, and received death with composure and courage. In proof of the blind excitement of civil wars, several traits of character were mentioned demonstrating that Carrier, before his mission to Nantes, was by no means of a bloodthirsty disposition. The revolutionists, at the same time that they condemned his conduct, were alarmed at his fate; they could not conceal from themselves that this execution was the commencement of the bloody reprisals preparing for them by the counter-revolution. Besides the prosecutions directed against the representatives who had been members of the old committees, or sent on missions, other laws, lately enacted, proved that vengeance was about to descend lower, and that the inferiority of the part would not save them. A decree required all those who had held any function whatever, and had the handling of the public money, to give an account of their management. Now, as all the members of the revolutionary committees and of the municipalities had formed chests with the produce of the taxes, with

* "Out of five hundred members, four hundred and ninety-eight voted in favour of the sentence of death against Carrier, the remaining two were also in favour of it, but conditionally."—*Hazlitt.* E.

the church plate, and with the revolutionary imposts, for the purpose of organizing the first battalions of volunteers, paying the revolutionary armies, defraying the expense of transport, carrying on the police—in short, for a thousand causes of that nature, it was evident that every individual functionary during the system of terror would be amenable to inquiry.

To these well-founded apprehensions were added very alarming reports. Peace with Holland, Prussia, the Empire, Spain, and even La Vendée was talked of; and it was asserted that the conditions of this peace would be ruinous to the revolutionary party.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

CONQUEST OF HOLLAND—NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRUSSIA—COMMENCEMENT OF PACIFICATION IN LA VENDEE—PUISAYE IN ENGLAND.

THE French armies, masters of the whole left bank of the Rhine, and ready to debouch on the right bank, threatened Holland and Germany. Were they to be urged to advance or to go into cantonments? Such was the question that presented itself.

Notwithstanding their triumphs, and their abode in Belgium which was so rich, they were in a state of the greatest destitution. The country which they occupied, overrun for three years past by innumerable legions, was completely drained. To the evils of war were added those of the French administration, which had introduced in its train assignats, the *maximum*, and requisitions. Provisional municipalities, eight intermediate administrations, and a central administration established at Brussels, governed the country till its fate should be definitively decided. Twenty-five millions had been levied upon the clergy, the abbeys, the nobles, and the corporations. The assignats had been put into forced circulation; the prices at Lille had been taken as a standard for fixing the *maximum* throughout all Belgium. Articles of consumption and commodities serviceable for the armies had been laid under requisition. These measures had not put an end to the dearth. The dealers, the farmers, hid all that they possessed: the officer, like the common soldier, was in want of every thing.

Being levied *en masse* in the preceding year, and transported in haste to Hondtschoote, Watignies, and Landau, the entire army had only been supplied by the administration with powder and projectiles. For a long time it had not encamped in tents, but bivouacked under boughs of trees, in spite of the commencement of an already severe winter. Many of the soldiers, destitute of shoes, fastened wisps of straw about their feet, or wrapped themselves in mats for want of great coats. The officers, paid in assignats, found their appointments reduced sometimes to eight or ten effective francs per month; those who received any assistance from their families were scarcely the better for it, as every thing was put under requisition beforehand by the French administration. They fared precisely the same as the common soldiers, marching on foot, carrying the knapsack

at their backs, eating ammunition bread, and living by the chances of war.

The administration appeared to be exhausted by the efforts which it had made to raise and arm twelve hundred thousand men. The new organization of the supreme power, feeble and divided, was not calculated to restore it to the necessary vigour and activity. Thus every thing seemed to require that the army should be put into winter-quarters, and rewarded for its victories and its military virtues by rest and abundant supplies.

Meanwhile, we were before the fortress of Nimeguen, which seated on the Wahl—the name given to the Rhine near its mouth—commanded both banks, and might serve the enemy as a *tête-du-pont* for debouching in the next campaign on the left bank. It was, therefore, important to gain possession of that place before wintering, but the attack of it was a very difficult undertaking. The English army, ranged on the right bank, was encamped there to the number of thirty-eight thousand men: a bridge of boats enabled it to communicate with, and to re-victual, the place. Besides its fortifications, Nimeguen had before it an intrenched camp manned with troops. To render the investment complete, it would therefore have been necessary to throw upon the right bank an army which would have had to run the risks of the passage and of a battle, and which, in case of defeat, would have had no means of retreat. Our troops, therefore, could act on the left bank only, and they would be obliged to attack the intrenched camp, without any great hope of success.

The French generals nevertheless determined to try the effect of one of those sudden and bold attacks which had in so short a time opened to them the gates of Maestricht and Venloo. The allies, aware of the importance of Nimeguen, had met at Arnheim to concert the means of defending the place. It had been agreed that an Austrian corps under General Werneck should be taken into English pay, and form the left of the Duke of York for the defence of Holland, while the duke, with his English and Hanoverians was to remain on the right bank before the bridge of Nimeguen and to recruit the forces of the place. General Werneck was to attempt, at a great distance above Nimeguen, towards Wesel, a singular movement, which experienced officers have deemed one of the most absurd that the coalition planned during all these campaigns. This corps, taking advantage of an island formed by the Rhine, near Buderich, was to cross to the ~~right~~ left bank, and to attack a point between the army of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the North. Thus twenty thousand men were to be thrown across a great river, between two victorious armies, each eighty or one hundred thousand strong, to see what effect they should produce upon them. This corps was to be reinforced according to its success. It is obvious that this movement, executed with the united armies of the allies,

might have been grand and decisive; but, effected with twenty thousand men, it would be but a puerile attempt, and probably disastrous one to the corps engaged in it.

The allies, however, hoping to save Nimeguen by these means, caused Werneck's corps to advance towards Buderich on the one hand, and sorties to be made by the garrison of Nimeguen on the other. The French repulsed the sorties, and, as at Maestricht and Venloo, opened the trenches much closer to the place than was yet usual in war. A lucky accident accelerated their operations. The two extremities of the arc which they described about Nimeguen terminated at the Wahl: they attempted to fire from these extremities at the bridge. Some of their projectiles reached several pontoons, and endangered the communications of the garrison with the English army. The English who were in the fortress, surprised at this by no means probable event, re-established the pontoons, and hastened to rejoin the main body of their army on the other bank, leaving the garrison composed of three thousand Dutch to itself. No sooner were the republicans aware of the evacuation than they redoubled their fire. The governor, alarmed, communicated his situation to the Prince of Orange, and obtained permission to retire as soon as he should deem the danger sufficiently urgent. The moment he had received this authority, he crossed over himself. Disorder ensued among the garrison. One part laid down their arms, another, attempting to escape on a flying bridge, were stopped by the French who cut the cables, and they were stranded upon an island, where they were made prisoners.

On the 18th of Brumaire (November 8), the French entered Nimeguen,* and found themselves masters of that important place, owing to their temerity, and to the terror excited by their arms. Meanwhile the Austrians, commanded by Werneck, had attempted to debouch from Wesel, but the impetuous Vandamme, rushing upon them at the moment when they were setting foot on the other side of the Rhine, drove them back to the right bank; and it was fortunate for them that they had not been more successful, for, had they advanced farther, they would have run the risk of being destroyed.

The fit moment had at length arrived for going into cantonments, since they were masters of all the important points on the

* People in every country had been induced to look upon the siege of Nimeguen as an event that would terminate in great celebrity; from its duration, the number of brilliant actions it would produce, and the unyielding obstinacy with which on both sides it would be accompanied. The sudden and unexpected disappointment of all these expectations, put an end to the hopes which had been entertained that, laying aside the animosity of parties, the Dutch would at length cordially unite in opposing the threatened invasion of the French. The loss of the town was imputed at the time to the secret machinations of those within the walls, who were labouring in the service of the French, and continually giving them notice of whatever was transacted in the garrison. E.

Rhine. To conquer Holland; to secure thus the navigation of the three great rivers, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; to deprive England of her most powerful naval ally; to threaten Germany on its flanks; to interrupt the communications of our enemies on the continent with those of the Ocean, or at least to oblige them to make the long circuit by Hamburg; to open to ourselves, in short, the richest country in the world, and the most desirable for us in the state that our commerce then was,—these were, to be sure, objects worthy of exciting the ambition of our government and of our armies; but how durst they attempt the conquest of Holland, almost impossible at any time, but most impracticable in the rainy season? Situated at the mouths of several rivers, Holland consists of stripes of land thrown between the currents of those rivers and the sea. Its soil, every where lower than the bed of the waters, is constantly threatened by the Ocean, the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, and is intersected moreover by small detached arms of rivers, and by a multitude of artificial canals. These lowlands so menaced are covered with gardens, manufacturing towns, and arsenals. At every step that an army attempts to take there, it comes either to broad streams whose banks are elevated, dikes lined with cannon, or to arms of rivers or canals, all defended by fortifications, or to fortresses which are the strongest in Europe. Those great manœuvres, which frequently disconcert methodical defence by rendering sieges useless, are therefore impossible in a country intersected and defended by innumerable lines. If an army, nevertheless, succeeds in conquering so many obstacles and advances into Holland, its inhabitants, by an act of heroism, of which they furnished an example in the time of Louis XIV., need only cut their dikes, in order to ingulf, together with their country, the army that has been rash enough to invade it. They have their shipping left, and, like the Athenians of old, they can fly with their most valuable effects, and wait for better times, or go to India, and transfer their abode to the vast empire which there belongs to them. All these difficulties are greatly increased during the season of inundations, and are insurmountable with a maritime alliance, such as that of England.

It is true that the spirit of independence which possessed the Dutch, their hatred of the stadtholdership, their aversion to England and Prussia, their acquaintance with their true interests, their resentment on account of the Revolution so unfortunately stifled in 1787, gave the French armies the certainty of being ardently wished for. It was to be presumed that the Dutch would oppose the cutting of the dikes and the ruining of the country for a cause which they detested. But the army of the Prince of Orange and that of the Duke of York still overawed them, and these united were sufficient to prevent the passage of the numberless lines which it would be necessary

to carry in their presence. If then a surprise was rash in the time of Dumouriez, it was almost insane at the end of 1794.

The committee of public welfare, instigated by Dutch refugees, nevertheless thought seriously of pushing a point beyond the Wahl. Pichegru, almost as badly off as his soldiers, who were eaten up by itch and vermin, had gone to Brussels to get cured of a cutaneous disease. Moreau and Regnier* had succeeded him. Both were in favour of rest and winter quarters. The Dutch general Daendels, a refugee and a gallant officer, earnestly recommended a first attempt on the isle of Bommel, which need not to be followed up, if that attack should fail. The Meuse and the Wahl, running parallel with the sea, unite just below Nimeguen, again separate, and once more unite at Wondrichem, a little above Gorcum. The tract inclosed by them during their separation is called the isle of Bommel. Contrary to the opinion of Moreau and Regnier, an attack was attempted upon that island at three different points. It was not successful, and was immediately relinquished with the utmost alacrity, especially on the part of General Daendels, who cheerfully acknowledged, as soon as he was convinced of, its impossibility.

Then, that is about the middle of Frimaire (the beginning of December), winter-quarters, which the army stood so much in need of, were assigned to it, and part of the cantonments were established around Breda, for the purpose of forming the blockade of that place, which, with Grave, still held out, but the interruption of the communications during the winter could not fail to oblige them to surrender.

It was in this position that the army expected to await the end of the season; and most assuredly it had done enough to make it proud of its glory and its services. But an almost miraculous chance reserved for it new destinies. The cold had already begun to be very severe; it soon increased to such a degree as to encourage a hope that the great rivers would be frozen over. Pichegru left Brussels, without waiting to complete his cure, that he might be ready to seize the first opportunity for new conquests, should it be offered him by the season. The frost became more and more intense, and the winter exceeded in severity any that had preceded it for several years. The Meuse and the Wahl were already covered with floating ice, and the ice was set along their banks.

On the 3rd of Nivose (December 23) the Meuse was entirely frozen, and hard enough to bear cannon. General Walmoden, to whom the Duke of York had left the command on setting

* "Regnier was certainly a man of talent, but he was more fit to give counsel to an army of twenty or thirty thousand men, than to command one of five or six."—*A Voice from St. Helena.* E.

out for England, and whom he had thus doomed to experience nothing but disasters, found himself in the most difficult position. The Meuse being taken, his front would be uncovered; and the floating ice upon the Wahl even threatening to carry away all the bridges, his retreat would be endangered. He soon learned that the bridge of Arnheim had been actually carried away: he then ordered his baggage and his heavy cavalry to file off on the rear, and himself retreated upon Deventer, towards the banks of the Yssel. Pichegru, profiting by the occasion which fortune offered to surmount obstacles usually invincible, prepared to cross the Meuse on the ice. He made arrangements for passing at three points, and for seizing the isle of Bommel, while the division blockading Breda was to attack the lines which surrounded that place. Those brave Frenchmen, exposed almost without clothes to the severest winter for a century past, marching in shoes of which nothing but the upper leather was left, immediately quitted their quarters, and cheerfully renounced the rest which they had begun to enjoy.

On the 8th of Nivose (December 28), in a cold of 17°, they presented themselves at three points, at Crèvecœur, Empel, and Fort St. André. They crossed the ice with their artillery, surprised the Dutch, almost stiffened with cold, and completely defeated them. While they were making themselves masters of the isle of Bommel, that division of their force which was besieging Breda, attacked its lines and carried them. The Dutch, assailed on all points, retired in disorder, some towards the headquarters of the Prince of Orange, who was still at Gorcum, the others to Thiel. In the confusion of their retreat they did not think of defending the passes of the Wahl, which was not entirely frozen. Pichegru, master of the isle of Bommel, into which he had penetrated by passing over the frozen Meuse, crossed the Wahl at different points, but durst not venture beyond the river, the ice not being strong enough to bear cannon. In this situation, the state of Holland would be desperate if the frost continued, and there was every appearance that it would continue. The Prince of Orange, with his Dutchmen disheartened at Gorcum, Walmoden with his English in full retreat upon Deventer, could not make head against a formidable conqueror, who was far superior to them in strength, and who had just broken the centre of their line. Their political was not less alarming than their military situation. The Dutch, full of hope and joy on seeing the French approach, began to stir. The Orange party was far too weak to overawe the republican party. The enemies of the stadtholder's authority reproached it with having suppressed the liberties of the country, imprisoned or banished the best and the most generous patriots, and, above all, with having sacrificed Holland to England, by forcing her into an alliance contrary to all her interests commercial and naval. They met secretly in revolutionary committees, ready at

the first signal to rise, to turn out the authorities, and to appoint others. The province of Friesland, whose states were assembled, ventured to declare that it was determined to separate itself from the stadtholder. The citizens of Amsterdam presented a petition to the authorities of the province, in which they declared that they were ready to oppose any preparation for defence, and that they would not at any rate suffer the dikes to be cut.

In this desperate situation the stadtholder thought of negotiating, and sent envoys to Pichegru's head-quarters to demand a truce, and to offer, as conditions of peace, neutrality and an indemnification for the expenses of the war. The French general and the representatives refused the truce; and as for the offers of peace, they referred them immediately to the committee of public welfare.

Spain, threatened by Dugommier, whom we left descending from the Pyrenees, and by Moncey,* who, master of Guipuscoa, was advancing upon Pampeluna, had already made proposals of accommodation. The representatives sent into La Vendée, to inquire if a pacification were possible, had replied affirmatively, and recommended a decree of amnesty. How secret soever a government may be, negotiations of this kind are sure to transpire: they transpire even with absolute irremoveable ministers; how then should they continue secret with committees renewable by one-fourth every month? It was publicly known that Holland and Spain had made proposals; it was added that Prussia, sensible of her illusions, and acknowledging the fault which she had committed in allying herself with the house of Austria, had applied to treat; it was known from all the newspapers of Europe that several states of the Empire, weary of a war which concerned them but little, had at the diet of Ratisbon insisted on the opening of a negotiation. Thus every thing disposed people's minds to peace, and, in the

* "Bon-Adrien-Jeannot Moncey was born in 1754. His father was an advocate, and he was intended for the same profession, but he took an invincible repugnance to it, and entered the army as a private soldier. In 1790, at the age of thirty-six, he was but a sub-lieutenant of dragoons. Soon afterwards, however, he was draughted into a battalion of light infantry, and thenceforward his promotion was rapid. In the course of the ensuing two years, he had risen to be general of division, and received the command of the eleventh military division at Bayonne. On the formation of the consular government Moncey took part in the war of Italy, and was present at the famous battle of Marengo. In the year 1804 he became marshal of the empire, and subsequently Duke of Conegliano. In 1808 he was engaged in the Spanish campaigns, but his operations were by no means brilliant. He was also present in the Russian expedition, and in the subsequent struggles in Germany. When Napoleon abdicated, Moncey sent in his adhesion to the royal government; he refused however to preside on the trial of Marshal Ney, for which he was degraded from his honours and confined. In 1823, he accompanied the Duke d'Angouleme in his invasion of Spain. Moncey was humane by nature, honourable in conduct, and a cautious, rather than a bold, general."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

same manner as they had gone over from the ideas of revolutionary terror to those of clemency, they now passed from ideas of war to those of a general reconciliation with Europe. They seized the slightest circumstances to found conjectures on them. The unfortunate children of Louis XVI., deprived of all their relatives, and separated from one another in the prison of the Temple, had seen their situation somewhat ameliorated since the 9th of Thermidor. Simon, the shoemaker, to whose care the young prince was committed, had perished as an accomplice of Robespierre's. Three keepers were appointed in his stead, each of whom officiated in turn for a day, and who treated the young prince with more humanity. From these changes made at the Temple important inferences were drawn. The plan under consideration for withdrawing the assignats also furnished occasion for abundance of conjectures. The royalists, who began already to show themselves, and whose number was increased by those waverers who are always ready to forsake a party which begins to grow weak, said maliciously that the government was going to make peace. As they could no longer say to the republicans, "Your armies will be beaten"—which had been too frequently repeated without success, and which would now have appeared too silly—they said, "Their career of victory is cut short; peace is signed; you will not have the Rhine; the condition of peace will be the restoration of Louis XVII. to the throne, the return of the emigrants, the abolition of assignats, and the restitution of the national property." It is easy to conceive how such rumours must have irritated the patriots. Alarmed already at the proceedings directed against them, they saw with despair the end which they had been pursuing with such toil compromised, by the government. "What do you mean to make of young Capet?" said they. "What are you going to do with the assignats? Shall our armies have shed so much of their blood to be stopped in the midst of their victories? Shall they not enjoy the satisfaction of giving to their country the line of the Rhine and the Alps? Europe meant to dismember France; the just reprisals of victorious France upon Europe ought to be, to conquer the provinces wanting to complete her territory. What is to be done for La Vendée? Are rebels to be pardoned when they sacrifice patriots?"—"Better were it," exclaimed a deputy of the Mountain, in a transport of indignation, "to be Charette than a member of the Convention!"

It may easily be conceived how much these subjects of division, added to those already furnished by domestic policy, must have agitated men's minds. The committee of public welfare, finding itself pressed between the two parties, deemed it incumbent on it to explain. It declared, therefore, on two different occasions, first through Carnot, secondly through Merlin of Douai, that the armies had received orders to prosecute their

triumphs, and not to listen to any proposals of peace but in the heart of the enemy's capitals.

The proposals of Holland appeared to it in fact to come too late to be accepted, and it did not think it right to consent to negotiate when on the point of becoming master of the country. To overthrow the power of the stadtholder, and to restore the Dutch republic, seemed to it to be worthy of the French republic. It ran the risk, it is true, of seeing all the colonies of Holland, and even part of her navy, fall a prey to the English, who would declare that they took possession of them in the name of the stadtholder: but political considerations of course gained the ascendency. France could not avoid overthrowing the stadtholdership; this conquest of Holland would enhance the marvellousness of her victories, intimidate Europe more, compromise especially the flanks of Prussia, oblige that power to treat immediately, and, above all, give confidence to the French patriots. In consequence, Pichegru was ordered not to stop.* Prussia and the Empire had not yet made any overture, and there was no answer to give to them. As for Spain, who promised to acknowledge the republic and to pay its indemnities, on condition of its erecting a little state near the Pyrenees for Louis XVII., her proposals were received with scorn and indignation, and orders were issued to the two French generals to lose no time in advancing. As for La Vendée, a decree of amnesty was passed. It purported that all the rebels, without distinction of rank, who should lay down their arms within the space of one month, should be exempted from all punishment for their insurrection.

General Canclaux, removed on account of his moderation, was replaced at the head of the army of the West, which comprised La Vendée. Young Hoche, who had already the command of the army of the Coasts of Brest, had that of the army of the Coasts of Cherbourg annexed to it: none were more capable than these two generals, to pacify the country by tempering prudence with energy.

Pichegru, who had received orders to prosecute his victorious career, waited till the surface of the Wahl should be entirely frozen. Our army skirted the river; it was spread upon its banks towards Millingen, Nimeguen, and all along the isle of Bommel, of which it had gained possession by crossing the

* "The invasion of Holland was an object of universal expectation in Europe. The force under the command of General Pichegru, who was placed at the head of this great expedition, amounted to not less than 200,000 men. His ability, and those of the officers who served under him, annexed a security to the enterprise, which equally elated the French and depressed their enemies. The strength which was to oppose this vast and victorious army consisted of the remains of the British troops, and those in their pay, and of the Dutch troops. But their numbers were beneath consideration, when compared to the multitude of their enemies."—*Annual Register.* E.

frozen Meuse. Walmoden, observing that Pichegru had left but a few advanced posts on the right bank towards Bommel, drove them back, and began an offensive movement. He proposed to the Prince of Orange to join him, in order to form with their united armies an imposing mass, capable of stopping by a battle an enemy who could no longer be stopped by the line of the rivers. The Prince of Orange could not be prevailed upon to quit Gorcum, lest the road to Amsterdam should be left uncovered. Walmoden then resolved to place himself on his line of retreat, which he had traced beforehand from the Wahl to the Linge, from the Linge to the Leck, and from the Leck to the Yssel, through Thiel, Arnheim, and Deventer.

While the republicans were waiting with the utmost impatience for the freezing of the river, the fortress of Grave, defended with heroic courage by Debons, the commandant, surrendered when nearly reduced to ashes. It was the principal of the fortresses which the Dutch possessed beyond the Meuse, and the only one that had not yielded to the ascendency of our arms. The French entered it on the 9th of Nivose (December 29). At length, on the 19th of Nivose (January 8, 1795), the Wahl was solidly frozen. Souham's division crossed it near Bommel; Dewinther's brigade, detached from Macdonald's corps, crossed near Thiel. At Nimeguen and above, the passage was not so easy, because the Wahl was not entirely frozen. Nevertheless, on the 21st (January 10) the right of the French crossed it above Nimeguen, and Macdonald, supported by it, passed over at Nimeguen itself in boats. On perceiving this general movement, Walmoden's army retired. A battle alone could have saved it; but, in the state of division and discouragement that prevailed among the allies, a battle would probably have led to disastrous consequences. Walmoden executed a change from front to rear, proceeding upon the line of the Yssel, in order to reach Hanover by the provinces of the main land. Conformably with the plan of retreat which he had laid down for himself, he thus abandoned the provinces of Utrecht and Guelders to the French. The Prince of Orange remained near the sea, namely at Gorcum. Having no longer any hope, he left his army, repaired to the States assembled at the Hague, declared to them that he had done all in his power for the defence of the country, and that nothing more could be done. He exhorted the representatives not to make any further resistance to the conqueror, lest it might produce disastrous consequences.

From that moment, the victorious French had only to spread like a torrent over all Holland. On the 28th of Nivose (January 17) Salm's brigade entered Utrecht, and General Vandamme* arrived at Arnheim. The States of Holland decided

* "Vandamme was one of the bravest men in the world but fiery and

that no further resistance should be made to them, and that commissioners should be sent to open for them such places as they deemed necessary for their security. In all parts, the secret committees which had been formed manifested their existence, drove out the established authorities, and spontaneously appointed new ones. The French were received with open arms and as deliverers. Such provisions and clothing as they needed were carried to them. In Amsterdam, which they had not yet entered and where they were impatiently expected, the greatest agitation prevailed. The citizens, exasperated against the Orangists, insisted that the garrison should leave the city, that the regency should resign its authority, and that the inhabitants should have their arms restored to them. Pichegru, who was approaching, sent an aide-de-camp to exhort the municipal authorities to preserve peace and prevent disorder. On the 1st of Pluviose (January 20) Pichegru, accompanied by the representatives Lacoste, Bellegarde, and Joubert, made his entry into Amsterdam. The inhabitants hastened forth to meet him, carrying in triumph the persecuted deputies, and shouting, *The French republic for ever! Pichegru for ever! Liberty for ever!** They admired those brave men, who, though half-naked, had defied such a winter and won such victories. The French soldiers furnished on this occasion a most praiseworthy example of order and discipline. Destitute of provisions and clothing, exposed to frost and snow, in the heart of one of the wealthiest capitals of Europe, they waited for several hours around their piled arms, till the magistrates had provided for their wants and assigned them quarters. As the republicans entered on one side, the Orangists and French emigrants fled on the other. The sea

passionate. A nobler figure than he possessed, cannot well be imagined. He had a finely-formed head, regular features, beautiful curly hair, glistening eyes which, when angry, seemed to flash fire, and an exquisitely-turned hand."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

"The Emperor related the following anecdote, as highly characteristic of General Vandamme: When made prisoner by the Russians, he was brought before the Emperor Alexander, who reproached him in bitter terms with being a robber, a plunderer, and a murderer; adding that no favour could be granted to such an execrable character. This was followed by an order that he should be sent to Siberia, while the other prisoners were sent to a much less northern destination. Vandamme replied with great *sang froid:* 'It may be, Sire, that I am a robber and a plunderer; but at least I have not to reproach myself with having soiled my hands with the blood of a father."—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

* "A neutral party subsisted in Holland which, without inclining to the stadtholder or to his enemies, were decidedly adverse to the entrance of the French. But their remonstrances on the necessity of a reunion of all parties against a foreign invasion were lost in the fixed determination of those in authority to trust none but their adherents, and in the not less obstinate resolution of their antagonists to destroy their authority through the assistance of the French, whom they welcomed with enthusiasm as liberators!"—*Annual Register*. E.

was covered with vessels, laden with fugitives and with property of every kind.

On the same day, the 1st of Pluviose, Bonnaud's division, which had the day before taken possession of Gertruydenberg, crossed the frozen Biesbos, and entered the town of Dordrecht, where six hundred pieces of cannon, ten thousand muskets, and magazines of provisions and ammunition for an army of thirty thousand men were found. This division then passed through Rotterdam, on its way to the Hague, where the States were sitting. Thus the right about the Yssel, the centre about Amsterdam, and the left about the Hague, successively took possession of all the provinces. The marvellous itself became already associated with the extraordinary operations of the war. Part of the Dutch fleet was at anchor near the Texel. Pichegru, unwilling to give it time to get clear of the ice and to sail for England, sent some divisions of cavalry and several batteries of light artillery towards North Holland. The Zuider Zee was frozen: our squadrons galloped across those plains of ice, and our hussars and horse artillery summoned the ships, immoveably fixed, as they would have done a fortress. The Dutch ships surrendered to these strange assailants.

On the left there was nothing to gain possession of but the province of Zealand, which is composed of the islands situated at the mouth of the Scheldt and the Meuse; and on the right the provinces of Overyssel, Drenthe, Friesland, and Gröningen, which join Holland to Hanover. The province of Zealand, strong in its inaccessible position, proposed a rather lofty capitulation, in which it insisted on not admitting garrisons into its principa, towns, on not being subject to contributions, on not receiving assignats, on retaining its shipping and its property, public and private, in short on being exempt from all the inconveniences of war. It demanded also that the French emigrants should be allowed to retire safe and sound. The representatives accepted some of the articles of the capitulation, but entered into no engagement respecting others, saying that they must refer them to the committee of public welfare, and, without further explanation they entered the province, glad to avoid the dangers of an attack by main force, and to preserve the squadron which might have been delivered up to England. During these occurrences on the left, the right crossing the Yssel drove the English before it, and forced them to retreat beyond the Ems. The provinces of Friesland, Drenthe, and Gröningen were thus conquered, and the Seven United Provinces were subdued by the victorious arms of the republic.

This conquest, which was attributable to the season, to the admirable perseverance of our soldiers, and to their happy disposition for withstanding all hardships, much more than to the abilities of our generals, excited an astonishment in Europe mingled with

terror, and in France unbounded enthusiasm. Carnot, having directed the operations of the armies during the campaign of the Netherlands, which had carried them to the banks of the Rhine, was the first and the real author of their successes. Pichegru, and still more Jourdan, had effectively seconded him during that sanguinary series of actions. But, since the army had proceeded from Belgium into Holland, every thing was due to the soldiers and the season. Nevertheless Pichegru, as commander-in-chief of that army, reaped all the glory of that wonderful conquest; and his name, borne on the wings of fame, circulated throughout all Europe as that of the most eminent general of France.

It was not enough to have conquered Holland; it behoved the French to conduct themselves there with prudence and policy. In the first place, it was of importance that they should not trample upon the country, lest they should alienate the inhabitants. In the next, they had to impart a political direction to Holland, and on this point they soon found themselves between two contrary opinions. Some were desirous that this conquest should be rendered serviceable to liberty by revolutionizing Holland: others wished that too strong a spirit of proselytism might not be displayed, lest it should again alarm Europe, which was on the point of reconciling herself with France.

The first act of the representatives was to publish a proclamation, in which they declared that they would respect all private property, excepting however that of the stadtholder; that, the latter being the only foe of the French republic, his property belonged to the conquerors as an indemnification for the expenses of the war; that the French entered as friends of the Batavian nation, not to impose upon it any religion or any form of government whatever, but to deliver it from its oppressors, and to confer on it the means of expressing its wishes. This proclamation, followed up by corresponding acts, produced a most favourable impression. The authorities were every where renewed under the French influence. Several members, who had been introduced into the States by the stadtholder's influence alone, were excluded; and the patriot, Peter Paulus, minister of marine before the overthrow of the republican party in 1787, a distinguished man, and strongly attached to his country, was chosen president. No sooner was this assembly complete than it abolished the stadtholdership for ever, and proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. It waited on the representatives, to acquaint them with what it had done, and to pay them homage, as it were, by its resolution. It then fell to work upon a constitution, and committed the affairs of the country to a provisional administration. Out of the eighty or ninety ships of war composing the military marine of Holland, fifty were left in the ports and preserved for the Batavian republic: the others had been seized by the English. The

Dutch army, dissolved since the departure of the Prince of Orange, was to be reorganized on a new footing, and under the command of General Daendels. As for the famous bank of Amsterdam, the mystery which enveloped its funds was at length dispelled. Had it continued to be a bank of deposit, or had it become a discounting bank, by lending either to the India Company, or to the Government, or to the provinces? Such was the question which had long been asked, and which exceedingly diminished the credit of that celebrated bank. It was ascertained that it had lent to the amount of eight or ten millions of florins on obligations of the India Company, the Chamber of Loans, the province of Friesland, and the city of Amsterdam. This was a violation of its statutes. It was alleged, however, that there was no deficit, because these obligations represented certain amounts. But it was requisite that the Company, the Chamber of Loans, and the Government, should be able to pay, in order that the obligations accepted by the bank should not give rise to a deficit.

While the Dutch were thus turning their attention to the internal administration of their country, it was necessary to provide for the wants of the French army, which was destitute of every thing. The representatives made a requisition to the provisional government for cloth, shoes, clothing of all kinds, provisions, and ammunition, which it promised to supply. This requisition, without being exorbitant, was sufficient to equip and subsist the army. The Dutch government invited each town to furnish its share of this requisition, telling them very justly that they ought to lose no time in satisfying a generous conqueror, who asked for, instead of taking, what he wanted, and who demanded no more than merely what his necessities required. The towns complied with the greatest cheerfulness, and the articles laid under requisition were duly supplied. An arrangement was then made for the circulation of assignats. The soldiers received their pay in paper only,* and if they were to pay away all that they took, it was requisite that this paper should have the currency of money. The Dutch government came to a decision on this head. The shopkeepers and the petty dealers were obliged to take the assignats of the French soldiers at the rate of nine sous per franc; they were not allowed to sell to the amount of more than ten francs to any one soldier; they were then, at the end of every week, to appear before the municipalities, who would withdraw the assignats at the rate at which they had taken them. Owing to these different arrange-

* "The soldiers being still paid in assignats which passed only for one-fifteenth of their real value, the pay of an officer was only equal in real value to three francs, or half-a-crown a month. In 1795, one third was paid in specie, which raised the income of a captain to seventy francs, or three pounds sterling a month."—*Jomini.* E.

ments, the army, which had so long suffered, found itself at length in abundance, and began to enjoy the fruits of its victories.

Our triumphs, so surprising in Holland, were not less brilliant in Spain. There, thanks to the climate, the operations had not been discontinued. Dugommier, quitting the high Pyrenees, had advanced to the enemy's line, and attacked on three points the long chain of positions taken by General La Union. The brave Dugommier had been killed by a cannon-ball in the attack of the centre. The left had not been successful, but his right, owing to the intrepidity and energy of Augereau,* had been completely victorious. The command had been given to Perignon, who had recommenced the attack on the 30th of Brumaire

* "Pierre-François-Charles Augereau the son of a poor fruiterer in one of the faubourgs in Paris, was born in 1757. At an early age he entered the Neapolitan service, but in 1787 was still only a private soldier. Seeing little prospect of advancement, he quitted the army in disgust and settled at Naples, where he taught fencing. In 1792, however, he returned to France, and became a volunteer in the republican army of the South. Owing to his daring intrepidity, his promotion was rapid beyond all precedent. In 1794 he was brigadier-general, and two years later, general of division. In the year 1796 he joined the army of Italy, and fought at Lodi and Castiglione, from which place he afterwards derived his ducal title. In this campaign, Augereau, who was as avaricious as he was cruel, amassed immense wealth. In 1799 he warmly espoused Bonaparte's cause, and on the establishment of the empire was created marshal, and Duke of Castiglione. In 1806 he distinguished himself greatly at the battle of Jena, and, after the Russian expedition, still more so in the campaigns in Germany. He was one of the first to give in his adhesion to Louis XVIII., for which he was presented with the cross of St. Louis, and created a peer of France. On Napoleon's return from Elba, however, he again offered his services to the Emperor, who repulsed him as a traitor, and, being neglected also by the Bourbons shortly after, he retired to his country-seat, where he died in 1816."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

"Augereau was a cross-grained character; he seemed to be tired and disheartened by victory, of which he always had enough. His person, his manners, and his language, gave him the air of a braggadocio, which however he was far from being."—*Las Cases*. E.

"Augereau was a man wholly destitute of religious feeling. When Napoleon re-established religious worship in France, he insisted on all his ministers and generals attending a solemn *Te Deum*, which was chanted at the cathedral of Notre Dame. On their way from the Tuileries thither, Lannes and Augereau wanted to alight from the carriage as soon as they saw that they were being driven to mass, and it required an order from the First Consul to prevent their doing so. They went, therefore, to Notre Dame, where Augereau kept swearing, in no low whisper, during the whole of the chanted mass. The next day, Bonaparte asked him what he thought of the ceremony. 'Oh, it was all very fine,' replied the general; 'there was nothing wanting but the million of men who have perished in the pulling down of what you are now setting up.'"—*Bourrienne*. E.

"Augereau was one who might possess that daring spirit which hurries along thousands of soldiers in its train; but for directing a political movement, or organizing the simplest machination, he was a mere cipher. Not only was he a mere soldier, but his manners were those of a soldier; every thing about him betrayed the uneducated man. His vanity was, nevertheless, inordinate."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

(November 20) and gained a signal victory. The enemy had fled in disorder, and left us the intrenched camp of Figueras. A panic seizing the Spaniards, the commandant of Figueras had opened the gates to us on the 9th of Frimaire, and we had thus entered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. Such was our position in Catalonia. Towards the western Pyrenees, we had taken Fontarabia, St. Sebastian, and Tolosa, and occupied the whole province of Guipuscoa. Moncey, who had succeeded General Muller, had crossed the mountains and advanced to the gates of Pampeluna. Considering however his position too hazardous, he had fallen back, and, supported upon safer positions, he awaited the return of the favourable season for penetrating into the Castilles.

Winter, therefore, had not been able to stop the course of that memorable campaign, and it had just closed in the middle of the season of frost and snow, in Pluviose, that is, in January and February. If the glorious campaign of 1793 had saved us from invasion by raising the blockade of Dunkirk, Maubeuge and Landau, that of 1794 had just opened to us the career of conquest by giving us Belgium, Holland, the country comprised between the Meuse and the Rhine, the Palatinate, the line of the high Alps, the line of the Pyrenees, and several fortresses in Catalonia and Biscay. We shall presently see still greater wonders; but these two campaigns will remain in history as the most national, the most legitimate, and the most honourable, for France.

The coalition could not withstand so many rude shocks. The English cabinet, which had lost only the states of its allies through the blunders of the Duke of York, which had gained forty or fifty ships of war, upon pretext of restoring them to the stadtholder, and which was about to seize the Dutch colonies upon the same pretext—the English cabinet was in no hurry to put an end to the war; it was apprehensive, on the contrary, lest it should be terminated by the dissolution of the coalition: but Prussia, which perceived the French on the banks of the Rhine and the Ems, and saw the torrent ready to burst upon her, no longer hesitated. She immediately sent a commissioner to Pichegru's head-quarters to stipulate for a truce, and to promise to open forthwith negotiations for peace. The place chosen for these negotiations was Basle, where the French government had an agent, who had acquired high consideration among the Swiss by his abilities and his moderation. The pretext for selecting this place was that they might there treat with more secrecy and quiet than in Paris itself, where too many passions were still in agitation, and where a multitude of foreign intrigues were crossing one another. But that was not the real motive. While making overtures of peace to that republic, whose enemies had fully expected to annihilate it by a single military march, they wished to cloak the acknowledgment

of their defeat, and it was less galling to them to go to a neutral country in quest of peace than to seek it in Paris. The committee of public welfare, less haughty than its predecessor, and feeling the necessity of detaching Prussia from the coalition, consented to invest its agent at Basle with sufficient powers for treating. Prussia sent Baron de Goltz, and the powers were exchanged at Basle on the 3rd of Pluviose, year III (January 22, 1795).

The Empire was quite as much inclined to withdraw from the coalition as Prussia. Most of its members, incapable of furnishing the quintuple contingent and the subsidies voted under the influence of Austria, had suffered themselves, during the whole campaign, to be urged to no purpose to keep their engagements. Excepting those whose territories lay beyond the Rhine, and who clearly saw that the republic would not restore them unless it were forced to do so, all were desirous of peace. Bavaria, Denmark, for the Duchy of Holstein, the Elector of Mayence, and several states, had declared that it was high time to put an end by an acceptable peace to a ruinous war; that the Germanic empire had had no other aim than the maintenance of the stipulations of 1648, and had taken up arms only in behalf of such of its states as bordered on Alsace and Lorraine; that it was thinking of its preservation, not of its aggrandizement; that *it never had been, and never could be, its intention to interfere in the internal government of France;* that this pacific declaration must be made sooner or later, to put an end to the evils which afflicted humanity; and that Sweden, the guarantee of the stipulations of 1648, and which had fortunately remained neutral amidst this general war, could undertake the office of mediatrix. The majority of the votes had acceded to this proposal. The Elector of Treves, stripped of his dominions, and the Imperial envoy for Bohemia and Austria, had alone declared that it was certainly right to seek for peace, but that it was scarcely possible with a country without government. At length, on the 25th of December, the diet had published a *conclusum* tending to peace, leaving it to be afterwards decided by whom the proposal should be made. The substance of the *conclusum* was that, while making preparations for a new campaign, the states ought nevertheless to make overtures for peace; that no doubt France, touched by the sufferings of humanity, and convinced that there was no intention of interfering in her internal affairs, would consent to conditions honourable to both parties.

Thus, whoever had committed faults thought of repairing them, if it were not yet too late. Austria, though faint from her efforts, had lost too much, in losing the Netherlands, to think of relinquishing arms. Spain had been inclined to lay down hers: but, again involved in English intrigues, and bound by false shame to the cause of the French emigration, she durst not yet demand peace.

The same discouragement that seized the external enemies of the republic prevailed among its internal enemies also. The Vendeans, divided, exhausted, would not have been averse to peace, had it been discreetly proposed to them, and pains been taken to make them believe it to be sincere. The forces of Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette were extremely reduced. It was only by constraint that they could now make their peasants march.* These people, weary of carnage, and above all ruined by devastations, would have been glad to discontinue this horrid warfare. The only persons still entirely devoted to the chiefs were a few men of an absolutely military turn, smugglers, deserters, and poachers, for whom fighting and plunder had become a want, and who could not settle down to agricultural labour. But these were not numerous. They composed the picked band, which kept constantly together, but were quite incapable of withstanding the efforts of the republicans. It was not without the greatest difficulty that, on days when expeditions were to be undertaken, the peasants could be induced to leave their fields. Thus the three Vendean chiefs found themselves almost without forces. Unfortunately for them, they were not even united among themselves. We have seen that Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, had entered at Jalais into a convention, which was but an adjournment of their rivalry. It was not long before Stofflet, at the instigation of the ambitious Abbé Bernier, resolved to organize an army and a financial and administrative department, in short all that constitutes a regular power. To this end he purposed also to issue paper-money. Charette, jealous of Stofflet, opposed his designs. Seconded by Sapinaud, whom he influenced, he summoned Stofflet to relinquish his project, and to appear before the general council instituted by the convention of Jalais. Stofflet had refused to reply. On his refusal, Charette declared the convention of Jalais null and void. This was equivalent to stripping him of his command, for it was at Jalais that they had reciprocally acknowledged each other's titles. The rupture was therefore complete, and did not allow them to make amends by concord for their exhausted state. Notwithstanding the commission given to the royalist agents at Paris to open a correspondence with Charette and to transmit to him the letters of the regent, nothing had yet reached him.

* "The insurrection had now come to be entirely in the hands of Charette and Stofflet, who never in reality agreed. They were both devoured with jealousy and ambition. The war had no longer that character of union among the chiefs, and universal self-devotion, which distinguished the early days of La Vendée. The peasants were disheartened, and severity was become necessary to keep them to their duty, instead of those higher motives by which they were at first impelled. No great battles were fought as formerly. It was now a war of ruffians carried on by treachery."—*Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein.* E.

Scépeaux's division, between the Loire and the Vilaine, was in the same predicament. In Bretagne, it is true, there was less relaxation of energy: a long war had not exhausted the inhabitants. *Chouannerie* was a lucrative trade of plunder, which did not fatigue those who addicted themselves to it, and, besides a single chief, a man of unequalled perseverance, was there to rekindle the nearly expiring ardour. But this chief, whom we have seen preparing to set out as soon as he should have completed the organization of Bretagne, had lately gone to London, for the purpose of entering into communication with the English cabinet and the French princes. Puisaye had left, to supply his place in the central committee, a Sieur Desotteux, who styled himself Baron de Cormatin in quality of major-general. The emigrants, so numerous in the courts of Europe, were very rare in La Vendée, in Bretagne, and wherever this arduous civil war was waged. They affected supreme contempt for this kind of service, which they called *chouanning* (*chouanner*). For this reason there was a want of officers, and M. de Puisaye had taken this adventurer, who had decorated himself with the title of Baron de Cormatin, from a petty barony of that name in Burgundy, which had devolved to his wife by inheritance. He had been by turns a red-hot revolutionist, then an officer of Bouillé's, afterwards a knight of the dagger, and lastly he had emigrated, seeking every where a part to enact. He was like one possessed, talking and gesticulating with great vivacity, and liable to the most sudden changes. Such was the man, whom Puisaye, without knowing much about him, had left in Bretagne.

Puisaye had organized a correspondence through the Channel Islands; but his absence was prolonged; his letters frequently miscarried; Cormatin was utterly incapable of supplying his place and reviving the courage of the people; the chiefs became impatient or disheartened, and they saw animosities, calmed by the clemency of the Convention, subsiding around them, and the elements of civil war dissolving. The presence of such a general as Hoche was not likely to encourage them, and thus Bretagne, though less exhausted than La Vendée, was quite as well disposed to accept a peace adroitly prepared.

Canclaux and Hoche were both very capable of conducting such an affair with success. We have already witnessed the proceedings of Canclaux in the first war in La Vendée. He had left behind him in that country a high character for moderation and ability. The army placed under his command was considerably weakened by the continual reinforcements sent to the Pyrenees and to the Rhine, and, moreover, entirely disorganized by its long stay on the same spot. From the disorder incident to civil wars, insubordination had gained ground, and hence pillage, debauchery, drunkenness, and disease had ensued. This was the second relapse of that army since the commencement of this baneful war. Out of the forty-six thousand men who com-

posed it, fifteen or eighteen thousand were in the hospitals; the remaining thirty thousand were badly armed, and half of them were guarding the fortresses: thus fifteen thousand at most were disposable. At his desire, twenty thousand men were given to him, fourteen thousand being taken from the Brest army, and six from that of Cherbourg. With this reinforcement he doubled all the posts, recovered the camp of Sorinières near Nantes, recently taken by Charette, and proceeded in force towards the Layon, which formed Stofflet's defensive line in Upper Anjou. After he had taken this imposing attitude, he circulated abundantly the decrees and the proclamation of the Convention, and sent emissaries all over the country.

Hoche, accustomed to conduct a war upon a large scale, and endowed with superior qualities for carrying it on, found himself, to his extreme mortification, doomed to oppose a civil war, without generosity, without combinations, and without glory. He had at first solicited his dismissal; but he presently made up his mind to serve his country in this disagreeable post, one too obscure for his talents. He was now to be rewarded for this resignation, by finding, on the very stage that he had wished to quit, occasion for displaying the qualities of a statesman as well as those of a general. His army was exceedingly weakened by the reinforcements sent to Canclaux: he had scarcely forty thousand ill-organized men to guard an intersected, mountainous, and woody country, and more than three hundred and fifty leagues of coast from Cherbourg to Brest. He was promised twelve thousand men which were to be drawn from the North. He asked more especially for well-disciplined men and he immediately set about weaning his troops from the habits contracted in the civil war. "We ought," said he, "to put at the head of our columns none but disciplined men, who can show as much moderation as valour, and be mediators as well as soldiers." He had trained them in a great number of small camps, and he recommended to them to go about in parties of forty or fifty, to endeavour to make themselves acquainted with the country, to accustom themselves to this war of surprises, to vie in stratagems with the Chouans, to converse with the peasants, to establish an intercourse with them, to gain their confidence, their friendship, nay even their assistance. "Never forget," he thus wrote to his officers, "that policy ought to have a great share in this war. Let us employ by turns humanity, virtue, integrity, energy, stratagem, and always the dignity that befits republicans." In a short time, he had given to that army a different aspect and a different attitude: the order indispensable for pacification was restored. It was he who, mingling indulgence with severity in his treatment of the soldiers, used these charming expressions in writing to one of his lieutenants, who complained too bitterly of some drunken excesses: "Why, my friend, if soldiers were philoso-

phers, they would not fight. Let us, however, punish drunkards, if drunkenness causes them to neglect their duty." He had formed the most judicious notions of the country, and of the way to restore peace to it. "These peasants," he wrote, "must absolutely have priests; let us leave them their priests, then, since they desire it. Many have suffered, and are sighing to return to an agricultural life; let us afford them some assistance to repair their farms. As for those who have contracted the habit of war, it would be impossible to throw them back upon their country; they would only disturb it by their indolence and their restlessness. They must be formed into legions and enrolled in the armies of the republic. They will make excellent advanced guard soldiers; and their hatred of the coalition, which has neglected to succour them, will guarantee their fidelity to us. Besides, what signifies the cause?—it is war that they want. Recollect," he added, "the bands of Duguesclin going to dethrone Peter the Cruel, and the regiments raised by Villars in the Cevennes." Such was the young general called to give peace to those unfortunate countries.

The decrees of the Convention, profusely circulated in La Vendée and in Bretagne, the release of the suspected persons, both at Nantes and at Rennes, the pardon granted to Madame de Bonchamps, who had been saved from the decree of death issued against her, the cancelment of all unexecuted sentences, the free exercise of religion which had been granted, the prohibition to injure churches, the liberation of the priests, the punihment of Carrier and his accomplices, began to produce the effect expected from them in both countries, and disposed minds to profit by the amnesty offered alike to chiefs and soldiers.* Animosities subsided, and courage along with them. The representatives on mission at Nantes had interviews with the sister of Charette, and transmitted to him, through her agency, the decree of the Convention. He was at that moment reduced to extremity. Though endowed with unparalleled perseverance, he could not dispense with hope, and he saw not a ray of it on any side. The court of Verona, where he excited such admiration, as we have already seen, nevertheless did nothing for him. The regent had, indeed, written him a letter, in which he appointed him lieutenant-general, and styled him the second founder of the monarchy. But this letter, which might at least have flattered his vanity, had been intrusted to the agents in Paris and had not yet reached him. He had for the first time solicited succour from England, and sent his young

* "At the suggestion of Carnot, the committee of public safety, weary of a contest apparently interminable, published a proclamation couched in terms of reconciliation and amity; and, this having led to an address in similar terms from the royalist chiefs, conferences took place between the contending parties, and eventually a treaty was concluded for the final pacification of the West of France."—*Alison*. E.

aide-de-camp La Roberie to London; but he had received no tidings from him. Thus he had not a word of reward or encouragement, either from the princes to whom he was devoting himself, or from the powers whose policy he was seconding. He consented therefore to an interview with Canclaux and the representatives of the people.

At Rennes also the desired approximation was brought about by the sister of one of the chiefs. Botidoux, one of the principal Chouans of the Morbihan, had learned that his sister, who was at Rennes, had been imprisoned on his account. He was prevailed upon to repair thither, in order to obtain her release. Boursault, the representative, gave up his sister to him, paid him all sorts of attentions, satisfied him respecting the intentions of the government, and convinced him of the sincerity of the decree of amnesty. Botidoux promised to write to Bois-Hardi, an intrepid young Chouan, who commanded the division of the Côtes-du-Nord, and was reputed to be the most formidable of the insurgents. "What are your hopes?" he wrote to him. "The republican armies are masters of the Rhine. Prussia is soliciting peace. You cannot rely on the promises of England; you cannot rely upon the chiefs who write to you only from beyond sea, or who have forsaken you upon pretext of seeking succour for you; henceforth you can but wage a war of assassination." Bois-Hardi, staggered by this letter, and unable to leave the Côtes-du-Nord, where yet active hostilities required his presence, solicited the central committee to come to him, in order to answer Botidoux. The committee, at the head of which was Cormatin, as Puisaye's major-general, went to Bois-Hardi. There was in the republican army a young general, bold, brave, possessing great natural talent, and especially that cunning peculiar to the profession which he had formerly followed—that of jockey. This was General Humbert. "He was one of those," said Puisaye, "who had triumphantly proved that a year's practice in war amply supplies the place of all the apprenticeships of the parade." He wrote a letter, the style and orthography of which were denounced to the committee of public welfare, but which was so effective as to touch Bois-Hardi and Cormatin. An interview took place. Bois-Hardi showed the easiness of a young and brave soldier, without animosity, fighting from natural disposition rather than fanaticism. He entered, however, into no engagements, and left Cormatin to act. The latter, with his habitual inconsistency, highly flattered at being called to treat with the generals of the mighty French republic, acceded to all Humbert's overtures, and begged to be introduced to the generals, Hoche and Canclaux, and to the representatives. Interviews were agreed upon; the day and the place were fixed. The central committee found fault with Cormatin for having gone too far. The latter, adding duplicity to inconsistency, assured the committee that he would not betray its cause; that,

in accepting an interview, he wished to have an opportunity of closely observing the common enemies, and judging of their forces and their dispositions. He laid particular stress upon two reasons, and, according to him, important ones: in the first place, he had never seen Charette, with whom no concert had ever taken place; by desiring to see him, upon pretext of comprehending La Vendée as well as Bretagne in the negotiation, he might acquaint him with Puisaye's plans, and prevail upon him to concur in them: secondly, Puisaye, the playfellow in boyhood of Canclaux, had written him a letter capable of touching him, and containing the most splendid offers to gain him for the monarchy. Upon pretext of an interview, Cormatin would deliver the letter to him, and thus complete Puisaye's work. Affecting thus the part of a skilful diplomatist with his colleagues, Cormatin obtained their assent to his opening a feigned negotiation with the republicans, in order to concert with Charette and to win Canclaux. In this spirit he wrote to Puisaye, and set out with his head full of the most contrary ideas, sometimes proud of deceiving the republicans, of plotting before their faces, and of taking from them a general; at others, vain of being the mediator of the insurgents with the representatives of the republic, and ready, in this whirl of ideas, to become a dupe while intending to make dupes. He saw Hoche, first demanded a provisional truce, and then asked permission to visit all the Chouan chiefs, one after another, for the purpose of inspiring them with pacific sentiments, to see Canclaux, and especially Charette, in order to concert with the latter, saying that the Bretons could not separate themselves from the Vendeans. Hoche and the representatives complied with his desire; but they directed Humbert to accompany him, and to attend all the interviews. Cormatin, at the summit of his wishes, wrote to the central committee and to Puisaye, stating that his artifices were successful, that the republicans were his victims, that he was going to encourage the Chouans, to talk to Charette, to prevail on him merely to temporize till the grand expedition, and lastly, to gain over Canclaux. He accordingly set out on a tour through Bretagne, calling every where on the chiefs, and astonishing them by the language of peace, and by this singular truce. All of them were not aware of the trick, and relaxed their efforts. The cessation of hostilities produced an eager desire for rest and peace, and, without intending it, Cormatin promoted the pacification. He began himself to be inclined to it; and, while he meant to dupe the republicans, it was the republicans who, without meaning to do so, made him their dupe. Meanwhile, the day and place for the interview with Charette had been agreed upon. It was in the vicinity of Nantes. Cormatin was to repair thither, and there the negotiations were to commence. Cormatin, more and more embarrassed every day by the engagements which he was contracting with

the republicans, began to write less frequently to the central committee, and the committee, observing the turn which things were taking, wrote to Puisaye in Nivose: "Lose no time in returning. The courage of our men is shaken; the republicans are seducing the chiefs. You must come, if with only twelve thousand men, money, priests, and emigrants. Be here before the end of January (Pluviose)." Thus, while the emigrants and the foreign powers were building all their hopes upon Charette and Bretagne, a negotiation was on the point of restoring peace to the two countries. In Pluviose (January and February) the republic was, therefore, treating at Basle with one of the principal powers of the coalition, and at Nantes with the royalists, who had hitherto combated and misconceived it.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

VARIOUS REFORMS—DESTRUCTION OF THE BUSTS OF MARAT —ABOLITION OF THE MAXIMUM AND OF REQUISITIONS— VARIOUS PLANS RESPECTING ASSIGNATS—DEARTH—INSURRECTION OF THE 12TH OF GERMINAL — TRANSPORTATION OF BILLAUD-VARENNES, COLLOT-D'HERBOIS, AND BARRERE —DISARMING OF THE PATRIOTS.

THE Jacobins were dispersed, the principal agents or chiefs of the revolutionary government under prosecution, Carrier put to death, several other deputies called to account for their missions; lastly, Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, were placed under accusation, and destined to be soon brought to trial before the tribunal of their colleagues. But, while France was thus seeking to revenge herself on the men who had required of her such painful efforts, and doomed her to a system of terror, she returned with passion to pleasure and to the enjoyments of the arts and of civilization, of which those men had for a moment deprived her. We have already seen with what ardour people were preparing to launch into the amusements of the winter, with what new and singular taste the women strove to dress, how eagerly the concerts in the Rue Feydeau were attended. All the theatres were now opened again. The actors of the Comédie Française were released from prison: Larive, St. Prix, Molé, Dazincourt, St. Phal, and Mesdemoiselles Contat and Devienne, had again appeared on the stage. The theatres became quite the rage. There all the passages in plays that could be applied to the Reign of Terror were applauded; there the air of the *Réveil du Peuple* was sung; there the *Marseillaise* was proscribed. In the boxes appeared the beauties of the time, the wives or friends of the Thermidorians; in the pit, Fréron's gilded youth seemed to spite, by its pleasures, its dress, and its taste, those coarse, sanguinary Terrorists who it was said had wanted to stifle all civilization. The balls were attended with the same eagerness. There was one, at which no person was present who had not lost relatives during the Revolution. It was called the ball of the victims. The public places devoted to the arts were again opened. The Convention ordered the formation of a Museum, to contain not only the pictures previously possessed by France, but all those acquired by conquests. Those of the Flemish school taken in Belgium

had been already removed thither. The Lyceum, where Laharpe had very recently celebrated philosophy and liberty in a red cap which had been shut up during the Reign of Terror, was just restored to the public, thanks to the bounty of the Convention, which had taken upon itself part of the expense of the establishment, and distributed some hundreds of tickets among the young men of each section. There Laharpe* was again heard declaiming against anarchy, the system of terror, the corruption of the language, *philosophism*, and all that he had formerly extolled, before that liberty which he celebrated, but with which he was unacquainted, had affrighted his little soul. The Convention had granted pensions to almost all the literary men and to all the men of science, without any distinction of opinion. It had just decreed the establishment of the primary schools, where the lower classes were to learn the elements of the spoken and written language, the rules of arithmetic, the principles of surveying, and some practical notions concerning the principal phenomena of nature; the central schools destined for the higher classes where youth were to be taught the mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, natural history, medical science, the mechanical arts, the arts of design, the belles lettres, the ancient languages, the living languages most appropriate to the localities, general grammar, logic and analysis, history, political economy, the elements of legislation, all in the order best adapted to the development of the understanding; the normal school, where, under the most eminent literati and men of science, young professors were to be trained, who were afterwards to spread throughout all France the instruction acquired by them at the focus of

* "Jean François de Laharpe, a French dramatic poet, critic, and philosopher, was born at Paris in 1739. His father, a Swiss officer in the French service, dying in indigence, he was admitted into the college of Harcourt, where he received an excellent education. A lampoon, however, on one of his benefactors, occasioned him a confinement of some months in the Bastille, when he threw himself on his talents as an author for support. In 1762 he published a collection of poems, and, in the following year, the tragedy of Warwick, which was very successful at the time. On the breaking out of the Revolution, Laharpe embraced the principles of republicanism, but during the Reign of Terror, being suspected by the ruling powers, he was thrown into prison, but ultimately restored to liberty. The last years of his life were spent in literary retirement. He died in 1803, in his sixty-fourth year. His principal work is the 'Lyceum, or a Complete Course of Literature.'"—*Encyclopædia Americana.* E.

"At the beginning of the Revolution Laharpe adopted its principles, and went so far as to preach its maxims in his lessons at the Lyceum, where, in 1792, at the time of the greatest ferment, he declaimed a very vehement hymn to liberty, in which the following lines are particularly remarkable: 'The sword, my friends, the sword, it presses on carnage! The sword, it drinks blood; blood nourishes rage; rage inflicts death.' Another day Laharpe appeared in the same assembly with a red cap on his head, and cried out, 'This cap penetrates and inflames my brain!' He soon afterwards lowered his tone, and became zealous in defence of rational liberty and religion."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

knowledge; lastly, the special schools of medicine, jurisprudence, and the veterinary art. Besides this vast system of education, destined to diffuse and to propagate that civilization which the Revolution was so unjustly accused of having banished, the Convention had added encouragements of all kinds. The establishment of various manufactures had just been ordered. To the Swiss expatriated on account of disturbances national domains at Besançon were given, that they might carry thither the manufactures of clocks and watches. The Convention had, moreover, demanded from its committees plans for canals, banks, and a system of advances to certain provinces ruined by the war. It had mitigated several laws likely to injure agriculture and commerce. A great number of farmers and labourers had quitted Alsace when it was evacuated by Wurmser, Lyons during the siege, and the whole South since the severities exercised against federalism. It distinguished them from the emigrants, and enacted a law by which labourers and artisans, who had left France since the 1st of May, 1793, and who were disposed to return before the 1st of Germinal, were not to be considered as emigrants. The law relative to suspected persons, the repeal of which had been demanded, was maintained; but it was now formidable to the patriots only, who had become the suspected of the day. The revolutionary tribunal had been entirely re-formed, after the model of the ordinary criminal tribunals. There were judges, juries, and counsel. Judgment could no longer be given upon written documents, or without the examination of witnesses. The law which allowed the tribunal to dispense with pleadings, and which had been passed against Danton, was repealed. The district administrations were to cease to be permanent, as well as the revolutionary committees, excepting in cities containing upwards of fifty thousand souls. Lastly, the important interests of religion were regulated by a new law. This law stated that, in virtue of the declaration of rights, all religions were free; but it declared that the state would no longer pay any, or permit the public celebration of their worship. Each sect was at liberty to erect or to rent buildings, and to perform the ceremonies of its worship in those edifices. Lastly, as a substitute for the ancient ceremonies of the Catholic religion and those of *Reason*, the Convention formed a plan of decadary festivals. It had combined dancing, music, and moral exhortations, so as to render the diversions of the people profitable, and to produce upon their imagination impressions at once useful and agreeable. Thus relieved from the urgent necessity for defending itself, the Revolution threw off its violent forms, and reverted to its true mission, that of promoting the arts, industry, knowledge, and civilization.

But, while cruel laws were thus disappearing, while the upper classes were recomposing themselves and indulging in pleasure, the lower were suffering severely from the effects of dearth and

of a cold season scarcely ever known in our climate. This winter, which enabled us to cross dry-shod over the rivers and arms of the sea in Holland, made us pay dearly for that conquest, by dooming the populace in the towns and in the country to grievous hardships. It was indisputably the severest winter of the century: it surpassed even that which preceded the opening of the States-general in 1789. Provisions were scarce from various causes. The principal was the deficiency of the crops. Though they had afforded at first a very fair promise, yet the drought, and afterwards blights, had disappointed all expectations. Thrashing had been neglected, as in the preceding years, either from want of hands, or the ill-will of the farmers. As the assignats were depreciating from day to day, and had lately fallen to one-tenth of their value, the *maximum* had become more oppressive, and the reluctance to obey it, and the efforts to evade it, were so much the greater. The farmers every where made false declarations, and were assisted in their lies by the municipalities, which, as we have seen, had lately been renewed. Being composed almost all of them of moderate men, they cheerfully seconded disobedience to the revolutionary laws; in short, all the springs of authority were relaxed: the government having ceased to strike terror, the requisitions for the supply of the armies and of the great communes were no longer obeyed. Thus the extraordinary system of supplies, destined to make amends for the deficiencies of commerce, was disorganized long before commerce had resumed its natural movement. The dearth was of course more severely felt in the great communes, the supply of which is always more difficult. Paris was threatened with a more distressing famine than any of those which had struck terror into it during the Revolution. With general causes were combined purely particular causes. By the suppression of the commune which had conspired against the Convention on the 9th of Thermidor, the superintendence of the supply of Paris had been transferred from the commune to the commission of commerce and supplies. An interruption in the services had been the consequence of this change. The orders had been given very late, and with a dangerous precipitation. The means of transport were wanting: all the horses, as we have seen, had perished, and, besides the difficulty of collecting sufficient quantities of corn, there was the further difficulty of conveying them to Paris. Dilatoriness, pillage by the way, all the usual accidents of dearth, thwarted the efforts of the commission. With the scarcity of provisions was combined the scarcity of wood for fuel and of charcoal. The canal of Briaire had been dry during the summer. Supplies of pitcoal had not yet arrived, and the forges had consumed all the charcoal. The felling of timber had been tardily ordered, and the people engaged in floating it down the rivers, who were annoyed by the local authorities, had been entirely discouraged. Charcoal and wood

were therefore both scarce, and in that terrible winter the dearth of fuel was almost as severely felt as that of corn.

Thus a cruel infliction on the lower classes contrasted with the new pleasures in which the higher orders indulged. The revolutionists, irritated against the government, followed the example of all vanquished parties, and made use of the public calamities as so many arguments against those who were then at the head of the state.* They even contributed to aggravate those calamities by opposing the orders of the administration. "Do not send your corn to Paris," said they to the farmers; "the government is counter-revolutionary; it is bringing back the emigrants; it will not put the constitution in force; it leaves the corn to rot in the magazines of the commission of commerce; it means to starve the people in order to oblige them to throw themselves into the arms of royalty." By such language they prevailed on the owners of the corn to keep it. They left their communes and repaired to the great towns, where they were unknown, and out of the reach of those whom they had persecuted. There they excited disturbances. At Marseilles, they had just committed fresh violence upon the representatives, whom they forced to suspend the proceedings instituted against the men who were called the accomplices of terror. It had been deemed necessary to put the city in a state of siege. In Paris, where they were much more numerous, they were also more turbulent. They harped perpetually upon the same subject, the distress of the people, and contrasted it with the luxury of the new leaders of the Convention. Madame Tallien was the woman of the day whom they accused, for at all periods there was one person whom people accused: she was the perfidious enchantress whom they blamed, as Madame Roland had formerly been blamed, and before her time, Marie Antoinette, for all the miseries of the people. Her name was several times pronounced in the Convention without appearing to gall Tallien. At last, he one day rose to reply to this abuse. He represented her as a model of attachment and courage, as one of the victims whom Robespierre had destined to the scaffold, and he declared that she had become his wife. Barras, Legendre, and Fréron, joined him. It was high time, they said, to speak out. They exchanged abuse with the Mountain, and the Convention was obliged, as usual, to put an end to the discussion by proceeding to the order of the day. On another occasion, Duhem told Clausel, the deputy, a member of the committee of general safety, that he would

* "The season had been very unfavourable, and the scarcity of food was dreadful. The people, wanting provisions, and not having the power even with assignats of purchasing them, were reduced to the greatest distress; they attributed it of course to the government, and called to mind, not without regret, that they had, not long ago, both bread and power under the committee of public safety."—*Mignet.* E.

murder him. The tumult became tremendous, and the order of the day once more interfered to put an end to this new scene.

The indefatigable Duhem discovered a publication entitled *Le Spectateur de la Révolution*, containing a dialogue on the two governments, monarchical and republican. This dialogue gave an evident preference to the monarchical government, and even exhorted the French people, in an undisguised manner, to revert to it. Duhem denounced this work with indignation, as one of the symptoms of the royalist conspiracy. The Convention, acknowledging the justice of this complaint, sent the author before the revolutionary tribunal; but Duhem, having gone so far as to say that royalism and aristocracy were triumphant, it sent him for three days to the Abbaye, as having insulted the assembly. These scenes had set all Paris in commotion. In the sections it was proposed to prepare addresses on what had just happened, and violent contests ensued about drawing them up, each desiring that these addresses should be written agreeably to his own opinion. Never had the Revolution exhibited so tempestuous a scene.

Formerly, the all-powerful Jacobins had met with no resistance capable of producing a real combat. They had driven all before them and come off conquerors—noisy and furious, but sole conquerors. Now, a powerful party had just risen up, and though it was less violent, it made up by number what it wanted in violence, and could fight with an equal chance of success. Addresses were made in every variety of tone. Some Jacobins, who met in coffee-houses near the populous quarters of St. Denis, the Temple, and St. Antoine, held the same language as they had been accustomed to do. They threatened to go and attack the new conspirators at the Palais Royal, in the theatres, and in the Convention itself. The young men, on their side, made a terrific noise in the pit of the theatres. They resolved upon an outrage which would be keenly felt by the Jacobins. The bust of Marat was in all the public places and particularly in the theatres. At the Théâtre Feydeau some young men climbed up to the balcony, and mounting upon one another's shoulders threw down the bust of the *saint*, dashed it to pieces, and immediately set up that of Rousseau in its place. The police made vain efforts to prevent this disturbance. The act of the young men was universally applauded. Wreaths were thrown upon the stage to crown the bust of Rousseau; verses, written for the occasion were circulated; and there were shouts of "Down with the Terrorists! down with Marat! down with the sanguinary monster who demanded three hundred thousand heads! The author of *Emile*, of the *Contrai Social*, of the *Nouvelle Heloise*, for ever!" No sooner had this example been set, than it was imitated on the following day at the other theatres and at all the places of public resort. People ran to the markets, smeared the bust of Marat with blood, and then threw it into the mud. A number of boys,

in the quarter of Montmartre, formed a procession, and, after carrying a bust of Marat to the brink of a sewer, tumbled it in. Public opinion was expressed with extreme violence. Dislike, even hatred of Marat, filled every heart, not excepting even those of most of the Mountaineers; for none of them could follow in his eccentricities the ideas of this audacious maniac. But the name of Marat being consecrated, the dagger of Corday having gained him a kind of worship, people were as much afraid of touching his altars as those of liberty itself. We have seen that during the last sans-culottides, that is four months before, he had been introduced into the Pantheon in the place of Mirabeau. The committees, eagerly taking the hint, proposed to the Convention to decree that no individual should be deposited in the Pantheon till twenty years after his death, and that the bust or portrait of no citizen should be set up in the public places. It added that every decree to the contrary was repealed. In consequence, Marat, introduced into the Pantheon, was turned out again before the end of four months. Such is the instability of revolutions! Immortality is decreed or taken away, and unpopularity threatens party-leaders even after death! From that moment commenced the long infamy which has covered Marat, and which he has shared with Robespierre. Both, formerly idolized by fanaticism, but now judged by affliction, were devoted to long-continued execration.

The Jacobins, incensed at this outrage offered to one of the most renowned characters of the Revolution, assembled at the faubourg St. Antoine, and swore to avenge the memory of Marat. They took his bust, carried it about in triumph in all the quarters under their sway, and, being armed exceedingly well, threatened to murder any one who should attempt to disturb this sinister solemnity. The young men had a great mind to fall upon this train. They encouraged one another to attack it, and a battle would infallibly have ensued, if the committees had not ordered the club of the Quinze-Vingts to be closed, forbidden processions of this kind, and dispersed the assemblages. In the sitting of the 20th of Nivose, the busts of Marat and Lepelletier were removed from the hall of the Convention,* as well as the two fine

* "Marat was now attacked in his turn. His bust was in the Convention, and in most of the popular assemblies. The gilded youths broke it to pieces at the Theatre Feydeau, and the Mountain remonstrated, but without success. The commotion in the faubourgs became, consequently, considerable. There was also in front of the Invalids a mountain crowned with a colossal statue of Hercules killing the Hydra. The section of the corn-market demanded of the Assembly that it should be pulled down. Some murmurs were heard from the left. 'This giant,' said a member, 'is the image of the people.'—'I see nothing but a mountain,' replied another; 'and what is a mountain, if it be not a lasting protest against equality?' These words were received with applause; they were sufficient to procure the petition a favourable reception, and to overturn this monument of the victory and domination of a party."—*Mignet.* E.

paintings in which David had represented them dying. The tribunes, which were divided, set up contrary cries: some applauded, while others raised tremendous murmurs. Among the latter were many of those women who were called the furies of the guillotine: they were turned out. The Assembly applauded, and the Mountain, sullen and silent, on seeing those celebrated pictures taken down, fancied that it saw the Revolution and the republic annihilated.

The Convention had just deprived both parties of an occasion for quarrel; but it had only deferred the struggle for a few days. The resentment was so keen, and the sufferings of the people were so severe, that there was every reason to expect one of those violent scenes which had imbrued the Revolution in blood. Amidst the uncertainty as to what was likely to happen, all the questions to which the commercial and financial situation of the country gave rise were discussed—unfortunate questions, which people took up afresh every moment, to treat and resolve them in a different manner, according to the changes which opinions had undergone.

Two months before, the Convention had modified the *maximum* by rendering the price of corn variable according to the localities. It had modified the requisitions by making them special, limited, and regular; and it had adjourned the questions relative to the sequestration, the specie, and the assignats. Now, all respect for the revolutionary creations was gone. It was no longer a mere modification that was demanded, but the abolition of the system of coercion established during the Reign of Terror. The adversaries of this system adduced excellent reasons. Every thing, they said, was not subject to a *maximum;* the *maximum* was absurd and unjust. The farmer paying 30 francs for a coulter, for which he formerly paid 50 sous, 700 francs for a servant, for whom he used to pay 100, and 10 francs to a day-labourer, to whom he had given 50 sous, could not afford his produce at the same price as formerly. As raw materials imported from abroad had recently been exempted from the *maximum*, in order to restore some activity to trade, it was absurd to subject them to it after they were wrought; for eight or ten times less would then be paid for them than before. These examples were not the only ones. A thousand others of the same kind might be mentioned. As the *maximum* thus exposed the shopkeeper, the manufacturer, and the farmer, to inevitable losses, they never would submit to it; the former would voluntarily shut up their shops or their factories; the latter would hide his corn or consume it in his own farm-yard, because he would find it more profitable to sell poultry and pigs when fattened upon it. At any rate, if it was desired that the markets should be supplied, it was requisite that the prices should be free; for nobody would like to work for nothing. Besides, added the adversaries of the revolutionary system, the *maximum*

had never been carried into execution; those who wanted to buy made up their minds to pay according to the real price, and (taccording to the legal price. The whole question, therefore, was comprised in these words—to pay high or to have nothing. It would be vain to attempt to supply the lack of spontaneous activity in manufactures and commerce by requisitions, that is to say, by the action of the government. A trading government was a ridiculous monstrosity. Was it certain that that commission of supplies, which had made such a noise about its operations, had imported any foreign corn into France? What was there to feed France with for five days? It was necessary, therefore, to return to individual activity, that is, to free trade, and to rely only on herself. When the *maximum* should be abolished, and the merchant could again lay on the price of freight and insurance, the interest of his capital, and his fair profit, he would import commodities from all parts of the globe. The great communes, in particular, which were not provisioned, like Paris, at the cost of the state, could not have recourse to any thing but commerce, and would be famished unless its freedom were restored to it.

These arguments were just in principle. It was not the less true that the transition from a forced trade to a free trade was liable to prove dangerous in a great crisis like the present. Till the freedom of prices should have awakened individual industry, and supplied the markets, every thing would be excessively dear. It would be a very transient inconvenience for all commodities which were not of prime necessity; it would be only an interruption for a moment, till competition should reduce the prices; but, for articles of consumption which did not admit of interruption, how was the transition to take place? Until the faculty of selling corn at a free price should have caused vessels to be despatched to the Crimea, to Poland, to Africa, and to America, and by the competition have obliged the farmers to part with their grain, how were the populace in the cities to subsist without *maximum* and without requisitions? Would not bad bread, produced by the laborious efforts of the administration, with incredible pains and anxiety, be better than absolute want? Most certainly it would be well to get out of the forced system as soon as possible, but with great caution and without silly precipitation.

As for the reproaches of M. Boissy-d'Anglas* to the commission of supplies, they were not less unjust than ridiculous. Its importations, he said, could not have fed France for five days. The accuracy of the calculation was at first denied; but that

* "At this particular period, Boissy d'Anglas, who was at the head of a committee of subsistence for supplying the people with bread, was any thing but popular. People began to suspect him even of keeping back the supplies of provisions, in order to make them desperate, and favour the royalist faction, with which he was secretly connected."—*Hazlitt.* E.

was of little consequence. It is but a little of which a country is deficient, otherwise it would be impossible to supply that deficiency; but was it not an immense service to have provided that little? Who can form a conception of the distress of a country deprived of bread for five days? Moreover, had this privation been equally divided, it would not have been mortal, but, while the country would have been glutted with corn, the great towns and the capital, in particular, would have been destitute of it not for five days only, but for ten, twenty, fifty, and a convulsion would have ensued. Besides, the commission of commerce and supplies, under the direction of Lindet, had not merely imported articles of consumption from abroad, but transported the corn, forage, and merchandise which were in France, from the country to the frontiers or to the great communes; and commerce, affrighted by the war and political horrors, would never have done so spontaneously. It had been found necessary to make amends for this by the will of the government, and that energetic and extraordinary will was entitled to the gratitude and the admiration of France, notwithstanding the outcry of those petty men, who, during the dangers of the country, could do nothing but hide themselves.

The question was carried by assault, as it were. The *maximum* and the requisitions of transport were abolished, as the seventy-three had been recalled, as Billaud, Collot, and Barrère had been denounced. Some relics of the system of requisitions were nevertheless suffered to subsist. Those which were imposed, in order to supply the great communes, were to be enforced for a month longer. Government retained the right of pre-emption, that is, the right to take articles of consumption by authority on paying the market price for them. The famous commission lost part of its title; it was no longer called commission of commerce and supplies, but merely commission of supplies. Its five directors were reduced to three; its ten thousand agents to a few hundred. The system of contracts was judiciously substituted for that of administrative management; and, by the way, Pache was found fault with for his appointment of the committee of markets. The expense of carriage was allowed to contractors. The manufacture of arms in Paris, which had rendered costly but important services, was discontinued, as it could then be without inconvenience. The fabrication of arms was again committed to contractors. The workmen, who clearly saw that they should be paid less wages, began to murmur: instigated by the Jacobins, they even threatened a commotion; but they were quelled, and sent back to their communes.

The question of the sequestration, previously adjourned (because the government feared lest, in re-establishing the circulation of bills, it should furnish supplies to the emigrants, and cause jobbing in foreign paper to be renewed), was again taken up, and this time resolved to the advantage of

freedom of trade. The sequestration was taken off; the sequestrated bills were thus restored to the foreign merchants, at the risk of not obtaining the like restitution in favour of the French. Lastly, the free circulation of specie was restored, after a warm debate. It had formerly been prohibited, to prevent emigrants from carrying specie out of France; it was now permitted from the consideration that, as we lacked the means of return, Lyons being no longer able to furnish sixty millions' worth of manufactured goods, Nimes twenty, and Sedan ten, commerce would be impossible, unless purchases made abroad were allowed to be paid for in gold or silver. Besides, it was believed that, as specie was hoarded and would not come forth on account of the paper-money, the faculty of paying foreigners for articles of importation would induce it to show itself, and draw it again into circulation. Precautions of a puerile kind were moreover taken to prevent its going to feed the emigrants; every person who sent abroad any metallic amount being obliged to import merchandise of the like value.

Lastly, the government turned its attention to the difficult question of the assignats. There were nearly seven thousand five or six hundred millions in actual circulation; in the coffers there were five or six hundred millions; the total sum fabricated amounted therefore to eight thousand millions. The pledge in hand, in property of first and second origin, as woods, lands, country mansions, hotels, houses, furniture, amounted to more than fifteen thousand millions, according to the actual valuation in assignats. The pledge was therefore amply sufficient. But the assignat lost nine-tenths or eleven-twelfths of its value, according to the objects for which it was given in payment. Thus the state, which received the taxes in assignats, the stockholder, the public functionary, the owner of houses or of lands, the creditor of a capital, all those in short who received their salaries, their income, their reimbursements, in paper, sustained losses that became daily more enormous; and the distress resulting from this state of things likewise increased every day. Cambon purposed to augment the salaries of the public functionaries and the income of the stockholders. After this suggestion had been opposed, it was found necessary to adopt it in regard to the public functionaries, who could no longer live upon their salaries. This was but a very slight palliative for an immense evil: it was relieving one class out of a thousand. To relieve them all, it would be requisite to re-establish the just standard of values; but how was this to be effected?

People were still fond of indulging in the dreams of the preceding year. They investigated the cause of the depreciation of the assignats, and the means of raising them. In the first place, though they acknowledged that their great quantity was one cause of the depreciation, they strove to prove that this was not

the chief cause, in order to exculpate themselves from the excessive issue. In proof, they alleged that at the moment of the defection of Dumouriez, of the insurrection in La Vendée, and of the taking of Valenciennes, the assignats, circulating in much smaller quantity than after the raising of the blockade of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, nevertheless lost more. This was true, and it proved that defeats and victories had an influence on the course of paper-money, a truth that was certainly incontestable. But now, in the year III. (March, 1795), victory was complete on all points, confidence in the sales was established, the national property had become the object of a species of jobbing, a great number of speculators bought to make a profit by reselling or by dividing; and yet the discredit of the assignats was four or five times as great as in the preceding year. The quantity of the issues was therefore the real cause of the depreciation of the paper, and to decrease the amount in circulation was the only mode to raise its value.

The way to bring it back was to sell the national possessions. But what were the means of selling them?—an everlasting question, which was brought forward every year. The cause which had prevented the purchase of national property in preceding years was repugnance, prejudice, and above all, want of confidence in the acquisitions. Now there was a different cause. Let us figure to ourselves how immoveable property is acquired in the ordinary course of things. The merchant, the manufacturer, the farmer, and the capitalist, with slow accumulations arising from produce or income, purchase land of the man who has impoverished himself, or who wishes to change his property for another. But either it is one estate that is exchanged for another, or it is the estate that is exchanged for a moveable capital accumulated by labour. The purchaser of the estate comes to enjoy repose on its bosom; the seller goes elsewhere to employ the moveable capital which he receives in payment, and to succeed to the laborious part of him who accumulated it. Such is the insensible revolution of immoveable property. But let us figure to ourselves a full third of the territory, consisting of extensive and mostly undivided estates, parks, country-houses, hotels, put up for sale all at once, at the very moment too when the most opulent proprietors, merchants, and capitalists, were dispersed, and we shall be able to judge whether it was possible to pay for them. It was not a few tradesmen or farmers who had escaped the proscriptions that could make such acquisitions, and what was still more, pay for them. We shall no doubt be told that the mass of assignats in circulation was sufficient to pay for the domains; but this mass was illusory, if every holder of assignats was obliged to lay out eight or ten times the quantity to procure the same objects as formerly.

The difficulty consisted, therefore, in furnishing purchasers not with the inclination to buy, but with the faculty of paying:

consequently, all the means proposed were founded on a false basis, for they all presupposed that faculty. The means proposed were either forced or voluntary. The former were demonetization and forced loan. Demonetization changed paper-money into a mere delegation upon property. It was tyrannical; for, when it reached the assignat in the hands of the labouring man or the individual who had but just wherewithal to live, it converted the morsel of bread into earth and starved the holder of that assignat. The mere rumour, in fact, that a certain portion of the paper was to be divested of the character of money had caused a rapid fall, and a decree had been issued against demonetizing. The forced loan was quite as tyrannical; it consisted also in forcibly changing the money assignat into an obligation on the lands. The only difference was that the forced loan bore upon the upper and wealthy classes, and operated the conversion for them only; but they had suffered so severely that it was difficult to oblige them to buy landed property, without throwing them into cruel embarrassment. Besides, since the reaction, they began to defend themselves against any return to revolutionary measures.

There was of course nothing left but voluntary means. Expedients of all kinds were proposed. Cambon devised a scheme for a lottery: it was to consist of four millions of tickets at 1000 francs each, which made an amount of four thousand millions to be furnished by the public. The state was to add 391 millions out of which the great prizes were to be formed, so that there should be four of 500,000 francs, thirty-six of 250,000 and three hundred and sixty of 100,000. The least fortunate were to get back the 1000 francs which they had given for their tickets; but both, instead of being paid in assignats, were to receive a bond on the national property, bearing interest at three per cent. Thus it was supposed that the attraction of a considerable prize would cause this kind of investment in bonds on the national domains to be sought after, and that four thousand millions of assignats would thus exchange the quality of money for that of contracts on lands, by the sacrifice of a premium of 391 millions. Thirion proposed another plan, that of a tontine. But this method, consisting in those investments which are made to secure a small capital to certain survivors, was far too slow and too inadequate in regard to the enormous mass of the assignats. Johannot proposed a kind of territorial bank where assignats might be paid in and bonds bearing three per cent. interest obtained in their stead—bonds which might be exchanged at pleasure for assignats. This was still the same plan of changing the paper-money into simple obligations on lands. Here the only difference consisted in conferring on those obligations the faculty of resuming the form of circulating medium. It is evident that the real difficulty was not surmounted. All the means devised for withdrawing and raising the paper were there-

fore illusory: it would have been necessary to proceed for a long time to come in the same track, issuing assignats, which would fall more and more every day; and in the end there must have been a forced solution. Unfortunately, people can never foresee the necessary sacrifices, and diminish their extent by making them beforehand. Nations have always lacked this foresight and this courage in a financial crisis.

To these supposed means of withdrawing the assignats were added others, fortunately more practicable but very limited. The moveable property of the emigrants, for which a ready sale might be found, amounted to 200 millions. The shares of emigrants in the commercial companies might produce 100 millions, the share in their inherited property 500 millions. But in the first case capital would be withdrawn from commerce; in the second, a portion of the amount must be raised in lands. It was intended to offer a premium to those who should complete their payments for the property already purchased, and it was hoped that 800 millions might thus be brought back. Lastly, it was intended to make a lottery of the great houses situated in Paris and not let. In case of complete success, this would bring in a thousand millions more. All the items that we have enumerated would thus withdraw 2600 millions; but it would have been very fortunate if 1500 millions had been got in upon the whole. That sum, however, was about to be produced in another way. The Convention had just decreed a very judicious and a very humane measure—the payment of the creditors of the emigrants. It had at first been resolved to make a separate liquidation for each emigrant. As many of them were insolvent, the republic would not have paid their debts till it had realized their credits. But this individual liquidation would have been attended with endless delay. It would have been necessary to open an account for each emigrant, to enter in it his immoveable property and his moveable property, and to balance the whole with his debts; and his unfortunate creditors, almost all of them servants, artisans, or shopkeepers, would have had to wait twenty or thirty years for their money. At the instigation of Cambon, it was decided that the creditors of the emigrants should become creditors of the state, and should be paid immediately, excepting those whose debtors were notoriously insolvent. The republic might thus lose a few millions, but it would relieve very great distress and confer an immense benefit. Cambon, the revolutionist, was the author of this most humane idea.

But, while these unhappy questions were under discussion, the attention of the government was called off every moment to still more urgent matters—the supply of Paris, which was almost entirely destitute. It was now the end of Ventose (the middle of March). The abolition of the *maximum* had not yet had the effect of reviving commerce, and corn did not arrive. A number

of deputies, scattered around Paris, made requisitions which were not obeyed. Though they were still authorized for the supply of the great communes, and on paying the market-price, the farmers alleged that they were abolished, and refused to comply with them: but this was not the greatest obstacle. The rivers and the canals were entirely frozen. Not a boat could arrive. The roads, covered with ice, were impassable; to render wheel-carriage possible it would have been requisite to gravel them for twenty leagues round. During the journey the carts were plundered by the famished people, who were excited to fury by the Jacobins, who told them that the government was counter-revolutionary, that it suffered corn to rot in Paris, and that it intended to restore royalty. While the arrivals diminished, the consumption increased, as always happens in such cases. The fear of running short made each person lay in provisions for several days. Bread was delivered as formerly on the presentation of tickets; but every one exaggerated his wants. To favour their milkwomen, their laundresses, or the country-people, who brought them vegetables and poultry, the inhabitants of Paris gave them bread, which was preferred to money, on account of the dearth which afflicted the environs as much as Paris itself. The bakers even sold dough to the country-people, and from fifteen hundred sacks the consumption had thus risen to nineteen hundred. The abolition of the *maximum* had caused an extraordinary rise in the prices of all kinds of eatables; to bring them down, the government had put meat and goods in the hands of the pork-butchers, the grocers, and the shopkeepers, to be sold at a low price. But these depositaries abused their commission and sold at a higher rate than they had agreed to do.

The committees were every day in the greatest alarm, and waited with extreme anxiety for the nineteen hundred sacks of flour which had become indispensable. Boissy d'Anglas, charged with the superintendence of the supply of articles of consumption, came continually to make new reports, in order to pacify the public, and to impart to it a security which was not felt by the government itself. In this situation the customary abuse was not spared. "See," said the Mountain, "the effect of the abolition of the *maximum!*"—"See," replied the right side, "the inevitable effect of your revolutionary measures!" Each then proposed as a remedy the accomplishment of the wishes of his party, and demanded measures frequently most foreign to the painful subject under discussion. "Punish all the guilty!" said the right side, "repair all injustice, revise all the tyrannical laws, repeal all the law relative to the suspected."—"No," answered the Mountaineers: "renew your committees of government; render their energy revolutionary: cease to persecute the best patriots, and to raise the aristocracy again." Such were the means proposed for the relief of the public distress.

It is always moments like these that parties choose for coming to blows and for carrying their schemes into effect. The report so long expected concerning Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, was presented to the Assembly. The commission of twenty-one decided upon accusation, and demanded the provisional arrest. The arrest was immediately voted by an immense majority. It was decreed that the four inculpated members should be heard by the Assembly, and that a solemn discussion should be opened on the motion for placing them under accusation. No sooner was this decision adopted, than it was proposed to readmit into the bosom of the Assembly the proscribed deputies, who two months before had been discharged from all prosecution, but who had been forbidden to resume their seats among their colleagues. Sieyes,* who had kept silence for five years, who, from the first months of the Constituent Assembly, had concealed himself in the centre, that his reputation and his genius might be forgotten, and whom the dictatorship had forgiven as an unsociable character, incapable of conspiring, ceasing to be dangerous as soon as he ceased writing—Sieyes emerged from his long silence, and said that, since the reign of the laws seemed to be restored, he should resume the right to speak. So long as the outrage committed on the national representation was not repaired, the reign of the laws, according to him, was not re-established. "Your whole history," said he to the Convention, "is divided into two epochs; from the 21st of September, the day of your meeting, to the 31st of May, the oppression of the Convention by the misguided people;

* The following anecdotes are highly characteristic of Sieyes, who rendered himself conspicuous during the Revolution by his numerous crotchets, theories, and systems, which possessed every earthly recommendation except common sense.

"Sieyes, observed Napoleon, before the Revolution, was almoner to one of the princesses. One day, when he was performing mass in the chapel before herself, her attendants, and a large congregation, something occurred which made the princess get up and retire. Her example was followed by her ladies-in-waiting, and by the whole of the nobility, officers, and others, who attended more out of complaisance to her than from any true sense of religion. Sieyes was very busy reading his breviary, and for some time did not perceive the general desertion. Lifting up his eyes, however, from his book, lo! he observed that the princess, nobles, and all their retainers, had disappeared. With an air of contempt, displeasure, and haughtiness, he shut the book, hastily descended from the pulpit, exclaiming, 'I do not say mass for the *canaille*,' and went out of the chapel, leaving the service half finished"—*A Voice from St. Helena.* E.

"The Abbé Sieyes rendered himself remarkable on occasion of the King's trial. When his turn came to ascend the tribune, he pronounced the words, 'Death, *sans phrase*.' This expression was afterwards parodied in a cutting manner by a minister of the King of Prussia, whom Caillard, the French minister, had requested to pay some attention to Sieyes, who was going as ambassador to Berlin. 'No,' replied he; 'and *sans phrase*.'"—*Memoirs of a Peer of France.* E.

from the 31st of May to the present day, the oppression of the people by the Convention, tyrannized over itself. From this day you will prove that you are become free by recalling your colleagues. Such a measure cannot even be discussed; it is one of absolute right." The Mountaineers inveighed against this manner of reasoning. "All that you have done then is null!" exclaimed Cambon. Those immense toils, that multitude of laws, all the decrees which constitute the present government, are then null! and the salvation of France effected by your courage and your efforts all this is null!" Sieyes said that he was misunderstood. The Assembly nevertheless decided that the deputies who had escaped the scaffold should be reinstated. Those famous proscripts, Isnard, Henri Larivière, Louvet, Lareveillère-Lepaux, and Doulcet de Pontecoulant, entered amidst applause. "Why," exclaimed Chenier, "was there not a cavern deep enough to save from the executioners the eloquence of Vergniaud and the genius of Condorcet!"*

The Mountaineers were indignant; nay even several Thermidorians, alarmed at seeing the chiefs of a faction which had opposed so dangerous a resistance to the revolutionary system, admitted again into the Assembly, went back to the Mountain. Thuriot, that Thermidorian so inimical to Robespierre, who had by a miracle escaped the fate of Philipeaux; Lesage-Senault, a man of sound discretion, but a decided enemy to all counter-revolution; lastly Lecointre, the resolute adversary of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, who had five months before been declared a calumniator for denouncing the seven remaining members of the old committees; took their seats again on the left side. "You know not what you are doing," said Thuriot to his colleagues; "those men will never forgive you." Lecointre proposed a distinction: "Recall the proscribed deputies," said he, "but inquire which of them took arms against the country by exciting the departments to insurrection, and admit them not again among you." All of them had in fact taken arms. Louvet hesitated not to confess this, and proposed to declare that the departments which had risen in 1793 had deserved well of the country. This called up Tallien, who, alarmed at the boldness of the Girondins, opposed the two propositions of Lecointre and

* "I will not do the National Convention the injustice," said Chenier, who spoke in favour of the Girondins, "to place before its eyes the phantom of federalism, which they have dared to make the principal head of accusation against your colleagues. They have fled, it is said. They have concealed themselves. This then is their crime. Ah! would that it had pleased the fates of the republic that this had been the crime of them all! Why were there not caverns deep enough to preserve to their country the meditations of Condorcet, and the eloquence of Vergniaud? Why, on the 10th of Thermidor, did not a hospitable land again bring to light this band of energetic patriots, and virtuous republicans? But they fear schemes of vengeance from men soured by misfortune."—*Mignet.* E.

Louvet. Both were rejected. While the Assembly recalled the proscribed Girondins, it referred Pache, Bouchotte, and Garat,* to the examination of the committee of general safety.

Such resolutions were not calculated to pacify the public mind. The increasing dearth at length rendered necessary the adoption of a measure which had been postponed for several days, and which could not fail to increase the irritation to the highest pitch —namely, to reduce the inhabitants of Paris to rations. Boissy-d'Anglas appeared before the Assembly on the 25th of Ventose (March 15) and proposed, in order to prevent waste and to ensure to each a sufficient share of provisions, to limit every individual to a certain quantity of bread. The number of persons composing each family was to be stated on the ticket, and no more than one pound of bread per day was to be allowed for each person. On this condition, the commission of supplies could answer for it that the city would not be left without provisions. Romme, the Mountaineer, proposed to raise the allowance of working men to a pound and a half. The upper classes, he said, possessed the means of procuring butchers' meat, rice, or vegetables; but the common people, being unable to buy any thing but bread, ought to have more of it. Romme's proposition was adopted, and the Thermidorians were sorry that they had not made it themselves, to gain the support of the lower classes and to withdraw them from the Mountain.

No sooner was this decree passed, than it excited a most violent ferment in the populous quarters of Paris. The revolutionists strove to aggravate its effect, and never called Boissy-d'Anglas by any other name than *Famine* Boissy. On the day after the next, the 27th of Ventose (March 17), when the decree was for the first time carried into execution, a great tumult arose in the faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau. For the 636,000 inhabitants of the capital there had been given out 1897 sacks of flour: 324,000 citizens had received the additional half-pound allowed to persons supporting themselves by the labour of their hands. Nevertheless, it appeared so new to the people of the faubourgs to be reduced to rations, that they murmured. Some women, who were accustomed to attend the clubs, and who were always ready to create a riot, made a disturbance in the section of the Observatoire, and were joined by the usual agitators of the section. They resolved to present a petition to the Convention; but for this purpose it was requisite that there should be a meeting of the whole section, and it was not lawful to hold such a meeting excepting on the Decadi. They

* "Garat was a man of talent who had distinguished himself in the revolutionary troubles, but his eloquence, I well remember, was always disliked by Bonaparte. 'What an animal that Garat is!' said he to me one day. 'What a stringer of words! There are people who never know when to hold their tongues.'"—*Bourrienne*. E.

nevertheless beset the civil committee, demanded with threats the keys of the hall, and, on its refusal to give them up, the mob insisted on its sending one of its members to go with them to the Convention. The committee complied, and appointed one of its members to regularize the movement and to prevent disturbance. A similar scene was taking place at the same moment in the section of Finistère. A concourse had collected there and joined that of the Observatoire; and both, blended together, proceeded towards the Convention. One of the ringleaders undertook to speak, and was conducted with a few of the petitioners to the bar. The rest of the mob remained outside making a tremendous noise. "We are in want of bread!" said the spokesman of the deputation: "we are ready to regret all the sacrifices that we have made for the Revolution." At these words the Assembly, filled with indignation, abruptly stopped him, and several members rose to condemn language so unbecoming. "Bread! bread!" shouted the petitioners striking the bar with their fists. On this insolent conduct, the Assembly desired them to be turned out of the hall. Tranquillity, however, was restored; the speaker finished his harangue and said that, till the wants of the people were supplied, they would not shout any thing but *The republic for ever!* Thibaudeau, the president, replied with firmness to this seditious speech, and, without inviting the petitioners to the sitting, sent them back to their work. The committee of general safety, which had already collected some battalions of the sections, cleared away the crowd from the doors of the Assembly, and dispersed it.

This scene produced a strong impression on the public mind. The daily threats of the Jacobins spread through the sections of the faubourgs; their inflammatory placards, in which they gave warning that an insurrection would take place within a week, if all the prosecutions against the patriots were not dropped, and if the constitution of 1793 were not enforced; their almost public conferences, held in the coffee-houses of the faubourgs; lastly, this recent attempt at riot, revealed to the Convention the scheme of a new 31st of May. The right side, the reinstated Girondins, the Thermidorians, all threatened alike, deemed it time to take measures for preventing any new attack on the national representation. Sieyes, who had lately made his appearance again upon the stage, and become a member of the committee of public welfare, proposed to the united committees a sort of martial law, destined to preserve the Convention from fresh violence. This *projet de loi* declared as seditious every concourse of people assembled for the purpose of attacking public or private property, of restoring royalty, of overthrowing the republic and the constitution of 1793, of going to the Temple, to the Convention, &c. Every member of such an assemblage was to

be liable to banishment. If after three warnings from the magistrates the assemblage did not disperse, force was to be employed; and, till the public force should collect, all the adjoining sections were to send their own battalions. An insult offered to a representative of the people was to be punished by banishment; outrage, attended with violence, by death. One bell only was to remain in Paris, and to be placed in the Pavillon de l'Unité. If any assemblage should be proceeding towards the Convention, this bell was immediately to sound the alarm. At this signal, all the sections were to be required to assemble and to march to the succour of the national representation. If the Convention should be dissolved, or its liberty violated, all the members who could escape were to be enjoined to leave Paris immediately, and to repair to Châlons-sur-Marne. All the deputies absent on leave or on missions were to be ordered to join them. The generals were also to send them troops from the frontiers, and the new Convention formed at Châlons, the only depository of the legitimate authority, was to march to Paris, to deliver the oppressed portion of the national representation, and to punish the authors of the outrage.

This plan was cordially adopted by the committees. Sieyes was commissioned to draw up the report upon it, and to present it as speedily as possible to the Assembly. The revolutionists, on their part, imboldened by the late movement, finding in the dearth a most favourable opportunity, perceiving that the danger was becoming more imminent for their party, and that the fatal moment for Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier, was approaching, bestirred themselves with greater violence, and thought seriously of getting up a sedition. The electoral club and the popular society of the Quinze-Vingts had been dissolved. Deprived of this place of refuge, the revolutionists had resorted to the sectional assemblies, which were held every Decadi. They swayed the faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau, and the quarters of the Temple and of the City. They met at the coffee-houses situated in the heart of these different quarters; they projected a commotion, but without having either any avowed plan or leaders. Among them were several men compromised either in the revolutionary committees or in different offices, who possessed considerable influence over the multitude; but none of them had a decided superiority. The one counterbalanced the other, agreed but ill together, and had, moreover, no communication whatever with the deputies belonging to the Mountain.

The old popular leaders had always been allied with Danton, with Robespierre, with the heads of the government, and had served as intermediate agents to give their directions to the populace. But all these had perished. The new leaders were strangers to the new chiefs of the Mountain. They had nothing in common with them but their dangers and their attachment to the same cause. Besides, the Mountaineer deputies, as the

beaten party, being left in a minority in the Assembly, and accused of conspiring in order to recover power, were under the necessity of justifying themselves every day, and obliged to declare that they were not conspiring. The usual result of such a position is a wish that others should conspire, and a fear of entering into a conspiracy oneself. Accordingly, the Mountaineers said every day, *The people will rise—the people must rise;* but they would not have dared to concert with the people in order to bring about that rising.* Many imprudent expressions used by Duhem and Maribon-Montaud in a coffee-house were repeated. Both must have been very unguarded and indiscreet to utter them. Declarations made by Leonard Bourdon to the sectionary society of the Rue du Vertbois were also cited; they were likely enough to have come from him: but none of these men corresponded with the patriots. As for Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, who were more interested than any other persons in a commotion, they were afraid lest, by taking part in one, they should render their own position worse, which was already very dangerous.

The patriots, therefore, proceeded alone, without much unity of purpose, as is almost always the case when there are no very prominent chiefs. They ran from one to the other, carrying messages from street to street and from quarter to quarter, and intimating that this or that section was going to present a petition, or to attempt a movement. At the commencement of a revolution, at the outset of a party, when all its chiefs are with it, when success and novelty hurry the mass along in its train, when it disconcerts its adversaries by the boldness of its attacks, it makes amends by excitement for the want of unity and order: on the contrary, when it is once forced to defend itself, when it is deprived of impulsion, when it is known to its adversaries, it has more need than ever of discipline. But that discipline almost always impossible, becomes absolutely so when the influential leaders are gone. Such was the position of the patriot party: it was no longer the torrent of the 14th of July, of the 5th and 6th of October, of the 10th of August, or of the 31st of May. It was the combination of a few men, inured by long discord to hostility, seriously compromised, full of energy and obstinacy it is true but more capable of fighting desperately than of conquering.

According to the old custom of preceding every movement by an imperative and yet guarded petition, the sections of Montreuil and the Quinze-Vingts, comprised in the faubourg St.

* "With respect to the middle classes and the people, the death of Robespierre was the death of the revolutionary government; and, after various struggles and oscillations, the Mountaineers (that is to say, those who wished to continue the system of terror), found themselves no longer heading the people, but, in spite of themselves, drawn along with and governed by public opinion."—*Las Cases.* E.

Antoine, drew up one in much the same spirit as all those which had been the forerunners of the great insurrections. It was agreed that it should be presented on the 1st of Germinal (March 21). This was the very day that the committees had resolved to propose the law of high police devised by Sieyes. Besides the deputation which was to present the petition, an assemblage of patriots took care to proceed towards the Tuileries; thither they thronged, and, as usual, they formed numerous groups, shouting, *The Convention for ever! the Jacobins for ever! down with the aristocrats!* The young men, with hair turned up and black collars, had also moved off from the Palais Royal to the Tuileries, and formed hostile groups, crying, *The Convention for ever! down with the Terrorists!* The petitioners were admitted to the bar. The language of their petition was extremely moderate. They referred to the distress of the people, but without acrimony; they combated the accusation directed against the patriots, but without recriminating against their adversaries. They merely remarked that the authors of these charges misconceived both the past services of the patriots, and the position in which they had found themselves. They confessed, however, that excesses had been committed, but added, that all parties were composed of men and not of gods. "The sections of the Quinze-Vingts and of Montreuil," said they, "are not come, therefore, to demand of you as general measures either banishment or the spilling of blood against this or that party, measures which confound mere error with crime: they regard all Frenchmen as brethren, differently organized, it is true, but all members of the same family. They come to solicit you to employ an instrument which is in your hands, and which is the only efficacious one for putting an end to our political storms: that is the constitution of 1793. Organize from this day forth that popular constitution which the French people have accepted and sworn to defend. It will reconcile all interests, pacify the public mind, and lead you to the term of your labours."

This insidious proposition comprised all that the revolutionists desired at the moment. They actually conceived that the constitution, in expelling the Convention, would bring back their leaders and themselves to the legislature, to the executive power, and to the municipal administrations. This was an egregious mistake; but such was their hope, and they thought that, without expressing dangerous wishes, such as the release of the patriots, the suspension of all proceedings against them, and the formation of a new commune at Paris, they should find its accomplishment in the mere putting in force of the constitution. If the Convention refused to comply with their demand, if it did not speak out precisely, and did not fix an early period, it would confess that it disliked the constitution of 1793. Thibaudeau, the

president, made them a very firm reply, concluding with these words, which were by no means flattering, nay, they were indeed severe: "The Convention has never attributed the insidious petitions which have been presented to it to the sturdy and stanch defenders of liberty, whom the faubourg St. Antoine has produced." As soon as the president had finished, Chales hastened to mount the tribune, to demand that the declaration of rights should be exhibited in the hall of the Convention, as one of the articles of the constitution required. Tallien succeeded him in the tribune. "I ask those men," said he, "who now pretend to be such zealous defenders of the constitution, those who seem to have adopted the watchword of a sect which sprang up at the conclusion of the Constituent Assembly—*The constitution, and nothing but the constitution*—I ask them if it was not themselves who shut it up in a box?" Applause from one quarter, murmurs and shouts from another, interrupted Tallien. Resuming his speech, amidst tumult, "Nothing," he continued, "shall prevent me from expressing my opinion when I am among the representatives of the people. We are all for upholding the constitution, with a firm government, with the government which it prescribes; and it is not right that certain members should make the people believe that there are in this Assembly persons hostile to the constitution. It behoves us this day to take measures to prevent them from slandering the pure and respectable majority of the Convention."—"Yes, yes," was the general cry from all quarters. "That constitution," proceeded Tallien, "which they followed up not by laws calculated to complete it and to render its execution possible, but by the revolutionary government—that constitution we must put in action, and we must impart life to it. But we shall not be so imprudent as to pretend to carry it into effect without organic laws, so as to consign it incomplete and defenceless to all the enemies of the republic. For this reason, I move that a report be immediately prepared on the means of perfecting the constitution, and that it be decreed that henceforth there shall be no intermediate agency between the present government and the definitive government." Tallien descended from the tribune amidst universal demonstrations of the satisfaction of the Assembly, whom his manner of replying had extricated from a dilemma. The preparation of organic laws was a happy pretext for deferring the promulgation of the constitution, and furnishing the means of modifying it. It was an occasion for a new revision, like that to which the constitution of 1791 was subjected. Miaulle, a moderate Mountaineer, approved Tallien's proposal, and admitted, with him, that they ought not to be too precipitate in carrying the constitution into effect: but he maintained that there could not be any inconvenience in giving it publicity; and he moved that it should be engraved on marble tablets and set up in all the public places. Thibaudeau,

alarmed at the idea of giving such publicity to a constitution framed in a moment of democratic frenzy, gave up the chair to Clauzel, and ascended the tribune. "Legislators," said he, "we ought not to resemble those priests of antiquity who had two ways of expressing themselves, the one secret, the other ostensible. It behoves us to have the courage to say what we think of this constitution; and, were it even to strike me dead, as it last year struck those who presumed to make observations against it, still would I speak out." After a long interruption occasioned by applause, Thibaudeau boldly asserted that there would be danger in publishing a constitution with which those who so highly extolled it were assuredly not acquainted. "A democratic constitution," said he, "is not one in which the people themselves exercise all the powers."—"No! no!" cried a multitude of voices. "It is that," resumed Thibaudeau, "under which the people enjoy liberty, equality, and peace. Now I cannot find these in a constitution which should place a usurping commune or factious Jacobins by the side of the national representation; which should not give to the national representation the direction of the armed force in the place where it is sitting, and should thus deprive it of the means of defending itself and of upholding its dignity; which should grant to a fraction of the people the right of partial insurrection and the faculty of overthrowing the state. To no purpose are we told that an organic law will correct all these inconveniences. A mere law may be altered by the legislature; but dispositions so important as those which shall be comprehended in these organic laws must be as immutable as the constitution itself. Besides, organic laws are not framed in a fortnight, or even in a month; meanwhile I propose that no publicity be given to the constitution; that great vigour be imparted to the government, and that even, if it be requisite, new powers be given to the committee of public welfare." Thibaudeau descended from the tribune amidst applause bestowed on the boldness of his declaration. It was then proposed to close the discussion immediately. The president put the question to the vote, and almost the whole Assembly rose in support of it. The irritated Mountaineers complained that they had not had time to hear what the president said, and that they knew not what had been proposed. No attention was paid to them, and the Assembly proceeded to other business. Legendre then moved the appointment of a commission of eleven members, to consider without intermission the organic laws with which the constitution was to be accompanied. This idea was forthwith adopted. The committees at that moment intimated that they had an important report to make, and Sieyes ascended the tribune to submit his law of high police.

While these different scenes were passing in the interior of the Assembly, the greatest tumult prevailed without. The

patriots of the faubourg, who had not been able to get into the hall, had gone to the Carrousel and to the gardens of the Tuileries, and were there waiting impatiently, and setting up their accustomed shouts, till the result of the application to the Convention should be known. Some of them had come from the tribunes to report to the others what had passed; and, giving them an unfaithful account, they had told them that the petitioners had been maltreated. The tumult among them increased. Some ran off to the faubourgs to say that their envoys were ill-used by the Convention; others scoured the garden, driving before them the young men whom they met with; they had even seized three of them and thrown them into the great basin of the Tuileries.* The committee of general safety, observing these disorders, had directed the drums to beat, for the purpose of calling together the neighbouring sections. Meanwhile, the danger was urgent; and it required time for the sections to be called together, and to assemble. The committee had around it a body of young men, who had collected to the number of a thousand or twelve hundred, armed with sticks and disposed to fall upon the groups of patriots, who had not yet met with any resistance. It accepted their aid, and authorized them to keep order in the garden. They rushed upon the groups which were shouting *The Jacobins for ever!* dispersed them after a long contest, and drove back part of them towards the hall of the Convention. Some of the patriots again went up to the tribunes, and there caused a sort of confusion by their precipitate arrival. At this moment, Sieyes was finishing his report on the law of high police. An adjournment was demanded, and there were cries from the Mountain of "It is a bloody law! It is martial law! They want the Convention to leave Paris!"—With these cries was mingled the noise of the runaways coming back from the garden. Great agitation ensued. "The royalists are assassinating the patriots!" exclaimed a voice. A tumult was heard at the doors: the president put on his hat. A great majority of the assembly said that the danger against which Sieyes's law provided had already occurred, that it ought to be voted immediately. "Vote! vote!" was the general cry. The law was put to the vote, and adopted by an immense majority, amidst the loudest applause. The members of the extreme left refused to take any part in the proceeding. At length quiet was

* "The enraged patriots set off to appear before the Convention. They vociferously demanded, 'Bread, the Constitution of 1793, and the liberty of the imprisoned Jacobins.' They met some young people, and threw them into the basin of the Tuileries. But the report having soon spread that the Convention was in danger, and that the Jacobins were going to attempt the rescue of their chiefs, the Troupe Dorée, followed by about five thousand citizens belonging to the interior sections, arrived to disperse the men of the faubourgs, and to act as the guard of the Assembly."—*Mignet.* E.

gradually restored, and it began to be possible to hear the speakers. "The Convention has been imposed upon," cried Duhem. Clauzel, who then came in, said that he had brought good news. "We want none of thy good news," replied several voices. Clauzel continued, and reported that the good citizens had assembled to make a rampart of their bodies for the national representation. He was applauded. "It is thou," cried Ruamps, "who hast instigated these mobs, in order to cause the passing of an atrocious law." Clauzel attempted to reply, but could not make himself heard. The law, voted with such precipitation, was then attacked. "The law has been passed," said the president, "it is too late to revert to it."—"People here are conspiring with those outside," said Tallien; "no matter, let us resume afresh the discussion of the *projet*, and prove that the Convention can deliberate even amidst murderers." Tallien's proposal was adopted, and the *projet* of Sieyes was anew taken into consideration. The discussion was carried on with more calmness. While the Assembly was deliberating within the hall, tranquillity was restored without. The young men, victorious over the Jacobins, begged permission to present themselves before the Assembly. They were introduced by deputation, and protested their patriotic intentions and their devotedness to the national representation. They withdrew after having been vehemently applauded. The Convention persisted in discussing the law of police without stirring, voted it article by article, and at length broke up at ten at night.

This day left both parties convinced of the approach of some important event. The patriots, repulsed by the closing of the debate in the Convention, and beaten with sticks in the gardens of the Tuileries, repaired to the faubourgs to vent their rage, and to excite the populace there to riot. The Convention plainly saw that it was about to be attacked, and prepared to avail itself of the tutelary law which it had just passed.

The next day was likely to produce as warm a discussion as that which was just over. It was the first time that Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier were to be heard before the Convention. A great number of patriots and women had thronged very early to occupy the tribunes. The young men more prompt, had got there before them, and prevented the women from entering. They had sent them away rather roughly, and some scuffles had ensued around the hall. Numerous patroles, on duty in the environs, had nevertheless maintained the public peace; the tribunes had filled without much disturbance, and, from eight in the morning till noon, the time had been spent in singing patriotic airs. On one side was sung *Le Réveil du Peuple*, on the other *La Marseillaise*, till the deputies were seated. The president at length took the chair amidst shouts of *The Convention for ever! The republic for ever!* The accused

had entered and seated themselves at the bar, and the discussion was awaited in profound silence.

Robert Lindet immediately demanded permission to speak on a motion of order. It was surmised that this irreproachable man, whom none had dared to accuse along with the other members of the committee of public safety, meant to defend his old colleagues. It was generous in him to do so, for he had still less concern than Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or in the political measures of the late committee of public welfare. He had accepted the department of supplies and transports solely on condition that he should have nothing to do with the operations of his colleagues, that he should never deliberate with them, nay, that he should even have his office in a different building. He had refused the co-suretiship before the danger; the danger arrived, and he generously came forward to claim it. It was thought likely that Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or would follow Lindet's example: accordingly, several voices on the right were raised at once to oppose his being heard. "The accused must be heard first," was the cry; "they must speak before either their accusers or their defenders."—"Yesterday," said Bourdon of the Oise, "a plot was hatched to save the accused; it was frustrated by the good citizens. To-day recourse is had to other means; scruples are awakened in honest men, whom the accusation has separated from their colleagues; they are prevailed upon to associate themselves with the guilty, in order to retard justice by new obstacles." Robert Lindet replied that the intention was to bring the whole government to trial, that he had been a member of it, that, in consequence, he ought not to consent to be separated from his colleagues, and that he claimed his share of the responsibility. Men hardly dare withstand an act of generosity and courage. Robert Lindet obtained permission to speak. He expatiated at great length on the immense toils of the committee of public welfare; he demonstrated its activity, its foresight, and its eminent services; and proved that the excitement of zeal produced by the struggle had alone caused the excesses with which certain members of that government were charged. This speech, which lasted six hours, was not heard without many interruptions. Ungrateful persons, forgetting already the services of the accused, found this enumeration of the obligations owing to them rather tedious: and some members even had the indecency to say that this speech ought to be printed at Lindet's expense, because it would cost the republic too much. The Girondins were nettled by the mention of the federalist insurrection and the calamities which it had caused. Every party found reason to complain. At length, the Assembly adjourned to the following day, many of its members vowing not to suffer any more of those long depositions in favour of the accused. Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or

desired, however, to be heard in their turn; they were anxious, like Lindet, to lend a generous succour to their colleagues, and at the same time to justify themselves against a great number of accusations, which could not be urged against Billaud, Collot, and Barrère without involving them also. The signature of Carnot and Prieur of the Côte d'Or was in fact attached to the orders for which the accused were most severely censured. Carnot, whose reputation was immense, who was said in France and in Europe to have *organized victory*, and whose courageous contests with St. Just and Robespierre were well known, could not be heard without respect and a sort of reverence.* He obtained leave to speak. "It belongs to me," said he, "to justify the committee of public welfare, to me who dared first to face Robespierre and St. Just;" and he might have added—to me who dared attack them, while you obeyed their slightest orders, and decreed at their pleasure all the executions which they demanded of you. He first explained how his signature and that of his colleagues, who had no participation whatever in the political acts of the committee, came nevertheless to be appended to the most sanguinary orders. "Overwhelmed," said he, "by the pressure of business, having three or four hundred matters to settle every day, and very often no time for meals, we had agreed to lend our signatures to one another. We signed a multitude of papers without reading them. I signed orders for placing under accusation, and my colleagues signed orders for military movements and plans of attack, without either having time to enter into any explanation concerning them. The necessity for this immense toil had required that individual dictatorship, which each had reciprocally granted to the other. Without this, we could never have got through the business. The order to arrest one of the most useful of my *employés* in the war department, an order for which I attacked St. Just and Robespierre, and denounced them as usurpers—that order I had signed without knowing it. Thus our signature proves nothing, and it cannot be adduced in evidence of our participation in the acts

* "Carnot was not included in the act of accusation, but he had the magnanimity to declare that, having acted with his colleagues for the public good, he had no wish but to share their fate. This generous proceeding embarrassed the accusers; but, in order to avoid implicating so illustrious a character in the impeachment, it was resolved to limit it to some only of the members of the committee; and Amar, Vouland, and the painter David, were excluded, the last of whom had disgraced a fine genius by the most savage revolutionary fanaticism."—*Alison.* E.

"Carnot, after the events of Thermidor, when the Convention caused all the members of the committee of public safety to be arrested, with the exception of himself, insisted on sharing their fate. This conduct was the more noble, inasmuch as the country had declared violently against the committee. Carnot, who had a high sense of honour and great natural sensibility, was deeply affected by the reproaches of public opinion."—*Las Cases.* E.

laid to the charge of the late government." Carnot then endeavoured to justify his accused colleagues. Though admitting, without precisely saying so, that they had formed part of the passionate and violent men of the committee, he declared that they had been the first to rise up against the triumvirate, and that the indomitable character of Billaud-Varennes had been the greatest obstacle that Robespierre had had to encounter. Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, who, in the fabrication of arms and ammunition, had rendered as important services as Carnot, and who had given the same signatures and in the same manner, repeated Carnot's declaration, and insisted, like him and Lindet, on sharing the responsibility which pressed upon the accused.

Here the Convention found itself plunged again into the perplexities of a discussion which had been several times renewed, and which had never led to any thing but frightful confusion. Was not this example, given by three men enjoying universal consideration and voluntarily declaring themselves co-sureties of the late government a warning for it? Was it of no consequence that every body had more or less been an accomplice of the old committees, and that it ought itself to demand chains, like Lindet, Carnot, and Prieur? In fact, it had not attacked tyranny till after the three men whom it now wished to punish as its accomplices; and as for their passions, it had shared them all; it was even more culpable than they if it had not felt them, for it had sanctioned all their excesses.

Thus, on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Germinal, the discussion degenerated into a frightful squabble. Every moment the name of a fresh member was compromised; he demanded permission to justify himself; he recriminated in his turn; and the members belonging to both parties entered into digressions equally long and dangerous. It was then decreed that the accused and the members of the commission should alone have the privilege of speaking, for the purpose of discussing the facts, article by article, and every deputy was forbidden to attempt to justify himself if his name was mentioned. To no purpose was this decree passed. Every moment the discussion again became general, and there was not an act but was bandied from one to the other with fearful violence. The commotion which existed on the preceding days kept still increasing. Only one cry was heard in the faubourgs. We must go to the Convention, to demand bread, the constitution of 1793, and the release of the patriots. Unfortunately, the quantity of flour necessary for furnishing the 1800 sacks not having arrived in Paris on the 6th, only a half ration was given out on the morning of the 7th, with a promise of the other half in the evening. The women of the section of the Gravilliers, in the quarter of the Temple, refused the half ration offered them, and assembled tumultuously in the

Rue du Vert-Bois. Some of them, who possessed influence, strove to form an assemblage, and, taking with them all the women whom they fell in with, set off for the Convention. While they were proceeding thither, the leaders ran to the house of the president of the section, seized by violence his bell and the keys of the hall of meeting, and set about forming an illegal assembly. They appointed a president, composed a bureau, and read several times the article of the declaration of rights which proclaimed insurrection to be a right and a duty. The women had meanwhile pursued their way to the Convention, and were making a great noise at its doors. They desired to be introduced *en masse*, but only twenty were admitted. One of them boldly spoke in their name, and complained that they had received only half a pound of bread. The president having attempted to reply, they shouted, " Bread ! bread !" They interrupted by the same cry the explanation which Boissy-d'Anglas would have given respecting the distribution of the morning. They were at length obliged to withdraw, and the discussion relative to the accused was resumed. The committee of general safety ordered patroles to escort these women back, and sent one of its members to dissolve the assembly illegally formed in the section of the Gravilliers. Those who composed it refused at first to comply with the exhortations of the representative sent to them; but on seeing the armed force they dispersed. In the night, the principal instigators were apprehended and conveyed to prison.

This was the third attempt at commotion. On the 27th of Ventose people had rioted on account of the ration, on the 1st of Germinal, on account of the petition of the Quinze-Vingts, and on the 7th on account of the insufficient distribution of provisions. Apprehensions were entertained of a general movement on the Decadi, a day of idleness, and on which the meetings of the sections were held. To prevent the dangers of an assemblage at night, it was decided that the sectional assemblies should be held between the hours of one and four. This was but a very insignificant measure, and could not possibly prevent the conflict. It was obvious that the principal cause of these commotions was the accusation preferred against the late members of the committee of public welfare, and the imprisonment of the patriots. Many deputies were disposed to drop prosecutions which, were they ever so just, were certainly dangerous. Rouzet devised a plan which would render it unnecessary to pass any sentence on the accused, and which at the same time would save their lives. This was the ostracism. When a citizen should have made his name a subject of discord, he proposed to banish him for a time. His suggestion was not listened to. Merlin of Thionville, a warm Thermidorian and an intrepid citizen, began nevertheless to think that it would be better to avoid a conflict. He proposed, therefore, to convoke the primary assemblies, to put the consti-

tution in force immediately, and to refer the trial of the accused to the next legislature. Merlin of Douai strongly supported this advice. Guyton-Morveau* proposed a firmer course. "The proceedings in which we are now engaged," said he, "are a scandal: where should we stop, if we were to prosecute all those who have made more sanguinary motions than those with which the accused are charged? One cannot tell, indeed, whether we are finishing or recommencing our revolution." The Convention was justly startled at the idea of resigning at such a moment the supreme authority to a new assembly; neither was it disposed to give France a constitution so absurd as that of 1793. It declared, therefore, that there were no grounds for discussing the propositions of the two Merlins. As for the proceedings already commenced, their continuance gratified the revenge of too many for them to be relinquished; and it was merely decided that the Assembly, in order that it might be able to attend to other business, should devote every other day only to the hearing of the accused.

Such a decision was not calculated to pacify the patriots. The Decadi was spent in reciprocally exciting one another. The sectional assemblies were very tumultuous. Still the so-much-dreaded commotion did not take place. In the section of the Quinze-Vingts a new petition was drawn up; it was bolder than the first, and was to be presented on the following day. It was accordingly read at the bar of the Convention. "Why," it asked, "is Paris without municipality? Why are the popular societies shut up? What has become of the crops? Why are assignats falling every day? Why are the young men of the Palais Royal alone allowed to assemble? Why are the patriots alone in prison? The people are at length determined to be free. They know that when they are oppressed, insurrection is the first of their duties." The petition was read, amid the murmurs of a large portion of the Assembly and the applause of the Mountain. Pelet of La Lozère, the president, received the petitioners rather roughly, and dismissed them. The only satisfaction granted was to send to the sections the list of the imprisoned patriots, that they might be enabled to judge whether there were any who deserved to be claimed.

* "L. B. Guyton-Morveau, born in 1737, was chosen deputy to the legislature, to which he became secretary in 1791. In the following year he was appointed president, and employed himself in financial affairs. Being afterwards deputed to the Convention, he voted for the King's death. In 1794, after the 9th of Thermidor, he was chosen into the committee of public safety. During the session of 1795 he distinguished himself by his activity, and his reports; and shortly after entered into the council of Five Hundred. In the year 1804, he was made an officer of the Legion of Honour. Guyton-Morveau was a man of science, and we owe to him the important discovery of a method of purifying the air by reducing muriatic acid to gas."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

The rest of the 11th was passed in agitations in the faubourgs. People said every where that they must go the next day to the Convention, to demand once more all that they had not yet been able to obtain from it. This opinion circulated from mouth to mouth, in all the quarters occupied by the patriots. The leaders of each section, without having any determined object, were desirous of exciting a general rising, and propelling the entire mass of the populace upon the Convention. Next day, the 12th of Germinal (April 1), men, women, and children, actually sallied forth in the section of the Cité, and beset the bakers' doors, preventing those who were there from accepting the ration, and endeavouring to draw every body towards the Tuileries. The ringleaders at the same time circulated all sorts of rumours. They said that the Convention was on the point of starting for Châlons and leaving the people of Paris to their misery; that the section of the Gravilliers had been disarmed in the night; that the young men had assembled, to the number of thirty thousand, in the Champ de Mars, and that with their aid all the patriot sections were about to be disarmed. They forced the authorities of the section of the Cité to give up its drums; they took them away, and began to beat the *générale* in all the streets. The flame spread with rapidity; the population of the Temple and the faubourg St. Antoine turned out, and proceeding along the quays and the boulevard, directed its course towards the Tuileries. This formidable assemblage consisted of women, boys, and drunken men, the latter armed with bludgeons, and having this inscription on their hats—*Bread and the constitution of* 1793.

At this moment, Boissy d'Anglas was reading to the Convention a report on the various systems adopted in regard to provisions. It had but its ordinary guard around it; the mob had reached its doors; it inundated the Carrousel and the Tuileries, and obstructed all the avenues, so that the numerous patroles scattered through Paris could not come to the aid of the national representation. The crowd entered the saloon of Liberty, which preceded the hall where the Assembly met, and prepared to force its way into the latter. The ushers and the guard strove to stop them. Men, armed with cudgels, dashed forward, dispersed all who attempted to resist, rushed against the doors, burst them open, and poured like a torrent amidst the Assembly, shouting, waving their hats, and raising a cloud of dust. *Bread! bread! The constitution of* 1793! Such was the cry of the infuriated rabble. The deputies did not leave their seats, and displayed an imposing firmness. One of them suddenly rose, and cried, *The republic for ever!* All followed his example, and the mob also set up the same cry, but added, *Bread! The constitution of* 1793! The members of the left only bestowed some applause, and did not seem sorry to see the populace

among them. That crowd, for which no plan had been chalked out, whose leaders wished only to make use of it to intimidate the Convention, introduced itself among the deputies, and sat down beside them, but without daring to commit any act of violence. Legendre began to speak. "If ever," said he, "malice —" He was not suffered to proceed. "Down! down!" cried the rabble; "we have no bread!" Merlin of Thionville, still as courageous as at Mayence and in La Vendée, left his seat, went down among the populace, talked to several of those men, embraced and was embraced by them, and exhorted them to pay due respect to the Convention. "To thy place!" cried some of the Mountaineers. "My place," replied Merlin, "is among the people. These men have just assured me that they have no bad intention; that they have no wish to intimidate the Convention by their number; that, on the contrary, they are ready to defend it, and that they have come hither merely to make it acquainted with their wants."—"Yes, yes," cried some of the crowd; "we want bread."

At these words shouts were heard in the saloon of Liberty: another popular billow had followed the first. It was a second irruption of men, women, and boys, shouting all at once, "Bread! bread!" Legendre would have begun again what he was going to say; but he was interrupted with cries of "Down! down!"

The Mountaineers were perfectly aware that in this state the Convention, oppressed, degraded, smothered, could neither listen, nor speak, nor deliberate, and that the very aim of the insurrection was foiled, since the desired decrees could not be passed. Gaston and Duroi, both sitting on the left, rose, and complained of the state to which the Assembly was reduced. Gaston approached the populace. "My friends," said he, "you want bread, the release of the patriots, and the constitution; but for all this we must deliberate, and we cannot if you remain here." The noise prevented Gaston from being heard. André Dumont, who had succeeded the president in the chair, in vain attempted to give the same reasons to the mob. He was not heard. Huguet, the Mountaineer, alone succeeded in gaining a hearing for a few words. "The people who are here," said he, "are not in insurrection: they are come to make a just demand—the release of the patriots. People, relinquish not your rights!" At this moment, a man went up to the bar, passing through the crowd which opened before him. It was Vanec, who commanded the section of the Cité at the epoch of the 31st of May. "Representatives," said he, "you see before you the men of the 14th of July, of the 10th of August, and of the 31st of May—" Here the tribunes, the populace, and the Mountain applauded most vehemently. "These men," continued Vanec, "have sworn to live free or to die. Your divisions rend the country; it ought

not to suffer from your animosities. Give liberty to the patriots and bread to the people. Do us justice upon Fréron's army and those gentlemen with cudgels. And as for thee, sacred Mountain," proceeded the speaker, turning towards the benches of the left, "for thee, who hast fought so many battles for the Republic, the men of the 14th of July, of the 10th of August, and of the 31st of May, claim thee in this critical moment; thou wilt find them ever ready to support thee, ever ready to spill their blood for the country." Shouts and applause accompanied the concluding words of Vanec. One voice in the assembly seemed to be raised against him, but it was scarcely distinguishable. "Let him who has any thing to say against Vanec speak up," cried another. "Yes, yes," exclaimed Duhem, "let him say it aloud." The spokesmen of several sections succeeded one another at the bar, and made, but in more measured terms, similar demands to that of the Cité. Dumont, the president, replied with firmness that the Convention would attend to the wishes and wants of the people, as soon as it could resume its deliberations. "Let it do so immediately," replied several voices; "we are in want of bread." The tumult lasted thus for several hours. The president was exposed to remarks of all kinds. "Royalism is in the chair," said Choudieu* to him. "Our enemies are exciting the storm," replied Dumont; "they little think that the thunderbolt will fall upon their own heads." —"Yes," rejoined Ruamps, "that thunderbolt is your youth of the Palais-Royal."—"Bread! bread!" furiously shouted the women.

Meanwhile the tocsin was heard sounding from the Pavillon de l'Unité. The committees were actually calling together the sections, agreeably to the new law of high police. Several of them had taken arms and were marching towards the Convention. The Mountaineers were well aware that no time ought to be lost in converting the wishes of the patriots into decrees; but for this purpose it was necessary to clear the hall of the intruders, and to give the assembly room to breathe. "President," cried Duhem, "exhort the good citizens to withdraw, that we may be able to deliberate." He then addressed the people. "The tocsin has rung," said he, "the *générale* has beaten in the sections; if you will not let us deliberate, the country is undone." Choudieu took a woman by the arm to lead her out. "We are in our own house," replied she angrily. Choudieu addressed the president, and told him that, if he was not capable of doing his duty and directing the hall to be cleared, he had only to give up

* "In consequence of his attack on André Dumont who presided in the Convention, and of whom he said that, 'Royalism occupied the arm-chair, Choudieu was put under arrest, and confined in the castle of Ham, but quitted it in consequence of the amnesty which terminated the session of the Convention. In the year 1806 he was living in obscurity in Holland as a bookseller."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

the chair to another. He again turned to the people. "A snare is laid for you," said he; "retire that we may fulfil your wishes." The people, observing signs of impatience shown by the whole Mountain, began to withdraw. The example once set was gradually followed. The crowd diminished in the interior of the hall, and it began also to diminish on the outside. The groups of young men would not this day have been able to cope with so immense a multitude; but the numerous battalions of the faithful sections were already arriving from all quarters, and the mob retired before them. Towards evening, the hall was entirely cleared both within and without, and tranquillity restored in the Convention.*

No sooner was it free from the mob, than it was proposed to continue the report of Boissy d'Anglas, which had been broken off by the irruption of the populace. The assembly did not yet feel quite secure, and it wished to prove that, when free, its first thoughts were directed to the supply of the wants of the people. After he had finished his report, Boissy proposed that an armed force should be furnished by the sections of Paris, to protect in the environs the corn coming to the capital. The decree was adopted. Prieur of La Marne proposed to commence the distribution of bread with the labouring people. This suggestion was likewise adopted. The evening was already far advanced. A considerable force was collected about the Convention. A few factious men, who still resisted, had assembled in the section of the Quinze-Vingts, a few others similarly inclined, in that of the Cité. These latter had taken possession of the church of Notre-Dame, and, as it were, intrenched themselves there. No further apprehensions however were felt, and the assembly possessed power to punish the misdeeds of the day.

Isabeau presented himself in the name of the committees, and made a report on the events of the day, the manner in which the assemblages had been formed, the direction which they had received, and the measures taken by the committees to disperse them, agreeably to the law of the 1st of Germinal. He stated that Auguis the deputy, who had been commissioned to visit the different quarters of Paris, had been stopped by the factious

* "The insurgents soon forced their way into the assembly; drunken women and abandoned prostitutes formed the advanced guard; but speedily a more formidable band of petitioners with pikes in their hands, filled every vacant space. Having penetrated to the bar, they commenced the most seditious harangues; and ascending the benches of the members, seated themselves with the deputies of the Mountain. Every thing announced the approach of a crisis. The Jacobins were recovering their former audacity, and the majority of the assembly labouring under severe apprehension, were on the point of withdrawing when fortunately a large body of the Troupe Doreé who had assembled at the sound of the tocsin, entered the hall, chanting in loud strains the 'Réveil du Peuple.' The insurgents knew their masters, and though lately so clamorous, gradually withdrew from the Convention."—*Alison*. E.

and wounded, and that Pénière, who was sent to extricate him, had also been wounded by a musket-shot. At this statement cries of indignation burst forth, and vengeance was demanded. Isabeau proposed, 1. to declare that on this day the freedom of the sittings of the Convention had been violated; 2. to charge the committees to institute proceedings against the authors of that outrage. The Mountaineers, seeing what an advantage would be derived against them from an attempt which had miscarried, received this proposition with murmurs. Three-fourths of the assembly rose, desiring that it should be put to the vote: they said that it was a 20th of June against the national representation; that this day the hall of the assembly had been stormed, as the King's palace was stormed on the 20th of June; and that, if they were not severe, a 10th of August would soon be prepared for the Convention. Sergent, a deputy of the Mountain, affected to impute this commotion to the Feuillans, to the Lameths, the Duports, who, from London, strove, he said, to excite the patriots to imprudent excesses. He was told that he was digressing. Thibaudeau, who, during this scene had withdrawn from the assembly, indignant at the outrage committed upon it, rushed to the tribune. "There it is," he exclaimed pointing to the left side, "there is the minority that is conspiring! I declare that I absented myself for four hours, because I no longer saw the national representation here. I now return, and I support the *projet*. The time of weakness is past. It is the weakness of the national representation that has always compromised it, and that has encouraged a criminal faction. The salvation of the country is this day in your hands; you will lose it if you are weak." The decree was adopted amidst applause; and those paroxysms of rage and vengeance, which are excited by the recollection of dangers that have been incurred, began to burst forth on all sides. André Dumont, who had filled the chair during that stormy scene, mounted the tribune. He complained of the threats and insults to which he had been exposed; he declared that Chales and Choudieu, pointing him out to the people, said that royalism was in the chair; that Foussedoire had proposed the preceding day, in a group, to disarm the national guard. Foussedoire contradicted him: but a great number of deputies asserted that they heard it. "For the rest," resumed Dumont, "I despise all those enemies who would have pointed the dagger against me. It is the chiefs whom you ought to strike. An attempt has to-day been made to save the Billauds, the Collots, the Barrères; I shall not propose to you to send them to the scaffold, for they are not yet tried, and the time of assassinations is past, but to banish them from the country, which they infect and agitate by seditions. I propose to you, this very night, the transportation of the four accused, whose cause has occupied you for several days past." This proposal was received with vehement applause. The members of the Moun-

tain demanded a call of the Assembly, and several of them went to the bureau to sign the demand for it. "'Tis the last effort," said Bourdon, "of a minority whose treason is confounded. I propose to you, in addition, the arrest of Choudieu, Chales, and Foussedoire." The two propositions were then decreed. Thus terminated in transportation the long proceedings against Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier.* Choudieu, Chales, and Foussedoire, were put under arrest. But the assembly did not stop there. It was recollected that Huguet, addressing the populace while it was pouring into the hall, had exclaimed, "People, forget not your rights!" that Leonard Bourdon had presided at the popular meeting in the Rue du Vert-Bois, and that he instigated to insurrection by his incessant declamations; that Duhem openly encouraged the rioters during the irruption of the rabble; that, on the preceding days, he was seen at the Payen coffee-house, in the section of the Invalides, drinking with the ringleaders of the Terrorists and inciting them to insurrection. A decree of arrest was consequently passed against Huguet, Leonard Bourdon, and Duhem. Many others were denounced; among these was Amar, the most obnoxious member of the old committee of general safety, and reputed to be the most dangerous of the Mountaineers. The Convention ordered the latter also to be arrested. In order to remove these leaders of the conspiracy, as they were called, from Paris, it was proposed that they should be confined in the castle of Ham. The suggestion was adopted, and it was moreover decided that they should be

* "After Billaud-Varennes reached his place of transportation at Cayenne, his life was a continued scene of romantic adventures. He escaped to Mexico, and entered, under the name of Polycarpus Varennes, the Dominican convent at Porto Rico. Being obliged to fly the continent for the part he took in the disputes between the Spanish colonies and the mother country, Pethion, then president of Hayti, not only afforded him an asylum, but made him his secretary. After Pethion's death, Boyer refusing to employ him, he went to the United States, and died at Philadelphia in 1819."—*Universal Biography*. E.

"Collot-d'Herbois died in exile at Cayenne. He was found one day lying on the ground, with his face exposed to a burning sun, in a raging fever. The negroes who were appointed to carry him from Kouron to Cayenne, had thrown him down to perish. He expired, vomiting froth and blood, and calling upon that God whom he had so often renounced."—*Piton's Voyage to Cayenne*. E.

"Barrère was employed in obscure situations by Napoleon, and was alive at Brussels, where he was living in great poverty in 1831. It was one of his favourite positions at that time, that 'the world could never be civilized till the punishment of death was utterly abolished, for no human being had the right to take away the life of another.' This was the man who said in 1793, 'The tree of liberty cannot flourish, if it is not watered by the blood of a king.' Before the Revolution Barrère was the Marquis de Vieusac with an ample fortune."—*Falkner's Travels in Germany*. E.

"Vadier contrived to conceal himself in Paris, and thereby avoided his sentence. He continued to reside in the capital up to the law of 1816, when he was compelled to quit France. He died at Brussels in 1828 at the age of ninety-three."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

brought to trial immediately. It was then proposed to declare Paris in a state of siege till the danger should be entirely over. General Pichegru was at this moment in Paris, and in the full lustre of his glory. He was appointed commander of the armed force during the continuance of the danger, and Barras and Merlin of Thionville were appointed his assistants. It was six o'clock in the morning of the 13th of Germinal when the assembly, exhausted with fatigue, broke up, confiding in the measures which it had taken.

The committees prepared to carry into execution without delay the decrees that had just been passed. That same morning, the three persons doomed to transportation were put into carriages, though one of them, Barrère, was extremely ill, and sent off for Brest, by way of Orleans. The same promptitude was shown in despatching the seven deputies who were to be confined in the castle of Ham. The carriages had to pass through the Champs Elysées; the patriots knew this, and a crowd had collected on their way to stop them. When the carriages came up preceded by the gendarmerie, a numerous concourse gathered round them. Some said that it was the Convention retiring to Châlons, and carrying off the money in the treasury; others said on the contrary that it was the patriot deputies unjustly torn from the bosom of the Convention, and whom no one had a right to remove from their functions. They surrounded the carriages, dispersed the gendarmerie, and conducted them to the civil committee of the section of the Champs Elysées. At the same moment, another mob rushed upon the post on duty at the Barrière de l'Etoile, seized the cannon, and pointed them upon the avenue. The officer commanding the gendarmerie attempted in vain to parley with the rioters; he was assaulted and obliged to flee. He hastened to Gros-Caillou to demand succour; but the artillerymen of the section threatened to fire upon him unless he retired. At this moment headed by Pichegru, several battalions of the sections and several hundred young men arrived, proud of being commanded by so celebrated a general. The insurgents fired two cannon-shot, and kept up a brisk fire of small arms. Raffet, who on that day commanded the sections, received a musket-shot close to the muzzle of the piece. Pichegru himself ran the greatest risks, and was twice aimed at. His presence, however, and the confidence which he infused into those under his command, decided the victory. The insurgents were put to flight and the vehicles proceeded without further molestation.

The assemblage in the section of the Quinze-Vingts, which had been joined by that formed at the church of Notre-Dame, still remained to be dispersed. There the factious had constituted themselves a permanent assembly, and were planning a new insurrection. Pichegru repaired thither, cleared the hall

of the section, and completed the restoration of the public tranquillity.

On the following day, he presented himself to the Convention, and informed it that its decrees were executed. Unanimous applause greeted the conqueror of Holland, who, by his presence in Paris had just rendered a fresh service to the state. "The conqueror of tyrants," replied the president, "could not fail to triumph over the factious." He received the fraternal salute and the honours of the sitting; and was exposed for several hours to the gaze of the assembly and of the public, every eye being fixed upon him alone. People did not inquire the cause of his conquests, or which of them were the effect of lucky accidents. They were struck by the results, and filled with admiration of so brilliant a career.

This daring attempt of the Jacobins, which we cannot better characterize than by calling it a 20th of June, excited redoubled irritation, and provoked fresh repressive measures. A rigid scrutiny was ordered, for the discovery of all the springs of the conspiracy, which was erroneously attributed to the members of the Mountain. These latter had no communication with the popular agitators, and their intercourse with them was confined to a few accidental meetings in coffee-houses and some encouragement in words: nevertheless, the committee of general safety was commissioned to make a report.

The conspiracy was supposed to be the more extensive, because there had been commotions in all the provinces washed by the Rhone and the Mediterranean, at Lyons, Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon. The patriots had already been denounced as quitting the communes, where they had signalized themselves by excesses, and resorting in arms to the principal cities, either to escape the observation of their fellow-citizens, or to join their brethren there and to make common cause with them. It was asserted that they haunted the country bordering on the Rhone, that they were roving in numerous bands in the environs of Avignon, Nimes, and Arles, and in the plains of La Craux, and committing depredations on such of the inhabitants as were reputed to be royalists. To them was imputed the death of a wealthy individual, a magistrate of Avignon, who had been robbed and murdered. At Marseilles, they were scarcely repressed by the presence of the representatives, and by the measures which had been taken to place the city in a state of siege. At Toulon they had collected in great number, and formed an assemblage of several thousand persons, nearly as the federalists had done at the time of General Cartaux's arrival. By their union with the *employés* of the marine, who had almost all been appointed by the younger Robespierre after the recapture of the place, they overawed the city. They had numerous partisans among the workmen in the arsenal, who amounted to more than

twelve thousand: and taken collectively they possessed the means of committing the greatest excesses. At this moment, the squadron, completely repaired, was ready to sail. Letourneur,* the representative, was on board the admiral's ship: land forces had embarked in the fleet, and the expedition was said to be destined for Corsica. The revolutionists, taking advantage of the moment when there was left only a weak garrison, which was not to be relied on, and among them they numbered many partisans, had assembled riotously, and murdered seven prisoners accused of emigration, in the very arms of the three representatives, Mariette, Ritter, and Chambon. At the close of Ventose, they attempted to repeat these outrages. Twenty prisoners, taken in an enemy's frigate, were in one of the forts; they insisted that they were emigrants, whom the government intended to pardon. They raised the twelve thousand workmen belonging to the arsenal, and surrounded the representatives, who narrowly escaped with their lives, but were fortunately quelled by a battalion which was landed from the squadron.

These occurrences, coinciding with those in Paris, increased the alarm of the government, and redoubled the severity. It had already enjoined all the members of the municipal administrations, of the revolutionary committees, and of the popular and military commissions, and all *employés* dismissed since the 9th of Thermidor, to quit the towns to which they had repaired, and to retire to their respective communes. A still more severe decree was levelled at them. They had obtained possession of arms distributed in moments of danger. It was decreed that all those who were known in France to have contributed to the vast tyranny abolished on the 9th of Thermidor should be disarmed. To each municipal assembly, or to each sectional assembly, belonged the designation of the accomplices of that tyranny, and the task of disarming them. It is easy to conceive to what dangerous persecutions this decree must expose them, at a moment when they had excited so violent a hatred.

The government did not stop there. It determined to take

* "Letourneur was born in 1751 of a respectable but not noble family, and having early made some progress in mathematics, he entered the artillery corps in 1768, and attained the rank of captain. On the breaking out of the Revolution he embraced the popular party, and was appointed deputy to the legislature. He voted for the King's death; but though attached to the Mountain, was never stained with any personal crime, and, from the downfall of the Girondins to that of Robespierre, preserved silence. In 1795 he was appointed commissioner of the fleet in the Mediterranean. In the same year he was appointed one of the Directory. In the year 1800, the Consuls appointed him prefect of the Lower Loire, whence in 1804 he was recalled."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

"Letourneur had been an officer of engineers before the Revolution. He was a man of narrow capacity, little learning, and a weak mind. There were in the Convention five hundred deputies better qualified for public life, than he was; but he was a man of strict probity, and left the Directory without any fortune."—*Las Cases.* E.

from them the pretended chiefs whom they had on the benches of the Mountain. Though the three principal had been condemned to transportation, though seven more, Choudieu, Chales, Foussedoire, Leonard Bourdon, Huguet, Duhem, and Amar, had been sent to the castle of Ham, still it was thought that others quite as formidable were left. Cambon, the dictator of the finances, and the inexorable adversary of the Thermidorians, whom he never forgave for daring to attack his integrity, appeared troublesome at least. He was even supposed to be dangerous. It was asserted that on the morning of the 12th he had said to the clerks of the treasury, "There are three hundred of you here, and in case of danger you will be able to make resistance"—words which he was likely enough to have uttered, and which would prove his conformity of sentiments, not his complicity, with the Jacobins. Thuriot, formerly a Thermidorian, but who had again become a Mountaineer since the readmission of the seventy-three and the twenty-two, and a deputy possessing great influence, was also considered as a chief of the faction. Under the same head were placed Crassous, who had become one of the most energetic supporters of the Jacobins; Lesaye-Sénault, who had contributed to cause their club to be shut up, but who had since taken alarm at the reaction; Lecointre of Versailles, the declared adversary of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, and who had rejoined the Mountain since the return of the Girondins; Maignet, the incendiary of the South; Hentz, the terrible proconsul of La Vendée; Levasseur of La Sarthe, one of those who had contributed to the death of Philipeaux, and Granet of Marseilles, accused of being the instigator of the revolutionists of the South. It was Tallien, who designated them, and who, after picking them out in the very tribune of the assembly, insisted on their being arrested like their seven colleagues and sent with them to Ham. Tallien's desire was complied with, and they were doomed to suffer the same imprisonment.

Thus this movement of the patriots caused them to be persecuted, disarmed throughout all France,* sent to their respective communes, and to lose a score of Mountaineers, some of whom were transported and others confined. Every movement of a party that is not strong enough to conquer serves only to accelerate its ruin.

The Thermidorians, after they had punished persons, attacked things. The commission of seven, charged to report upon the

* "Many of the provinces of France became scenes of counter-revolutionary excesses, of the same character, and almost as terrible, as those of the revolutionary committees themselves. Massacres in mass, private assassinations, were the order of the day. Thus the infliction of cruelty and terror went its round, and was not confined to any particular class or side, but was the consequence of the maddening spirit and delirium of the time, and the hatred of the different factions towards each other."—*Hazlitt.* E.

organic laws of the constitution, declared without reserve that the constitution was so general that it wanted framing anew. A commission of eleven was then appointed to present a new plan. Unfortunately the victories of their adversaries, instead of reducing the revolutionists to order, only tended to inflame them still more, and to excite them to fresh and dangerous efforts.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

PEACE WITH HOLLAND, PRUSSIA, AND TUSCANY—NEGOTIATIONS WITH LA VENDEE AND BRETAGNE; INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST AGENTS; FEIGNED PEACE—STATE OF AUSTRIA AND OF ENGLAND; THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN.

DURING these melancholy events, the negotiations at Basle had been interrupted for a moment by the death of Baron de Goltz. The most sinister rumours were immediately circulated. One day, it was said, the powers will never treat with a republic constantly threatened by factions; they will leave it to perish in the convulsions of anarchy, without fighting and without acknowledging it. Another day, the very contrary was asserted. Peace, it was said, is concluded with Spain; the French armies will go no farther: we are treating with England, we are treating with Prussia, but at the expense of Sweden and Denmark, who are about to be sacrificed to the ambition of Pitt and Catherine, and who will be repaid in this manner for their friendship to France. We see that malice, differing in its reports, always imagined the very contrary to that which was most consistent with the interest of the republic; it supposed ruptures where peace was wished for, and peace where victories were desired. At another time again, it was pleased to report that any peace was for ever impossible, and that a protest on this subject had been placed in the hands of the committee of public welfare by the majority of the members of the Convention. It was a new sally of Duhem's that had given rise to this rumour. He pretended that it was mere shuffling to treat with a single power, and that peace ought not to be granted to any till they should come to demand it all together. He had delivered a note on this subject to the committee of public welfare, and it was this that had given rise to the rumour of a protest.

The patriots, on their part, circulated reports not less annoying. They alleged that Prussia was spinning out the negotiations, for the purpose of getting Holland included in one common treaty with herself, in order to keep her under her influence, and to save the stadtholdership. They complained that the fate of that republic remained so long unsettled; that the French there enjoyed none of the advantages of conquest; that the assignats were there taken at not more than half their value, and from the soldiers only; that the Dutch merchants

had written to the Belgian and French merchants, that they were ready to transact business with them, but only on condition of being paid in advance, and in specie; that the Dutch had allowed the stadtholder to go off with just what he pleased, and had sent part of their wealth to London in ships belonging to the East India Company. Many difficulties had, in fact, arisen in Holland, either on account of the conditions of the peace, or owing to the excitement of the patriotic party. The committee of public welfare had sent thither two of its members, capable by their influence of terminating all the differences which had arisen. For fear of prejudicing the negotiation, it had begged the Convention to excuse it from stating either their names or the object of their mission. The Assembly had complied, and they had set out immediately.

It was natural that such important events and such high interests, should excite hopes and fears, and contrary reports. But, in spite of all these rumours, the conferences were continued with success. Count Hardenberg* had succeeded Baron de Goltz at Basle, and the conditions were nearly arranged on both sides.

Scarcely had these negotiations commenced when the empire of facts was sensibly felt, and required modifications in the powers of the committee of public welfare. A perfectly open government which could not conceal any thing, could not decide any thing of itself, could do nothing without a public deliberation, would be incapable of negotiating a treaty with any power, how frank soever it might be. For treating, signing suspensions of

* "Charles Augustus, Baron and afterwards Prince Hardenberg, Prussian chancellor of state, was born in 1750, and, after having completed his studies at Leipsic and Gottingen, entered into the civil service of his country in 1770. He passed several years in travel, particularly in England, and in 1778 was made privy councillor, but a misunderstanding with one of the English princes induced him to resign his place in 1782 and to enter the service of Brunswick. The duke sent him to Berlin in 1786 with the will of Frederick II. which had been deposited with him. A few years afterwards Count Hardenberg was made Prussian minister of state, and then cabinet minister. In 1795 he signed the treaty of peace between the French republic and Prussia, on the part of the latter. At the commencement of the present century, Berlin became the centre of many negotiations between the northern powers, in which Hardenberg played a conspicuous part. In consequence of the disasters which Prussia met with in her contests with Napoleon, he resigned his post, but in the year 1806 once more resumed the portfolio. In 1810 the King of Prussia appointed him prime minister. In 1814 he signed the peace of Paris, and was created prince. He went to London with the sovereigns, and was one of the most prominent actors at the congress of Vienna. He was subsequently the active agent in all matters in which Prussia took part. While on a journey in the north of Italy, he fell sick at Pavia, and died in 1822. Prince Hardenberg was an active minister of the Holy Alliance; but his abolition of feudal services and privileges in Prussia will always be remembered to his honour. He patronized the sciences munificently; loved power, but was just in his administration. He wrote 'Memoirs of his own Times from 1801 to the peace of Tilsit.' He was twice married.—"*Encyclopædia Americana.* E.

arms, neutralizing territories, secrecy is most especially necessary; for a power sometimes negotiates long before it suits it to avow that fact: this is not all; there are frequently articles which must absolutely remain unknown. If a power promises, for example, to unite its forces with those of another, if it stipulates either the junction of an army, or that of a squadron, or any concurrence whatever of means, this secret becomes of the utmost importance. How could the committee of public welfare, renewed in the proportion of one-fourth every month, obliged to render an account of every thing, and not possessing the energy or the boldness of the old committee—how could it have negotiated, especially with powers ashamed of their blunders, reluctant to admit their defeat, and all insisting on either leaving secret conditions, or not publishing their treaty until it should be signed! The necessity which it felt for sending two of its members to Holland, without making known either their names or their mission, was a first proof how essential an ingredient secrecy is in diplomatic operations. It presented, in consequence, a decree which gave rise to fresh rumours, and which conferred on it the powers indispensably necessary for treating.

A curious spectacle for the theory of governments is that of a democracy, surmounting its indiscreet curiosity, its distrust of power, and, constrained by necessity, granting to a few individuals the faculty of even stipulating secret conditions. This the National Convention did. It conferred on the committee of public welfare the power of concluding armistices, neutralizing territories, negotiating treaties, stipulating their conditions, drawing them up and even signing them, without reserving to itself any more than was its due, that is, the ratification. It did still more. It authorized the committee to sign secret articles, on the sole condition that these articles should contain nothing derogatory to the open articles, and should be published as soon as the interest of secrecy ceased to exist. Invested with these powers, the committee prosecuted and concluded the negotiations commenced with different states.

The peace with Holland was at length signed under the influence of Rewbel,* and especially of Sieyes, who were the two members of the committee recently sent to that country.

* "Rewbel," said Napoleon, "born in Alsace, was one of the best lawyers in the town of Colmar. He possessed that kind of intelligence which denotes a man skilled in the practice of the bar. His influence was always felt in deliberations; he was easily inspired with prejudices; did not believe much in the existence of virtue; and his patriotism was tinged with a degree of enthusiasm. He bore a particular hatred to the Germanic system; displayed great energy in the Assemblies, both before and after the period of his being a magistrate; and was fond of a life of application and activity. He had been a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention. Like all lawyers he had imbibed from his profession a prejudice against the army."—*Las Cases*. E.

The Dutch patriots gave a brilliant reception to the celebrated author of the first declaration of rights, and paid him a deference which put an end to many difficulties. The conditions of peace, signed at the Hague on the 27th of Floreal (May 16), were the following: The French republic acknowledged the republic of the United Provinces as a free and independent power, and guaranteed its independence and the abolition of the stadtholdership. There was to be an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two republics during the present war. This offensive and defensive alliance was to be perpetual between the two republics in all cases of war against England. That of the United Provinces placed immediately at the disposal of France twelve ships of the line and eighteen frigates, to be employed principally in the German Ocean and in the Baltic. It gave, moreover, in aid of France half its land army, which indeed had dwindled almost to nothing, and required to be completely reorganized. As to the demarcations of territory, they were fixed as follows: France was to keep all Dutch Flanders, so as to complete her territory towards the sea, and to extend it to the mouths of the rivers. Towards the Meuse and Rhine, she was to have possession of Venloo and Maestricht and all the country to the south of Venloo, on both sides of the Meuse. Thus the republic relinquished the idea of extending itself on this point to the Rhine, which was reasonable. On this side, in fact, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, blend in such a manner that there is no precise boundary. Which of these arms ought to be considered as the Rhine? We cannot tell, and on this point all is matter of convention. Besides, in this quarter France is not threatened by any hostility but that of Holland, an hostility far from formidable, so that a marked boundary is no longer a necessary guarantee. Lastly, the territory allotted by nature to Holland consisting of tracts formed by alluvions carried to the mouths of the rivers, France, in order to extend herself to one of the principal streams, must have seized three-fourths at least of those tracts, and reduced nearly to nothing the republic which she had just liberated. The Rhine does not become a boundary for France in regard to Germany till near Wesel, and the possession of the two banks of the Meuse to the south of Venloo left that question untouched. The French republic, moreover, reserved to itself a right, in case of war towards the Rhine or Zealand, of putting garrisons into the fortresses of Grave, Bois-le-Duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom. The port of Flushing was to belong in common to both. Thus all precautions were taken. The navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, the Hondt, and all their branches, was declared thenceforward and for ever free. Besides these advantages, an indemnity of one hundred millions of florins was to be paid by Holland. To compensate the latter for her sacrifices, France promised, at the general pacification, indemnities of territory taken from the con-

quered countries, and in a situation most suitable for the clear demarcation of the reciprocal boundaries.

This treaty rested on the most reasonable basis. The conqueror showed himself in it equally generous and skilful. It has been vainly argued that, in attaching Holland to her alliance, France exposed her to the loss of half her vessels detained in the ports of England, and especially of her colonies, left defenceless to the ambition of Pitt. Holland, if left neutral, would neither have recovered her shipping nor retained her colonies, and Pitt would still have found a pretext for seizing them on behalf of the stadtholder. The mere retaining of the stadtholdership, without saving in a certain manner the Dutch ships or colonies, would have deprived English ambition of all pretext; but was the retaining of the stadtholdership, with the political principles of France, with the promises given to the Batavian patriots, with the spirit which animated them, or with the hopes conceived by them when they opened their gates to us, either possible, consistent, or even honourable?

The conditions with Prussia were more easy to settle. Bischoffwerder had just been thrown into confinement. The King of Prussia, delivered from mystics, had conceived a perfectly new ambition. He no longer aspired to save the principles of general order, but to become the mediator of universal pacification. The treaty with him was signed at Basle on the 16th of Germinal (April 5, 1795). In the first place, it was agreed that there should be peace, amity, and good understanding, between his majesty the King of Prussia and the French republic; that the troops of the latter should evacuate that part of the Prussian territories which they occupied on the right bank of the Rhine; that they should continue to occupy the Prussian provinces on the left bank, and that the lot of those provinces should not be definitively fixed till the general pacification. From this last condition it was very evident that the republic, without yet speaking out positively, thought of giving itself the boundary of the Rhine; but that, till it should have gained fresh victories over the states of the Empire and Austria, it deferred the solution of the difficulties to which this important determination must have given rise. Not till then would it be able either to eject the one, or to give indemnities to the others. The French republic engaged to accept the mediation of the King of Prussia for the purpose of reconciling it with the princes and states of the German empire; it even engaged, for the space of three months, not to treat as enemies such of the princes of the right bank in whose behalf his Prussian majesty should interest himself. This was a sure way to induce the whole Empire to solicit peace through the mediation of Prussia.

Accordingly, immediately after the signing of this treaty, the cabinet of Berlin caused its determination and the motives which had swayed it, to be solemnly communicated to the Empire. It

declared to the diet that it tendered its good offices to the Empire if it were desirous of peace; and, if the majority of the states refused it, to such of them as should be obliged to treat for their individual safety. Austria, on her part, addressed some very severe remarks to the diet: she said that she desired peace as much as any one, but that she believed it to be impossible; that she would choose the fit moment for treating; and that the states of the Empire would find many more advantages in relying upon old Austrian faith than upon perjured powers, which had violated all their engagements. The diet, to give itself the air of preparing for war, at the same time that it solicited peace, decreed the quintuple contingent for the ensuing campaign, and stipulated that the states which could not furnish soldiers, should be released from the obligation on paying two hundred and forty florins per man. At the same time, it decided that Austria, having just contracted with England for the continuance of the war, could not be the mediatrix of peace, and resolved to confide that mediation to Prussia. There was nothing more to be settled but the form and the composition of the deputation.

Notwithstanding this strong desire to treat, the Empire could not well do so *en masse*; for it must have required for its members stripped of their territories restitutions which France could not make without renouncing the line of the Rhine. But it was evident that, in this impossibility to treat collectively, each prince would throw himself into the arms of Prussia, and through her mediation make his separate peace.

Thus the republic began to disarm its enemies and to force them to peace. None were bent upon war but those who had sustained great losses, and who had no hopes of recovering by negotiation what they had lost by arms. Such could not fail to be the dispositions of the princes of the left bank despoiled of their territories, of Austria, deprived of the Netherlands, of Piedmont, ejected from Savoy and Nice. Those, on the contrary, who had had the good sense to preserve their neutrality, congratulated themselves every day on their prudence, and the profits which it brought them. Sweden and Denmark were about to send ambassadors to the Convention. Switzerland, which had become the *entrepôt* of the trade of the continent, persisted in its wise arrangements, and addressed, through M. Ochs, these sensible observations to Barthelemy,* the envoy:

* "François Barthelemy, nephew of the celebrated author of the 'Travels of Anacharsis,' was brought up under the direction of his uncle, and at the commencement of the Revolution was sent as ambassador to England, to notify to the court that Louis XVI. had accepted the constitution. In 1791 he went to Switzerland in the same character; in 1795 he negotiated and signed a peace with Prussia, and in the same year a similar treaty with Spain. In 1797 he was elected into the Directory, but was involved in the downfall of the Clichyan party. After the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, Barthelemy became a member of the conservative senate, and was soon afterwards called to the Institute."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

"Switzerland is necessary to France, and France to Switzerland. There is, in fact, every reason to suppose that, but for the Helvetic confederation, the wrecks of the ancient kingdoms of Lorraine, Burgundy, and Arles, would not have been united with the French dominions; and one can scarcely help believing that, but for the powerful diversion and decided interference of France, the efforts made to stifle Helvetic liberty in its cradle would have proved successful." The neutrality of Switzerland had in fact recently rendered an eminent service to France, and contributed to save her. To these observations M. Ochs added others not less elevated: "People," said he, "will perhaps some day admire that sentiment of natural justice, which, inducing us to abhor all foreign influence in the choice of our own forms of government, forbids us for that very reason to set ourselves up for judges of the mode of public administration chosen by our neighbours. Our forefathers neither censured the great vassals of the German empire for having swallowed up the imperial power, nor the royal authority of France for having curbed the great vassals. They successively saw the French nation represented by the States-general; the Richelieus and the Mazarins seize absolute power; Louis XIV. appropriate to himself the entire power of the nation; and the parliaments aspire to share the public authority in the name of the people; but never were they heard, with rash voice, recalling the French government to this or that period of its history. The happiness of France was their wish, her unity their hope, and the integrity of her territory their support."

These elevated and just principles were a severe censure of the policy of Europe, and the results which Switzerland reaped from them were a very striking demonstration of their wisdom. Austria, jealous of her commerce, strove to cramp it by a cordon; but Switzerland complained to Wurtemberg and the neighbouring states, and obtained justice.

The Italian powers wished for peace, such of them at least whose imprudence was likely to expose them some day to disastrous consequences. Piedmont, though exhausted, had lost enough to desire to have recourse once more to arms. But Tuscany, forced in spite of herself to give up her neutrality by the English ambassador, who, threatening her with an English squadron, had allowed her but twelve hours to decide, was impatient to resume her part, especially since the French were at the gates of Genoa. The grand-duke had consequently opened a negotiation, which terminated in a treaty, the easiest to conclude of any. Good understanding and friendship were re-established between the two states, and the grand-duke restored to the republic the corn which had been taken from the French in his ports, at the moment of the declaration of war. This restitution he had made of his own accord, even before the negotiation. This treaty, beneficial to France for the trade of

the South, and especially that in corn, was concluded on the 21st of Pluviose (February 9).

Venice, who had withdrawn her envoy from France, intimated that she was about to appoint another, and to despatch him to Paris. The Pope expressed regret for the outrages committed on the French. The court of Naples, led astray by the passions of an insensate queen and the intrigues of England, was far from thinking of negotiating, and promised ridiculous succours to the coalition.

Spain still had need of peace, and seemed to be only waiting to be forced into it by new reverses.

A negotiation, not less important perhaps for the moral effect which it was likely to produce, was that begun at Nantes with the insurgent provinces. We have seen that the chiefs of La Vendée, divided among themselves, almost deserted by their peasants, accompanied only by a few determined warriors, pressed on all sides by the republican generals, compelled to choose between an amnesty and utter destruction, had been led to treat for peace. We have seen that Charette had agreed to an interview near Nantes; that the pretended Baron de Cormatin, Puisaye's major-general, had come forward as the mediator of Bretagne; that he travelled with Humbert, wavering between the wish to deceive the republicans, to concert with Charette, to seduce Canclaux, and the ambition to be the pacificator of those celebrated provinces. The common rendezvous was appointed at Nantes. The conferences were to begin at the castle of La Jaunaye, a league from that city, on the 24th of Pluviose (February 12).

Cormatin, on his arrival at Nantes, was anxious to put Puisaye's letter into the hands of Canclaux; but this man, who reckoned upon tricking the republicans, was not clever enough even to keep this most dangerous letter from their knowledge. It was discovered and published, and he was obliged to declare that the letter was spurious, that he was not the bearer of it, and that he had come in all sincerity to negotiate a peace. By these professions he became more deeply implicated than ever. He dropped the part of a skilful diplomatist, duping the republicans, conferring with Charette, and seducing Canclaux; that of peace-maker only was now left him. He saw Charette, and found him compelled by his position to treat for the moment with the enemy. From that instant, Cormatin fell to work in good earnest to bring about a peace. It was agreed that it should be a feigned one, and that, till England should fulfil her promises, they should appear to submit to the republic. They intended to obtain for the moment the best possible conditions. As soon as the conferences were opened, Cormatin and Charette delivered a note in which they demanded freedom of religion, sufficient pensions for the support of all the ecclesiastics of La

Vendée, exemption from military service and taxes for ten years, in order to repair the calamities of the war, indemnities for all devastations, the discharge of the engagements contracted by the generals for the supply of their armies, the re-establishment of the old territorial divisions of the country and its former mode of administration, the formation of territorial guards under the command of the existing commanding generals, the removal of all the republican armies, the exclusion of all the inhabitants of La Vendée who had left the country as patriots, and of whose property the royalists had taken possession, and lastly, a general amnesty for the emigrants as well as the Vendeans. Such demands were absurd and could not be admitted. The representatives granted freedom of religion, indemnities for those whose cottages had been destroyed, exemption from service for the young men of the present requisition, in order to repeople the country, the formation of territorial guards under the direction of the administrations to the number of two thousand only; the payment of the bonds signed by the generals to the amount of two millions. But they refused the re-establishment of the old territorial divisions and the old administrations, the exemption from taxes for ten years, the removal of the republican armies, and the amnesty for the emigrants; and they required the restoration of their property to the Vendean patriots. They stipulated moreover that all these concessions should be introduced not into a treaty but into ordinances (*arrêtés*) issued by the representatives on mission, and that the Vendean generals, on their part, should sign a declaration recognising the republic and promising to submit to its laws. A last conference was fixed for the 29th of Pluviose (February 17), for the truce was to end on the 30th.

It was proposed that, before peace was concluded, Stofflet should be invited to these conferences. Several royalist officers wished this because they thought that it was not right to treat without him; the representatives wished it also, because they were desirous of including all La Vendée in the same negotiation. Stofflet was directed by the ambitious Bernier, who was far from being favourably disposed towards a peace that must deprive him of all his influence. Stofflet, moreover, disliked playing the second part, and he saw with vexation this whole negotiation begun and carried on without him. He consented, nevertheless, to attend the conferences, and he repaired to La Jaunaye with a great number of his officers.

The tumult was great. The partisans of peace and those of war were much exasperated against one another. The former gathered round Charette: they said that those who wished to continue the war were men who never went into action; that the country was ruined and reduced to extremity; that the foreign powers had done nothing for them, and that it was extremely improbable any succours would ever come from them. They added,

(but this they merely whispered to one another), that they must wait and gain time by a feigned peace, and that if England ever performed her promises they would be quite ready to rise. The partisans of war said, on the contrary, that, if the republicans offered them peace, it was only to disarm them, then violate al promises, and sacrifice them with impunity; that, if they were to lay down their arms for a moment, they should depress the courage of their people, and render any insurrection impracticable for the future; that, since the republic negotiated, it was a proof that it was also reduced to extremity; that, by waiting a moment and displaying firmness a little longer, they should be enabled to attempt great things with the assistance of the foreign powers; that it was unworthy of French gentlemen to sign a treaty with the secret intention of not fulfilling it; and that, moreover, they had no right to recognise the republic, for that would be to deny the rights of the princes for whom they had so long been fighting.

Several very animated conferences took place, at which considerable irritation was manifested on both sides. For a moment indeed violent threats were exchanged by the partisans of Charette and those of Stofflet, and they had nearly come to blows. Cormatin was not the least ardent of the partisans of peace. His fluency of speech, his agitation of body and mind, his quality of representative of the army of Bretagne, had drawn attention to him. Unfortunately for him, he had about him a person named Solilhac, whom the central committee of Bretagne had directed to accompany him. Solilhac, astonished to see Cormatin play so different a part from that which he had been directed, and which he had promised to perform, observed to him that he was deviating from his instructions, and that he had not been sent to treat for peace. Cormatin was extremely embarrassed. Stofflet and the partisans of war triumphed, when they learned that Bretagne was thinking rather of contriving a delay and of concerting with La Vendée than of submitting. They declared that they would never lay down their arms, since Bretagne had determined to support them. On the morning of the 29th of Pluviose (February 17) the council of the army of Anjou met in a separate room in the castle of La Jaunaye, to adopt a definitive determination. The chiefs of Stofflet's division drew their swords, and swore to cut the throat of the first who should talk of peace; they decided upon war. Charette, Sapinaud, and their officers, in another room, decided upon peace. At noon they were both to meet the representatives of the people in a tent pitched in the plain. Stofflet, not daring to declare to their faces the determination which he had adopted, sent to them to say that he should not accede to their proposals. About noon the meeting was to take place. The representatives left the detachment which accompanied them at the distance agreed upon, and proceeded to the tent. Charette left his Vendeans at

the same distance, and brought with him only his principal officers to the rendezvous. Meanwhile, Stofflet was seen mounting a horse, with some furious partisans who accompanied him, and galloping off, waving his hat, and shouting *Vive le Roi!* In the tent where Charette and Sapinaud were conferring with the representatives, there was nothing more to discuss, for the ultimatum of the representatives was accepted beforehand. The declarations agreed upon were reciprocally signed. Charette, Sapinaud, Cormatin, and the other officers, signed their submission to the laws of the republic; the representatives gave the ordinances containing the conditions granted to the Vendean chiefs. The greatest politeness prevailed on both sides, and every thing seemed to promise a sincere reconciliation.

The representatives, with a view to give great *éclat* to the submission of Charette, prepared for him a magnificent reception at Nantes. The greatest joy pervaded that entirely patriot city. People flattered themselves that the destructive civil war was at length brought to a conclusion. They exulted in seeing a man so distinguished as Charette return into the bosom of the republic, perhaps to devote his sword to its service. On the day appointed for his formal entry, the national guard and the army of the West were under arms. All the inhabitants, full of joy and curiosity, thronged to see and to do honour to the celebrated chief. He was received with shouts of *The republic for ever! Charette for ever!* He wore his uniform of Vendean general and the tricoloured cockade. Charette was harsh, distrustful, artful, intrepid. All this was discernible in his features and in his person. Of middle stature, a small bright eye, a nose turned up in the Tartar style, and a wide mouth, gave him an expression the most singular and the most accordant with his character.* Each of those who ran to see him strove to divine his sentiments. The royalists fancied that they could read embarrassment and remorse in his face. The republicans thought him overjoyed and almost intoxicated with his triumph. Well he might be, in spite of the embarrassment of his position; for his enemies procured him the fairest and the first reward that he had yet received for his exploits.

No sooner was this peace signed, than preparations were made

* "Charette was slight and of a middle height, and had a fierce air and severe look. He may justly be considered as one of the causes of the ruin of his party. His jealousy of d'Elbée and Bonchamp, who had greater political and military talents than he, disunited the forces of the royalists and injured their success; while even in his own army his severity alienated his troops; and his harshness towards priests, whom he had the indiscretion to remove from him, destroyed the enthusiasm so necessary in a war like that which he had undertaken. Such was the public interest he excited throughout France, that shortly after his death, his waistcoat and pantaloons were sold for twenty-seven guineas."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

CHARETTE.

for reducing Stofflet and for compelling the Chouans to accept the conditions granted to Charette. The latter appeared to be sincere in his proceedings. He circulated proclamations in the country, to induce all the inhabitants to return to their duty. The people were overjoyed at this peace. The men who had irrevocably devoted themselves to war were formed into territorial guards, and the command of them was left to Charette. These were to constitute the police of the country. This was an idea of Hoche's, which had been disfigured to satisfy the Vendean chiefs, who, harbouring at once secret schemes and distrust, wished to keep the men most inured to war under their own orders. Charette even promised assistance against Stofflet, in case the latter, pressed in Upper Vendée, should fall back upon the Marais.

General Canclaux was immediately despatched in pursuit of Stofflet. Leaving only a corps of observation around Charette's country, he marched the greater part of his troops upon Layon. Stofflet, with a view to produce a sensation by a grand stroke, made an attempt on Chalonne, which was spiritedly repulsed, and fell back upon St. Florent. He proclaimed Charette a traitor to the cause of royalty, and pronounced sentence of death upon him. The representatives, who knew that such a war was to be terminated not merely by the employment of arms, but by giving the ambitious an interest in its cessation, by affording succour to men destitute of resources, had also distributed money. The committee of public welfare had opened a credit in their favour on its secret funds. They gave 60,000 francs in specie, and 365,000 in assignats, to various officers of Stofflet's. His major-general, Trotouin, received 100,000 francs, half in money, half in assignats, and separated from him. He wrote a letter addressed to the army of Anjou, exhorting them to peace, and urging such reasons as were most likely to have an effect upon them.

While such means were employed upon the army of Anjou, the representatives who had been engaged in the pacification of La Vendée repaired to Bretagne, to induce the Chouans to enter into a similar negotiation. Cormatin accompanied them. He was now attached in good earnest to the system of peace, and he was ambitious of making a triumphal entry into Rennes, as Charette had done at Nantes. Notwithstanding the truce, many acts of pillage had been committed by the Chouans. Being generally mere robbers, without attachment to any cause, caring very little about the political views which had induced their chiefs to sign a suspension of arms, they took no pains to observe it, and thought of nothing but obtaining booty. Some of the representatives, on seeing the conduct of the Bretons, began to distrust their intentions, and were already of opinion that they must renounce all idea of peace. Of these Boursault was the most decided. On the other hand, Bollet, a zealous peace-

maker, conceived that, notwithstanding some acts of hostility, an accommodation was possible, and that mild means only ought to be employed. Hoche, hurrying from cantonments to cantonments, eighty leagues apart, never giving himself a moment's rest, placed between the representatives who were in favour of war and those who were in favour of peace, between the Jacobins of the towns, who accused him of weakness and treason, and the royalists who charged him with barbarity—Hoche was filled with disgust, though his zeal was by no means quenched. "You wish me another campaign of the Vosges," he wrote to one of his friends; "how would you make such a campaign against the Chouans and almost without an army?" This young officer saw his talents wasted on an ungrateful war, while generals, altogether inferior to himself, were immortalizing themselves in Holland and on the Rhine, at the head of the finest armies of the republic. He nevertheless prosecuted his task with ardour, and with a profound knowledge of men and of his own situation. We have seen that he had already given the most judicious advice, and recommended, for example, the indemnification of the insurgents who had remained peasants, and the enrolment of such as the war had made soldiers. A better acquaintance with the country had enabled him to discover the true means of appeasing the inhabitants, and of again attaching them to the republic. "We must continue," said he, "to treat with the Chouan chiefs. Their sincerity is very doubtful, but we must keep faith with them. We shall thus gain by confidence those who only need to be made easy on that point. We must gain by commissions those who are ambitious—by money those who are necessitous; we shall thus divide them among themselves; and we should commit the police to those whom we can trust, by giving them the command of the territorial guards, the institution of which has just been suffered. For the rest, we should distribute twenty-five thousand men in several camps to watch the whole country; place along the coasts a number of gun-boats which must be kept in continual motion; and transfer the arsenals, the arms, and the ammunition, from the open towns to the forts and defended places. As for the inhabitants, we must employ the influence of the priests with them, and grant some relief to the most distressed. If we could succeed in diffusing confidence by means of the priests, *chouannerie* would fall immediately." "Circulate," he thus wrote to his general officers on the 27th of Ventose, "circulate the salutary law which the Convention has just passed respecting the freedom of religion, and preach up yourselves religious toleration. The priests, certain that you will not disturb them in the exercise of their ministry, will become your friends, were it only in order to be quiet. Their character inclines them to peace: visit them, tell them that the continuance of the war will render them liable to be annoyed

not by the republicans, who respect religious opinions, but by the Chouans, who acknowledge neither God nor law, and who want to domineer and to plunder without ceasing. Some of them are poor, and in general they are very selfish; do not neglect to offer them some succour, but without ostentation, and with all the delicacy of which you are capable. Through them you will learn all the manœuvres of their party, and you will induce them to keep their peasants at home and to prevent their fighting. You must be aware, that, to attain this end, mildness, amenity, and frankness are requisite. Prevail upon some of the officers and soldiers to attend respectfully some of their ceremonies, taking care never to disturb them. The country expects of you the greatest devotedness; all the means by which you can serve it are good, if they accord with the laws and with republican honour and dignity." To this advice, Hoche added the recommendation not to take any thing from the country for the supply of the armies for some time at least. As for the projects of the English, he proposed to thwart them by taking the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, and raising a *chouannerie* in England, that they might have something to occupy their attention at home. He was thinking of Ireland; but he wrote that on this subject he would enter into a verbal explanation with the committee of public welfare.

These means, chosen with judgment and employed in more than one place with great address, had already been completely successful. Bretagne was thoroughly divided; all the Chouans who had appeared at Rennes were caressed, paid, satisfied, and persuaded to lay down their arms. The others, more obstinate, reckoning upon Stofflet and Puisaye, were for persisting in carrying on the war. Cormatin continued to run from one to the other, with a view to bring them together at La Prévalaye, and to induce them to treat. Notwithstanding the ardour which he manifested to pacify the country, Hoche, who had discerned his character and his vanity, distrusted him, and suspected that his word given to the republicans would not be better kept than that given to the royalists. He watched him with great attention, to ascertain whether he laboured sincerely and without any secret design in the work of reconciliation.

Secret intrigues were destined to combine with all these circumstances in bringing about the pacification so earnestly desired by the republicans. We have already seen Puisaye in London, striving to prevail on the English cabinet to concur in his projects; we have seen the three French princes on the continent, one waiting at Arnheim for a part to enact, another fighting on the Rhine, the third, in his quality of regent, corresponding from Verona with all the cabinets, and keeping up a secret agency in Paris. Puisaye had followed up his schemes with equal activity and skill. Without waiting to be introduced by the old Duke

d'Harcourt, the useless ambassador of the regent in London, he addressed himself directly to the British minister. Pitt, who, invisible to those emigrants who swarmed in the streets of London and beset him with plans and applications for relief, welcomed the organizer of Bretagne, and placed him in communication with Wyndham, the minister at war, a zealous friend of monarchy and anxious to support or to re-establish it in every country. The plans of Puisaye, maturely investigated, were adopted *in toto*. An army, a squadron, money, arms, and immense supplies of ammunition, were promised for a landing on the coast of France; but Puisaye was required to keep the matter secret from his countrymen, and especially from the old Duke d'Harcourt, the envoy of the regent. Puisaye, who had no higher wish than to do every thing by himself, was impenetrable to the Duke d'Harcourt, to the other agents of the princes in London, and above all to the Paris agents, who corresponded with the very secretary of the duke. Puisaye merely wrote to the Count d'Artois, applying for extraordinary powers, and proposing that he should come and put himself at the head of the expedition. The prince sent the powers, and promised to come and take the command in person. The plans of Puisaye were soon suspected, in spite of his endeavours to keep them secret. All the emigrants repulsed by Pitt, and kept aloof by Puisaye, were unanimous. Puisaye, in their opinion, was an intriguer, sold to the perfidious Pitt, and meditated most suspicious projects. This opinion, disseminated in London, was soon adopted at Verona by the councillors of the regent. Since the affair of Toulon, that little court had harboured a great distrust of England; and particular uneasiness was felt as soon as she proposed to make use of one of the princes. On this occasion it did not fail to ask with a sort of anxiety what she meant to do with M. le Comte d'Artois, why the name of Monsieur was not introduced in her plans, if she conceived that she could do without him, &c. The agents in Paris, holding their mission from the regent, sharing his sentiments concerning England, having been unable to obtain any communication from Puisaye, used the same language respecting the enterprise which was preparing in London. Another motive contributed still more to make them disapprove it. The regent thought of having recourse to Spain, and purposed removing to that country, that he might be nearer to La Vendée and to Charette, who was his hero. The Paris agents, on their part, had entered into communication with an emissary of Spain, who had prevailed upon them to make use of that power, and promised that it would do for Monsieur and for Charette, what England intended to do for the Count d'Artois and for Puisaye. But it was necessary to wait till Monsieur could be conveyed from the Alps to the Pyrenees by the Mediterranean, and till a considerable expedition could be prepared.

The intriguers of Paris were therefore wholly in favour of Spain. They pretended that the French were less shy of her than of the English, because her interests were less opposed to theirs; that, moreover, she had gained Tallien, through his wife, the daughter of Cabarus,* the Spanish banker; they even dared to assert that they were sure of Hoche, so little did they stick at imposture to give importance to their schemes. But Spain, her ships and her troops, were much less powerful, according to them, than the intrigues which they pretended to set on foot in the interior. Placed in the heart of the capital, they saw a movement of indignation manifest itself against the revolutionary system. This movement must be excited, said they, and if possible turned to the account of royalism: but to this end, it would have been requisite for the royalists to show themselves as little formidable as possible, for the Mountain was regaining strength from all the apprehensions inspired by counter-revolution. A victory won by Charette, a landing of the emigrants in Bretagne, would have been sufficient to restore to the revolutionary party the influence which it had lost, to make unpopular the Thermidorians, whom the royalists had need of. Charette had just made peace; but it was requisite that he should hold himself in readiness to take up arms again; it was requisite that Anjou and Bretagne should also appear to submit for a time; that, during this time, the heads of the government and the generals should be won, that the armies should be suffered to pass the Rhine and to advance into Germany; and then that the lulled Convention should be all at once surprised, and royalty proclaimed in La Vendée, in Bretagne, and in Paris itself. An expedition from Spain, bringing over the regent, and concurring with these simultaneous movements, might then decide the victory of royalty. As for England, they meant to ask her for nothing but money—for these gentry could not do without that—and to deceive her afterwards. Thus each of the thousand agents employed for the counter-revolution indulged in his own particular revery, devised means according to his own position, and aspired to be the principal restorer of monarchy. Falsehood and intrigue were the means of most of them, and money was their principal ambition.

With such ideas, it was natural that the Paris agency, while

* "Count François Cabarus, born in 1752, was destined for commerce by his father, and obtained the charge of a soap-manufactory near Madrid. Here he became acquainted with several eminent and literary characters, and suggested some financial regulations to the Spanish minister of finance, which were adopted with the greatest success. In 1782 he established the bank of San Carlos, and a company to trade with the Philippine islands. In the year 1790 Cabarus was arrested, in 1792 he was released and made a nobleman, and in 1797 appointed minister plenipotentiary at the congress of Rastadt. He died in 1810 in the office of minister of finance, to which he had been appointed by King Joseph Bonaparte."—*Encyclopædia Americana.* E.

Puisaye was planning in London to carry the Count d'Artois at the head of an expedition to Bretagne, should strive, on the contrary, to thwart any expedition of the kind, to pacify the insurgent provinces, and to cause a feigned peace to be signed. By favour of the truce granted to the Chouans, Lemaitre, Brottier, and Laville-Heurnois, had just opened communications with the insurgent provinces. The regent had directed them to transmit letters to Charette. They intrusted them to an old naval officer, deprived of his commission and in want of employment. They instructed him, at the same time, to promote the pacification by exhorting the insurgents to temporize, to wait for succours from Spain and for a movement in the interior. This emissary, Duverne de Presle, repaired to Rennes, where he forwarded the regent's letters to Charette, and then recommended to every one a temporary submission. He was not the only one whom the Paris agents sent on this errand; and very soon, the ideas of peace, already generally circulated in Bretagne, spread still farther. People every where said that they must lay down their arms, that England was deceiving the royalists, that they had every thing to expect from the Convention, that it was itself about to re-establish monarchy, and that in the treaty signed with Charette there were secret articles, stipulating that the young orphan in the Temple, Louis XVII., should soon be acknowledged as King. Cormatin, whose position had become extremely perplexing, and who had disobeyed the orders of Puisaye and of the central committee, found in the system of the Paris agents an excuse and an encouragement for the conduct which he pursued. It even appears that he was led to hope for the command of Bretagne in the place of Puisaye. With great pains he at length succeeded in bringing together the principal Chouans at La Prévalaye, and the conferences began.

At this juncture, Messrs. de Tinténiac* and de la Roberie were sent from London by Puisaye, the former to bring the Chouans powder, money, and intelligence of a speedy expedition, the second to carry to Charette, his uncle, notice to hold himself in readiness to second the descent in Bretagne, and both to cause the negotiations to be broken off. They attempted to land with a few emigrants near the Côtes du Nord; the Chouans, apprized of their coming, had hastened to the spot; they had had an action with the republicans and been beaten; Messrs. de la

* "M. de Tinteniac was, in character and talents, one of the most distinguished men that appeared during the civil war in La Vendée. He was also remarkable for his intrepid and enterprising nature. At one time he swam across the Loire, holding his despatches between his teeth; and it is asserted, that being once in the middle of the town of Nantes, and finding himself near the ferocious Carrier, he escaped, by threatening to blow out his brains."—*Memoirs of the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein.* E.

Roberie and de Tinténiac had escaped by a miracle; but the truce was compromised, and Hoche, who began to distrust the Chouans, and suspected the sincerity of Cormatin, thought of ordering him to be apprehended. Cormatin, protested his sincerity to the representatives, and induced them to decide that the truce should not be broken. The conferences at La Prévalaye continued. An agent of Stofflet's came to take part in them. Stofflet, beaten, pursued, reduced to extremity, stripped of all his resources by the discovery of the little arsenal which he had in a wood, had at length begged to be permitted to treat, and sent a representative to La Prevalaye. This was General Beauvais. The conferences were extremely warm, as they had been at La Jaunaye. General Beauvais still advocated the system of war, in spite of the desperate situation of the chief who sent him; and he alleged that Cormatin, having signed the peace of La Jaunaye and acknowledged the republic, had lost the command with which Puisaye had invested him, and had no right to deliberate. M. de Tinténiac, who, in spite of all dangers, had reached the place where the conferences were held, would have broken them off in Puisaye's name and returned immediately to London; but Cormatin and the partisans of peace prevented him. Cormatin at length decided the majority to agree to a negotiation, by representing that they should gain time by an apparent submission, and lull the vigilance of the republicans. The conditions were the same as those granted to Charette: freedom of religion, indemnities for those whose property had been laid waste, exemption from the requisition, and the institution of territorial guards. There was an additional condition in the treaty, namely, a million and a half for the principal chiefs. Cormatin was of course to receive his share of that sum. Cormatin, says General Beauvais, that he might not cease for an instant to be guilty of insincerity, at the moment of signing, laid the sword upon his hand, and swore to take up arms again on the first occasion, and he recommended to each to maintain till fresh orders the established organization and the respect due to all the chiefs.

The royalist chiefs then repaired to La Mabilaye, a league from Rennes, to sign the treaty at a formal meeting with the representatives. Many would have declined going, but Cormatin prevailed upon them to attend. The meeting took place with the same formalities as at La Jaunaye. The Chouans had desired that Hoche might not be present, on account of his extreme distrust: this was agreed to. On the 1st of Floreal (April 20), the representatives signed the same ordinances as at La Jaunaye, and the Chouans signed a declaration by which they recognised the republic and submitted to its laws.

On the following day, Cormatin made his entry into Rennes, as Charette had done at Nantes. The bustle in which he had

kept himself, and the importance which he had arrogated, caused him to be considered as the chief of the Breton royalists. To him was attributed every thing—both the exploits of that band of unknown Chouans who had mysteriously traversed Bretagne, and that peace which had been so long desired. Applauded by the inhabitants, caressed by the women, supplied with a round sum in assignats, he reaped all the profit and all the honours of the war, as though he had long waged it. He had however only just landed in Bretagne before he undertook to play this singular part. Nevertheless, he dared no longer write to Puisaye; he could not venture to leave Rennes or trust himself in Bretagne, for fear of being shot by the malecontents. The principal chiefs returned to their divisions, wrote to Puisaye that they had been deceived, that he had only to come, and they would rise at the first signal and fly to meet him. A few days afterwards, Stofflet, finding himself deserted, signed a peace at St. Florent on the same conditions.

At length, after the two Vendées and Bretagne had submitted, Charette received the regent's first letter: it was dated the 1st of February. The prince called him the second founder of the monarchy, spoke of his gratitude, of his admiration, of his desire to join him, and appointed him lieutenant-general. These intimations arrived too late. Charette, deeply moved, replied immediately that the letter with which he had just been honoured filled his soul with a transport of joy; that his attachment and his fidelity would still be the same; that necessity alone had obliged him to yield, but that his submission was only apparent; that when *the parts should be bound better together*,* he would again take up arms, and be ready to die before the face of his prince and in the most glorious of causes.

Such was this first pacification of the insurgent provinces. As Hoche had suspected, it was but apparent; yet, as he had also foreseen, it might be made prejudicial to the Vendean chiefs, by habituating the country to repose and to the laws of the republic, and by calming or directing into another channel that ardour for fighting which animated some men. Notwithstanding what Charette wrote to the regent, and what the Chouans intimated to Puisaye, all ardour was likely to be extinguished in their hearts after a few months' tranquillity. These underhand dealings were but proofs of insincerity, excusable no doubt in the excitement of civil wars, but which take away from those who exhibit them all right to complain of the severities of their adversaries. The representatives and the republican generals

* "Even at this period it is evident that there existed over all the west of France powerful elements of resistance, and if they had been united under one head, and seconded by the allied powers, it was by no means impossible to have restored the royal cause."—*Jomini.* E.

were most scrupulous in the fulfilment of the conditions granted. It is assuredly superfluous to demonstrate the absurdity of the rumour then circulated, and even repeated since, that the treaties which had been signed contained secret articles, and that these articles comprehended a promise to seat Louis XVII. on the throne; as if representatives could have been so mad as to enter into such engagements; as if it had been possible that they could consent to sacrifice to a few partisans, a republic which they persisted in upholding against all Europe! Besides, none of the chiefs, in their letters to the princes or to the different royalist agents, ever ventured to advance such an absurdity. Charette, subsequently tried for having violated the conditions made with him, dared not avail himself of this powerful excuse of an article that was never carried into execution. Puisaye, in his Memoirs, considers the assertion to be equally frivolous and false; and we should not here have referred to it, had it not been repeated by a great number of writers.

This peace afforded another advantage besides that of leading to the disarming of the country. Concurring with that of Prussia, Holland, and Tuscany, and with the intentions manifested by several other states, it produced a very great moral effect. The republic was recognised at one and the same time by its enemies at home and abroad, by the coalition, and by the royalist party itself.

Among the decided enemies of France, there were only left Austria and England. Russia was too distant to be dangerous; the empire was on the point of being dissevered, and was incapable of supporting the war; Piedmont was exhausted; Spain, taking little share in the chimerical hopes of the intriguing royalists, sighed for peace; and the anger of the court of Naples was as impotent as ridiculous. Pitt, notwithstanding the unparalleled triumphs of the republic, notwithstanding a campaign unexampled in the annals of war, was not shaken; and his strong understanding perceived that so many victories ruinous to the continent were in no respect detrimental to England. The stadtholder, the princes of Germany, Austria, Piedmont, Spain, had lost in this war part of their territories; but England had acquired an incontestable superiority at sea. She was mistress of the Mediterranean and of the Ocean; she had seized half the Dutch fleet; she forced the navy of Spain to exhaust itself against that of France; she strove to possess herself of our colonies; she had already taken all those of the Dutch, and secured for ever her Indian empire. For this purpose she still needed some time of war and of political aberrations on the part of the continental powers: it was therefore to her interest to excite hostilities by affording succour to Austria, by rousing the zeal of Spain, by preparing fresh commotions in the southern provinces of France. So much the worse for the belligerent powers if they were beaten in a new campaign: but England had nothing

to fear; she would pursue her course on the seas, in India, and in America. If, on the other hand, the powers were victorious, she would be a gainer by restoring to Austria the Netherlands, which she particularly disliked to see in the hands of France. Such were the sanguinary but deep calculations of the English minister.

Notwithstanding the losses which England had sustained, either by prizes, by the defeats of the Duke of York, or by the enormous expenses which she had incurred, and the sums which she had given to Prussia and Piedmont, she still possessed resources superior to the idea which the English entertained of them, and to the idea entertained of them by Pitt himself. She complained bitterly, it is true, of the numerous captures, of the dearth, and of the high price of all articles of consumption. The English merchant-vessels, having alone continued to traverse the sea, had naturally run much greater risks of being taken by privateers than those of other nations. The insurances, in which a great deal of business was done, rendered them daring, and very often they would not wait for convoys. This it was that gave so many advantages to our cruisers. As for the dearth, it was general all over Europe. On the Rhine, about Frankfort, a bushel of rye cost fifteen florins. The enormous consumption of the armies, the multitude of hands taken from agriculture, the troubles in unhappy Poland,* which had this year furnished scarcely any corn, had occasioned this extraordinary dearth. Besides, transport from the Baltic to England was rendered almost impossible since the French were masters of Holland. It was to the New World that Europe had been obliged to resort for provisions; she lived at this moment on the surplus produce of those virgin lands which the North Americans had just brought into cultivation. But freight was high, and bread had risen in England to an enormous price. That of meat had increased proportionably. Spanish wool ceased to arrive, since the French occupied the ports of Biscay, and the manufacture of cloth was likely to be interrupted. Thus England, while in labour with her future greatness, suffered severely. The workmen struck in all the manufacturing towns; the people called aloud for peace, and petitions were presented to parliament, subscribed by thousands of signatures, imploring an end to this disastrous war. Ireland, agitated on account of

* "Abandoned by all the world, distracted by internal divisions, destitute alike of fortresses and resources, crushed in the grasp of gigantic enemies, the patriots of unhappy Poland, consulting only their own courage, resolved to make a last effort to deliver it from its enemies. But the tragedy was soon at an end. Warsaw capitulated, the detached parties of the patriots melted away, and Poland was no more! In November, 1794, Suwarrow made his triumphal entry into the capital. King Stanislaus was sent into Russia, where he ended his days in captivity, and the final partition of the monarchy was effected."—*Alison.* E.

concessions which had been withdrawn from it, was about to add fresh embarrassments to those in which the government was already involved.

In this arduous situation, Pitt discovered motives and means for continuing the war. In the first place, it flattered the passions of his court; it flattered even those of the English nation, which cherished a deadly hatred against France, that could always be revived amidst the severest sufferings. In the next, notwithstanding the losses of commerce, (losses which proved, however, that the English alone had continued to frequent the seas,) he saw English commerce increased during the last two years by the exclusive supply of all the markets of India and America. He had ascertained that the exports had amazingly increased since the commencement of the war, and he already had a glimpse of the future prosperity of the English nation. He found in loans an expedient, at the fecundity of which he was himself astonished. The funds had not fallen; the loss of Holland had but little affected them, because, the event being foreseen, an enormous quantity of capital had been transferred from Amsterdam to London. The Dutch commercial men, though patriots, had nevertheless no confidence in events, and had sought to place their wealth in safety by transporting it to England. Pitt had talked of a new loan to a considerable amount, and in spite of the war the offers for it were more numerous than ever. Experience has since proved that war, while it forbids commercial speculations and admits of no speculations but in the public funds, facilitates loans instead of rendering them more difficult. This must happen still more naturally in a country which, having no neighbours, never sees in war a question of existence, but merely a question of trade and markets. Pitt resolved, therefore, by means of the abundant capital of his nation, to supply Austria with funds, to strengthen his navy, to increase his land forces, for the purpose of sending them to India or America, and to give considerable succours to the French insurgents. He concluded a subsidiary treaty with Austria, like that which he had made in the preceding year with Prussia. That power had soldiers, and promised to keep on foot at least two hundred thousand effective men; but she was in want of money. She could no longer open loans either in Switzerland, in Frankfort, or in Holland. England engaged not to furnish the funds, but to guarantee the loan which she proposed to open in London. To guarantee the debts of a power like Austria is very much like undertaking to pay them; but the operation in this form was much more easy to justify in parliament. The loan was for 4,600,000*l.* (115 millions of francs) at 5 per cent. interest. Pitt opened at the same time a loan of 18 millions sterling on account of England at 4 per cent. The eagerness of capitalists was extreme; and, as the Austrian loan was guaranteed by the English government, and bore a higher interest, they required that for two-thirds taken in the

English loan they should have one-third given them in the Austrian. Pitt, having thus made sure of Austria, strove to awaken the zeal of Spain, but he found it extinct. He took into his pay the emigrant regiments of Condé, and he told Puisaye that, as the pacification of La Vendée diminished the confidence inspired by the insurgent provinces, he would give him a squadron, the *matériel* for an army, and emigrants formed into regiments, but no English soldiers, and that if, as letters from Bretagne stated, the dispositions of the royalists were not changed, and if the expedition proved successful, he would endeavour to render it decisive by sending an army. He then resolved to raise the number of seamen from eighty to one hundred thousand. For this purpose he devised a sort of conscription. Every merchant-vessel was obliged to furnish one seaman for every seven of her crew: it was a debt which it was but fair that commerce should pay for the protection which it received from the royal navy. Agriculture and manufactures were likewise under obligations to the navy, which ensured them markets; in consequence, each parish was also obliged to furnish one seaman. In this manner he secured the means of making an extraordinary addition to the strength of the English navy.* The English men-of-war were very inferior in construction to the French ships; but the immense superiority in number, the excellence of the crews, and the skill of the officers, put rivalry entirely out of the question.

With all these means combined, Pitt presented himself to the parliament. The opposition had this year gained an accession of about twenty members. The partisans of peace and of the French Revolution were more animated than ever, and they had strong facts to oppose to the minister. The language which Pitt lent to the crown, and which he himself held during this session, one of the most memorable of the English parliament on account of the importance of the questions and the eloquence of Fox and Sheridan, was extremely specious. He admitted that France had obtained unexampled triumphs, but these triumphs, instead of discouraging her enemies, ought on the contrary, he said, to impart to them more firmness and perseverance. It was still England against which France bore a grudge; it was her constitution, her prosperity, that she was striving to destroy; it was decidedly far from prudent, far from honourable, to shrink from such a rancorous animosity. To lay down her arms at that moment above all, would discover, he said, a disastrous weakness. France, having no other foes than Austria and the Empire to combat, would overwhelm them; she would then come back,

* "England now augmented her naval force to a hundred thousand seamen; one hundred and eight ships of the line were put into commission, and the land forces were raised to a hundred and fifty thousand men. New taxes were imposed, and, notwithstanding the most vehement debates, Parliament concurred in the necessity, now that we were embarked in the contest, of prosecuting it with vigour."—*New Annual Register.* E.

relieved from her continental enemies, and fall upon England, who, thenceforth single-handed, would have to sustain a tremendous shock. It was right to take advantage of the moment, while several powers were yet in the field, to crush in concert the common enemy, to oblige France to retire within her own limits, to wrest from her the Netherlands and Holland, to drive back into her own bosom her armies, her commerce, and her mischievous principles. Moreover, it required only one more effort to overwhelm her. She had conquered, it was true, but only by exhausting herself, by employing barbarous means, which had spent themselves by their very violence. The *maximum*, *requisitions*, *assignats*, terror, had spent themselves in the hands of the chiefs of France. All these chiefs had fallen by striving to conquer at such a price. One more campaign, then, said Pitt, and Europe, England, will be avenged and secured from a sanguinary revolution. Were there any whom these reasons of honour, of safety, or of policy, failed to touch? were there any still bent on making peace? he would tell them that it would not be possible. The French demagogues would repel it with that ferocious pride which they had displayed even before they were victorious. And in order to treat with them where was one to find them? where look for the government amid those bloodthirsty factions, urging each other on to power, and disappearing as soon as they had attained it? how hope for solid conditions in negotiating with such transient depositaries of a still disputed authority? It was, therefore, not honourable, it was imprudent, it was impossible, to negotiate. England still possessed immense resources; her exports had wonderfully increased; her commerce sustained losses which proved its boldness and its activity; her navy had become formidable, and her great capitalists came spontaneously to offer themselves in abundance to the government, for the purpose of continuing this just and necessary war.

Such were the epithets which Pitt had given to this war from the outset, and which he affected to give it still. It is evident that amidst these reasons of declamation he could not assign the real motives; that he could not confess by what Machiavelian ways he aimed at conducting England to the highest pinnacle of power. Men shrink from the avowal of such an ambition before the face of the world.

Hence the opposition replied victoriously to the false reasons which he was obliged to assign in default of the real ones. We were told at the end of last session, said Fox and Sheridan, that one more campaign would be sufficient; that the allies had already several fortresses, from which they were to sally forth in the spring and annihilate France. But what are the facts? The French have conquered Flanders, Holland, the whole left bank of the Rhine, excepting Mayence, part of Piedmont, the greater part of Catalonia, and the whole of Navarre. Where is

such a campaign to be found in the annals of Europe? They have taken, we are told, some fortresses. Show us a war in which so many fortified places have been reduced in a single campaign! If the French, struggling against all Europe, have had such success, what advantages are they not likely to gain in a conflict with Austria and England left almost alone; for the other powers are either no longer able to second us, or have made peace! We are told that they are exhausted; that the assignats, their sole resource, have lost all their value; that their present government has ceased to possess its former energy. But the Americans saw their paper-money fall ninety per cent., and yet they were not conquered. But this government, when it is energetic, we are told is barbarous; now that it is become humane and moderate, it is said to possess no energy. We are told of our resources, of our great wealth; but the people are perishing of want, and unable to pay for either bread or meat; they are loudly demanding peace. That wonderful wealth, which seems to be created by enchantment—is it real? Can treasures be created out of paper? All those systems of finance conceal some frightful error, some immense void, which will suddenly appear. We go on lavishing our wealth on the powers of Europe: we have already wasted it on Piedmont and on Prussia; we are again going to waste it on Austria. Who will guarantee us that this power will be more faithful to her engagements than Prussia? Who will guarantee us that she will not break her promises and treat, after taking our money? We are exciting an infamous civil war; we are arming the French against their native country, and yet to our shame these French, acknowledging their error and the wisdom of their new government, have just laid down their arms. Shall we go and fan the expiring embers of La Vendée, for the purpose of producing a tremendous conflagration there? We are told of the barbarous principles of France. Is there in those principles any thing more anti-social than our conduct towards the insurgent provinces? All the means of the war are, therefore, equivocal or culpable. Peace, we are assured, is impossible. France hates England. But when did the violence of the French against us break forth? Was it not when we manifested the guilty intention of wresting from them their liberty, of interfering in the choice of their government, of exciting civil war among them? Peace, we are further told, would spread the pestilence of their principles. But Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, are at peace with them. Is their constitution destroyed? Peace, it is added, is impossible with a tottering government, a government that is incessantly changing. But Prussia and Tuscany have found some one to treat with; Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and the United States, know to whom to address themselves in their relations with France; and yet we cannot negotiate with her! We ought then to have been told,

on commencing the war, that we should not make peace before a certain form of government had been re-established among our enemies; before the republic had been abolished among them; before they had submitted to the institutions which it pleased our fancy to give them.

Amidst this clash of reasons and of eloquence, Pitt pursued his course, and, without ever assigning his real motives, obtained all that he desired: loans, naval conscription, and the suspension of the *habeas corpus* act. With his treasures, his navy, the two hundred thousand men belonging to Austria, and the desperate courage of the French insurgents, he resolved to make a new campaign this year, certain at any rate to rule the seas, if victory on the continent should adhere to the enthusiastic nation which he was fighting.

These negotiations, these conflicts of opinion in Europe, these preparations for war, prove of what importance our country then was in the world. At this juncture, ambassadors were seen to arrive all at once from Sweden, from Denmark, from Holland, from Prussia, from Tuscany, from Venice, and from America. On their arrival in Paris they called upon the president of the Convention, whom they found lodging sometimes in a second or third story, and whose simple and polite reception had succeeded the ancient introductions at court. They were then ushered into that famous hall, where, on humble benches, and in the simplest costume, sat that Assembly which, from the might and the grandeur of its passions, appeared no longer ridiculous but terrible. They had an arm-chair opposite to that of the president; they spoke seated; the president replied in the same manner, calling them by the titles specified in their credentials. He then gave them the fraternal salute, and proclaimed them representatives of the power by which they were sent. They had a tribune set apart for them, where they could witness those stormy discussions, which excited in strangers as much curiosity as terror. Such was the ceremonial observed in regard to the ambassadors of foreign powers. Its simplicity befitted a republic, receiving without pomp, but with decency and respect, the envoys of monarchs whom it had vanquished. The name of Frenchman was then a glorious name. It was ennobled by splendid victories, and by the purest of all, those gained by a nation in defence of its existence and of its liberty.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

LAST CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE MOUNTAINEERS AND THE THERMIDORIANS—INSURRECTION OF PRAIRIAL AND MURDER OF FERAUD—EXECUTION OF ROMME, GOUJON, DUQUESNOI, DURAI, BOURBOTTE, AND SOUBRANY—DESTRUCTION OF THE PATRIOT PARTY—BOLDNESS OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY—SCALE OF REDUCTION FOR THE ASSIGNATS.

The events of Germinal had produced the usual consequence of an uncertain action for the two parties which divided France: those two parties had become the more violent in consequence, and the more intent on destroying one another. In the whole of the South, and particularly at Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon, the revolutionists, more menacing and more audacious than ever, foiling all the efforts that were made to disarm them or to send them back to their communes, continued to demand the release of the patriots, the death of all returned emigrants, and the constitution of 1793. They corresponded with the partisans whom they had in every province; they called them to their aid; they exhorted them to collect at two principal points, Toulon for the south, Paris for the north. When they should be strong enough at Toulon, they would raise the departments, they said, and advance to join their brethren in the north. This was precisely the plan adopted by the federalists in 1793.

Their adversaries, whether royalists or Girondins, had become bolder, since the government, attacked in Germinal, had given the signal for persecutions. Masters of the administrations, they made a terrible use of the decrees passed against the patriots. They imprisoned them, as accomplices of Robespierre's, or as having had the management of the public money without rendering any account of it. They disarmed them, as having participated in the tyranny abolished on the 9th of Thermidor; or, lastly, they hunted them from place to place, as having quitted their communes. It was in the South itself that these hostilities against the unfortunate patriots were most active; for violence always provokes equal violence. In the department of the Rhone, a terrible reaction was in contemplation. The royalists, being obliged to flee from the cruel violence of 1793, returned through Switzerland, crossed the frontier, entered Lyons with false passports, talked there of the King, of religion, of past prosperity, and availed themselves of the recollection of the massacres, to bring

back to monarchy a city which had become wholly republican. Thus the royalists looked towards Lyons for aid, as the patriots did towards Toulon. It was said that Precy had returned and was concealed in the city, upon which he had by his valour, brought all its calamities. A multitude of emigrants, collecting at Basle, at Berne, and at Lausanne, showed themselves more presumptuously than ever. They talked of their speedy return; they said that their friends governed; that they would soon seat the son of Louis XVI. on the throne, procure themselves to be recalled, and their property to be restored to them; and that with the exception of some Terrorists and some military officers whom it would be necessary to punish, every body would eagerly contribute to this restoration. At Lausanne, where all the youth were enthusiastic admirers of the French Revolution, they were annoyed but were forced to hold their tongues. In other places, they were suffered to talk: people despised these vain boastings to which they were pretty well accustomed for six years past; but they were shy of some of them, who had pensions from the Austrian police for acting as spies in the inns upon travellers who should use indiscreet language. It was towards this quarter too, that is, near Lyons, that companies were formed, which, calling themselves companies of the Sun, and companies of Jesus, were to scour the country or to penetrate into the towns, and put to death the patriots who had retired to their estates or were confined in the prisons.* The transported priests also returned by this frontier, and had already spread themselves over all the eastern provinces; they declared all that had been done by the priests who had taken the oath to be null and void; they rebaptized children, remarried couples, and excited in the people a hatred and contempt of the government. They took care to keep near the frontier in order to recross it at the first signal. Those who had not suffered transportation, and who enjoyed in France a pension for their support and the free exercise of their religion, abused the tolerance of the government as much as the transported priests. Dissatisfied at having to say mass in houses either hired or lent, they stirred up the people and instigated them to seize the churches, which had become the property of the communes. A great number of disturbances had taken place on this subject, and force had been required to compel submission to the decrees. In Paris, the journalists in the pay of royalism, stimulated by Lemaître, wrote with more boldness

* "Companies of Jesus and Companies of the Sun took place of the Companies of Marat, and exacted as severe a retribution. At Lyons, at Aix, at Tarascon, at Marseilles, they slew all those confined in the prisons who had participated in the revolutionary transactions, pursued those who had escaped into the streets, and without any other form or notice than the reproach 'Behold a Matavin!' (the nickname they gave to their opponents) slew them, and threw them into the river. At Tarascon they precipitated them from a high tower on a rock which bordered on the Rhone."—*Hazlitt.* E.

than ever against the Revolution, and almost openly preached up monarchy. Lacroix, the author of the *Spectateur*, had been acquitted of the charges preferred against him; and since then the herd of libellers had ceased to be afraid of the revolutionary tribunal.

Thus the two parties were arrayed against each other, and ready for a decisive engagement. The revolutionists, resolved to strike the blow of which the 12th of Germinal had been merely the threat, conspired openly. They hatched plots in every quarter, since they had lost their principal chiefs who alone framed plans for the whole party. An association was formed at the house of a man named Lagrelet, in the Rue de Bretagne. The plan was to collect several mobs, and to put Cambon, Maribon-Montant, and Thuriot, at the head of them; to despatch some of them to the prisons to deliver the patriots, others to the committees to seize them, and others again to the Convention to extort decrees from it. When once masters of the Convention, the conspirators purposed to oblige it to reinstate the imprisoned deputies, to annul the condemnation passed upon Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère; to exclude the seventy-three, and immediately to proclaim the constitution of 1793. Every thing was prepared, even to the crowbars for breaking open the prisons, the rallying tickets for recognising the conspirators, and a piece of stuff to hang out at the window of the house from which all the orders were to be issued. A letter, concealed in a loaf and addressed to a prisoner, was intercepted. In this letter it was said, "On the day that you will receive some eggs half white and half red, you will hold yourself in readiness." The day fixed was the 1st of Floreal. One of the conspirators betrayed the plan, and communicated the secret and the details to the committee of general safety. The committee immediately caused all the chiefs who were pointed out to be apprehended, but unfortunately this did not derange the plans of the patriots; for at that time every one was a chief, and people were conspiring in a thousand places at once.* Rovère, who formerly deserved the name of a Terrorist, in the time of the old committee of public welfare, and now a violent reactor, presented a report on this plot to the Convention, and inveighed vehemently against the deputies who were to be put at the head of the assemblages.

* "Paris was full of conspirators, for the Convention had lost its popularity, because it had evinced so little disposition to relieve the sufferings of the people, which had now become absolutely intolerable. The conspiring anarchists profited by this ferment, and did their utmost to augment it, because that class reap no harvests but in the fields of misery. France, exhausted by every species of suffering, had lost even the power of uttering a complaint; and we had all arrived at such a point of depression, that death, if unattended by pain, would have been wished for, by even the youngest human being. But it was ordained that many months and years should still continue in that state of horrible agitation, the true foretaste of the torments of hell."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

Those deputies were utter strangers to the plot, and their names had been used without their knowledge, because the conspirators had need of them, and reckoned upon their being well disposed to the plot. Already condemned by a decree to be confined at Ham, they had not obeyed, but withdrawn themselves from the operation of that decree. At the instigation of Rovère, the assembly decided that, if they did not surrender themselves immediately, they should be transported on the sole ground of their disobedience. This abortive project plainly indicated that an event was near at hand.

As soon as the journals had made known this new plot of the patriots, a great agitation was manifested at Lyons and the rage against them was redoubled. At this moment, a noted Terrorist denouncer, prosecuted by virtue of the decree passed against the accomplices of Robespierre, was upon his trial at Lyons. The newspapers containing Rovère's report on the plot of the 29th of Germinal had just arrived. The people of Lyons began to assemble; most of them had to deplore either the ruin of their fortune or the death of relatives. They beset the hall of the tribunal. Boisset, the representative, mounted his horse; they surrounded him, and each began to enumerate the complaints that he had to make against the man who was upon his trial. The promoters of disturbance, the companies of the Sun and of Jesus, availing themselves of this manifestation of public feeling, excited a tumult, repaired to the prisons, broke them open, and murdered seventy or eighty prisoners, reputed Terrorists.* The national guard made some efforts to prevent this massacre, but showed perhaps less zeal than it would have displayed, had it not harboured such violent resentment against the victims of that day.

Thus no sooner was the Jacobin plot of the 29th of Germinal made public, than the counter-revolutionists replied to it by the massacre at Lyons on the 6th of Floreal. The sincere republicans, though they saw the plans of the Terrorists, were nevertheless alarmed at those of the counter-revolutionists. Hitherto they had been wholly occupied in preventing a new terror, and had felt no apprehension of royalism. Royalism, in fact, appeared very remote after the executions of the revolutionary tribunal and the victories of our armies; but when they beheld it, driven as it were from La Vendée, returning by Lyons, forming companies of assassins, pushing on seditious priests into the heart of France, and dictating in Paris itself publications filled with the violence of the emigrants, they changed their opinion and thought

* "One prison at Lyons was set on fire by the infuriated mob, and the unhappy inmates all perished in the flames. The people exasperated with the blood which had been shed by the revolutionary party, were insatiable in their vengeance; they invoked the name of a parent, brother, or sister, when retaliating on their oppressors; and while committing murder themselves, exclaimed with every stroke, 'Die, assassins!' Many innocent persons perished, as in all popular tumults, during these bloody days."—*Alison.* E.

that, to the rigorous measures adopted against the tools of terror, it would be right to add others against the partisans of royalty. In the first place, to leave those without pretext who had suffered from excesses and demanded vengeance for them, they caused the tribunals to be enjoined to exert more activity in the prosecution of persons charged with peculation, abuse of authority, and oppressive acts. They then set about devising the measures most capable of curbing the royalists. Chenier, known for his literary talents and his avowedly republican opinions, was directed to draw up a report on this subject. He drew an energetic picture of France, of the two parties which disputed the empire over her, and especially of the seditious manœuvres of the emigrants and the clergy, and he proposed to direct every returned emigrant to be immediately delivered up to the tribunals, in order that he might be dealt with according to law; to consider as an emigrant every banished person who had returned to France and should be still there at the expiration of one month; to punish with six months' imprisonment all who should violate the law relative to the exercise of religion, and who should attempt to take possession of the churches by force; to condemn to banishment every writer who should instigate to outrages against the national representation or to the restoration of royalty; lastly, to oblige all the authorities charged with disarming the Terrorists to assign the motives for disarming them.

All these measures were adopted, excepting two which occasioned some observations. Thibaudeau considered the proposition as imprudent which recommended the punishment of violators of the law relative to religious worship with six months' imprisonment; he justly remarked that the churches were fit for one purpose only, that of religious ceremonies; that the people devout enough to attend mass in private meeting-houses would always feel extremely sore at being deprived of those edifices in which it was formerly held; that, in declaring the government exempted for ever from the expense of all religious worship, it ought to have restored the churches to the Catholics, to prevent regrets, commotions, and perhaps a general rising as in Vendée. Thibaudeau's observations were not favourably received; for it was feared lest, in restoring the churches to the Catholics, even though to be kept up at their own cost, the assembly might restore ceremonies to the old clergy which were a part of its power. Tallien, who had become a journalist with Fréron, and who, either from this reason or from an affectation of justice, was induced to protect the independence of the press, opposed the penalty of banishment against writers. He insisted that this was an arbitrary plan and left too great latitude for severities against the press. He was right; but, in that state of open war with royalism, it was perhaps of importance that the Convention should declare itself strongly against those libellers who strove to bring back

France so soon to monarchical ideas. Louvet, that fiery Girondin, whose distrust had done so much injury to his party, but who was one of the most sincere men in the assembly, hastened to reply to Tallien, and besought all the friends of the republic to forget their dissensions and their reciprocal grievances, and to unite against their oldest enemy, the only real one they had—namely, royalty. The testimony of Louvet in favour of violent measures was least suspicious of all, for he had braved the most cruel proscription to oppose the system of revolutionary means. The whole assembly applauded his frank and noble declaration, voted that his speech should be printed and sent to every part of France, and adopted the article to the great confusion of Tallien, who had chosen such a wrong time for supporting a just and true maxim.

Thus, at the same time that the Convention ordered the prosecution and the disarming of the patriots, and their return to their communes, it renewed the laws against the emigrants and the exiled priests, and instituted penalties against the opening of the churches and against royalist pamphlets. But penal laws are feeble guards against parties ready to rush upon one another. Thibaudeau was of opinion that the organization of the committees of government since the 9th of Thermidor was too weak and too relaxed. This organization, established at the moment when the dictatorship was just overthrown, had been devised only under the dread of a new tyranny. Thus excessive tension of all the springs had been followed by extreme relaxation. The restoration of their influence to all the committees, for the purpose of destroying the too predominant influence of the committee of public welfare, had led to skirmishing, to delays, and to a complete enfeebling of the government. In fact, if a disturbance occurred in a department, the established routine required that the committee of general safety should first be made acquainted with it; that committee summoned the committee of public welfare, and in certain cases, that of legislation; it was necessary to wait till these committees were complete before they could assemble, and then that they should have time to confer together. Thus their meetings were rendered almost impossible, and too numerous to act. If it was requisite merely to send twenty men by way of guard, the committee of general safety, charged with the police, was obliged to apply to the military committee. Now it began to be felt how wrong it was to be so exceedingly afraid of the tyranny of the old committee of public welfare, and to take such precautions against a danger that was thenceforward chimerical. A government thus organized could but very feebly resist the factions conspiring against one another, and oppose to them only a powerless authority. Thibaudeau proposed, therefore, a simplification of the government. He moved that all the committees should be confined to the mere proposition of laws, and that the measures of execution should

all be assigned to the committee of public welfare; that the latter should combine the police with its other functions, and that consequently the committee of general safety should be abolished; that, lastly, the committee of public welfare, charged thus with the whole government, should be increased to twenty-four members, in order that it might be adequate to the extent of its new duties. The cowards in the assembly, who were always ready to arm themselves against impossible dangers, cried out against this plan, and said that it was a renewal of the old dictatorship. The discussion being opened, each proposed his plan. Those who had the mania for reverting to constitutional means, or to the division of powers, proposed to create an executive power out of the assembly, in order to separate the execution from the voting of the law. Others were for selecting the members of this power from the assembly, but for depriving them, so long as they held their office, of any legislative vote.

After long digressions, the assembly felt that, having but two or three months longer to exist, that is to say, only just the time requisite for making a constitution, it was ridiculous to waste it in framing a provisional constitution, and especially to renounce its dictatorship at a moment when it had more need of strength than ever. All the propositions tending to a division of the powers were in consequence rejected; but the assembly had too great a dread of Thibaudeau's plan to adopt it. It contented itself therefore with merely clearing the track of the committees a little more. It was decided that they should be confined to the mere proposition of laws; that the committee of public welfare alone should possess the powers of execution, but that the police should remain with the committee of general safety; that the meetings of committees should take place only by the deputation of commissioners; and lastly, the assembly, in order to guard itself still more against that formidable and so much dreaded committee of public welfare, decided that it should be deprived of the initiative of the laws, and never be capable of making propositions tending to proceedings against any deputy.

While the assembly took these means for restoring a little energy to the government, it continued to pay attention to those financial questions, the discussion of which had been interrupted by the events of the month of Germinal. The abolition of the *maximum*, of requisitions, of the sequestration, of the whole apparatus of forced means, in giving back things to their natural movement, had rendered the fall of the assignats more rapid. The sales being no longer forced, and the prices having again become free, goods had risen in an extraordinary manner, and consequently the assignat had fallen in proportion. The communications with foreign countries being re-established, the assignat had again entered into comparison with foreign paper, and its inferiority had been rapidly manifested by the conti-

nually increasing fall of the exchange. Thus the fall of the paper-money was complete in every respect; and, agreeably to the ordinary law of velocities, the rapidity of this fall was increased by its very rapidity. Every too abrupt change in the value of effects produces hazardous speculations, that is, jobbing. As such change never happens but from the effect of some derangement either political or financial, as consequently production suffers, as manufactures and commerce are impeded, this kind of speculation is almost the only one that is left; and then, instead of fabricating or of trransporting new commodities, people hasten to speculate on the variations in price of those which exist. Instead of producing, they gamble with what is produced. Stockjobbing, which had risen to such a pitch in the months of April, May, and June, 1793, when the defection of Dumouriez, the insurrection of La Vendée, and the federalist coalition, had occasioned so considerable a fall in the assignats, again appeared with greater violence than ever in Germinal, Floreal, and Prairial, year III (April and May, 1795). With the horrors of scarcity the scandal of unbounded gambling was thus combined, which again contributed to increase the dearness of commodities and the depreciation of paper.* The procedure of the gamblers was the same as in 1793, the same that it always is. They bought goods, which, rising in relation to the assignat with singular rapidity, increased in value in their hands, and procured them in a few moments a considerable profit. Thus all wishes, all efforts, tended to the fall of paper. There were articles, which were sold and resold thousands of times without ever being removed. People even speculated, as usual, with what they did not possess. They bought a commodity of a seller, who had it not, but who engaged to deliver it at a specified time: when that time arrived, the seller could not deliver it, but he paid the difference between the price at which he sold and the current price of the day, if the commodity had risen; he received that difference, if it had fallen. It was at the Palais Royal, already so obnoxious to the people as the haunt of the *gilded youth*, that the jobbers met. It was impossible to pass through it without being followed by dealers, carrying in their hands stuffs, gold snuff-boxes, silver plate, rich jewellery. It was at the Chartres coffee-house that all the speculators in the metallic substances assembled. Though gold and silver were no longer considered as merchandise, and though, since 1793, they were forbidden upon very severe penalties to be sold against assignats, the traffic in them was nevertheless carried on almost openly. The louis was sold for 160 livres in paper;

* "The rapidity of the decline of the assignat gave rise to numerous speculations on the exchange of Paris; and the people in the midst of the horrors of famine, were exasperated by the sight of fortunes made out of the misery which they endured."—*Alison.* E.

and in an hour the price was made to fluctuate from 160 to 200, and even 210 livres.

Thus a frightful dearth of bread, an absolute want of fuel, in weather that was still severe in the middle of spring, an excessive rise in the prices of all commodities, the impossibility of procuring them with a paper that was sinking from day to day; amidst all these evils an unbridled jobbing, accelerating the depreciation of the assignats by its speculations, and affording a spectacle of the most scandalous gambling, and sometimes of sudden fortunes springing up out of the general distress—such was the vast theme of grievances presented to the patriots for exciting the people to commotion.* It behoved the government, as well for the relief of the public distresses, as for preventing a commotion, to redress these grievances—but therein lay the everasting difficulty.

One expedient was deemed indispensable, as we have seen, to raise the assignats by withdrawing them from circulation; but, in order to withdraw them, it was necessary to sell the domains, and people persisted in shutting their eyes to the real difficulty, that of furnishing purchasers with the means of paying for one-third of the territory. The Assembly had rejected violent means, that is to say, the demonetisation and the forced loan; but it hesitated between the two voluntary means, namely, a lottery and a bank. The proscription of Cambon decided the preference in favour of the plan of Johannot, who had proposed the latter. But, till this chimerical expedient could be made to succeed, an expedient which, even if it did succeed, never could raise the assignats to a par with money, the greatest evil, that of a difference between the nominal value and the real value still existed. Thus the creditor of the state, or other persons, took the assignat at par, and could only pay it away again for one-tenth at most. Proprietors, who had let their lands, received but one-tenth of the rent. Instances were known of farmers who paid their rent with a sack of corn, a fat hog, or a horse. The treasury, in particular, sustained a loss which contributed to the ruin of the finances, and consequently of the paper itself. It took the assignat at its nominal value from the taxpayer, and received per month about fifty millions, which were at most only worth five. To supply this deficit, and to cover the extraordinary expenses of the war, it was obliged to issue assignats to the amount of not less than eight hundred millions per month, on account of their great depreciation. The first thing to be done, until measures should be devised for withdrawing and raising them, was to re-

* "The daily crowds which were in the habit of assembling on account of the distribution of bread, and of the popular fermentation, did not allow the Convention to perceive the preparations that the patriots were making for a general commotion, nor consequently to organize any measures with respect to it."—*Mignet.* E.

establish the relation between their nominal value and their real value, so that the republic, the creditor of the state, the land-owner, the capitalist, in short, all persons paid in paper, might not be ruined.

Johannot proposed an expedient, namely, to return to metals as the measure of value. The worth of the assignats in proportion to gold and silver was to be ascertained every day, and they were no longer to be received but at that rate. A person to whom one thousand francs were owing was to be paid ten thousand in assignats, if the assignats were worth only one-tenth of the metals. Taxes, rents, income of all kinds, the purchase-money of the national domains, were to be paid in specie or in assignats at their current value. An objection was made to this adoption of specie as the general standard of all property, in the first place, from an old grudge against metals, which were charged with having ruined paper, and, in the next, because the English, having a great quantity of them, could, it was said, make them vary at pleasure, and would thus be masters of the course of the assignats. These reasons were very paltry; but they decided the Convention to reject metals as the standard of worth. Jean-Bon-St.-André then proposed to adopt corn, which among all nations was the essential standard of value to which all other effects must bear a proportion. Thus the quantity of corn that could be procured for any sum at the time of making a bargain was to be calculated, and such an amount was to be paid in assignats as would be required to purchase at the moment the same quantity of corn. The person who owed rent or taxes to the amount of one thousand francs, at a time when one thousand francs represented one hundred quintals of corn, was to pay the current value of one hundred quintals of corn in assignats. But to this an objection was urged. The calamities of the war and the losses of agriculture had caused the price of corn to rise considerably in proportion to all other articles of consumption or merchandise, and it was worth four times as much. According to the existing currency of the assignats, it ought to have cost but ten times as much as in 1790, namely, one hundred francs per quintal; but it really cost four hundred. The person who owed one thousand francs in 1790 would owe at that moment ten thousand francs if he paid according to the standard of specie, and forty thousand if he had to pay according to the standard of corn; so that he would have to give a value which had become four times too great. The Assembly was, therefore, puzzled what standard of value to adopt. Raffron proposed that from the 30th of the month assignats should fall one per cent. every day. An immediate outcry was raised that this would be a bankruptcy, as if it were not one to reduce the assignats to the standard of specie or of corn, that is, to saddle them at once with a loss of ninety per

cent. At the instigation of Bourdon, who talked continually of financial matters without understanding them, a decree was passed, declaring that the Convention would not listen to any proposition tending to bankruptcy.

The reduction of the assignat to the currency must, however, have been attended with one most serious inconvenience. If, in all payments, either of taxes, or rent, or debts due, or for national domains, the assignat were to be taken no longer but at the standard to which it was daily sinking, the fall would have no end, for nothing could stop it. In the actual state of things, in fact, the assignat, being still capable of serving, from its nominal value, for the payment of taxes, of rents, of all sums due, had an employment which still gave a certain reality to its value; but if it was to be taken every where only at the standard of the day, it must sink indefinitely and without limit. The assignat issued to-day for one thousand francs might to-morrow be worth but one hundred francs, but one franc, but one centime; it would, indeed, no longer ruin any one, either private individuals or the state, for all would take it merely for what it was worth; but its value, being in no case compulsory, would instantly sink to nothing. There was no reason why a nominal thousand millions should not fall to one real franc, and then the resource of paper-money, still indispensable to the government, would be entirely cut off.

Dubois-Crancé, considering all these plans as dangerous, opposed the reduction of the assignats to the currency, and, overlooking the sufferings of those who were ruined by payment in paper, merely proposed to levy the land-tax in kind. The state might thus secure the means of subsisting the armies and the great communes, and spare the issue of three or four thousand millions in paper, which it expended in procuring supplies. This plan, which at first appeared attractive, was afterwards rejected upon mature examination: it became necessary to seek some other.

Meanwhile the evil was daily increasing: riots broke out in all parts on account of provisions and fuel; bread was put up for sale at the Palais Royal at twenty-two francs per pound; and boatmen, at one of the passages of the Seine, had offered forty thousand francs for a service for which they formerly paid one hundred. A kind of despair seized every one; people cried out that an end must be put to this state of things, and that measures of some sort must absolutely be devised. In this distressing situation, Bourdon of the Oise, a very ignorant financier, who talked upon all these questions like one possessed, hit no doubt by accident on the only suitable expedient for getting out of the dilemma. It would have been difficult, as we have seen, to reduce the assignats to the currency, for nobody could tell whether specie or corn ought to be taken for a standard, and

besides, it would have been stripping them immediately of all their value and exposing them to a depreciation without end. To raise by absorbing them would have been just as difficult, for that would have required the sale of the domains, and to find purchasers for so great a quantity of immoveable property would have been almost impossible.

There was, however, one way of selling the domains, and that was, to place them within the reach of purchasers, by requiring only such a value as they could give for them in the existing state of the public fortune. The domains were then sold by auction: the consequence was, that offers were proportioned to the depreciation of paper, and that it was necessary to give in assignats five or six times the price of 1790. Still it was paying but half the value which land realized in money at that period; but it was far too much for the present time, for land was in reality not worth half, nor a fourth, of what it was in 1790. There is nothing absolute in value. A thing is worth no more than it will fetch in exchange for other objects. In America, in extensive continents, lands are of little value, because their mass is far superior to that of moveable capital. Such was in some measure the case in France in 1795. It was requisite therefore to insist no longer on the fictitious value of 1790, but to be content with that which could be obtained in 1795, for the real value of a thing is just as much as can be paid for it.

In consequence, Bourdon of the Oise suggested that the domains should be disposed of, without sale and by mere verbal agreement, to any one who should offer three times the value of 1790 in assignats. In case of competition the preference was to be given to the first applicant. Thus a property valued at one hundred thousand francs in 1790 was to be sold for three hundred thousand. Assignats having fallen to one-fifteenth of their value, three hundred thousand francs represented in reality but twenty thousand effective francs: a purchaser, therefore, paid twenty thousand francs for a property which in 1790 was worth one hundred thousand. This was not losing four-fifths if no more could be obtained for it. Besides, had the sacrifice been real, it would have been wrong to hesitate, for the advantages were immense.

In the first place, it obviated the inconvenience of the reduction to the current value, which would have destroyed the paper. We have seen, in fact, that the assignat reduced to the current value in payment for every thing, even of the domains, would cease to have any fixed value whatever, and that it would fall to nothing. When, on the contrary, it could be paid for domains on giving thrice the valuation of 1790, it would have a fixed value, for it would represent a certain quantity of land; as it would always be capable of procuring that, it would always have the value of it, and not perish any more than it. Thus the annihilation of

the paper would be avoided. But there was another advantage: it is proved by what happened two months afterwards that all the domains might have been sold immediately, on condition of paying for them in paper thrice their value in 1790. All the assignats, or almost all, might thus have been withdrawn; those which should remain out would have recovered their value; the state would have had it in its power to issue more and to make fresh use of this resource. It is true that, in demanding only thrice the valuation of 1790, it would be obliged to give much more land in order to withdraw the circulating mass of paper; but it would still have enough left to supply new extraordinary wants. Moreover, the taxes, now reduced to nothing, because they were paid in depreciated assignats, would recover their value if the assignat were either withdrawn or raised. The domains, consigned immediately to individual industry, would begin to be productive both for the owners and for the treasury; in short, the most frightful catastrophe would be averted, for the just relation of values would be re-established.

The plan of Bourdon of the Oise was adopted, and preparations were immediately made for carrying it into execution; but the storm which had been so long gathering, and of which the 12th of Germinal had been only a forerunner, had become more threatening than ever: it had overspread the horizon and was ready to burst. The two adverse parties acted each in its own way. The counter-revolutionists, predominating in certain sections, got up petitions against the measures recommended in Chenier's report, and particularly against that which punished with banishment the abuse of the press by the royalists. The patriots, on their part, reduced to extremity, were meditating a desperate project. The execution of Fouquier-Tinville, condemned with several jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal for the manner in which he had performed his functions, had increased their irritation to the highest pitch. Though discovered in their plan of the 29th of Germinal, and recently thwarted in an attempt to place all the sections in permanent deliberation upon pretext of the dearth, they were nevertheless conspiring in various populous quarters. They had finally formed a central committee of insurrection, the seat of which was in the Rue Mauconseil between the quarters of St. Denis and Montmartre. It was composed of old members of the revolutionary committees and various persons of the same kind, almost all unknown out of their own quarter. The plan of insurrection was sufficiently marked out by all the occurrences of the same nature: to put the women in front, to cause them to be followed by an immense concourse, to surround the Convention by such a multitude as to prevent its being relieved, to force it to turn out the seventy-three, to recall Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, to release the deputies confined at Ham, to put in force the constitution of

1793, and thus give a new commune to Paris, to recur anew to all the revolutionary measures, the *maximum*, requisitions, &c.—such was the plan entertained by all the patriots.* They embodied it in a manifesto, consisting of eleven articles, and published it in the name of the sovereign people which had resumed its rights. They caused it to be printed and circulated in Paris in the evening of the 30th of Floreal (May 19). It enjoined the inhabitants of Paris to repair in a body to the Convention, with this inscription upon their hats—*Bread and the constitution of* 93! The whole night between the 30th of Floreal and the 1st of Prairial (May 19 and 20) was passed in uproar, shouts, and threats. The women ran about the streets, declaring that they must go next day to the Convention, that it had put Robespierre to death merely to step into his place, that it starved the people, protected the shopkeepers who sucked the blood of the poor, and sent all the patriots to the scaffold. They encouraged one another to march in the front, because, they said, the armed force would not dare fire upon women.

Accordingly, next morning, at daybreak, there was a general tumult in the faubourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau, in the quarter of the Temple, in the Rues St. Denis and St. Martin, and more particularly in the Cité. The patriots caused all the bells which they could get at to be rung; they beat the *générale*, and fired cannon. At the same moment, the tocsin sounded in the Pavillon de l'Unité, by order of the committee of general safety, and the sections assembled; but those who were in the plot had assembled very early, and were already marching in arms long before the others were roused by the signal. The mob, which kept constantly increasing, advanced slowly towards the Tuileries. A great number of women, intermixed with drunken men, shouting *Bread and the constitution of* 1793! Bands of ruffians armed with pikes, sabres, and all sorts of weapons, a torrent of the lowest rabble, lastly, some battalions of the sections regularly armed, composed this concourse, and marched without order towards the point indicated to all—the Convention. About ten o'clock they reached the Tuileries, beset the hall of the Assembly, and closed all the outlets.

The deputies, hastily assembled, were at their post. The members of the Mountain, who were not in communication with that obscure committee of insurrection, had not been forewarned, and, like their colleagues, knew nothing of the commotion except by the shouts of the populace and the pealing of the tocsin.

* "The patriots resolved to make one last attempt to establish a new municipality to serve as a common centre; to seize upon the barriers, the telegraph, the alarm-gun, the tocsin, and the drums; and not to stop until they had secured subsistence and repose, happiness and liberty to the French nation. They invited the cannoniers, the gendarmes, and the troops, horse and foot, to enrol themselves under the banners of the people; and they marched upon the Convention."—*Mignet*. E.

They even suspected that the committee of general safety had laid a snare for the patriots, and excited them to riotous proceedings that it might have occasion for persecuting them. No sooner had the Assembly met, than Isabeau the deputy read the manifesto of the insurrection. The tribunes, occupied very early by patriots, immediately rang with boisterous applause. On seeing the Convention thus surrounded, a deputy exclaimed, that it would know how to die at its post. "Yes! yes!" cried all the deputies, rising immediately. One of the tribunes, filled with persons of a class superior to the others, applauded this declaration. At this moment the uproar increased on the outside; the living waves of the populace were heard roaring: the deputies, meanwhile, succeeded each other in the tribune, offering various observations. All at once, a swarm of women rushed into the tribunes, trampling over those who occupied them, and shouting *Bread! bread!* Vernier, the president, put on his hat, and commanded silence, but they continued shouting *Bread! bread!* Some shook their fists at the Assembly, others laughed at its distress. A great number of members rose for the purpose of speaking; they could not make themselves heard. They desired the president to enforce respect for the Convention; the president endeavoured to do so, but without success. André Dumont, who had presided with firmness on the 12th of Germinal, succeeded Vernier in the chair. The uproar continued; the shouts of *Bread! bread!* were repeated by the women who had taken possession of the tribunes. André Dumont declared that he would have them turned out: he was greeted with yells on the one hand, and with applause on the other. At this moment the noise of violent blows given to the door on the left of the bureau were heard, and the tumult of a multitude striving to break it open. The hinges of the door creaked, and pieces of plaster began to fall. In this perilous situation the president addressed a general, who had appeared at the bar with a company of young men, to present a very discreet petition in the name of the section of Bon-Conseil. "General," said he, "I charge you to protect the national representation, and I appoint you provisional commandant of the armed forces." The Assembly, by its applause, confirmed this appointment. The general declared that he would die at his post, and withdrew to fly to the scene of the combat. At this moment, the noise that was made at one of the doors ceased, and some degree of quiet was restored. André Dumont, addressing the tribunes, enjoined all the good citizens who occupied them to withdraw, declaring that force would be immediately employed to clear them. Many citizens went out, but the women remained, shouting as before. Presently, the general charged by the president to protect the Convention returned with an escort of fusiliers and a number of young men, who had provided themselves with postboys' whips. They went up to the tribunes, and, laying about them with their

whips, soon cleared them of the women, who fled with tremendous screams, amidst the loud applause of part of the spectators.

No sooner were the tribunes cleared, than the noise at the left-hand door redoubled. The mob had returned to the charge; it made a fresh attack on the door, which could not withstand the violence, and was burst open and broken. The members of the Convention retired to the upper benches; the gendarmerie forming a line around them for their protection. Armed citizens of the sections immediately entered the hall by the right-hand door to turn out the populace. They drove it back at first and seized some women; but they were soon repulsed in their turn by the victorious populace. Fortunately, the section of Grenelle, which was the first to hasten to the assistance of the Convention, arrived at this moment and furnished a useful reinforcement. Anguis, the deputy, was at its head, with drawn sword. "Forward!" he cried. His men closed, advanced, crossed bayonets, and drove back, without wounding, the multitude of the assailants, who gave way at the sight of the arms. One of the rioters was seized by the collar, dragged to the foot of the bureau, searched, and his pockets were found full of bread. It was now two o'clock. Quiet being somewhat restored in the Assembly, it declared that the section of Grenelle had deserved well of the country. All the foreign ambassadors had repaired to the tribune which was reserved for them, as if to share, in some measure, the dangers of the Convention, and witnessed this scene. It was decreed that mention should be made in the bulletin of their courageous devotedness.

Meanwhile the crowd around the hall kept increasing. No more than two or three sections had yet had time to come up and to throw themselves into the national palace, but they could not withstand the constantly increasing host of the assailants. Others arrived, but they could not penetrate into the interior. They had no communication with the committees, they had received no orders, they knew not what use to make of their arms. At this moment the mob made a fresh attempt on the saloon of liberty, and penetrated to the broken door. Shouts of *To arms!* were renewed, and the force within the hall hastened to the door which was threatened. The president put on his hat; the Assembly continued calm. The parties closed with one another, and a battle ensued before the very door. The defenders of the Convention crossed bayonets. The assailants on their part fired, and the balls struck the walls of the hall. The deputies rose, crying *The Republic for ever!* Fresh detachments arrived, crossed from right to left, and assisted to repel the attack. The firing became brisker; the combatants charged, intermingled, and fought hand to hand with swords. But an immense crowd in the rear of the assailants propelled them, and pushed them in spite of themselves upon the bayonets, overthrowing all the obstacles that

opposed it, and penetrating into the Assembly. Feraud, a young deputy, full of courage and self-devotion, who had recently returned from the army of the Rhine, and had been for a fortnight running about in the vicinity of Paris to hasten the arrival of supplies, flew to meet the rioters, and besought them not to advance farther. "Kill me," cried he, baring his bosom; "you must pass over my body before you shall enter." Accordingly, he threw himself on the ground to endeavour to stop them; but the furious wretches, without heeding him, stepped over his body and rushed towards the bureau. It was now three o'clock. Drunken women, men armed with swords, pikes, and muskets, having on their hats the words, *Bread—the constitution of* 93! filled the hall. Some seated themselves on the lower benches which the deputies had left on retiring to the upper ones; others covered the floor, placed themselves before the bureau, or ascended the small flights of steps leading to the president's chair. A young officer of the sections, named Mally, who was standing on the steps of the bureau, snatched the inscription which was on the hat of one of these men. He was instantly fired at, and fell wounded in several places. At this moment all the pikes, all the bayonets, were turned towards the president. A fence of iron was placed around his head. It was Boissy-d'Anglas who had succeeded André Dumont; he remained calm and immoveable. Feraud, who had risen, hastened to the foot of the tribune, tore his hair, beat his breast for grief, and, on perceiving the danger of the president, rushed towards him for the purpose of covering him with his own body. One of the pikemen pulled him back by the coat; an officer, with a view to release Feraud, struck with his fist the man who held him; the latter returned the blow by firing a pistol-shot which wounded Feraud in the shoulder. The unfortunate young man fell; he was dragged away, trampled upon, carried out of the hall, and his dead body consigned to the populace.*

Boissy-d'Anglas continued calm and unshaken during this frightfultransaction; bayonets and pikes still surrounded his head. At this moment commenced a scene of confusion which baffles description. Every one attempted to speak, and shouted to no purpose to make himself heard. The drums beat to restore silence; but the mob, enjoying the uproar, bawled, stamped, and shook with delight, on seeing the state to which that sovereign assembly was reduced. It was not in this manner that the events of the 31st of May had been effected, when the revolutionary party, headed by the commune, the staff of the sections, and a great number of deputies, to receive and give the word, surrounded the Convention with a mute and armed multitude, and,

* "Feraud was one of the most devoted and intrepid members of the Convention. It has been justly observed that it was his tragical end which contributed more than any thing else to the final downfall of the Mountain."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

besieging without breaking into it, obliged it to pass, with an apparent dignity, the decrees which it desired to obtain. On the present occasion there were no arrangements for acting in concert, or for extorting at least the apparent sanction of the wishes of the patriots. A gunner, surrounded by fusiliers, ascended the tribune, for the purpose of reading the plan of insurrection. His voice was every moment drowned by shouts, by abuse, and by the rolling of the drums. A man attempted to address the multitude. "My friends," said he, "we are all here for the same cause. The danger is pressing, we want decrees: allow your representatives to pass them."

Shouts of "Down! down!" were the only reply, Rhul, the deputy, a venerable-looking old man, and a zealous Mountaineer, endeavoured to say a few words from his place, with a view to obtain silence; but he was interrupted by fresh vociferations. Romme, an austere man, a stranger to the insurrection, like the whole Mountain, but who desired that the measures demanded by the people might be adopted, and saw with pain that this tremendous confusion would be without result, like that of the 12th of Germinal—Romme asked leave to speak, as did Duroi also from the same motive; but neither of them could obtain it. The tumult recommenced and lasted for more than another hour. During this scene, a head was brought in on the point of a bayonet. The deputies fixed their eyes on it with horror; they could not recognise it. Some said that it was the head of Fréron, others that it was Feraud's. It was in fact the head of Feraud, which some ruffians had cut off and stuck upon the point of a bayonet. They carried it about in the hall, amidst the yells of the rabble. Their fury against the president, Boissy-d'Anglas, was again excited; again he was in danger; his head was encompassed with bayonets; pieces were levelled at him on all sides; he was threatened with a thousand deaths.*

* "On this memorable morning we were awakened by loud shouts in the streets; the tocsin sounded to arms, and another day of blood was added to the calendar which took its date from 1789. Enough has already been said of this dreadful day. I recollect that terror reigned every where. The conspirators had promised a day of pillage to the three faubourgs, and particularly to that of St. Antoine. The whole population of this last district was in arms. They were in extreme misery. There was greater reason to dread the issue of this, than of any preceding insurrection. It was not a castle or a court against which the animosity of the people was directed; but every thing elevated above the lowest grade of society was marked out for proscription. This it was that saved France and the Convention. All those who had any thing to lose enrolled themselves into corps, which were very superior to unorganized masses, acting without plan, and apparently without leaders. While the most frightful scenes were passing in the Convention, the respectable inhabitants of Paris shut themselves up in their houses, concealed their valuables, and awaited with fearful anxiety the result. Towards evening, my brother, whom we had not seen during the day, came home to get something to eat; he was almost famished, not having tasted

It was already seven in the evening. Apprehensions were felt in the Assembly lest this mob, among which were sanguinary ruffians, should proceed to the last extremities, and murder the representatives of the people amidst the darkness of night. Several members of the centre begged certain Mountaineers to speak and to exhort the multitude to disperse. Vernier told the rioters that it was late, that they ought to think of retiring, and that they were likely to expose the people to the want of bread by delaying the expected arrivals. "It is humbug," replied the mob: "you have told us that tale these three months." Several voices were then successively raised amidst the crowd. One demanded the release of the patriots and of the arrested deputies; another the constitution of 93; a third, the apprehension of all the emigrants; a multitude of others, the permanence of the sections, the re-establishment of the commune, the appointment of a commander of the armed Parisian force, domiciliary visits to search for hidden articles of consumption, assignats at par, &c. One of these men, who succeeded in gaining a hearing for a few moments, insisted on the immediate appointment of a commander of the Parisian armed force, and that Soubrany should be chosen. Lastly, another, not knowing what to demand, cried out, *The arrest of the rogues and the cowards!* and for half an hour he kept repeating from time to time, *The arrest of the rogues and the cowards!*

One of the ringleaders, at length aware of the necessity of doing something, proposed to make the deputies descend from the upper benches on which they had seated themselves, to collect them in the middle of the hall, and to make them deliberate. The suggestion was instantly adopted. They were thrust from their seats, forced to descend, and driven like a flock of sheep into the space between the tribune and the lower benches. Here they were surrounded by men who enclosed them with a chain

food since the morning. Disorder still raged, and we heard the most appalling cries in the streets, mingled with the roll of the drums. The faubourg St. Antoine, which had been regularly armed, in pursuance of the proposition of Tallien, excited the most serious alarm. My brother had scarcely finished his hasty repast, when Bonaparte arrived to make a similar demand on our hospitality. He also told us he had tasted nothing since the morning, for all the restaurateurs were closed. He contented himself with what my brother had left; and while eating he told us the news of the day. It was most appalling! My brother had informed us but of part. He did not know of the assassination of the unfortunate Feraud, whose body had been cut almost piecemeal. 'They took his head,' said Napoleon, 'and presented it to poor Boissy-d'Anglas, and the shock of this fiend-like act was almost death to the president in the chair. Truly,' added he, 'if we continue thus to sully our Revolution, it will be a disgrace to be a Frenchman."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

"With the view of terrifying Boissy-d'Anglas, the wretches held up to him the bloody head of Feraud; he turned aside with horror: they again presented it, and he bowed before the remains of the martyr; nor would he quit the chair till compelled by the efforts of his friends; and the insurgents, awed with respect, allowed him to retire unmolested."—*Lacretelle.* E.

ASSASSINATION OF THE DUKE D'ENGHIEN.

of pikes. Vernier took the chair, instead of Boissy-d'Anglas, who was exhausted with fatigue after so perilous a presidency of six hours. It was now nine o'clock. A sort of deliberation was held; it was agreed that the populace should remain covered, and that the deputies alone should take off their hats in token of approbation or disapprobation. The Mountaineers began to hope that the decrees might be passed, and prepared to speak. Romme, who had already spoken once, demanded a decree for the release of the patriots. Duroi said that, ever since the 9th of Thermidor, the enemies of the country had exercised a baneful reaction; that the deputies arrested on the 12th of Germinal had been illegally arrested, and that they ought to be recalled. The president was required to put these various propositions to the vote: hats were taken off, and cries of *Adopted! adopted!* were raised amidst a tremendous uproar, though nobody could distinguish whether the deputies had really given their votes or not. Goujon succeeded Romme and Duroi, and said that it was necessary to ensure the execution of the decrees; that the committees absented themselves; that it was right to inquire what they were doing; that they ought to be summoned to give an account of their operations; and that an extraordinary commission ought to be instituted in their stead. Herein lay, in fact, the peril of the day. Had the committees continued free to act, they could have come and delivered the Convention from its oppressors. Albitte, the elder, observed that the deliberation was not carried on with sufficient order, that the bureau was not formed, and that they ought to form one. The bureau was immediately composed. Bourbotte demanded the arrest of the journalists. An unknown voice was raised, and said that, in order to prove that the patriots were not cannibals, they ought to abolish the punishment of death. "Yes, yes," cried another, "except for the emigrants and the forgers of assignats." This proposition was adopted in the same form as those which had preceded. Duquesnoi, reverting to Goujon's proposition, renewed the demand for the suspension of the committees, and the appointment of an extraordinary commission of four members. Bourbotte, Prieur of La Marne, Duroi, and Duquesnoi were immediately selected. These four deputies accepted the functions deputed to them. Let them be ever so perilous, they were determined, they said, to fulfil them, or to die at their post. They withdrew for the purpose of repairing to the committee and possessing themselves of all the powers. There lay the difficulty, and on the result of this operation depended entirely the fortune of the day.

It was nine o'clock. Neither the insurrectional committee nor the committees of the government appear to have acted during this long and awful day. All that the former had had the spirit to do was to urge the populace upon the Convention; but, as we

have already observed, obscure chiefs, such as are left in the end of a party, having at their disposal neither the commune, nor the staff of the sections, nor a commandant of the armed force, nor deputies, had not been able to direct the insurrection with the prudence and the vigour requisite to ensure success. They had instigated furious wretches, who had perpetrated atrocious outrages, but not done any thing that they ought to have done. No detachment had been sent to suspend and paralyze the committees, to open the prisons, and to deliver the resolute men whose succour would have been so serviceable. They had merely possessed themselves of the arsenal, which the gendarmerie of the tribunals, composed entirely of Fouquier-Tinville's soldiery, had given up to the first comers. Meanwhile, the committees of the government, surrounded and defended by the *gilded youth*, had been exerting all their efforts to assemble the sections. This was no easy task, with the tumult that prevailed, with the consternation that had seized many of them, and even the ill-will that was manifested by some. They had at the outset collected two or three, whose efforts, as we have seen, had been repulsed by the assailants. They had subsequently succeeded in bringing together a greater number, thanks to the zeal of the section Lepelletier, formerly called Filles St. Thomas, and they were preparing towards night to seize the moment when the people, wearied out, should begin to disperse, to fall upon the rioters and to deliver the Convention. Foreseeing clearly that, in this long period of durance, the mob would have wrung from the Assembly the decrees which it was unwilling to pass, they had adopted a resolution declaring that they should not consider as authentic the decrees issued on that day. These arrangements being made, Legendre, Anguis, Chénier, Delecloi, Bergoeng, and Kervelegan, had repaired, at the head of strong detachments, to the Convention. On their arrival, they agreed to leave the doors open, that the mob, pressed on one side, might be able to retreat on the other. Legendre and Delecloi had then undertaken to penetrate into the hall, to mount the tribune in spite of all dangers, and to warn the rioters to retire. "If they will not comply," said those deputies to their colleagues, "charge, without concerning yourselves about us. Keep pushing on, even though we should perish in the fray."

Legendre and Delecloi actually penetrated into the hall, at the moment when the four deputies appointed to form the extraordinary commission were retiring. Legendre ascended the tribune, assailed with insults and blows, and began to speak amidst hooting. "I exhort the Assembly to remain firm," said he, "and the citizens who are here to withdraw."*—"Down!

* "Legendre, with some of his adherents, penetrated with fixed bayonets into the hall, where the conspirators were still engaged in active consulta-

down!" was the cry. Legendre and Delecloi were obliged to retire. Duquesnoi then addressed his colleagues of the extraordinary commission, and desired them to follow him, in order to suspend the committees which, as they saw, were adverse to the operations of the Assembly. Soubrany urged them to lose no time. All four were then going out, but they met the detachment headed by Legendre, Kervelegan, and Anguis, the representatives, and Raffet, the commandant of the national guard. Prieur of La Marne asked Raffet if he had obtained the president's order for entering. "I am not accountable to you," replied Raffet advancing. The mob was then ordered to retire; the president enjoined it to do so in the name of the law: it replied with yells. The bayonets were immediately lowered; the detachment entered; the unarmed rabble gave way, but armed men among the crowd resisted for a moment. They fled, shouting, "This way, sans-culottes!" Part of the patriots returned at this cry, and charged with fury the detachment which had forced its way in. They obtained a momentary advantage: Kervelegan was wounded in the hand. Bourbotte, Peyssard, and Gaston, the Mountaineers, shouted "Victory!" But the charge-step was heard in the outer hall: a considerable reinforcement had arrived, who rushed upon the insurgents, repulsed, and pursued them with swords and fixed bayonets. They fled, crowding to the doors, clambering up the tribunes, or escaping by the windows. The hall was at length cleared. It was now midnight.

The Convention, delivered from the assailants who had carried violence and death into its bosom, took a short time to recover itself. Tranquillity was at length restored. "It is then true," exclaimed a member, "that this Assembly, the cradle of the republic, had once more well nigh been its tomb. Fortunately, the crime of the conspirators is prevented. But, representatives, you would not be worthy of the nation, if you were not to avenge it in a signal manner." Applause burst from all sides, and, as on the 12th of Germinal, the night was spent in punishing the misdeeds of the day; but facts of a different kind of importance called for measures of a different sort of severity. The first thing done was to repeal the decrees proposed and passed by the rioters. "Repeal is not the proper word," it was observed to Legendre, who had made this motion. "The Convention did not, could not, vote, while one of its members was murdered before its face. All that has been done was not its act, but that of the ruffians who controlled it, and of some guilty representatives who made themselves their accomplices." All that had

tion, and Legendre called out, 'In the name of the law, I command the armed citizens to retire.' For some time, the insurgents refused, but the arrival soon afterwards of battalions, which entered at all the doors, intimidated them, and they finally evacuated the hall with the disorder of flight.—*Mignet.* E.

been done was then declared null and void. The secretaries burned the minutes of the decrees passed by the rioters. The eyes of the deputies sought those of their colleagues who had spoken during that terrible sitting. They were pointed out with the finger—they were called upon with vehemence. "There is no longer," said Thibaudeau, "any hope of reconciliation between us and a factious minority. Since the sword is drawn, we must fight this faction, and avail ourselves of circumstances for restoring peace and security for ever to this Assembly. I move that you decree forthwith the arrest of those deputies, who, betraying their duty, have endeavoured to realize the wishes of rebellion and moulded them into laws. I propose that the committees immediately submit to you the severest measures against those representatives unfaithful to their country and to their oaths." They were then named. There were Rhul, Romme, and Duroi, who had commanded silence for the purpose of opening the deliberation; Albitte, who had proposed the appointment of a bureau; Goujon and Duquesnoi,* who demanded the suspension of the committees, and the formation of an extraordinary commission of four members; Bourbotte and Prieur of La Marne, who, with Duroi and Duquesnoi, had accepted appointments to that commission; Soubrany, whom the rebels nominated commandant of the Parisian army; and Peyssard, who shouted victory during the combat. Duroi and Goujon attempted to speak. They were prevented—they were called assassins; a decree was instantly issued against them, and it was suggested that they ought not to be allowed to escape, as most of those had done against whom a decree had been passed on the 12th of Germinal. The president directed the gendarmerie to secure them and bring them to the bar. Romme, who did not come forward, was sought for; Bourdon pointed him out, and he was dragged to the bar with his colleagues. Vengeance did not stop there. It aimed at reaching all the Mountaineers who had rendered themselves conspicuous by extraordinary missions in the departments. "I demand," cried one voice, "the arrest of Lecarpentier, the executioner of La Manche."—"Of Pinet the elder," cried another, "the executioner of the people of Biscay."—"Of Borie," cried a third, "the devastator of the South, and of Fayau, one of the exterminators of La Vendée." These propositions were decreed, with shouts of "The Convention for ever! the republic for ever!"—"Let us have no more half measures," said Tallien. "The aim of the movement of this day was to re-establish the Jacobins, and particularly the commune: we must destroy what remains of them; Pache and Bouchotte ought to be arrested. This is only the prelude to the measures which the

* "Goujon was a man who, since the opening of the Convention, had rendered himself remarkable for his private virtues and republican sentiments; Duquesnoi also was distinguished by his statesmanlike qualities."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

committee will submit to you. Vengeance, citizens, vengeance against the murderers of their colleagues and of the national representation! Let us profit by the unskilfulness of these men, who fancy themselves the equals of those who overthrew the throne, and strive to rival them; of these men, who aim at producing revolutions and can produce nothing but riots. Let us profit by their unskilfulness; let us lose no time in punishing them, and thus put an end to the Revolution." The proposition of Tallien was applauded and adopted. In this paroxysm of vengeance there were voices which denounced Robert Lindet, whose virtues and whose services had hitherto protected him from the fury of the reaction. Lehardi demanded the arrest of *that monster;* but so many voices were raised to extol Lindet's humanity, to attest that he had saved communes and whole departments, that the order of the day was adopted. After these measures, the disarming of the Terrorists was again ordained. It was decreed that, on the following Quintidi, the sections should assemble, and proceed immediately to the *disarming of the assassins, of the quaffers of blood, of the robbers, and of the agents of the tyranny which preceded the 9th of Thermidor.* They were even authorized to cause all those to be apprehended who ought in their opinion to be brought before the tribunals. It was decided at the same time that, till a new order, women should not be admitted into the tribunes. It was now three in the morning. The committees sent word that all was quiet in Paris, and the sitting was adjourned to ten o'clock.

Such was the insurrection of the 1st of Prairial. No day of the Revolution had exhibited so fearful a spectacle.* If, on the 31st of May and the 9th of Thermidor, cannon had been pointed at the Convention, still the place of its sittings had not been invaded, stained with blood spilt in battle, traversed by balls, and sullied by the murder of a representative of the people. The revolutionists had this time acted with the awkwardness and violence of a party long beaten, deprived of accomplices in the government from which it is excluded, robbed of its chiefs, and directed by obscure, compromised, and desperate men. Without knowing how to make use of the Mountain, without even apprizing it of the movement, they had endangered and exposed to the scaffold, upright deputies, strangers to the excesses of terror, attached to the patriots by the fear of reaction, and who had spoken merely to prevent greater calamities, and to accomplish some wishes which they shared.

The rioters, however, seeing the fate that awaited them all,

* "From the affair of this terrible day, one of the most terrible that had occurred during the Revolution, it is very clear that an immense physical force and a determinate design are not sufficient to ensure success; but that chiefs and an authority to support and direct an insurrection are also requisite. One single legal power now only existed; and the party which possessed its favour triumphed."—*Mignet.* E.

habituated, moreover, to revolutionary conflicts, were not people to disperse all at once. They assembled on the following day at the commune, proclaimed themselves in permanent insurrection, and endeavoured to rally around them the sections devoted to their cause.* But, conceiving that the commune was not a good post, though it was situated between the quarter of the Temple and the city, they deemed it preferable to establish the centre of the insurrection in the faubourg St. Antoine. Thither they removed in the middle of the day, and prepared to renew their attempt. This time they strove to act with more order and caution. They despatched three battalions, completely armed and organized: they were those of the sections of the Quinze-Vingts, of Montreuil, and of Popincourt, all three composed of stout working men, and directed by intrepid chiefs. They advanced alone, without the concourse of people which accompanied them on the preceding day, met some of the sections which adhered to the Convention, but were not strong enough to stop them, and in the afternoon drew up with their cannon before the National Palace. The sections of Lepelletier, of the Butte-des-Moulins, and others, immediately ranged themselves opposite, to protect the Convention. It was, nevertheless, doubtful, in case a battle should ensue, whether victory would favour the defenders of the national representation. Unfortunately, too, for them, the gunners, who in all the sections were working men and warm revolutionists, abandoned the other sections drawn up before the Palace, and went with their cannon to join those of Popincourt, Montreuil, and the Quinze-Vingts. Shouts of "To arms!" were heard. The muskets were loaded on both sides, and every thing seemed to forebode a bloody conflict. The dull rolling of the guns was heard in the Assembly. Many of its members rose to speak. "Representatives!" exclaimed Legendre, "be calm, and remain at your post. Nature has decreed that we must all die: whether a little sooner or a little later is of no consequence. Good citizens are ready to defend you. Meanwhile, the most becoming motion is to keep silence." The whole Assembly again seated itself, and showed the same imposing calmness as it had displayed on the 9th of Thermidor, and on so many other occasions in the course of this stormy session. Meanwhile, the adverse forces were face to face in the

* "These disorderly risings of the common people might be mischievous, but they were no longer formidable. They wanted the clubs, they wanted the terrible municipality, with Henriot at its head, knocking at the gates of the Convention, and crying out with a voice of thunder and a front of brass, 'the sovereign People is at hand.' They wanted public opinion on their side; and, above all, they wanted Prussian manifestoes and the dread of the Allied Powers hanging imminent over Paris, and threatening them with military execution and lasting servitude. The brain pressed on that nerve, started into sudden phrensy; otherwise, it was tame and light enough."—*Hazlitt.* E.

most threatening attitude. Before they came to blows, some persons exclaimed that it was a frightful thing for good citizens to slaughter one another, that they ought at least to come to some explanation, and endeavour to accommodate matters. They left their ranks and stated their grievances. Members of the committees, who were present, introduced themselves among the battalions of the hostile sections, talked to them, and, finding that much might be effected by conciliatory means, they sent to the Assembly to desire that twelve of its members might be deputed to fraternize. The Assembly, regarding this step as a kind of weakness, was by no means disposed to assent to it; still, as it was assured that the committees deemed it serviceable for preventing the effusion of blood, the twelve members were sent, and introduced themselves to the three sections. The ranks were soon broken on both sides, and became intermixed. The uncultivated man of the lower class is always sensible of the amicable demonstrations of the man who is placed above him by dress, language, and manners. The soldiers of the three adverse battalions were touched, and declared that they would neither spill the blood of their fellow-citizens, nor violate the respect due to the National Convention. The ringleaders, nevertheless, insisted on obtaining a hearing for their petition. General Dubois, commanding the cavalry of the sections, and the twelve representatives sent to fraternize, consented to introduce at the bar a deputation of the three battalions.

They accordingly did present it, and solicited a hearing for the petitioners. Some of the deputies were for refusing it; at last, however, it was granted. "We are commissioned to demand of you," said the spokesman, "the constitution of 1793, and the release of the patriots." At these words the tribunes began to hoot and to shout, "Down with the Jacobins!" The president imposed silence on these interrupters. The speaker continued, and said that the citizens assembled before the Convention were ready to retire into the bosom of their families, but that they would die rather than forsake their post, if the claims of the people were not listened to. The president replied with firmness to the petitioners that the Convention had just passed a decree relative to articles of consumption, and he would read it to them. He actually did read it, and then added that the Assembly would consider of their demands, and judge in its wisdom what it ought to decide upon. He invited them to the honours of the sitting.

Meanwhile, the three hostile sections were still mingled with the others. They were told that their petitioners had been received, that their demands would be investigated, and that they must await the decision of the Convention. It was eleven o'clock. The three battalions found themselves surrounded by the immense majority of the citizens of the capital; the day,

moreover, was far advanced, especially for working men; and they resolved to retire to their faubourgs.

This second attempt of the patriots had not been more successful than the former. They nevertheless remained assembled in the faubourgs, keeping up their hostile attitude, and not yet desisting from the demands which they had made. Since the morning of the 3rd, the Convention had passed several decrees which circumstances required. To impart more unity and energy to the employment of these means, it gave the direction of the armed force to the representatives, Gilet, Aubry,* and Delmas, and authorized them to resort to arms for the purpose of maintaining the public tranquillity: it decreed the penalty of six months' imprisonment for any one who should beat the drum without order, and of death for such as should beat the *générale* without being authorized to do so by the representatives of the people. It ordered the formation of a military commission for the immediate trial and execution of all the prisoners taken from the rioters on the 1st of Prairial. It converted into a decree of accusation the decree of arrest issued against Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, Prieur of La Marne, Romme, Soubrany, Goujon, Albitte the elder, Peyssard, Lecarpentier of La Manche, Pinet the elder, Borie, and Fayau. It came to the same decision respecting the deputies arrested on the 12th and 16th of Germinal, and enjoined the committees to present to it a report respecting the tribunal that was to try them all.

The three representatives lost no time in collecting in Paris the troops dispersed in the environs to protect the arrivals of corn: they made the sections attached to the Convention remain under arms and kept around them a great number of the young men who had never quitted the committees during the whole insurrection. The military commission entered upon its functions the very same day. The first person whom it tried was the murderer of Feraud, who had been apprehended on the preceding day. It sentenced him to death, and directed that his execution should take place in the afternoon of the same day, the 3rd. The culprit was actually conveyed to the scaffold; but, the patriots being apprized of the circumstance, some of the

* "François Aubry, member of the Convention, voted for the King's death. In the year 1795 he entered into the committee of public safety, and in this station took an active part in the measures which occupied the government till the days of Prairial. At the time of the division between the Directory and the Councils, he made himself remarkable in the party called that of Clichy. Being afterwards involved in the fall of his party, he was condemned to banishment and put on board at Rochefort. He contrived to escape from Guiana in the year 1798 in a canoe, with Pichegru and several other exiles. He arrived at Demerara where he died of vexation and illness at the age of forty-nine. Aubry, before the Revolution, was a captain of artillery. He was one of the most active members of the council of Five Hundred, but was too much addicted to pleasure."—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

most resolute of them assembled round the place of execution, rushed upon the scaffold, dispersed the gendarmerie, delivered the condemned man, and carried him off to the faubourg. They put themselves under arms, pointed their cannon upon the Place de la Bastille, and thus awaited the consequences of the daring deed.

As soon as this event was known to the Convention, it decreed that the faubourg St. Antoine should be summoned to give up the condemned, and to surrender its arms and its cannon, and that, in case of refusal, it should be immediately bombarded. At this moment, it is true, the force which had been collected gave the Convention a right to use more imperative language. The three representatives had found means to bring together three or four thousand troops of the line; they had besides twenty thousand men of the armed sections, to whom the fear of seeing the Reign of Terror re-established imparted great courage, and lastly, the devoted troop of the young men. They immediately invested General Menou with the command of this collective force, and prepared to march against the faubourg. On that same day, while they were advancing, the *gilded youth* determined, by way of bravado, to be the first to enter the Rue St. Antoine. This rash band consisted of a thousand or twelve hundred persons. The patriots suffered them to advance without opposing any resistance, and then surrounded them on all sides. These daring youths soon saw in their rear the formidable battalions of the faubourg; they perceived at the windows a multitude of incensed women, ready to hurl upon them a shower of stones; and they concluded that they were about to atone for their imprudent bravado. Luckily for them, the armed force was approaching; besides, the inhabitants of the faubourg had no intention to murder them; and they permitted them to leave their quarter after giving some of them a thrashing. At this moment, General Menou came up with twenty thousand men: he caused all the outlets of the faubourg to be occupied, and especially those which communicated with the patriot sections. He ordered the cannon to be pointed and the insurgents to be summoned. A deputation appeared, and came to receive his ultimatum, which consisted in requiring the delivery of the arms and of the murderer of Feraud. The manufacturers and all the peaceable and wealthy people of the faubourg, dreading a bombardment, lost no time in using their influence over the population, and decided the three sections to surrender their arms. Those of Popincourt, the Quinze-Vingts, and Montreuil accordingly delivered up their cannon and promised to search for the culprit who had been rescued. General Menou returned in triumph with the cannon of the faubourg, and from that moment the Convention had nothing to fear from the patriot party. Overthrown for ever, it figured thenceforward only as undergoing vengeance.

The military commission immediately began to try all the prisoners that could be taken. It doomed to death some gendarmes who had sided with the rebels, some working men, and shopkeepers, members of revolutionary committees, and taken in the fact on the 1st of Prairial. In all the sections, the disarming of the patriots and the apprehension of the most conspicuous individuals commenced; and, as one day was not sufficient for this operation, permanence was granted to the sections to enable them to continue it.

But it was not in Paris alone that the despair of the patriots produced an explosion. In the South it broke forth in not less melancholy events. We have seen them, to the number of seven or eight thousand, taking refuge in Toulon, surrounding the representatives several times, wresting from them prisoners accused of emigration, and striving to involve the workmen of the arsenal, the garrison, and the crews of the ships, in their revolt. The squadron was ready to sail, and they wished to prevent it. The crews of the ships which had come from Brest to join the Toulon division, for the expedition which was meditated, were wholly adverse to them, but they could rely on the sailors belonging to the port of Toulon. They chose nearly the same time as the patriots of Paris. Charbonnier, the representative, who had solicited leave of absence, was accused of being their secret director. They rose on the 25th of Floreal, marched upon the commune of Souliés, seized fifteen emigrant prisoners, returned in triumph to Toulon, and nevertheless consented to give them up to the representatives. But, in the following days, they assembled riotously, roused the workmen in the arsenal, secured the arms which it contained, and surrounded Brunel, the representative, to extort from him an order for the release of the patriots. Nion, the representative, who was on board the fleet, hastened ashore, but the rioters were victorious. The two representatives were forced to sign the order for release. Brunel, ashamed of having given way, blew out his brains; Nion sought refuge on board. The insurgents then thought of marching for Marseilles, to excite a rising, they said, of the whole South. But the representatives on mission at Marseilles caused a company of artillery to be posted on the route, and took every precaution to prevent the execution of their designs. On the 1st of Prairial, they were masters of Toulon, without the power, it is true, of extending themselves farther, and striving to gain the crews of the squadron, one part of which resisted them, while the other, composed entirely of seamen of Provence, appeared decided to join them.

The report of these events was submitted to the Convention on the 8th of Prairial. It could not fail to produce fresh excitement against the Mountaineers and the patriots. It was said that the events in Toulon and Paris were concerted; the Mountaineer deputies were accused of being their secret organizers, and they were persecuted with redoubled fury. The arrest of

Charbonnier, Escudier, Ricord, and Salicetti,* accused all four of agitating the South, was immediately ordered. The deputies placed under accusation on the 1st of Prairial, and whose judges were not yet appointed, were treated with aggravated severity. They were handed over, without any regard to their quality of representatives of the people, to the military commission constituted for trying the abettors and accomplices of the insurrection of the 1st of Prairial. The only one excepted was old Rhul, whose discretion and virtues were attested by several members. Pache, the ex-mayor, Audouin his son-in-law, Bouchotte, formerly minister at war, and his assistants, Daubigny and Hassenfratz, were sent to the tribunal of Eure and Loire, as were likewise the principal agents of Robespierre's police, Heron, Marchand, and Clémence. It would have been supposed that the sentence of transportation pronounced against Billaud, Collot, and Barrère had acquired the force of a definitive judgment; no such thing. In these days of rigour that punishment was deemed too mild; it was decided that they should be tried anew and sent before the tribunal of the Lower Charente, that they might be consigned to the fate destined for all the chiefs of the Revolution. Hitherto the remaining members of the old committees appeared to be pardoned; the signal services of Carnot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, seemed to protect them from their enemies: they were now denounced with terrific violence by Henri Larivière, the Girondin. Robert Lindet, defended by a great number of members acquainted both with his merits and with his services, was nevertheless ordered to be put under arrest. "Carnot was the man who *organized victory*," cried a multitude of voices. The furious reactors durst not pass a decree against the conqueror of the coalition. No notice was taken of Prieur of the Côte-d'Or. As for the members of the old committee of general safety, all those who had not before been apprehended were now arrested. David, whose genius had

* "On the 21st of this month, my mother expected a party of friends to dinner. Bonaparte was to be one of the guests. It was six o'clock. One of our friends had arrived, and my mother was conversing with him in the drawing-room, when Mariette came and whispered to her that there was somebody in her chamber who wished to speak with her alone. My mother immediately rose and went to her chamber, and beheld near the window a man half-concealed by a curtain. He made a sign to her with his hand. My mother called me, and, desiring me to shut the door, advanced towards the stranger whom, to her astonishment, she discovered to be Salicetti. He was as pale as death; his lips were as white as his teeth; and his dark eyes appeared to flash fire. He was truly frightful. 'I am ordered to be arrested;' he said to my mother in an under-tone, 'and, if found, I shall be condemned to death. Madame Permon,' he continued, 'may I rely on your generosity? Will you save me? I need not, I am sure, remind you that I once saved your son and husband.' My mother took Salicetti by the hand, and concealed him in the next room, which was my bedchamber." — *Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

obtained his acquittal, was arrested with Jagot, Elie Lacoste, Lavicomterie, Dubarran, and Bernard of Saintes. The only exception made was in favour of Louis of the Bas-Rhin, whose humanity was too well known. Lastly, the report already ordered against all those who had executed missions, and who were called proconsuls, was demanded immediately. Proceedings were commenced against Artigoyte, Mallarmé, Javognes, Sergent, Monestier, Lejeune, Allard, Lacoste, and Baudot. Preparations were made for investigating successively the conduct of all those who had fulfilled any missions whatever. Thus none of the heads of that government which had saved France was pardoned: members of committees, deputies on mission, were all subjected to the general law. Carnot alone was spared, because the esteem of the armies commanded forbearance towards him; but Lindet, a citizen quite as useful and more generous, was struck, because victories did not protect him against the baseness of the reactors.

There was assuredly no need of such sacrifices to satisfy the manes of young Feraud: it should have sufficed that touching honours were paid to his memory. The Convention decreed a funeral sitting for him. The hall was hung with black; all the representatives went in full dress and in mourning. Soft and mournful music opened the sitting. Louvet then delivered a panegyric on the young representative, so devoted, so courageous, so soon torn away from his country. A monument was voted to perpetuate the memory of his heroism. Advantage was taken of this occasion to order a commemorative festival in honour of the Girondins. Nothing could be more just. Victims so illustrious, though they had compromised their country, deserved homage; but it would have been sufficient to scatter flowers on their tombs; they needed not to be sprinkled with blood. It was nevertheless spilt in torrents, for no party, not even that which takes humanity for its motto, is wise in its vengeance. It seemed in fact as though the Convention, not content with its losses, was determined itself to add new ones to them. The accused deputies, confined at first in the castle of Taureau, to prevent any attempt on their behalf, were brought to Paris, and proceedings against them commenced with the greatest activity. The aged Rhul, who had alone been excepted from the decree of accusation, spurned this pardon; he considered liberty as undone, and put an end to his life with a dagger. Moved by so many melancholy scenes, Louvet, Legendre, and Fréron, proposed that the deputies delivered up to the commission should be sent before their natural judges; but Rovère, formerly a Terrorist, and now a flaming royalist, and Bourdon of the Oise, implacable as a man who has been frightened, insisted on the execution of the decree, and caused it to be confirmed.

The deputies were brought before the commission on the 29th of Prairial. In spite of the most assiduous researches, no fact proving their secret connivance with the insurgents had been discovered. Difficult, indeed, would it have been to discover any, for they knew nothing of the movement, nay, they knew nothing of one another: Bourbotte alone was acquainted with Goujon, from having met with him during a mission to the armies. It was merely proved that, when the insurrection was accomplished, they desired to give the sanction of law to some of the wishes of the people. They were nevertheless condemned; for a military commission, to which a government sends accused persons of importance, never knows how to send them back to it absolved. The only one acquitted was Forestier. He had been associated with the condemned, though not a single motion had been made by him in the noted sitting. Peyssard, who had merely uttered a cry during the combat, was sentenced to transportation. Romme, Goujon, Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany, were condemned to death. Romme was a simple and austere man; Goujon was young, handsome, and endowed with excellent qualities; Bourbotte, as young as Goujon, combined extraordinary courage with the most polished education; Soubrany, formerly a noble, was sincerely devoted to the cause of the Revolution. At the moment when their sentence was pronounced, they delivered to the secretary, letters, packets, and portraits, to be transmitted to their families. They were ordered to be removed, and placed in a particular room till they should be conducted to the scaffold. That journey they hoped to spare themselves. They had left among them only one knife and one pair of scissors, which they had concealed in the lining of their clothes. In going down stairs, Romme was the first who stabbed himself, and, fearing that he had not done it effectually, he inflicted several more wounds in the breast, the throat, and the face. He delivered the knife to Goujon, who, with steady hand, gave himself a mortal blow, and fell lifeless. From the hand of Goujon, the instrument of liberation passed to those of Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany. The last three had unfortunately not succeeded in inflicting mortal wounds; they were dragged, streaming with blood, to the scaffold.* Sou-

* "One day my brother returned home dreadfully agitated. He had witnessed an awful scene. Romme, Soubrany, Duroi, Duquesnoi, Goujon, and Bourbotte, were condemned. During their trial they had exhibited the most admirable fortitude, feeling, and patriotism. The conduct of Romme in particular, is said to have been sublime. When sentence was pronounced on them, they surveyed each other calmly; and on descending the staircase which was lined with spectators, Romme looked about, as if seeking somebody. Probably the person who had promised to be there had not the courage to attend. 'No matter,' said he, 'with a firm hand this will do. Vive la Liberté!' Then drawing from his pocket a very large penknife, or perhaps it might more properly be called a small poniard, he plunged it into

brany, weltering in his blood, nevertheless retained, in spite of his sufferings, the composure and proud attitude for which he had always been distinguished. Duroi was exceedingly mortified at having failed to accomplish his purpose. "Enjoy," he exclaimed, "enjoy your triumph, messieurs royalists!" Bourbotte retained all the serenity of youth, and talked with imperturbable calmness to the people. At the moment when he was about to receive the fatal stroke, it was perceived that the blade had not been drawn up; it was necessary to put the instrument to rights: he availed himself of this interval to utter a few words more. He declared that none could die more devoted to his country, and more anxious for its prosperity and liberty. There were but few spectators at this execution. The period of political fanaticism was past; the work of slaughter was no longer carried on with that fury which formerly rendered people insensible. All hearts revolted on learning the details of this execution, and the Thermidorians reaped from it merited disgrace. Thus, in that long succession of conflicting ideas, all had their victims. The very ideas of clemency, humanity, reconciliation, had their holocausts; for in revolutions none can remain unstained by human blood.

Thus was the Mountaineer party entirely destroyed. The patriots had just been conquered at Toulon. After a very bloody battle, fought on the road to Marseilles, they had been obliged to give up their arms, and to surrender the place on which they hoped to support themselves for raising France. They were, therefore, no longer an obstacle; and, as usual, their fall occasioned that of several revolutionary institutions. The celebrated tribunal, which had been almost reduced, since the law of the 8th of Nivose, to an ordinary tribunal, was abolished. All the accused were delivered to the criminal tribunals, trying according to the procedure of 1791; conspirators alone were to be tried according to the procedure of the 8th of Nivose, and without appeal. The word revolutionary, as applied to institutions and establishments, was suppressed. The national guards were reorganized on the old footing; working men, domestic servants, citizens in narrow

his heart, and, drawing it out again, gave it to Goujon, who, in like manner, passed it to Duquesnoi. All three fell dead instantly, without uttering a groan. The weapon of deliverance, transmitted to Soubrany by the trembling hands of Duquesnoi, found its way to the noble hearts of the rest; but they were not so fortunate as their three friends. Grievously wounded, but yet alive, they fell at the foot of the scaffold, which the executioner made them ascend, bleeding and mutilated as they were. Such barbarity would scarcely have been committed by savages. My brother stood so near to Romme, to whom he wished to address a few words of friendship and consolation, that the blood of the unfortunate man spouted on him. Yes, my brother's coat was stained with the scarcely cold blood of a man who, only a few days before, was seated in the very chamber, perhaps in the very chair, in which Albert was then sitting!"—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

DEATH OF ROMEO, QUIXOTE, [illegible]

London: Richard Bentley 1845

circumstances, the populace, in short, were excluded from them; and thus the duty of watching over the public tranquillity was committed anew to that class which was most interested in maintaining it. In Paris, the national guard, organized by battalions, by brigades, and commanded alternately by each *chef de brigade*, was placed under the direction of the military committee. Lastly, the concession most ardently desired by the Catholics, the restitution of the churches, was granted; they were restored to them on condition that they should maintain them at their own cost. This measure, though the result of the reaction, was at the same time supported by men of the most enlightened minds. They deemed it very proper to pacify the Catholics, who would never think that they had recovered the freedom of worship, so long as they had not possession of the edifices in which they had been accustomed to celebrate its ceremonies.

The financial discussions interrupted by the events of Prairial were still the most urgent and the most arduous. The Assembly had resumed them, as soon as tranquillity was restored. It had anew decreed that there should be but one sort of bread, to deprive the lower classes of an occasion to censure the luxury of the rich; it had also ordered statements of the quantity of corn in the country, to secure the surplus of each department for the supply of the armies and great communes; lastly, it had repealed the decree permitting the free traffic in gold and silver. Thus the pressure of circumstances had brought it back to some of those revolutionary measures which had been so violently attacked. Jobbing had been carried to the highest pitch of mania. There were no longer bakers, butchers, grocers, following their distinct trades; every body bought and sold bread, meat, grocery, oil, &c. The garrets and cellars were filled with goods and eatables, in which every one speculated. At the Palais Royal white bread was sold at the rate of twenty-five or thirty francs per pound. The monopolists fell upon the markets and bought up all the fruit and vegetables brought by the country-people, for the purpose of selling them again immediately at a higher price. People went and bought standing crops, or herds of cattle, in order to speculate afterwards on a rise in the prices of them. The Convention forbade monopolists to appear in the markets before a certain hour. It was obliged to decree that the licensed butchers alone should have a right to buy cattle; and that corn could not be bought before it was cut. Thus every thing was turned upside down: every body, not excepting persons the most averse to speculation of every kind, was on the watch for every variation of the assignat, in order to make the loss fall upon another, and to obtain for himself a higher value for an article of consumption or a commodity.

We have seen that among the various projects, either for reducing the assignat to the current value or for levying the taxes

in kind, the Convention had preferred that of selling the domains, not by auction but at thrice their value in 1790. This was, as we have observed, the only mode of selling them; for sale by auction raised the price of the domains in proportion to the fall of the assignat, that is, to such a height as to be beyond the reach of the public. As soon as the law was passed, the quantity of offers was extraordinary. When it was known that it was sufficient to make the first offer, in order not to pay more for domains than thrice the value of 1790 in assignats, people thronged from all parts. For some estates there were several hundred offers; at Charenton there were three hundred and sixty for a domain which had formerly belonged to the Fathers of Mercy; and so many as five hundred were made for another. The inns in the country were crowded. Mere clerks, men of no property, but who happened to have sums in assignats in their hands at the moment, hastened away to make offers for domains. As they were obliged to pay down no more than one-sixth, and the remainder in several months, they bought with small sums very considerable estates, with a view to sell them again at a profit to those who had made less haste. Owing to this eagerness, domains which were not known by the administrations to have become national property, were pointed out as such. The plan of Bourdon of the Oise was therefore completely successful, and there was reason to hope that great part of the domains would soon be sold, and that the assignats would be either withdrawn or raised in value. It is true that by these sales the republic sustained losses which, calculated in figures, were considerable. The valuation of 1790, founded on the apparent revenue, was frequently inaccurate; for the possessions of the clergy and all those of the order of Malta were let very low; the farmers paid a certain amount over and above the rent by way of douceur, which was frequently equal to four times the rent. A farm, let ostensibly at 1000 francs, produced in reality 4000; according to the estimate of 1790 this estate was worth 25,000 francs; it might therefore be bought for 75,000 in assignats, which were worth in reality only 7500 francs. At Honfleur, salt magazines, the building of which had cost more than 400,000 livres, were sold in reality for 22,500. According to this calculation the loss was great; but there was no help for it, unless it had been reduced by demanding four or five times the value of 1790, instead of three.

Rewbel and a great number of deputies could not comprehend this; they considered only the apparent loss. They alleged that it was a wanton waste of the treasures of the republic, which was thus deprived of its resources. An outcry was raised on all sides: those who did not understand the question, and those who saw with pain the property of the emigrants disposed of, united to obtain a suspension of the decree. Balland and

Bourdon of the Oise warmly defended it: they were unable to assign the essential reason, namely that it was useless to ask more for domains than the buyers could afford to give; but they asserted, what was very true, that the numerical loss was not so great in reality as it appeared to be; that 75,000 francs in assignats were worth no more than 7500 in specie, but that specie was worth thrice as much as formerly, and that 7500 francs represented certainly 15,000 or 20,000 francs in 1790. They said also that the actual loss was counterbalanced by the advantage of putting an end immediately to that financial catastrophe, of withdrawing or raising the assignats, of putting a stop to jobbing in merchandise by diverting the paper to lands, of giving up forthwith the mass of the national domains to individual industry, and lastly of taking away all hope from the emigrants.

The decree was nevertheless suspended. The administrations were ordered to continue to receive orders, that all the national possessions might thus be denounced from private interest, and that a more accurate statement of them might be drawn up. A few days afterwards, the decree was repealed altogether, and it was decided that the national domains should continue to be sold by auction.

Thus, after discovering the way to put an end to the crisis, the government abandoned it, and fell back into the frightful distress from which it might have extricated itself. Meanwhile, as nothing was done to raise the assignats, it was not possible to persist in the cruel fallacy of their nominal value, which was ruining the republic and the individuals paid in paper. It was absolutely necessary to return to the proposition already made to reduce the assignats. The proposal to reduce them to the currency of money was rejected, because the English, it was said, abounding in specie, would be masters of the currency; neither would the government consent to reduce them to the standard of corn, because the price of corn had risen considerably; it had refused to take time for a standard, and to reduce paper a certain amount every month, because that, it was alleged, would be demonetising and committing bankruptcy. All these reasons were frivolous, for it would demonetise in what way soever it proceeded, whether it chose money, corn, or time, to determine the reduction of the paper. The bankruptcy did not consist in reducing the value of the assignat between private individuals, for that reduction had already taken place, and to recognise it was only to prevent robbery; but the bankruptcy, if there was any, consisted in re-establishing the principle of auction in the sale of the domains. What the republic had promised, indeed, was not that the assignats should be worth this or that sum between private individuals, for this did not depend upon it; but that they should procure a certain quantity of

domains. Now, when the sale by auction was re-established, the assignat would no longer procure a certain quantity of domains; it became impotent in regard to domains as in regard to articles of consumption; it experienced the same fall from the effect of competition.

A different standard from money, corn, or time, was chosen for reducing the assignat, namely the quantity of issues. It is true in principle that the increase of the circulating medium produces a proportionate increase in the prices of all commodities. Now, if an article was worth one franc when there were two thousand millions of money in circulation, it must be worth two when there were four, three when there were six, four when there were eight, five when there were ten. Supposing the present circulation of assignats to amount to ten thousand millions, people would at this moment be obliged to pay five times as much for any thing as when there were only two thousand millions. A scale of proportion was established, commencing from the period when there were but two thousand millions of assignats in circulation, and it was decided that in all payments made in assignats one-fourth should be added for every 500 millions added to the circulation. Thus for a sum of 2000 francs, stipulated for when there were 2000 millions in circulation and paid when there were 2500 millions, 2500 francs were to be paid; 3000 francs were to be paid for it when there were 3000 millions; and lastly 10,000 francs at the present moment, when there were 10,000 millions.

Those who considered the demonetisation as a bankruptcy were not likely to be satisfied with this measure, for, instead of demonetising in the proportion of specie, corn, or time, it demonetised in that of the issues, which amounted to the same thing, with the exception of one inconvenience, which was here found in addition. Thanks to the new scale, each issue would diminish the value of the assignat by a fixed and known quantity. In issuing five hundred millions, the state would take from the holder of the assignat a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, and so on, of what he possessed.

This scale, however, which had its inconveniences like all the other reductions to the course of specie or of corn, ought at least to have been applied to all transactions; but the government durst not venture upon this step; it was applied to the taxes and their arrears. A promise was given that it should be applied to the public functionaries when their number should have been reduced, and to the creditors of the state, when the first receipts of the taxes should admit of their being paid on the same footing. The government durst not extend the benefit of the scale to creditors of all kinds, to the owners of houses in town or country, the proprietors of forges, &c. The only class of persons favoured were the landowners. The farmers, making

excessive profits upon the articles of consumption, and paying by means of the assignats only a tenth or a twelfth of the amount of their rent, were obliged to pay it according to the new scale. They were to furnish a quantity of assignats proportionate to the quantity issued since the time when their rent became due.

Such were the measures adopted for the purpose of trying to check jobbing, and to put an end to the fluctuation in the value of all things. They consisted, as we have seen, in forbidding speculators to forestal the consumer in the purchase of eatables and articles of consumption, and in proportioning the payments in assignats to the quantity of paper in circulation.

The closing of the Jacobins in Brumaire had begun the ruin of the patriots, the event of the 12th of Germinal had advanced it, but it was completed by that of Prairial.* The mass of the citizens, who were hostile to them, not from royalism but from the dread of a new Terror, were more inveterate than ever, and treated them with the utmost severity. All who had ardently served the Revolution were imprisoned or disarmed. Acts as arbitrary as had ever been exercised towards the suspected, were committed in regard to them. The prisons were crowded, as before the 9th of Thermidor, but they were crowded with revolutionists. The number of the prisoners amounted not as then to nearly one hundred thousand persons, but to twenty or twenty-five thousand. The royalists triumphed. The disarming or imprisonment of the patriots, the execution of the Mountaineer deputies, the proceedings commenced against a great number of others, the suppression of the revolutionary tribunal, the restitution of the churches to the Catholic religion, and the recomposition of the national guard, were all measures that filled them with joy and hope. They flattered themselves that they should soon oblige the Revolution to destroy itself, and that they should see the republic shut up, or put to death, all those who had founded it. To accelerate this movement, they intrigued in the sections, they excited them against the revolutionists, and instigated them to the greatest excesses. A vast number of emigrants returned, either with false passports or upon pretext of soliciting their erasure. The local administrations, renewed since the 9th of Thermidor, and filled with men either weak or hostile to the republic, lent themselves to all the official falsehoods required of them. Whatever was done to mitigate the lot

* "The patriots, in consequence of this last blow were entirely excluded from the government of the State. The revolutionary committees who formed their assemblies were destroyed; the cannoniers who constituted their troops were disbanded; the constitution of 1793, which was their code, was abolished; and the government of the multitude was at an end. From this period the middle class resumed the conduct of the Revolution out of doors."—*Mignet.* E.

of those who were called the victims of terror was by them deemed allowable. They thus furnished a multitude of enemies of their country with the means of returning to tear it in pieces. At Lyons, and in the whole of the South, the royalist agents continued to appear again secretly. The companies of Jesus and of the Sun had committed fresh murders. Ten thousand muskets, destined for the army of the Alps, had been distributed to no purpose among the national guard of Lyons; it had done nothing, and suffered a great number of patriots to be slaughtered on the 25th of Prairial. Human bodies had again floated down the Saone and the Rhone. At Nîmes, Avignon, and Marseilles, similar massacres had taken place. In the last city, the mob had gone to Fort St. Jean, and there renewed the horrors of September against the prisoners.

The ruling party in the Convention, composed of Thermidorians and Girondins, while defending itself against the revolutionists, kept an eye on the royalists, and felt the necessity of curbing them. It immediately obtained a decree that the city of Lyons should be disarmed by a detachment of the army of the Alps, and that the authorities, who had suffered the patriots to be murdered, should be removed. At the same time the civil committees of the sections were enjoined to revise the lists of imprisoned persons, and to order the release of those who were confined without sufficient motives. The sections, excited by intriguing royalists, immediately bestirred themselves. They went and addressed threatening petitions to the Convention, complaining that the committee of general safety was liberating Terrorists and putting arms into their hands again. The sections of Lepelletier and of the Théâtre Français (Odeon), always the most violent against the revolutionists, asked if the Assembly meant to raise again the overthrown faction, and if it was to cause Terrorism to be forgotten that people began to talk about royalism to France.

To these petitions, often far from respectful, persons interested in disorder added such rumours as were most likely to agitate the public mind. They reported that Toulon had been delivered up to the English; that the Prince of Condé and the Austrians were about to enter by Franche-Comté, while the English were to land in the West; that Pichegru was dead; that articles of consumption would soon be very scarce, because the free trade in them was about to be restored; lastly, that there had been a general meeting of the committees, which, alarmed at the public dangers, had deliberated on the re-establishment of the system of Terror. The journals devoted to royalism excited and circulated all these reports; and, amidst this general agitation, it might truly be said that the reign of anarchy was come. The Thermidorians and the counter-revolutionists were wrong when they gave the name of anarchy to the system which had pre-

ceded the 9th of Thermidor: that system had been a frightful dictatorship; but anarchy had begun from the time that two factions, nearly equal in strength, were combating one another, while the government was not powerful enough to put them down.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

STATE OF THE ARMIES—TREASON OF PICHEGRU—THE QUIBERON EXPEDITION—PEACE WITH SPAIN—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.

The situation of the armies was but little changed, and, though half the summer was gone, no important event had occurred. Moreau had been appointed to the command of the army of the North, encamped in Holland: Jourdan to that of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, placed upon the Rhine, towards Cologne; Pichegru to that of the army of the Rhine, cantoned from Mayence to Strasburg. The troops were in a state of penury, which had been greatly increased by the relaxation of all the springs of the government, and by the ruin of paper money. Jourdan had no bridge equipage for crossing the Rhine, nor a horse to draw his artillery and baggage. Kleber, before Mayence, had not a fourth of the train necessary for besieging that place. The soldiers all deserted to the interior. Most of them thought that they had done enough for the republic, in carrying its victorious banners to the Rhine. The government knew not how to feed them; neither did it know how to rekindle and find employment for their ardour by great operations. It durst not bring back by force those who deserted their colours. It was known that the young men of the first requisition, who had returned into the interior, were neither sought after nor punished; nay, in Paris, they were in favour with the committees, and frequently formed their volunteer soldiery. The number of desertions was consequently considerable; the armies had lost a fourth of their effective strength, and there ensued that general relaxation which detaches the soldier from the service, renders the officers discontented, and puts their fidelity in jeopardy. Aubry, the deputy, charged as a member of the committee of public welfare with the *personnel* of the army, had effected in it an absolute reaction against all the patriot officers, in favour of those who had not served in the two glorious years 1793 and 1794.

If the Austrians had not been so demoralized, this would have been the time for them to revenge their reverses; but they were reorganizing themselves behind the Rhine, and durst not attempt any thing for preventing the only two operations undertaken by the French army—the siege of Luxemburg and that of Mayence. Those two fortresses were the only points re-

tained by the coalition on the left bank of the Rhine. The fall of Luxemburg would complete the conquest of the Netherlands and render it definitive; that of Mayence would deprive the Imperialists of a *tête-de-pont*, which always enabled them to cross the Rhine in safety. Luxemburg, blockaded during the whole winter and spring, surrendered on account of famine on the 6th of Messidor (June 24). Mayence could not be reduced without a siege, but artillery was wanting; it was necessary to invest the place on both banks, and for this purpose either Jourdan or Pichegru must cross the Rhine—a difficult operation in presence of the Austrians, and impracticable without bridge equipage. Thus our armies, though victorious, were stopped by the Rhine, which they could not pass for lack of means; and they, like all the parts of the government, felt the effects of the weakness of the ruling administration.

On the frontier of the Alps, our situation was still less satisfactory. On the Rhine, we had at least made the important conquest of Luxemburg, but we had fallen back on the Italian frontier. Kellermann commanded the two armies of the Alps; they were in the same state of penury as all the others; and they had been weakened not only by desertion but by various detachments. The government had planned a ridiculous *coup-de-main* upon Rome. With a view to revenge the murder of Basseville, it had put ten thousand men on board the Toulon squadron, the damages of which had been completely repaired by the old committee of public welfare, with the intention of sending them to the mouth of the Tiber, for the purpose of levying a contribution on the papal city, and of then returning with all speed to their ships. Fortunately, an action with Lord Hotham,* after which both squadrons sheered off equally damaged, had prevented the execution of this plan. The division taken from the army of Italy had been sent back to it; but it had been found necessary to despatch a corps to Toulon, to quell the Terrorists, and another to Lyons, to disarm the national guard, which had suffered the patriots to be murdered. In this manner the two armies of the Alps had been deprived of part of their force, in presence of the Piedmontese and the Austrians, strengthened by ten thousand men from the Tyrol. General Devins, taking advantage of the moment when Kellermann had just detached one of his divisions for Toulon, had actually attacked his right towards Genoa. Kellermann, unable to resist a superior effort, had been obliged to fall back. Still occupying with his centre the Col de Tende, on the Alps, he had ceased to extend himself by his right to Genoa, and had taken a position behind

* "Lord Hotham by a skilful manœuvre succeeded in cutting off two of the thirteen ships which constituted the Toulon fleet, and the remainder of that fleet after a severe but partial action was compelled to fall back to the Isles des Hieres, and disembark the land troops which were on board."—*Alison.* E.

the line of Borghetto. There was one great disadvantage in no longer communicating with Genoa, on account of the trade in corn, which would have to encounter great obstacles as soon as the Riviera di Ponente should be occupied by the enemy.

In Spain nothing decisive had taken place. Our army of the Eastern Pyrenees still occupied Catalonia as far as the banks of the Fluvia. Useless actions had been fought on the banks of that river, without enabling the French to take a position beyond it. At the Western Pyrenees, Moncey was organizing an army thinned by disease, with the intention of entering Guipuscoa, and advancing into Navarre.

Though our armies had lost nothing except in Italy, though they had even reduced one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, they were, as we see, badly administered, feebly conducted, and affected by the general anarchy which pervaded all the departments of the administration.

This was the moment, not for conquering them, for danger would have rekindled their energy, but for making attempts on their fidelity, and trying plans of counter-revolution. We have seen the royalists and the foreign cabinets concerting various enterprises upon the insurgent provinces; we have seen Puisaye and England proposing to enter by Bretagne; the Paris agents and Spain meditating an expedition into La Vendée: to these projects were added others for penetrating into France at another point. While these expeditions, to be attempted by Spain and England were to be directed against the West, another, to be made on the eastern frontier of France, had been projected. The Prince of Condé had his head-quarters on the Rhine, where he commanded a corps of 2500 foot and 1500 horse. All the emigrants dispersed over the continent were to be ordered to join him, upon pain of being no longer suffered by the powers to remain in their territories. His corps would thus be augmented by all the emigrants who had hitherto ramained useless; and, leaving the Austrians occupied on the Rhine to keep the republican armies in check, he was to endeavour to penetrate by Franche-Comté and to march upon Paris, while Count d'Artois, with the insurgents of the West, should advance towards it on that side. If they should not succeed, they had at least hopes of a capitulation like that which had been granted to the Vendeans; they had the same reasons for obtaining it. "We are Frenchmen,"—thus the emigrants who might have joined in this expedition could have argued—"who have had recourse to civil war, but in France, and without admitting foreigners into our ranks." The only way, so said the partisans of this plan, for the emigrants to return to France, was either by counter-revolution, or by an amnesty.

The English government, which had taken the corps of Condé into its pay, and earnestly desired a diversion towards the East, while it should be operating on the West, insisted that the

Prince of Condé should make some attempt, no matter what. Through Wickham, its ambassador in Switzerland, it promised him succour in money, and the means necessary for forming new regiments. The intrepid prince desired nothing better than to have some enterprise to attempt: he was utterly incapable of directing either a matter of business or a battle; but he was ready to rush headlong upon danger, the moment it was pointed out to him.

The idea of making a trial to gain Pichegru, who commanded the army of the Rhine, was suggested to him. The terrible committee of public welfare no longer awed the generals; its eye was no longer upon them, its hand was no longer uplifted over them. The republic, paying its officers in assignats, gave them scarcely wherewithal to satisfy their most urgent wants. The disorders which had arisen in its bosom raised doubts of its stability, and alarmed the ambitious who were afraid of losing with it the high dignities which they had attained. It was known that Pichegru was addicted to women and dissipation; that the four thousand francs which he received per month in assignats, worth scarcely two hundred on the frontiers, could not defray his expenses, and that he was disgusted of serving a tottering government. It was recollected that in Germinal he had employed main force against the patriots in the Champs Elysées. All these circumstances suggested the idea that Pichegru might perhaps be accessible to splendid offers. In consequence, the prince had recourse for the execution of this scheme to M. de Montgaillard, and he to M. Fauche-Borel, a bookseller of Neuf-

* The following is Montgaillard's own account of these curious overtures which were made by order of the Prince of Condé to General Pichegru:

"The Prince de Condé called me to Müilheim, and knowing the connexions I had had in France, proposed that I should sound General Pichegru, whose head-quarters were at Altkirch, and where he then was, surrounded by four representatives of the Convention. I immediately went to Neufchâtel, taking with me four or five hundred louis. I cast my eyes on Fauche-Borel, the King's printer at Neufchâtel, and I selected, as his colleague, M. Courant, a native of Neufchâtel. On the 13th of August, Fauche and Courant set out for the head-quarters at Altkirch. They remained there eight days without finding an opportunity to speak to Pichegru, who was surrounded by representatives and generals. Pichegru observed them, and seeing them continually wheresoever he went, conjectured that they had something to say to him, and he called out in a loud voice while passing them, '*I am going to Huningen.*' Fauche contrived to throw himself in his way at the end of a corridor. Pichegru observed him, and fixed his eyes upon him, and although it rained in torrents, he said aloud, '*I am going to dine at the château of Madame Salomon.*' This château was three leagues from Huningen, and Madame Salomon was Pichegru's mistress.

"Fauche set off directly to the château, and begged to speak with General Pichegru. He told the general that, being in the possession of some of J. J. Rousseau's manuscripts, he wished to publish them, and dedicate them to him. 'Very good,' said Pichegru; 'but I should like to read them first; for J. J. Rousseau professed principles of liberty, in which I do not concur, and with which I should not like to have my name connected.'—'But,' said

châtel, who, the subject of a wise and happy republic, did not hesitate to make himself the obscure servant of a dynasty under which he was not born. This M. Fauche-Borel repaired to

Fauche, 'I have something else to speak to you about.'—'What is it, and on whose behalf?'—'On behalf of the Prince de Condé.'—'Be silent, then, and follow me.'

"He conducted Fauche alone into a retired cabinet, and said to him, 'Explain yourself; what does Monseigneur the Prince de Condé wish to communicate to me?' Fauche was embarrassed, and stammered out something unintelligible. 'Compose yourself,' said Pichegru; 'my sentiments are the same as those of the Prince de Condé. What does he desire of me?' Fauche, encouraged by these words, replied, 'The prince wishes to join you. He is confident in you, and wishes to connect himself with you.'—'These are vague and unmeaning words,' observed Pichegru. 'All this amounts to nothing. Go back, and ask for written instructions, and return in three days to my head-quarters, at Altkirch. You will find me alone precisely at six o'clock in the evening.'

"Fauche immediately departed, arrived at Bâle, hastened to me, and joyfully informed me of all that had passed. I spent the night in writing a letter to General Pichegru. The Prince de Condé, who was invested with all the powers of Louis XVIII., except that of granting the cordon-bleu, had, by a note in his own handwriting, deputed to me all his powers, to enable me to maintain a negotiation with General Pichegru. I therefore wrote to the general, stating, in the outset, every thing that was calculated to awaken in him that noble sentiment of pride, which is the instinct of great minds; and after pointing out to him the vast good it was in his power to effect, I spoke of the gratitude of the King, and the benefit he would confer on his country by restoring royalty. I told him that his majesty would make him a marshal of France, and governor of Alsace, as no one could better govern the province than he, who had so valiantly defended it. I added, that he would have the cordon-rouge—the Château de Chambord—with its park, and twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians—a million of ready money—two hundred thousand livres per annum—and a hotel in Paris;—that the town of Arbois, Pichegru's native place, should bear his name, and be exempt from all taxation for twenty-five years;—that a pension of two hundred thousand livres would be granted to him, with half reversion to his wife, and fifty thousand livres to his heirs for ever, until the extinction of his family. Such were the offers, made in the name of the King, to General Pichegru. (Then followed the boons to be granted to the officers and soldiers, an amnesty to the people, &c.) I added, that the Prince de Condé desired that he would proclaim the King in the camps, surrender the city of Huningen to him, and join him for the purpose of marching on Paris.

"Pichegru, having read the letter with great attention, said to Fauche, 'This is all very well; but who is this M. de Montgaillard who talks of being thus authorized? I neither know him nor his signature. Is he the author?'—'Yes,' replied Fauche. 'But,' said Pichegru, 'I must, before making any negotiation on my part, be assured that the Prince de Condé, with whose handwriting I am well acquainted, approves of all that has been written in his name by M. de Montgaillard. Return directly to M. de Montgaillard, and tell him to communicate my answer to the prince.'

"Fauche immediately departed, leaving M. Courant with Pichegru. He arrived at Bâle at nine o'clock in the evening. I set off directly for Mülheim, the Prince de Condé's head-quarters, and arrived there at half-past twelve. The prince was in bed, but I awoke him. He made me sit down by his bedside, and our conference then commenced.

"After having informed the prince of the state of affairs, all that remained was to prevail on him to write to General Pichegru, to confirm the truth of what had been stated in his name. This matter, which appeared so simple,

Altkirch, where Pichegru's head-quarters were. After he had followed him in several reviews, he at length attracted his notice by watching him so closely, and ventured to accost him in a corridor. He began by talking of a manuscript work which he was desirous of dedicating to him, and, Pichegru having in some measure encouraged his communications, he at last explained his errand. Pichegru required a letter from the Prince of Condé himself, that he might know with whom he had to deal. Fauche-Borel returned to M. de Montgaillard, and the latter to the prince. A whole night was spent in obtaining from the prince a letter of eight lines. Now he would not call Pichegru general, lest he should recognise the republic: and then he objected to seal the envelope with his arms. At last the letter was finished; Fauche-Borel set out again, was admitted to Pichegru, who, on seeing the handwriting of the prince, immediately entered into negotiation. He was offered for himself the rank of

and so little liable to objection, occupied the whole night. It required nine hours' hard exertion to get him to write to General Pichegru a letter of nine lines. 1st. He did not wish it to be in his handwriting.—2nd. He objected to dating it.—3rd. He was unwilling to call him *General* Pichegru, lest he should recognise the republic by giving that title.—4th. He did not like to address it, or affix his seal to it. At length he consented to all, and wrote to Pichegru that he might place full confidence in the letters of the Comte de Montgaillard. When all this was settled, after great difficulty, the prince next hesitated about sending the letter; but at length he yielded. I set off for Bâle, and despatched Fauche to Altkirch, to General Pichegru. The general, after reading a letter of eight lines, and recognising the handwriting and signature, immediately returned it to Fauche, saying, 'I have seen the signature: that is enough for me. The word of the prince is a pledge with which every Frenchman ought to be satisfied. Take back his letter.' He then inquired what was the prince's wish. Fauche explained that he wished—1st. That Pichegru should proclaim the King to his troops, and hoist the white flag.—2nd. That he should deliver up Huningen to the prince. Pichegru objected to this:—'I will never take part in such a plot,' said he, 'I wish to do nothing by halves. There must be a complete end of the present state of things. France cannot continue a republic. She must have a king, and that king must be Louis XVIII. But we must not commence the counter-revolution, until we are certain of effecting it. 'Surely and promptly' is my motto. The prince's plan leads to nothing. He would be driven from Huningen in four days, and in fifteen I should be lost. That done, as soon as I shall be on the other side of the Rhine, I will proclaim the King, and hoist the white flag. Condé's corps and the emperor's army will then join us. I will immediately repass the Rhine, and re-enter France. The fortresses will be surrendered, and will be held in the King's name by the imperial troops. Having joined Condé's army, I immediately advance. All my means now develop themselves on every side. We march upon Paris, and in a fortnight shall be there. But it is necessary that you should know that you must give the French soldier wine and a crown in his hand, if you would have him cry *Vive le Roi!* Nothing must be wanting at the first moment. My army must be well paid as far as the fourth or fifth march in the French territory. There, go and tell all this to the prince, show my handwriting, and bring me back his answer.'

"The Prince de Condé after reading the plan, rejected it *in toto*." E.

marshal, the government of Alsace, a million in money, the chateau and park of Chambord, with twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians, and a pension of two hundred thousand francs, with the reversion to his wife and children. For his army he was offered the confirmation of all ranks, a pension for the commandants of fortresses who should give them up, and exemption from taxes for fifteen years for such towns as should open their gates. But it was required that Pichegru should hoist the white flag, that he should deliver up the fortress of Huningen to the Prince of Condé, and that he should march with him upon Paris. Pichegru was too cunning to accede to such demands. He would neither deliver Huningen nor hoist the white flag in his army: that would have been going a great deal too far and committing himself. He wished to be allowed to cross the Rhine with a corps of picked men; there he promised to hoist the white flag, to take with him the corps of Condé, and then to march upon Paris. It is not very evident in what respect his scheme could have gained by this; for it would have been as difficult to seduce the army beyond as on this side of the Rhine; but he would not have run the risk of delivering up a fortress, of being surprised when delivering it, and of having no excuse to assign for his treason. On the contrary, in crossing to the other side of the Rhine, it was at his own option not to consummate the treason, if he could not come to a satisfactory arrangement with the prince and the Austrians; or, if he were discovered too soon, he might avail himself of the passage obtained to execute the operations commanded by his government, and say that he had listened to the enemy's overtures merely to turn them against him. In both cases, he reserved to himself the means of betraying either the republic or the prince with whom he was treating. Fauche-Borel returned to those who had employed him, but he was sent back again to insist on the same propositions. He went several times to and fro, without being able to accommodate the difference, which consisted in this, that the prince wanted to obtain Huningen, and Pichegru the passage of the Rhine. Neither would take the first step and give the other so great an advantage. The motive which prevented the prince, in particular, from acceding to the demand made upon him, was the necessity of recurring to the Austrians for authority to grant the passage; he wished to act without their concurrence, and to secure for himself alone all the honour of the counter-revolution. It appears, however, that he was obliged to refer the matter to the Aulic Council; and during this interval, Pichegru, watched by the representatives, was obliged to suspend his correspondence and his treason.

Meanwhile, the agents in the interior, Lemaître, Brotier, Despomelles, Laville-Heurnois, Duverne-Depresle, and others, continued their intrigues. The young prince, son of Louis XVI.,

LOUIS THE SEVENTEENTH.

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had died of a tumour at the knee, arising from a scrofulous taint.* The royalist agents asserted that he had been poisoned, and they had eagerly sought after books relative to the ceremonial of the coronation, for the purpose of sending them to Verona. The regent had become king for them, and was called Louis XVIII. The Count d'Artois had become Monsieur.

The pacification in the insurgent countries had been only apparent. The inhabitants, who began to enjoy a little tranquillity and security, were, it is true, disposed to remain at peace; but the chiefs and the men habituated to war, who surrounded them, only waited for an occasion to take up arms again. Charette, having under his command those territorial guards, among whom he had admitted only such persons as had a decided predilection for war, aimed solely, under the pretext of attending to the police of the country, at preparing the nucleus of an army with which to take the field again. He had not for some time quitted his camp at Belleville, and was continually visited there by royalist emissaries. The Paris agents had forwarded to him a letter from Verona, in reply to that in which he sought to excuse the pacification. The pretender assured him that he need not make any excuses; he continued to him his confidence and favour, appointed him lieutenant-general, and announced the speedy arrival of succours from Spain. The Paris agents, enlarging upon the expressions of the prince, flattered Charette's ambition with the most magnificent prospects; they promised him the command of all the royalist country, and a considerable expedition which was to sail from the Spanish ports with succours for the French princes. As for that which was preparing

* "The 9th of Thermidor came too late to save the infant king of France, Louis XVII. His gaoler, Simon, was indeed beheaded, and a less cruel tyrant substituted in his place; but the temper of the times would not at first admit of any decided measures of indulgence in favour of the heir to the throne. The barbarous treatment he had experienced from Simon had alienated his reason, but not extinguished his feelings of gratitude. On one occasion that inhuman wretch had seized him by the hair and threatened to dash his head against the wall; the surgeon, Naulin, interfered to prevent him, and the child next day presented him with two pears which had been given him for his supper the preceding evening, lamenting at the same time that he had no other means of testifying his gratitude. Simon and Hebert had put him to the torture, to extract from him an avowal of crimes connected with his mother, which he was too young to understand; after that cruel day he almost always preserved silence, lest his words should prove fatal to some of his relations. This resolution and the closeness of his confinement soon preyed upon his health. In February, 1795, he was seized with a fever, and visited by three members of the committee of public safety; they found him seated at a little table making castles of cards. They addressed to him the words of kindness, but could not obtain any answer. In May the state of his health became so alarming, that the celebrated surgeon, Dessault, was directed by the Convention to visit him. His generous attentions assuaged the sufferings of the child's later days, but could not prolong his life."—*Alison*. E.

in England, they affected to put no faith in it. The English, they said, had always promised and always deceived; it was right, nevertheless, to make use of their means if possible, but to make use of them in a very different way from that which they purposed. It was necessary to induce them to land in La Vendée the succours which should be destined for Bretagne, and to subject that country to Charette, who alone enjoyed the confidence of the reigning king. Such ideas could not fail to flatter at once the ambition of Charette, his hatred of Stofflet, his jealousy of the recent importance of Puisaye, and his resentment against England, which he accused of never having done any thing for him.

As for Stofflet, he was much less disposed to resume arms than Charette, though he had shown much greater reluctance to lay them down. His district felt the advantages of peace much more sensibly than the others, and manifested a strong aversion to war. He was himself deeply hurt at the preference shown to Charette. He was quite as deserving of the rank of lieutenant-general, which was conferred on his rival, and he was much disgusted by the injustice done him, as he conceived. Bretagne, organized as before, was quite ripe for insurrection. The chiefs of the Chouans had obtained, like the Vendean chiefs, the organization of their best soldiers into regular companies, under pretext of enforcing the police of the country. Each of these chiefs had assigned to himself a company of chasseurs, wearing a green coat and pantaloons and a red waistcoat, and composed of the most intrepid Chouans. Cormatin, continuing his part, had assumed a ridiculous importance. He had established what he called his head-quarters at La Prevalaye; he issued publicly orders to all the Chouan chiefs, dated from those head-quarters; he went from one division to another, to organize the companies of chasseurs; he affected to repress infractions of the truce, when any had been committed, and seemed to have become in reality the governor of Bretagne. He frequently went to Rennes in his Chouan uniform, which had been brought into vogue; in the companies there he received tokens of the consideration of the inhabitants and the caresses of the women, who looked upon him as an important personage, and the chief of the royalist party.

At the same time he continued in secret to dispose the Chouans to war, and to correspond with the royalist agents. His part, in regard to Puisaye, was embarrassing. He had disobeyed him, he had betrayed his confidence, and thenceforward he had had no other resource than to throw himself into the arms of the Paris agents, who had encouraged him to hope for the command of Bretagne, and included him in their plans with Spain. That power had promised 1,500,000 francs per month, on condition that the royalists should act without England. Nothing could

be more agreeable to Cormatin than a plan which would enable him to break with England and Puisaye.* Two other officers whom Puisaye had sent from London to Bretagne, Messrs. de Vieuville and Dandigné, had entered into the system of the Paris agents, and persuaded themselves also that England meant to deceive as at Toulon, to make use of the royalists in order to possess herself of a seaport, to make Frenchmen fight against Frenchmen, but not to afford any real succour capable of raising the party of the princes and securing their triumph. While part of the Breton chiefs harboured these notions, those of Morbihan, Finisterre, and the Côtes-du-Nord, long connected with Puisaye, and accustomed to serve under him, organized by his efforts, and strangers to the Paris intriguers, had remained attached to him, called Cormatin a traitor, and wrote to London that they were ready to resume their arms. They made preparations, purchased ammunition and stuff for making black collars, seduced the republican soldiers, and prevailed on them to desert. In this they were successful, because, being masters of the country, they had abundance of provisions, and the republican soldiers, scantily supplied, and having nothing but assignats to make up for their deficient rations, were obliged to forsake their colours in quest of subsistence. Besides, many Bretons had been imprudently left in the regiments which were serving against the royalist districts, and it was but natural that they should transfer themselves to the ranks of their countrymen.

Hoche, ever vigilant, was attentively observing the state of the country. He saw the patriots persecuted under pretext of the law for disarming them; the royalists full of exultation; articles of consumption kept back by the farmers; the roads very unsafe; the public vehicles obliged to travel in convoys in order to obtain escorts; the Chouans forming secret assemblies; and frequent communications kept up with the Channel Islands: and he had written to the committee and to the representatives that the pacification was an egregious deception, that the republic was duped, and that every thing indicated the speedy resumption of arms. He had employed the time in forming moveable columns, and in distributing them all over the country, to ensure tranquillity, and to be ready to rush upon the first assemblage that should be formed. But the number of his troops was inadequate to the surface of the country and the immense extent of coast. Every moment, the fear

* "The Marquis de Puisaye, an enterprising, but fickle and intriguing soldier, induced the English government to believe that if a small army, well supplied with ammunition and muskets, were landed, a general rising would take place in Brittany. In consequence of his representation, the British ministry prepared an expedition which was joined by the most enterprising emigrants, almost all the officers of the old marine, and all those who, weary of exile and an unsettled life, were desirous of trying their fortune for the last time."—*Mignet.* E.

of a rising in some part of the country, or of the appearance of the English fleet on a part of the coast, required the presence of his columns, and they were worn out by incessant marches. For such a service there was required, on his part and on that of his army, a resignation a hundred times as meritorious as the courage to confront death. Unfortunately, his soldiers compensated themselves for their fatigues by excesses: he was deeply afflicted on account of them, and he had as much trouble to repress them as to watch the enemy.

He soon had occasion to surprise Cormatin in the very fact. Despatches sent by him to several Chouan chiefs were intercepted, and thus a substantial proof of his underhand dealings was obtained. Having learned that he was to be on a fair-day at Rennes with a number of disguised Chouans, and fearing lest it might be his intention to make an attempt on the arsenal, Hoche caused him to be apprehended on the evening of the 6th of Prairial, and thus put an end to his proceedings. The different chiefs immediately raised a great outcry, and complained that the truce was violated. Hoche, by way of reply, printed Cormatin's letters, and sent him with his accomplices to the prison of Cherbourg: at the same time he kept all his columns in readiness to rush upon the first rebels that should show themselves. In the Morbihan, chevalier Desilz, having risen, was immediately attacked by General Josnet, who killed three hundred of his men and completely routed his forces: the chief himself perished in the action. In the Côtes-du-Nord, Bois-Hardi also rose; his corps was dispersed, and he was himself taken and put to death. The soldiers, enraged at the bad faith of this young chief, who was the most formidable in the whole country, cut off his head and carried it on the point of a bayonet. Hoche, indignant at this want of generosity, addressed a truly noble letter to his soldiers, and ordered search to be made for the culprits, that they might be punished. This sudden destruction of the two chiefs who had made an attempt at insurrection, overawed the others. They remained quiet, awaiting with impatience the arrival of that expedition which had been so long announced. Their cry was, *The King, England, and Bonchamp for ever!*

At this moment, great preparations were going forward in London. Puisaye had made precise arrangements with the English ministers. They had not granted him all that they had at first promised, because the pacification had diminished confidence; but they gave him the emigrant regiments and a considerable train of artillery to attempt a landing; they promised him moreover all the resources of the kingdom, if the expedition proved successful in the outset. The interest alone of England forbade a doubt of the sincerity of these promises; for, driven from the continent ever since the conquest of Holland, she would recover a field of battle, she would transfer this field of battle

to the very heart of France, and compose her armies with Frenchmen. The means with which Puisaye was furnished were these. The emigrant regiments of the continent had been, ever since the opening of the present campaign, taken into the service of England; those which formed the corps of Condé were, as we have seen, to remain on the Rhine; the others, which were mere wrecks, were to embark at the mouth of the Elbe and to be conveyed to Bretagne. Besides these old regiments, which wore the black cockade, and were deeply disgusted with the unprofitable and destructive service in which they had been employed by the powers, England had agreed to form nine new regiments, which should be in her pay, but which should wear the white cockade, that their destination might appear to be more French. The difficulty consisted in recruiting them; for if, in the first moment of fervour, the emigrants had consented to serve as private soldiers, they would not do so now. It was proposed to pick up on the continent French deserters or prisoners. As for deserters, none were to be found, for the conqueror never deserts to the conquered: recourse was then had to prisoners. Count d'Hervilly, having met in London with Toulonese refugees who had formed a regiment, enrolled them in his own, and thus raised it to eleven or twelve hundred men, that is to more than two-thirds of the complement. Count d'Hector composed his of seamen who had emigrated, and collected five or six hundred men. Count du Dresnay found in the prisons a number of Bretons, enrolled against their will at the time of the first requisition, and made prisoners during the war. He got together four or five hundred of them. But these were all the French that could be collected to serve in those regiments with the white cockade. Thus, out of the nine, three only were formed, one having only two-thirds of its complement, and two only one-third of theirs. There was also in London, Lieutenant-colonel Rothalier, who commanded four hundred Toulonese gunners. With these was formed a regiment of artillery, to which were added some French engineers, with whom a corps of engineers was composed. As for the multitude of emigrants who would not serve unless in their former ranks, and who could not find soldiers to compose regiments for themselves, it was resolved to form with them skeletons, which should be filled up in Bretagne with insurgents. There, men being plentiful, and experienced officers rare, they would find their proper level. They were sent to Jersey, to be organized and held in readiness to follow the expedition. While the troops were forming, Puisaye turned his attention to his finances. England promised him money to a sufficient amount to begin with; but he determined to supply himself with assignats. To this end he obtained from the French princes an authority to forge assignats to the amount of three thousand

millions, and in this operation he employed idle ecclesiastics who were unfit to wield the sword. The Bishop of Lyons, judging of this measure very differently from Puisaye and the princes, forbade ecclesiastics to have any hand in it. Puisaye then had recourse to other agents, and fabricated the sum which he had resolved to carry with him. He also wished to take with him a bishop, to fill the part of papal legate to the Catholic districts. He recollected that an adventurer, the pretended Bishop of Agra, by assuming that usurped character, in the first Vendean insurrection, had exercised an extraordinary influence over the minds of the peasantry. He took with him the Bishop of Dol, who had a commission from Rome. He then procured from the Count d'Artois the powers necessary for commanding the expedition, and appointing officers of all ranks until he should arrive. The English ministry on its part conferred on him the direction of the expedition; but, having some misgiving on account of his temerity and his extreme ardour to land, it invested Count d'Hervilly with the command of the emigrant regiments till the moment that the landing should be effected.

All these arrangements being made, d'Hervilly's regiment and d'Hector's, and du Dresnay's two regiments, all wearing the white cockade, the four hundred Toulonese artillerymen commanded by Rothalier, and an emigrant regiment of old formation, that of La Châtre, known by the name of Loyal Emigrant, and reduced by the war on the continent to four hundred men, were put on board a squadron. This last valiant relic was reserved for decisive engagements. The squadron also carried out provisions for an army of six thousand men for three months, one hundred saddle and draught horses, seventeen thousand complete infantry uniforms, four thousand cavalry uniforms, twenty-seven thousand muskets, ten field-pieces, and six hundred barrels of powder. Puisaye was furnished with ten thousand louis in gold and letters of credit on England, to add to his forged assignats more substantial means of finance. The squadron which carried this expedition consisted of three ships of the line of 74 guns each, two frigates of 44, four of 30 to 36, and several gun-boats and transports. It was commanded by Commodore Warren, one of the most gallant and distinguished officers in the British navy. This was the first division. It was agreed that immediately after its departure another naval division should go to Jersey for the emigrants organized in skeletons of regiments; that it should cruise for some time off St. Malo, where Puisaye had his correspondents, and, which traitors had promised to deliver up to him; and after this cruise, if St. Malo were not delivered up, it was to follow Puisaye and carry the skeletons to join him. Transports were to proceed at the same time to the mouth of the Elbe, to fetch the emigrant regiments with the

black cockade and convey them to Puisaye. It was calculated that these different detachments would arrive nearly about the same time as himself. If all that he had said were realized, if the landing were effected without difficulty, if part of Bretagne hastened to meet him, if he could gain a solid position on the coast of France, either by the delivery into his hands of St. Malo, L'Orient, Port Louis, or any seaport whatever, then a new expedition, carrying an English army, further supplies of artillery, and Count d'Artois, was to sail immediately. Lord Moira had actually gone to the continent to fetch the prince.

There was but one fault to be found with these arrangements, that is, that the expedition was divided into several detachments, and especially that the French prince was not put at the head of the first.

The expedition sailed towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June). Puisaye took with him the Bishop of Dol, a numerous clergy, and forty gentlemen, all bearing illustrious names and serving as mere volunteers. The point of landing was a secret except to Puisaye, Commodore Warren, and Messrs. de Tinteniac and d'Allègre, whom Puisaye had despatched to announce his coming.

After long deliberation, the south of Bretagne had been preferred to the north, and the bay of Quiberon was fixed upon. This was one of the best and safest bays of the continent, and the English were thoroughly acquainted with it, because they had long been accustomed to lie there. While the expedition was under sail, Sir Sidney Smith and Lord Cornwallis made demonstrations on all the coasts, to mislead the republican armies as to the point of landing; and Lord Bridport, with the squadron stationed off the Isle of Ushant, protected the convoy. The French naval force in the ports of the Atlantic had not been very formidable since the unfortunate cruise of the preceding winter, during which the Brest fleet had suffered dreadfully from the weather. Villaret-Joyeuse had nevertheless received orders to sail with the nine ships of the line lying in Brest, and to call out a division blockaded at Belle-Isle to join him. He sailed accordingly, and, after being joined by that division, and having given chase to some English ships, he was returning to Brest, when he was overtaken by a gale, which for a moment dispersed his squadron. He lost time in collecting it again, and, during this interval, he fell in with the expedition destined for the coast of France. He was superior in number, and might have taken the whole of it; but Commodore Warren, perceiving the danger, hoisted all sail, and placed his convoy at a distance so as to give it the appearance of a second line; at the same time he despatched two cutters in quest of the strong squadron under Lord Bridport. Villaret, conceiving that he could not attack with advantage, pursued his course towards Brest, according to the instructions which he had received. At that moment, Lord

Bridport came up and immediately attacked the republican fleet.* It was the 5th of Messidor (June 23). Villaret, keeping pace with the Alexandre, which was a bad sailer, lost irreparable time in manœuvring. The line fell into confusion: he lost three ships, the Alexandre, the Formidable, and the Tigre, and, unable to regain Brest, he was obliged to throw himself into L'Orient.

A naval victory having signalized its outset, the expedition made sail for the bay of Quiberon. A division of the squadron went and summoned the garrison of Belle-Isle, in the name of the King of France; but it received from General Boucret nothing but an energetic answer and cannon-balls. The convoy came to an anchor in the bay of Quiberon, on the 7th of Messidor (June 25). Puisaye, according to the information which he had procured, knew that there were very few troops on the coast. He wanted, in his ardour, to land immediately. Count d'Hervilly, who was brave, capable of cleverly training a regiment, but incapable of cleverly directing an operation, and above all, extremely punctilious in matters of authority and duty, said that he was commander of the troops, that he was responsible to the English government for their safety, and that he should not hazard them upon a hostile and unknown coast till he had made a reconnoissance. He lost a whole day in examining the coast with a telescope, and, though not a soldier was to be seen, he refused to put the troops on shore. Puisaye and Commodore Warren having determined on the landing, d'Hervilly at last assented; and on the 9th of Messidor (June 27) those Frenchmen, blind and imprudent, landed full of joy in a country to which they brought civil war, and where they were destined to meet such a deplorable fate.

The bay in which they landed is formed on the one hand by the coast of Bretagne, on the other by a peninsula, nearly a league in breadth and two in length. This is the noted peninsula of Quiberon. It is joined to the main land by a narrow stripe of sand, a league in length, called La Falaise. Fort Penthièvre, situated between the peninsula and La Falaise, forbids approach from the land side. In this fort there was a garrison of seven hundred men. The bay formed by this peninsula and the coast

* "A short time after the Brest fleet put to sea, Lord Bridport, with fourteen ships of the line and eight frigates, hove in sight, and, after two days' manœuvring, succeeded in compelling the enemy to engage. The British admiral bore down in two columns on the hostile fleet, who, instead of awaiting the contest, immediately fell into confusion, and strained every nerve to escape. In the running fight three ships of the line were captured by the English; and, if the wind had permitted all their squadron to take part in the action, there can be no doubt that the whole French fleet would have been taken and destroyed. As it was, they were so discomfited that they crowded all sail till they reached the harbour of l'Orient, and made no attempt during the remainder of the season to dispute with the British the empire of the seas."—*Alison*. E.

offers to ships one of the safest and most sheltered roads of the continent.

The expedition had disembarked at the bottom of the bay, at the village of Carnac. At the moment of its arrival, several chiefs, Dubois-Berthelot, d'Allègre, George Cadoudal,* Mercier, apprized by Tinteniac, hastened up with their troops, dispersed some detachments which were guarding the coast, drove them back into the interior, and proceeded to the shore. They brought with them four or five thousand men inured to war, but ill armed, ill clothed, not marching in ranks, and looking more like plunderers than soldiers. These Chouans had been joined by peasants of the neighbouring country, shouting *Vive le Roi!* and bringing eggs, poultry, and provisions of all kinds, to this liberating army, which came to restore to them their prince and their religion. Overjoyed at this sight, Puisaye felt confident that all Bretagne was ready to rise. Very different were the impressions of the emigrants who accompanied him. Having lived in courts or served in the finest armies of Europe, they looked with disgust and very little confidence at those soldiers who were about to be given to them to command. Jeers and complaints began already to circulate. Chests of muskets and uniforms were brought;

* "George Cadoudal, a Chouan chief, was the son of a village miller. When Bretagne took up arms, he entered the service as a common horseman, and in 1795 was considered the head of the plebeian party. In 1796 and the three ensuing years he continued in arms, and was the only general-in-chief who was not noble. His division was that most frequently sent against the republicans. In 1800 he concluded peace with the French government. He afterwards went to Paris, on the invitation of Bonaparte; and then to London, where he was favourably received by the English ministers. The idea of the infernal machine is said to have originated with him, though he denied it. In 1803 George and Pichegru landed on the coast of Normandy to execute a plan of assassinating the First Consul. The conspiracy, however, was frustrated, and George was condemned and executed at Paris in 1804. He was thirty-five years old, and showed during his trial the greatest coolness." —*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

"When George Cadoudal came to Paris, the First Consul received him at a private audience. Rapp introduced him into the grand saloon leading into the garden. I saw Napoleon and George walk from the window to the bottom of the saloon, then return, then go back again. This lasted for a long time. The conversation appeared very animated, and I overheard several things, but without any connexion. There was occasionally a good deal of ill-humour displayed in their tones and gestures. The interview ended in nothing. George had the manners and bearing of a rude soldier; but under his coarse exterior he concealed the soul of a hero."—*Bourrienne*. E.

"One day I asked Napoleon's opinion of George Cadoudal. 'George,' said he, 'had courage, and that was all. After the peace with the Chouans I endeavoured to gain him over, as then he would have been useful to me, and I was anxious to calm all parties. I sent for, and spoke to him a long time. His father was a miller, and he was an ignorant fellow himself. I asked him, Why do you want to restore the Bourbons? If you were even to succeed in placing them on the throne, you would still be only a miller's son in their eyes. They would hold you in contempt because you were not of noble birth. But I found that he had no heart—in fact, that he was not a Frenchman.'"—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

the Chouans fell upon them; sergeants of d'Hervilly's regiment endeavoured to maintain order; a quarrel ensued, and, but for Puisaye, it might have had fatal consequences. These first occurrences were not at all likely to establish confidence between the insurgents and the regular troops, which, coming from England, and belonging to that power, were, as such, rather suspicious to the Chouans. Meanwhile, the bands were armed as they arrived. Their numbers amounted in two days to ten thousand. Red coats and muskets were given to them, and Puisaye's next care was to give them leaders. He was in want of officers, for the forty gentlemen volunteers were quite inadequate; he had not yet the skeletons at his disposal, for they had orders to cruise off St. Malo; he purposed, therefore, to take a few officers from the regiments, in which they were very numerous, to distribute them among the Chouans, then to march rapidly upon Vannes and Rennes, not to give the republicans time to look about them, to raise the whole country, and then to advance and take a position behind the important line of the Mayenne. There, master of forty leagues of country, and having raised the whole population, Puisaye conceived that it would be time to organize the irregular troops. D'Hervilly, brave, but standing on trifles, methodical, and despising the irregular Chouans, refused those officers. Instead of giving them to the Chouans, he proposed to select from among the latter men to complete the regiments, and then to advance, making reconnoissances and choosing positions. That was not Puisaye's plan. He threatened to use his authority; d'Hervilly denied it, saying that the regular troops belonged to him, that he was responsible for their safety to the English government, and that he ought not to compromise them. Puisaye represented to him that he held this command during the voyage only, that, on landing in Bretagne, he, Puisaye, was to be commander-in-chief and to direct the operations. He immediately despatched a cutter to London, to obtain an explanation concerning their respective powers; and, meanwhile, he besought d'Hervilly not to cause the miscarriage of the enterprise by fatal divisions. D'Hervilly was brave and full of sincerity, but he was unfit for civil war, and he felt an invincible dislike to those ragged insurgents. All the emigrants thought with him that they were not made to *chouanner;* that Puisaye compromised them by bringing them into Bretagne; that it was in Vendée they ought to have landed; and that there they would have found the illustrious Charette and undoubtedly different sort of soldiers.

Several days had been lost in disputes of this kind. The Chouans were divided into three corps, for the purpose of taking advanced positions, so as to occupy the roads from L'Orient to Hennebon and to Auray. Tinteniac, with a corps of 2500 Chouans, was placed on the left at Landevant; Dubois-Berthelot, on the right towards Auray, with a nearly equal force.

Count de Vauban, one of the gentlemen volunteers who had accompanied Puisaye, and one of those whose reputation and merit placed them in the first rank, was directed to occupy a central position at Mendon, with four thousand Chouans, so as to be able to succour Tinteniac or Dubois-Berthelot. He had the command of this whole line, defended by nine or ten thousand men, and advanced four or five leagues into the interior. The Chouans, finding themselves placed there, immediately asked why troops of the line were not put along with them; saying that they reckoned more upon those troops than upon themselves; that they had come to range themselves around them, to follow them, to support them, but they counted upon their advancing first to receive the formidable onset of the republicans. Vauban applied for only four hundred men, either to withstand a first attack, in case of need, or to impart confidence to his Chouans, to set them an example, and to prove that there was no intention of exposing them alone to danger. D'Hervilly at first refused, then delayed, and at last sent this detachment.

Five days had elapsed since the landing, and they had as yet advanced only three or four leagues inland. Puisaye was extremely dissatisfied, but he repressed his vexation, hoping to overcome the delays and obstacles thrown in his way by his companions in arms. Conceiving that, at all events, he ought to secure a point of support, he proposed to d'Hervilly to gain possession of the peninsula by surprising Fort Penthièvre. Once masters of this fort, which was the key to the peninsula on the land-side, supported on both sides by the English squadron, they would have an impregnable position: and that peninsula, a league broad and two long, would then afford a footing as secure and more convenient than that of St. Malo, Brest, or L'Orient. The English might there land all the men and stores that they had promised. This measure of safety was of such a nature as to please d'Hervilly; he assented to it, but was for a regular attack on the fort. Puisaye would not listen to him, and arranged a plan to take it by storm; and Commodore Warren, full of zeal, offered to second him with all the guns of his squadron. They began to cannonade on the 1st of July (13th of Messidor), and fixed the decisive attack for the 3rd (15th of Messidor). While preparations were making for it, Puisaye sent out emissaries over all Bretagne, to rouse Scépeaux, Charette, Stofflet, and all the chiefs of the insurgent provinces.

The news of the landing spread with extraordinary rapidity. In two days it was known over all Bretagne, and in a few more throughout all France. The royalists, full of joy, the revolutionists of rage, already figured to themselves the emigrants in Paris. The Convention immediately sent two extraordinary commissioners to Hoche; it selected Blad and Tallien. The

presence of the latter at the threatened point was intended to prove that the Thermidorians were as hostile to royalism as to terror. Hoche, cool and resolute, wrote forthwith to the committee of public welfare, to dispel its apprehensions. "Coolness," said he, "activity, provisions, of which we are in want, and the twelve thousand men whom you promised me so long ago." He immediately gave orders to the chief of his staff: he directed General Chabot to be placed between Brest and L'Orient, with a corps of four thousand men, that he might fly to the assistance of either of those ports which should be threatened. "Keep your eye more particularly upon Brest," said he; "in case of need, shut yourself up in the place and defend yourself to the last extremity." He wrote to Aubert-Dubayet, who commanded the coasts of Cherbourg, to send off troops for the north of Bretagne, in order to guard St. Malo and the coast. To secure the south, he begged Canclaux, who was still watching Charette and Stofflet, to send General Lemoine with reinforcements to him by Nantes and Vannes. He then collected all his troops about Rennes, Ploermel, and Vannes, and moved then *en échelon* upon those three points to guard his rear; after which he advanced to Auray with all the force that he had at hand. On the 14th of Messidor (July 2nd), he was already in person at Auray, with three or four thousand men.

All Bretagne was thus enveloped. The illusions which the first insurrection of La Vendée had generated were about to be dispelled. Because in 1793 the peasants of La Vendée, encountering only national guards, composed of tradesmen who knew not how to handle a musket, had made themselves masters of all Poitou and Anjou, and then formed in their ravines and on their heaths an establishment which it was difficult to destroy, it was imagined that Bretagne would rise at the first signal of England. But the Bretons were far from having the ardour of the first Vendeans; a few banditti only, under the name of Chouans, were bent upon war, or to speak more correctly, on pillage; and, moreover, a young commander, whose activity was equal to his genius, having practised troops at his disposal, repressed the whole population with a firm and steady hand. Could Bretagne rise under such circumstances, unless the army that came to support it advanced rapidly, instead of groping about on the sea-shore?

This was not all. Part of the Chouans, who were under the influence of the royalist agents in Paris, were waiting for a prince to appear along with Puisaye before they would join him. The cry of the agents and of all those who were in their intrigues was that the expedition was inadequate and fallacious,*

* "The expedition to Quiberon-bay was ill-timed, and that was in a great measure owing to those unfortunate gentlemen engaged, who impatient of

and that England had come to Bretagne to repeat the events of Toulon. They no longer said that she meant to give the crown to the Count d'Artois, since he was not there, but to the Duke of York. They wrote, desiring that no aid should be afforded to the expedition, but that it should be obliged to re-embark and to go and land near Charette. This was the highest wish of the latter. To the solicitations of Puisaye's agents he replied that he had sent M. de Scépeaux to Paris, to claim the execution of one of the articles of his treaty; that he must of course wait the return of that officer, and not expose him to the danger of being arrested by resuming arms. As for Stofflet, who was much more favourably disposed towards Puisaye, he sent word that, if the rank of lieutenant-general were conferred on him, he would march immediately and make a diversion on the rear of the republicans.

Thus every thing concurred against Puisaye: views opposite to his entertained by the royalists of the interior, jealousies among the Vendean chiefs, and lastly, a skilful adversary, having at his disposal organized forces, quite adequate to repress any royalist zeal that existed among the Bretons.

It was on the 15th of Messidor (July 3) that Puisaye had resolved to attack Fort Penthièvre. The soldiers who defended it had been without bread for three days. Threatened with an assault, cannonaded by the ships, and badly officered, they surrendered and delivered up the fort to Puisaye. But, at this very moment, Hoche, who was at Auray, caused all the advanced posts of the Chouans to be attacked, in order to re-establish the communication of Auray with Hennebon and L'Orient. He had ordered a simultaneous attack on Landevant and towards the post of Auray. Tinteniac's Chouans, vigorously assailed by the republicans, could not stand against troops of the line. Vauban, who was placed intermediately at Mendon, hastened with part of his reserve to the assistance of Tinteniac, but he found the band of the latter dispersed, and his own separated on seeing the rout. He was obliged to flee, and even to swim across two arms of the sea to rejoin the remainder of his Chouans at Mendon. On his right, Dubois-Berthelot had been repulsed: he thus saw the republicans advancing on his right and on his left, and it was likely that he would soon find himself *en flèche* between them. At this moment, the four hundred men of the line whom he had demanded would have been of great service for supporting his Chouans and bringing them back to the fight; but d'Hervilly had just recalled them for the attack of the fort. He, nevertheless, infused some courage into his soldiers, and decided them to profit by the op-

inactivity, and sanguine by character, urged the British ministry, or rather Mr. Wyndham, to authorize the experiment, without fully considering more than their own zeal and courage."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

portunity for falling upon the rear of the republicans, who had advanced very far in pursuit of the fugitives. He then threw himself upon their left, and rushed upon a village which the republicans had just entered at the heels of the Chouans. They had not expected this brisk attack, and were obliged to fall back. Vauban then returned to his position at Mendon; but he was left alone there. All around him had fled, and he was obliged to fall back too, but in order, and after an act of vigour which had checked the rapidity of the enemy.

The Chouans were indignant at having been exposed alone to the attack of the republicans. They complained bitterly that the four hundred men of the line had been taken from them. Puisaye found fault with d'Hervilly, who replied that he had recalled them for the attack of the fort. These reciprocal complaints did not mend matters, and each party continued to be greatly irritated against the other. Puisaye, however, was master of Fort Penthièvre. He directed all the stores sent by the English to be landed on the peninsula, where he fixed his head-quarters; there he collected all his troops, and there he resolved to establish himself solidly. He ordered the engineers to perfect the defences of the fort, and to add advanced works to them. There he hoisted the white flag beside the English colours, in token of alliance between the kings of France and England. Lastly, it was decided that each regiment should contribute to the garrison a detachment proportionate to its strength. D'Hervilly, who was very anxious to complete his, and to complete it with good troops, proposed to the republicans who had been taken prisoners to enter his service, and to form a third battalion in his regiment. Money, provisions, of which they had lately known the want, dislike to remain prisoners, the hope of being able soon to get away again to Hoche, decided them, and they were enrolled in d'Hervilly's corps.

Puisaye, who still thought of marching forward, and who had stopped to take the peninsula merely to secure a position on the coast, spoke sharply to d'Hervilly, gave him the best reasons to induce him to second his views, and even threatened to demand his removal if he refused to comply. D'Hervilly appeared for a moment to fall in with his plans. The Chouans, according to Puisaye, had need only of being supported to display bravery; the troops of the line ought to be distributed on their front and on their rear, and they to be thus placed in the middle, and, with twelve or thirteen thousand men, nearly three thousand of whom were of the line, they might run over the corps of Hoche, who had at the moment scarcely five or six thousand. D'Hervilly assented to this plan. At this instant Vauban, finding his position extremely perilous, having lost that which he at first occupied, asked for orders and succour. D'Hervilly sent him an order, worded in the most pedantic manner, in which he

directed him to fall back upon Carnac, and prescribed such movements as could only have been executed by the most practised troops in Europe.

On the next day, July 5th (15th of Messidor), Puisaye left the peninsula to review the Chouans, and d'Hervilly also quitted it with his regiment, to prepare for the execution of the plan formed the preceding day, of marching forward. Puisaye found nothing but dejection, discouragement, and ill-humour, among those men who, a few days before, were full of enthusiasm. They said that there was an evident intention to expose them alone, and to sacrifice them to the troops of the line. Puisaye appeased them as well as he could, and endeavoured to revive their courage. D'Hervilly, on his part, seeing those soldiers clothed in red, whose uniforms sat so ill on them, and who carried their muskets so awkwardly, said that nothing was to be done with such troops, and marched his regiment back again. Puisaye met him at the moment, and asked if that was the way to execute the plan agreed upon. D'Hervilly replied that he never would risk himself by marching with such soldiers; that all they could do was to embark again, or to shut themselves up in the peninsula, and there wait for fresh orders from London; which, according to his notions, signified orders to land in La Vendée.

Next day, July 6th (18th of Messidor), Vauban received a secret intimation that he should be attacked along his whole line by the republicans. He found himself in a most dangerous situation. His left was supported upon a post called St. Barbe, which communicated with the peninsula; but his centre and his right extended along the coast of Carnac, and had no other retreat than the sea. Thus, if he were briskly attacked, his right and his centre might be driven into the sea; while his left alone could retreat by St. Barbe to Quiberon. His Chouans, disheartened, were incapable of standing their ground; he had, therefore, but one course to pursue, namely, to make his centre and his right fall back upon his left, and file off by the beach to the peninsula. But they would then be shutting themselves up on this stripe of land without having the power to leave it, for the post of St. Barbe, which would be thus abandoned, was defenceless on the land side but impregnable towards the beach, which it entirely commanded. Thus this retreat would be equivalent to the determination to shut themselves up in the peninsula of Quiberon. Vauban, therefore, applied for succour, that he might not be obliged to retire. D'Hervilly sent him a fresh order, full of the pomposity of military phraseology, enjoining him to keep his ground at Carnac to the last extremity. Puisaye immediately desired d'Hervilly to send some troops, which he promised to do.

On the following day, July 7th (19th of Messidor), at daybreak, the republicans advanced in deep columns, and attacked the ten thousand Chouans along the whole line. The latter

looked towards the beach, but no regular troops were coming. They then became enraged against the emigrants, who left them without succour. Young George Cadoudal, whose men refused to fight, begged them not to disperse, but they would not listen to him. George, enraged in his turn, cried out that those rascally English and emigrants had only come to ruin Bretagne, and he wished that the sea had swallowed them up, before it had brought them to that coast. Vauban then ordered his right and his centre to fall back on his left, that they might retire by the beach to the peninsula. The Chouans rushed thither confusedly, most of them followed by their families, fleeing from the vengeance of the republicans. Women, children, old men, carrying their goods, and intermixed with several thousand Chouans in red uniform, covered that long, narrow stripe of land, washed on both sides by the sea, and already annoyed by balls and bullets. Vauban, then rallying all the chiefs around him, endeavoured to collect the bravest of the men, exhorted them not to bring ruin upon themselves by a precipitate flight, and conjured them, for their safety and their honour, to make an orderly retreat. They would, he said, make those troops of the line, who left them alone exposed to all the danger, ashamed of themselves. By degrees, he roused their courage, and prevailed upon them to face the enemy, to support his fire, and to return it. Then, owing to the firmness of the chiefs, the retreat began to be effected with regularity. The ground was disputed foot by foot. Still Vauban was not sure that he should be able to withstand a vigorous charge, and that he should not be driven into the sea; but, fortunately, the brave Commodore Warren coming up with his ships and gun-boats, poured such a fire from both sides of La Falaise upon the republicans, as prevented them for that day from pushing their advantages any further.

The fugitives hurried to the entrance of the fort, but admittance was for a moment denied them; they then fell upon the palisades, pulled them down, and rushed pell-mell into the peninsula. At that instant, d'Hervilly came up with his regiment. Vauban met him, and in a fit of passion told him that he should call him to account for his conduct before a council of war. The Chouans spread themselves over the whole peninsula, in which were several villages and hamlets. All the lodgings were occupied by the regiments; quarrels took place; at last, the Chouans lay down on the ground; a half-ration of rice was given to them, which they ate raw, having no means of cooking it.

Thus this expedition, which was so speedily to carry the standard of the Bourbons and the English to the banks of the Mayenne, was shut up in a peninsula two leagues in length. There were now twelve or fifteen thousand more mouths to feed, and it was impossible to furnish them either with lodging, fuel, or utensils for cooking their victuals. That peninsula, defended

by a fort at its extremity, lined on either side by the English squadron, was capable of opposing an invincible resistance; but it became at once extremely weak from the want of provisions. No more had been brought than were sufficient to feed six thousand men for three months, and there were now eighteen or twenty thousand to subsist. To get out of this position by a sudden attack on St. Barbe was scarcely possible; for the republicans, full of ardour, were intrenching that post in such a manner as to render it impregnable on the side next to the peninsula. While confusion, animosity, and dejection pervaded the confused mass of Chouans and emigrants, in Hoche's camp on the contrary, men and officers laboured assiduously in throwing up the intrenchments. "I saw," says Puisaye, "officers themselves stripped to their shirts, and distinguished only by their stock, handling the spade, and hastening the operations of their soldiers."

Puisaye, however, determined upon a sortie for that very night, in order to interrupt those operations; but the darkness and the cannon of the enemy produced confusion in his ranks and he was obliged to return. The Chouans, driven to despair, complained that they had been deceived. They regretted their old method of warfare, and desired to be taken back to their woods. They were perishing of hunger. D'Hervilly, with the intention of forcing them to enlist in the regiments, had ordered that only a half-ration should be distributed among the irregular troops. They revolted. Puisaye, without whose knowledge this order had been issued, revoked it, and a whole ration was allowed.

Puisaye was distinguished not only by superior intelligence but by invincible perseverance: he was nevertheless discouraged. He conceived the idea of picking out the best of the Chouans, and landing them in two divisions for the purpose of scouring the country in the rear of Hoche, raising the chiefs of whom he had yet no tidings, and directing them *en masse* upon the camp of St. Barbe, so as to take it in rear, while the troops in the peninsula should attack it in front. He should thus relieve himself from six or eight thousand mouths, rekindle the nearly extinguished zeal of the Breton chiefs, and prepare an attack on the rear of the camp of St. Barbe. Having formed this plan, he selected the best of the Chouans, gave four thousand of them to Tinteniac, with three intrepid chiefs, George, Mercier, and d'Allègre, and three thousand to Messrs. Jean-Jean and Lantivy. Tinteniac was to be put on shore at Sarzeau, near the mouth of the Vilaine, and Jean-Jean and Lantivy near Quimper. The two divisions, after making a considerable circuit, were to form a junction at Baud, on the 14th of July (26th of Messidor), and to march on the morning of the 16th upon the rear of the camp of St. Barbe. At the moment when they were about to start, the chiefs of the Chouans went to Puisaye, and

besought their old leader to accompany them, saying that these English traitors would be his ruin. It was not possible that Puisaye could comply. They set out, and were landed without accident. Puisaye immediately wrote to London that every thing might be repaired, but that provisions, ammunition, troops, and the French prince, must be sent to him without delay.

During these occurrences in the peninsula, Hoche had already collected eight or ten thousand men at St. Barbe. Aubert-Dubayet* had sent him from the coast of Cherbourg troops to guard the north of Bretagne; Canclaux had despatched from Nantes a considerable reinforcement under the command of General Lemoine. The representatives had put a stop to all the intrigue stending to deliver up L'Orient and St. Malo. The affairs of the republic were therefore improving every day. Meanwhile, Lemaître and Brothier were, by their intrigues, still contributing with all their might to thwart the expedition. They had immediately sent letters to Bretagne: the expedition, according to them had a dangerous object, since the French prince was not there, and no one ought to second it. Agents had, in consequence, spread themselves over the country, and given orders, in the name of the King, not to attempt any movement; and they had desired Charette to persist in his inaction. Agreeably to their system of profiting by the succour of England and then deceiving her, they had devised a plan on the very spot. Mixed up in the intrigue for the delivery of St. Malo to Puisaye, they were for summoning thither the emigrant skeleton regiments cruising on board the English fleet, and taking possession of the port in the name of Louis XVIII., while Puisaye, they said, was perhaps acting at Quiberon for the Duke of York. The intrigue at St. Malo having failed, they fell back upon St. Brieuc, kept off that coast the squadron with the emigrants on board, and immediately sent emissaries to Tinteniac and Lantivy, whom they knew to have landed, to desire them to march to St. Brieuc. Their aim was to form a counter-expedition in the north of Bretagne, more sure, according to them, than that of Puisaye in the south.

Tinteniac had landed safely, and, after taking several republican posts, had arrived at Elven. There he found the injunction, issued in the King's name, to proceed to Coëtlogon, where he

* "Aubert Dubayet at the beginning of the Revolution was hostile to its principles, but the patriots soon brought him over by flattering his ambition and his philosophical ideas. In 1791 he was deputed to the legislature, and in 1793 served as general of brigade at the defence of Mayence. Being afterwards sent into the Western departments, he seconded Hoche in the pacification of La Vendée, and with the Chouans. In 1795 he was appointed to the war-ministry, and in the following year was appointed ambassador to the Ottoman Porte. In 1797 he was attacked with a malignant fever, of which he died. Aubert Dubayet was, at the end of his career, a zealous republican, and equally ardent in the admiration of his own talents. He delighted to talk of himself and his works."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

should receive fresh orders. He objected to no purpose the commission of Puisaye, and the necessity of not frustrating his plan by going to a different place from that to which he had been ordered. At length, however, he yielded, hoping that by means of a forced march he might yet be in the rear of St. Barbe on the 16th. Jean-Jean and Lantivy, who likewise landed without accident, prepared to march towards Baud, when they found orders addressed to them to proceed to St. Brieuc.

Meanwhile Hoche, alarmed about his rear, was obliged to send off fresh detachments to stop the bands, of whose march he was apprized, but he left in St. Barbe a force sufficient to resist any sudden attack. He was much annoyed by the English gun-boats, which fired upon his troops the moment they appeared on the beach, and he reckoned upon nothing but famine for reducing the emigrants.

Puisaye, on his part, made preparations for the 16th (28th of Messidor). On the 15th, a new naval division arrived in the bay. It was that which had been to the mouth of the Elbe to bring away the emigrant regiments that had been taken into the pay of England and were known by the name of regiments with the black cockade. It brought the legions of Salm, Damas, Béon, and Perigord, reduced altogether to eleven hundred men by the losses of the campaign, and commanded by a distinguished officer, M. de Sombreuil.* This squadron brought also fresh supplies of provisions and ammunition. It intimated that three thousand English were coming under Lord Graham, and announced the speedy arrival of Count d'Artois, with a still more considerable force. A letter from the English ministry informed Puisaye that the skeletons were detained on the north coast by the royalist agents in the interior, who intended, they said, to deliver up a port to them. Another despatch, which arrived at the same time, put an end to the dispute which had arisen between d'Hervilly and Puisaye, gave to the latter the absolute command of the expedition, and conferred

* "M. de Sombreuil distinguished himself in the beginning of the Revolution by the boldness with which he forced his friend, the young Polignac, out of the hands of the seditious populace. In 1792 he served in the Prussian army, and rendered himself so conspicuous by his courage, that the King gave him the order of military merit. In 1793 he covered the retreat of the Austrian army, and the year after, at the head of a body of French emigrants protected the retreat of the Batavian forces. Being chosen in 1795, by the English government to conduct a reinforcement to the troops disembarked at Quiberon, he landed there a few days before Hoche attacked fort St. Penthièvre. The greatest part of the emigrants, however, whom he commanded, having laid down their arms, he was taken prisoner and condemned to be shot. But no French officer could be found to compose the council of war; it was necessary therefore to take Dutchmen, and it was with difficulty that the soldiers could be persuaded to fire on him. Sombreuil refused to have his eyes bound, and gave the signal of death himself."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

on him moreover the rank of lieutenant-general in the service of England.

Puisaye, now free to command, made all requisite preparations for the following day. He would fain have deferred the projected attack, in order to give Sombreuil's division time to land; but, all the arrangements having been made for the 16th, and that being the day appointed for Tinteniac, he could not postpone it. On the evening of the 15th, he ordered Vauban to land at Carnac with twelve hundred Chouans, for the purpose of making a diversion on the extremity of the camp of St. Barbe, and joining the Chouans, who were to attack it in the rear. The boats were prepared very late, and Vauban could not embark before midnight. He had orders to fire a fusee if he succeeded in landing, and a second if he failed to keep his ground on the shore.

On the 16th of July (28 Messidor), at daybreak, Puisaye left the peninsula with all the troops that he had. He marched in columns. The brave Loyal Emigrant regiment was at the head, with Rothalier's artillery; on the right, advanced the Royal Marine and Drusenay's regiments, with six hundred Chouans commanded by the Duke de Levis. D'Hervilly's regiment, and a thousand Chouans under the Chevalier de St. Pierre, occupied the left. These corps formed altogether nearly four thousand men. While they were advancing upon the beach, they perceived a first fusee fired by the Count de Vauban. They saw no second, and concluded that Vauban had succeeded. They continued their march, and soon heard distant sounds, like those of musketry. "It is Tinteniac!" exclaimed Puisaye: "forward!" A charge was then sounded, and they marched upon the intrenchments of the republicans. Hoche's advanced guard, commanded by Humbert, was placed before the heights of St. Barbe. On the approach of the enemy, it fell back and returned within the lines. The assailants advanced full of joy. All at once, a corps of cavalry which had remained deployed, made a movement and unmasked formidable batteries. The emigrants were received with a fire of musketry and artillery: grape, balls, and shells, showered upon them. On the right, the Royal Marine and Drusenay's regiments lost whole ranks without flinching; the Duke de Levis was severely wounded at the head of his Chouans: on the left d'Hervilly's regiment advanced gallantly amidst the fire. Meanwhile the report of musketry, which the assailants thought they had heard on the rear and on the flanks, had ceased. Neither Tinteniac nor Vauban had therefore attacked, and there was no hope of storming the camp. At this moment, the republican army, infantry and cavalry, sallied from its intrenchments; Puisaye, seeing nothing before him but inevitable destruction, sent word to d'Hervilly to order the right to retreat, while he would himself cause the same

to be done on the left. At that very moment, d'Hervilly, who braved the fire with the greatest courage, received a ball in the middle of the chest. He directed an aide-de-camp to carry the order for retreat. The aide-de-camp was killed by a cannon-ball. D'Hervilly's regiment and the thousand Chouans under the Chevalier de St. Pierre, having received no orders, continued to advance amidst this tremendous fire. While a retreat was sounded on the left, a charge was sounded on the right. The confusion and carnage were horrible. The republican cavalry then fell upon the emigrant army, and drove it back in disorder to the beach. Rothalier's cannon, sticking in the sand, were taken. After performing prodigies of valour, the whole army fled towards Fort Penthièvre; the republicans closely pursued, and were on the point of entering the fort with it, but an unexpected succour saved it from the further pursuit of the conquerors: Vauban, who was supposed to be at Carnac, was at the extremity of the beach with his Chouans, and Commodore Warren was with him. Both of them, on board gun-boats, kept up such a brisk fire upon the beach as to stop the republicans, and once more save the unfortunate army of Quiberon.

Thus Tinteniac had not made his appearance; Vauban, having landed too late, had not been able to surprise the republicans, had been ill-seconded by his Chouans, who dipped their muskets in water that they might not fight, and had fallen back near to the fort; his second fusee, kindled in broad daylight, had not been perceived, and thus it was that Puisaye, thwarted in all his combinations, had experienced this disastrous defeat. All the regiments had sustained frightful losses. That of Royal Marine alone had lost fifty-three officers out of seventy-two; and the others had suffered in proportion.

It must be confessed that Puisaye had been too precipitate in attacking the camp. Four thousand men, going to attack ten thousand solidly intrenched, ought to have ascertained, in the most positive manner, that all the attacks planned on the rear and flanks were ready to be effected. It was not sufficient to have appointed a rendezvous for corps which had so many obstacles to overcome, in order to conclude that they would have arrived at the point and the hour specified: some signal, some means or other for ensuring the execution of the plan, should have been agreed upon. In this particular, Puisaye, though deceived by the sound of distant musketry, had not acted with sufficient precaution. At any rate, he had risked his own person, and replied unanswerably to those who pretended to suspect his courage because they could not deny his abilities.

It is easy to comprehend why Tinteniac had not kept the appointment. He had found an order at Elven to proceed to Coëtlogon; he had complied with that strange order, in hopes of regaining the lost time by a forced march. At Coëtlogon he had found women charged to deliver to him an order to march

upon St. Brieuc. This came from the agents opposed to Puisaye, who, using the name of the king, in whose name they always spoke, wished to make the corps detached by Puisaye concur in the counter-expedition which they meditated upon St. Malo or St. Brieuc. While Tinteniac was conferring with his officers upon this order, the castle of Coëtlogon was attacked by the detachments which Hoche had sent in pursuit of him. He hastened up, and fell down dead, struck by a ball in the forehead. His successor in the command consented to march upon St. Brieuc. Messrs. de Lantivy and Jean-Jean, who had landed near Quimper, had found similar orders: the chiefs were divided; and, seeing this conflict of orders and plans, their soldiers, already discontented, had dispersed. Thus none of the corps sent by Puisaye to make a diversion had arrived at the rendezvous. The Paris agency, with its projects, sometimes for acting in Vendée, and by means of Spain, at others for provoking a separate landing in the Côtes-du-Nord, had thus deprived Puisaye of the skeletons which it detained on the north coast, of the two detachments which it had kept from proceeding to Baud on the 14th, and lastly of the aid of all the chiefs, to whom it had given orders not to attempt any movement.

Shut up in Quiberon, Puisaye had therefore no hope of leaving it and marching forward: all that he could do was to re-embark before he was forced to do so by famine, and to attempt a more propitious descent on some other part of the coast, namely in Vendée. Most of the emigrants desired nothing better: the name of Charette led them to expect to find in Vendée a great general at the head of a fine army. They were delighted, moreover, to see the counter-revolution effected by any one rather than by Puisaye.

Meanwhile, Hoche was examining this peninsula, and seeking how to penetrate into it. At the entrance it was defended by Fort Penthièvre, and on both sides by the English squadron. To land there in boats was impossible; to take the fort by means of a regular siege was equally impossible, for it could be reached only by the beach, which was incessantly swept by the fire of the gun-boats. The republicans, in fact, could not make a reconnoissance there but amidst showers of grape-shot. Nothing but a nocturnal surprise or famine could give the peninsula to Hoche. One circumstance induced him to attempt a surprise, dangerous as it was. The prisoners, who had been enrolled against their will in the emigrant regiments, were to be kept there at most by success; but their most urgent interest, in default of patriotism, impelled them to pass over to the side of a victorious enemy, who would treat them as deserters, if he were to take them in arms. They repaired during the night to Hoche's camp in great numbers, saying that they had enlisted merely to get out of prison or to escape being sent thither; and they

pointed out to him a way of penetrating into the peninsula. On the left of Fort Penthièvre, there was a rock; by wading into the water up to the breast, a man might walk round and then he would find a path which led to the summit of the fort. The deserters declared, on behalf of their comrades composing the garrison, that they would assist in throwing open the gates.

In spite of the danger of such an attempt, Hoche did not hesitate. He formed his plan upon the information which he had obtained, and resolved to make himself master of the peninsula and thus capture the whole expedition, before it had time to re-embark. The night of the 20th of July (2nd of Thermidor), was dark: Puisaye and Vauban had ordered patroles, to secure themselves against a nocturnal attack. "In such a night," said they to the officers, "make the enemy's sentinels fire their muskets at you." Every thing appeared quiet, and they retired to bed in full security.

The preparations were made in the republican camp. About midnight, Hoche broke up with his army. The sky was overcast with clouds; an extremely violent wind raised the waves, and drowned with their roar the noise of arms and of soldiers. Hoche formed his troops into columns on the beach. He then gave three hundred grenadiers to Adjutant-general Menage, a young republican of heroic courage. He ordered him to file off on his right, to wade into the water with his grenadiers, to turn the rock on which the walls were built, to ascend by the path, and to endeavour to penetrate into the fort. These dispositions made, the grenadiers marched off in profound silence; patroles, to whom had been given the red uniforms taken from the slain in the action of the 16th, and having the pass-word, deceived the advanced sentinels. They approached without being discovered. Menage entered the water with his three hundred grenadiers, the wind drowning the noise which they made in wading through it. Some fell and rose again, others were ingulfed in the abyss. Thus, following their intrepid chief from rock to rock, they reached the land, and ascended by the path that led to the fort. Hoche had meanwhile arrived under the walls with his columns. All at once the sentinels recognised one of the false patroles; they perceived amid the darkness a tall moving figure; they instantly fired; the alarm was given. The Toulonese gunners ran to their pieces, and poured a shower of grape on Hoche's troops; they were thrown into confusion, and on the point of running away. But at this moment Menage arrived; the soldiers, accomplices of the assailants, ran to the battlements, held the butt-ends of their muskets to the republicans and helped them up. They then rushed together upon the rest of the garrison, slaughtered all who resisted, and hoisted the tricoloured flag. Hoche, notwithstanding the disorder into which the enemy's batteries had thrown his columns, did not flinch for a moment. He ran to every officer, brought him back

to his post, made the men return to their ranks, and rallied his army under this tremendous fire. It began to be not quite so dark. He perceived the republican flag flying on the top of the fort. "What!" said he to his men, "would you run away now that your comrades have hoisted their flag on the enemy's walls!" He led them on to the advanced works, where part of the Chouans were encamped: they rushed upon the intrenchments, penetrated into them every where, and at length made themselves masters of the fort.

At this moment Vauban and Puisaye, roused by the firing, had hurried to the scene of the disaster: but it was too late. They found the Chouans running away pell-mell, the officers forsaken by their men, and the remnant of the garrison continuing faithful. Hoche did not stop at the taking of the fort: he rallied part of his columns, and pushed on into the peninsula, before the army of the invaders could re-embark. Puisaye, Vauban, all the officers, retired towards the interior where were still left d'Hervilly's regiment, the wrecks of Drusenay's, the Royal Marine, and the Loyal Emigrant regiments, and Sombreuil's legion, landed two days before, and eleven hundred strong. By taking a good position, and such positions there were in the peninsula, and occupying it with the three thousand regular troops which they still had, they might give the squadron time to collect the unfortunate emigrants. The fire of the gun-boats would have protected the embarkation: but a panic had seized men's minds; the Chouans threw themselves into the sea with their families, to get on board some fishing-boats which lay near the shore, and to put off in them to the squadron, which the rough weather kept at a considerable distance. The troops, scattered in the peninsula, ran hither and thither, not knowing where to rally. D'Hervilly, capable of defending a position with vigour, and acquainted with the localities, was mortally wounded. Sombreuil, who had succeeded him, was a stranger to the ground, knew not where to support himself or whither to retire, and, though brave, appeared on this occasion to have lost the necessary presence of mind. Puisaye, on coming to the place where Sombreuil was, pointed out a position to him. Sombreuil inquired if he had sent word to the squadron to bear ud; Puisaye replied that he had sent a skilful and devotcd pilot; but the weather was rough, and the pilot did not reaeh soon enough for the unfortunate men who had no other prospect but to be driven into the sea. The republican columns were approaching. Sombreuil again put the question, "Is the squadron informed?" Puisaye then offered to fly on board himself to hasten the approach of the commodore, a commission which he ought to have given to some other person, as he should have been the last to withdraw from the danger. One reason decided him. He was anxious to carry away his correspondence, which would have compromised all Bretagne, if it had fallen into the hands of the

republicans. It was no doubt as urgent to save that as to save the army itself; but he might have sent it on board without going in person. He set off, however, and arrived on board the Commodore at the same time as the pilot whom he had despatched. The distance, the darkness, the bad weather, had prevented the disaster from being observed on board the squadron. The brave Admiral Warren, who during the expedition had seconded the emigrants with all his means, made all sail, and at length arrived with his ships within cannon-shot, at the moment when Hoche, at the head of seven hundred grenadiers, was closely pressing Sombreuil's legion, and the latter was on the point of giving way. What a spectacle did this unhappy coast at that moment present! The roughness of the sea scarcely permitted boats to approach the shore; a multitude of Chouans and fugitive soldiers plunged into the water to their necks to meet them, and drowned themselves in their efforts to get at them the sooner; a thousand unfortunate emigrants, placed between the sea and the bayonets of the republicans, were reduced to the necessity of throwing themselves either into the one or upon the other, and suffered as much from the fire of the English squadron as the republicans themselves. Some boats had arrived, but at a different point. On this side there was but a brig, which kept up a tremendous fire, and which had checked for a moment the advance of the republicans. Some of the grenadiers cried out, it is said, to the emigrants, "Surrender; no harm shall be done you." This expression was circulated from rank to rank. Sombreuil would have approached to parley with General Humbert,* but the fire prevented him from advancing. An emigrant officer immediately swam off to desire the firing to cease. Hoche could not suffer a capitulation: he was too well aware of the laws against emigrants to venture to make any engagement, and he was incapable of promising what he was unable to perform. He declared, in a letter published throughout all Europe, that he heard none of the promises attributed to General Humbert, and that he would not have suffered them. Some of his men might have cried, "Surrender!" but he offered nothing, promised nothing. He advanced, and the emigrants, having no other resource than to submit to be slaughtered, hoped that they might perhaps be treated like the Vendeans. They threw down their arms. No capitulation whatever, not even a verbal one, took place with Hoche. Vauban, who was present, admitted that no con-

* "Humbert was a French general, who when he served in the army of the West, went alone to an interview requested by the chiefs of the Chouans, to bring on a negotiation. In 1798 he was charged with the command of the troops destined to invade Ireland, where he was beaten, and taken prisoner, but soon afterwards exchanged. In 1802 he joined the expedition to St. Domingo, and in the following year returned to France." — *Biographie Moderne.* E.

vention was made, and he even advised Sombreuil not to surrender on the vague hope inspired by the cries of a few private soldiers.

Many of the emigrants pierced themselves with their swords; others threw themselves into the water to get to the boats. Commodore Warren made all the efforts in his power to overcome the obstacles presented by the sea, for the purpose of saving as many as possible of those unfortunate men. Great numbers of them, on seeing the boats approaching, had plunged into the water up to the neck: the enemy on the shore fired at their heads. Sometimes they grappled boats which were already full, and those in them, fearing lest they should be sunk, cut off their hands with their swords.

But let us quit these scenes of horror, whose dreadful misfortunes punished great faults. More than one cause had contributed to prevent the success of this expedition. Too much reliance was placed on Bretagne. A people really disposed to insurrection breaks out like the Vendeans in 1793, seeks out chiefs, implores them, forces them to put themselves at its head, but does not wait to be organized, does not endure two years of oppression, and rise when that oppression is over. Were its dispositions ever so good, a superintendent such as Hoche would prevent them from manifesting themselves. Puisaye was, therefore, under the influence of strong illusion. Great use might, nevertheless, have been made of the people of Bretagne, and many men disposed to fight might have been found among them, had a considerable expedition advanced to Rennes, and driven before it the army which kept the country in subjection. To this end, it would have been necessary that the chiefs of the insurgents should have acted in unison with Puisaye, and Puisaye with the Paris agents, that the most contrary instructions should not have been sent to the Chouan chiefs; that some should not have received orders not to stir, and that others should not have been despatched in opposite directions to those which Puisaye had pointed out; that the emigrants should have understood better the nature of the war which they were about to wage; that they should have felt less contempt for the peasants who devoted themselves to their cause; that the English should have harboured less distrust of Puisaye, and not have associated another leader with him; that they should have given him at once all the means which they destined for him, and attempted this expedition with their whole united force; there ought, above all, to have been a great prince at the head of this expedition—nay, it was not requisite that he should be great, but he ought to have been the first to set foot on the shore. At sight of him all obstacles would have vanished. That division of the Vendean chiefs among themselves, between the Vendean chiefs and the Breton chief, between the Breton chief and the Paris agents, between the Chouans and the emigrants,

between Spain and England—that division of all the elements of the enterprise would instantly have ceased. At sight of the prince, all the enthusiasm of the country would have been kindled. Every body would have obeyed his orders and concurred in the attempt. Hoche might have been enveloped, and, in spite of his talents and his energy, he would have been obliged to give way to an influence all-powerful in those parts. There would, it is true, still have been behind him those valiant armies which had conquered Europe; but Austria might have occupied them on the Rhine, and prevented them from making great detachments; the government had no longer the vigour of the old committee, and the Revolution would have been in great jeopardy. Dispossessed twenty years earlier, its benefits would not have had time to consolidate themselves; unparalleled efforts, splendid victories, torrents of blood, would all have proved fruitless to France; or, at any rate, if it had not been given to a handful of fugitives to subject a brave nation to their yoke, they would have endangered its regeneration, and, as for themselves, they would not have ruined their cause without defending it, and they would have honoured their pretensions by their energy.

All the blame was thrown upon Puisaye and England by the restless spirits who composed the royalist party. Puisaye was, according to them, a traitor, who had sold himself to Pitt, with the intention of renewing the scenes of Toulon. It was nevertheless certain that Puisaye had done all that lay in his power. It was absurd to suppose that England did not wish to succeed: her very precautions in regard to Puisaye, the selection of d'Hervilly for the purpose of preventing the emigrant corps from being too much compromised, and lastly, the zeal with which Commodore Warren strove to save the unfortunate survivors in the peninsula, prove that, notwithstanding her selfish policy, she had not meditated the hideous and base crime which is attributed to her. Let justice be done to all, even to the implacable enemies of our Revolution and of our country.

Commodore Warren, having put the miserable wreck of the expedition on shore in the isle of Houat, waited there for fresh orders from London, and the arrival of Count d'Artois, who was on board the Lord Moira, to know what he was to do. Despair reigned in that little island. The emigrants and the Chouans, in the utmost distress, and attacked by a contagious disease, launched out into mutual recriminations, and bitterly accused Puisaye. Still deeper despair prevailed at Aurai and at Vannes, to which places the thousand emigrants taken in arms had been conveyed. Hoche, after conquering them, had hastened away from the painful sight and had gone in pursuit of Tinteniac's band, which was called the Red Army. The fate of the prisoners no longer concerned him: what could he do for them! The laws existed: he could not annul them. He re-

ferred the matter to the committee of public welfare and to Tallien. Tallien set out immediately, and arrived in Paris on the day preceding the anniversary of the 9th of Thermidor. On the morrow was to be held, according to the new fashion adopted, in the very bosom of the Assembly, a festival in commemoration of the fall of Robespierre. All the representatives attended in their appropriate costume; a numerous band played patriotic tunes; vocal performers sang hymns of Chenier's composition. Courtois read a report of the occurrences of the 9th of Thermidor. Tallien then read the report of the affair at Quiberon: his intention of procuring for himself a double triumph was apparent; the Assembly, nevertheless, applauded his services of that day twelvemonth and those which he had just rendered. His presence had been of benefit to Hoche. On the same day there was an entertainment at Tallien's, at which the principal Girondins met the Thermidorians. Louvet and Lanjuinais were present. Lanjuinais gave for a toast, "The 9th of Thermidor, and the courageous deputies who overthrew tyranny." Tallien gave, for a second, "The seventy-three, the twenty-two, the deputies, victims of terror." Louvet added these words, "And their close union with the men of the 9th of Thermidor."

They had great need, in fact, to unite and to join their efforts in opposing the adversaries of all kinds who had risen against the republic. Great was their joy, especially when they considered what danger they might have incurred, if the expedition in the West could have acted in concert with that prepared in the East by the Prince of Condé.

It was necessary to decide upon the fate of the prisoners. Many solicitations were addressed to the committees; but, in the present situation, to save them was impossible. The republicans asserted that the government intended to recall the emigrants, to restore their property to them, and consequently to restore royalty: the royalists, always presumptuous, maintained the same thing: they said that their friends governed, and the more they hoped the bolder they grew. To show the least indulgence on this occasion would have been verifying the apprehensions of the one and the silly hopes of the others. It would have been driving the republicans to despair, and encouraging the royalists to the most daring attempts. The committee of public welfare ordered the laws to be carried into effect,* and assuredly there were now no Mountaineers in its bosom; but it

* It was chiefly at Tallien's instigation that the French government came to this severe determination. In his speech to the Convention, on his return from Quiberon, he addressed the members in the following exciting terms:— "The emigrants, that vile assemblage of ruffians sustained by Pitt, those execrable authors of all our disasters, have been driven into the waves by the brave soldiers of the republic; but the waves have thrown them back upon the sword of the law. In vain have they sent forward some flags of truce to obtain conditions; what legal bond can exist between us and rebels, if it be not that of vengeance and death?" E.

felt the impossibility of doing otherwise. A commission, which met at Vannes, was directed to distinguish the prisoners enrolled against their will from the emigrants. The latter were shot. The soldiers allowed as many of them to escape as they could. Many brave men perished; but they had no right to complain of their fate, after they had carried war into their native land and been taken in arms. Had the republic been less threatened by foes of all sorts, and especially by their own accomplices, it might have pardoned them. Under existing circumstances, it could not do so. M. de Sombreuil, though a brave officer, gave way at the moment of death to an impulse unworthy of his courage. He wrote a letter to Commodore Warren, in which he accused Puisaye with all the vehemence of despair. He begged Hoche to transmit it to the commodore. Though it contained a false assertion, Hoche, complying with the request of a dying man, sent it to the commodore; but replied in a letter contradicting Sombreuil's assertion. "I was," said he, "at the head of Humbert's seven hundred grenadiers, and I declare that no capitulation was made." All his contemporaries who were acquainted with the character of the young general deemed him incapable of a lie. Eyewitnesses, moreover, confirm his assertion. Sombreuil's letter was extremely injurious to the emigrants and to Puisaye, and it was considered so far from honourable to the memory of the writer that it was asserted to have been forged by the republicans—an assertion every way worthy of the pitiful stories invented by the emigrants.

While the royalist party was suffering so severe a check at Quiberon, another was preparing for it in Spain. Moncey had once more entered Biscay, taken Bilboa and Vittoria, and was closely pressing Pampeluna. The favourite who governed the court, after having at first rejected an overture for peace, which the French government had made at the commencement of the campaign, but of which he had not been the channel, decided on negotiating, and sent the Chevalier d'Yriarte to Basle. Peace was signed at Basle with Barthelemy, the envoy of the republic, on the 24th of Messidor (July 12), at the very moment of the disasters at Quiberon. The conditions were, the restitution of all the conquests which France had made from Spain, and as an equivalent the cession of the Spanish part of St. Domingo. France made great concessions for a mere illusory advantage; for St. Domingo was no longer under the sway of any power; but these concessions were dictated by the wisest policy. France could not desire any thing beyond the Pyrenees; she had no interest in weakening Spain; she ought, on the contrary, had it been possible, to have restored to that power the strength which she had lost in a conflict so detrimental to the interests of both nations.

That peace was hailed with the greatest joy by all who wished

well to France and the republic. There was one more power detached from the coalition, a Bourbon who acknowledged the republic; and there were two disposable armies to send to the Alps, to the West, and upon the Rhine. The royalists were thunderstruck. The Paris agents, in particular, were apprehensive lest their intrigues should be divulged; they dreaded a communication of the letters which they had sent to Spain. England would there have seen all that they said of her; and though that power was loudly decried for the affair of Quiberon, yet she was now the only one that had money to give away: it was necessary therefore to keep on good terms with her, with the intention of cheating her, if it were possible.*

Another not less important success was that gained by the armies of Jourdan and Pichegru. After many delays, the passage of the Rhine was at length decided upon. The French and Austrian armies faced one another on the two banks of the river, from Basle to Düsseldorf. The defensive position of the Austrians upon the Rhine was an excellent one. The fortresses of Dusseldorf and Ehrenbreitstein covered their right; Mayence, Mannheim, and Philipsburg, covered their centre and their left: the Neckar and the Mayn, rising not far from the Danube and running in nearly a parallel direction towards the Rhine, formed two important lines of communication with the hereditary states, brought abundance of supplies, and covered the two flanks of the army that designed to act concentrically towards Mayence. The plan to be pursued in this field of battle was the same for the Austrians and the French: both—in the opinion of a great captain and a celebrated critic—ought to have endeavoured to act concentrically between the Mayn and the Neckar. The French armies of Jourdan and Pichegru ought to have attempted to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, not far from one another, to join in the valley of the Mayn, to separate Clairfayt from Wurmser; and to ascend between the Neckar and the Mayn, striving to beat in turn the two Austrian generals. In like manner, the two Austrian generals ought to have endeavoured to concentrate themselves, in order to debouch by Mayence upon the left bank and to fall upon Jourdan or Pichegru. If they had been anticipated, if the Rhine had been passed at one point, they ought to have concentrated themselves between the Neckar and the Mayn, to have prevented the two French armies from uniting, and to have seized some favourable moment to fall upon one or the other. The Austrian generals had all the advantage for taking the initiative, for they were in possession of Mayence, and could debouch on the left bank whenever they pleased.

The French took the initiative. After many delays, the Dutch craft having at length worked up as high as Düsseldorf, Jourdan prepared to cross the Rhine. On the 20th of Fructidor

* The 5th volume of Puisaye contains evidence to this effect.

(September 6), he passed it at Eichelcamp, Düsseldorf, and Neuwied, by a very bold manœuvre; he advanced by the road from Düsseldorf to Frankfort, between the line of Prussian neutrality and the Rhine, and arrived on the Lahn on the fourth complementary day (September 20). At the same moment, Pichegru had orders to attempt the passage on the Upper Rhine, and to summon Mannheim. That flourishing city, threatened with a bombardment, surrendered, contrary to all expectation, on the fourth complementary day (September 20). From that moment all the advantages would be on the side of the French. It would behove Pichegru, based upon Mannheim, to collect his whole army there and to join that of Jourdan in the valley of the Mayn. They would then be able to separate the two Austrian generals, and to act concentrically between the Mayn and the Neckar. It was of especial importance to draw Jourdan from his position between the line of neutrality and the Rhine, for as his army had not the means of transport necessary for conveying its provisions along with it, and could not treat the country like that of an enemy, it was likely soon to be in want of necessaries if he did not march forward.

Thus at this moment every thing was propitious to the republic. Peace with Spain, the destruction of the expedition sent by England to the coast of Bretagne, the passage of the Rhine, the offensive which had been carried on successfully in Germany—all these advantages she had at once. It was for her generals and her government to profit by so many fortunate events.

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST PARTY IN THE SECTIONS—DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION AND DECREES OF THE 3RD AND 15TH OF FRUCTIDOR—REVOLT OF THE SECTIONS OF PARIS AGAINST THOSE DECREES—OCCURRENCES OF THE 13TH OF VENDEMIAIRE—DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

THE royalist party, beaten on the frontiers, and deserted by the court of Spain, on which it placed most reliance, was now obliged to confine itself to intrigues in the interior; and it must be confessed that, at this moment, Paris offered a wide field for such intrigues. The work of the constitution was advancing; the time when the Convention was to resign its powers, when France should meet to elect fresh representatives, when a new Assembly should succeed that which had so long reigned, was more favourable than any other for counter-revolutionary manœuvres.

The most vehement passions were in agitation in the sections of Paris. The members of them were not royalists, but they served the cause of royalty without being aware of it. They had made a point of opposing the Terrorists; they had animated themselves by the conflict; they wished to persecute also; and they were exasperated against the Convention, which would not suffer this persecution to be carried too far. They were always ready to remember that Terror had sprung from its bosom; they demanded of it a constitution and laws, and the end of the long dictatorship which it had exercised. Most of those who demanded all this thought nothing whatever of the Bourbons. They belonged to the wealthy *tiers-état* of 1789; they were merchants, shopkeepers, landowners, advocates, writers, who wished at length for the establishment of the laws and the enjoyment of their rights; they were young men, sincerely republican, but blinded by their zeal against the revolutionary system; they were many of them ambitious men, newspaper-writers, or speakers in the sections, who, to gain a place for themselves, desired that the Convention should retire before them. Behind this mass the royalists concealed themselves. Among these were some emigrants, some returned priests, some creatures of the old court who had lost their situations, and many indifferent persons and poltroons, who dreaded a stormy liberty. These last did not frequent the sections; but the former attended them

diligently, and employed all possible means for exciting agitation among them. The instructions given by the royalist agents to their tools was to adopt the language of the sectionaries, to make the same demands, to insist like them on the punishment of the Terrorists, the completion of the constitution, the trial of the Mountaineer deputies, but to demand all these things with greater violence, so as to compromise the sections with the Convention and to provoke new commotions, for every commotion was a chance for them, and served at least to excite disgust of so tumultuous a republic.

Fortunately, such proceedings were not practicable except in Paris, for that is always the most agitated city in France. It is there that the public interests are discussed with most warmth, that people are fond of pretending to influence the government, and that opposition always commences. With the exception of Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon, where men were slaughtering one another, the rest of France took infinitely less share in these political agitations than the sections of Paris. To all that they said, or caused to be said, in the sections, the intriguers in the service of royalism added pamphlets and articles in newspapers.* They there lied, according to their custom, gave themselves an importance which they had not, and sent abroad letters stating that they had seduced the principal heads of the government. It was by these lies that they procured money, and that they had recently obtained some thousand pounds sterling from England. It is nevertheless certain that, if they had not gained either Tallien or Hoche, as they alleged, they had at least gained some members of the Convention, perhaps two or three, for instance, Rovère and Saladin, two fiery revolutionists, who had become violent reactors. It is likewise believed that they had touched by more delicate means some of those deputies holding middle opinions, who had some leaning towards a representative monarchy, that is, towards a Bourbon professedly bound by laws after the English fashion. To Pichegru had been offered a mansion, money, and cannon: to some legislators or members

* "Will the Convention," said one of the most eloquent of these royalist intriguers, "never be satisfied? Is a reign of three years, fraught with more crimes than the whole annals of twenty other nations, not sufficient for those who rose into power under the auspices of the 10th of August, and the 2nd of September? Is that power fit to repose under the shadow of the laws which has only lived in tempests? The Convention hitherto has done nothing but destroy; shall we now intrust it with the work of a Constitution? What reliance can be placed on the monstrous coalition between the proscribers and the proscribed? Irreconcilable enemies to each other, they have only entered into this semblance of alliance in order to resist those who hate them—that is, every man in France. Can two-thirds of the Convention be found who are not stained with blood? Shall we admit a majority of regicides into the new Assembly, intrust our liberty to cowards, our fortunes to the authors of so many acts of rapine, our lives to murderers? No; let us leave to the Convention its sins, and to our soldiers their triumphs, and the world will speedily do justice to both."—*Lacretelle.* E.

of the committees, it may have been said, "France is too extensive to be a republic; she would be much happier with a king, responsible ministers, hereditary peers, and deputies." This idea, were it even not suggested, could scarcely fail to occur to more than one person, especially to those who were qualified to become deputies or hereditary peers. Messrs. Lanjuinais and Boissy-d'Anglas, Henri Larivière, and Lesage of Eure and Loire, were then considered as secret royalists.

We thus see that the means of the agents were not very powerful; but they were sufficient to disturb the public tranquillity, to unsettle minds, and especially to recall to the memory of the French those Bourbons, the only enemies whom the republic still had, and whom its arms had not been able to conquer, because recollections are not to be destroyed with bayonets.

Among the seventy-three there was more than one monarchist; but in general they were republicans. The Girondins were all so, or nearly all. The counter-revolutionary journals, nevertheless, praised them with great warmth, and had thus succeeded in rendering them suspicious to the Thermidorians. To defend themselves from these praises, the seventy-three and the twenty-two protested their attachment to the republic; for at that time nobody durst speak coldly of the republic. What a frightful contradiction would it have been, in fact, if people had not loved it, to have sacrificed so much blood and treasure for its establishment, to have immolated thousands of Frenchmen either in civil war or in foreign war! Were not men forced to love it, or at least to say so? However, notwithstanding these protestations, the Thermidorians were distrustful; they reckoned only upon M. Daunou,* whose integrity and strict principles were well known, and on Louvet, whose ardent mind had continued to be republican. The latter, indeed, after losing so many illustrious friends, and incurring so many dangers, had no conception that all this could be in vain; he had no conception that so many valuable lives had been sacrificed to bring about royalty! He had cordially joined the Thermidorians. The Thermidorians united themselves from day to day with the Mountaineers, with that mass of unshaken republicans, a very great number of whom they had sacrificed.

They wished, in the first place, to provoke measures against the return of the emigrants, who continued to make their appearance in shoals, some with false passports and by fictitious

* "M. Daunou who was involved in the fall of the Girondins was readmitted into the Convention after the death of Robespierre, and became one of the commissioners for organizing the Constitution of 1795. He was afterwards chosen president of the council of Five Hundred, and was one of those who co-operated in the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. Daunou was one of the best orators of the latter French legislatures." — *Biographie Moderne.* E.

names, others upon pretext of coming to solicit their erasure. Almost all produced false certificates of residence, declared that they had not been out of France, and had merely concealed themselves, or that they had been proceeded against only on account of the events of the 31st of May. Upon pretext of soliciting the committee of general safety, they filled Paris, and some of them contributed to the agitations of the sections. Among the most distinguished personages who had returned to Paris was Madame de Staël, who had again made her appearance in France in company with her husband, the ambassador of Sweden. She had thrown open her drawing-room, where she felt an irresistible impulse to display her brilliant talents.* A republic was far from displeasing the boldness of her mind, provided she should see her proscribed friends shine in it; and on condition that those revolutionists should be excluded who passed no doubt for energetic men, but who were men of coarse and unpolished minds. There were others besides her, in fact, who were willing enough to receive from their hands the republic saved, but desirous to exclude them as speedily as possible from the tribune and the government. Foreigners of distinction, all the ambassadors, the literary men most celebrated for their abilities, assembled at the house of Madame de Staël. It was no longer Madame Tallien's drawing-room, but hers, that now attracted exclusive attention; and by this standard might be measured the change which French society had undergone during the last six months. It was said that Madame de Staël interceded for the emigrants; it was asserted that she wished to obtain the recall of Narbonne, Jaucourt, and several others. Legendre formally denounced her from the tribune. Complaints were made in the newspapers of the influence which coteries

* "'Madame de Staël,' said Napoleon, 'was a woman of considerable talent and great ambition; but so extremely intriguing and restless, as to give rise to the observation that she would throw her friends into the sea, that, at the moment of drowning, she might have an opportunity of saving them. Shortly after my return from the conquest of Italy, I was accosted by her in a large company, though at that time I avoided going out much in public. She followed me every where, and stuck so close that I could not shake her off. At last she asked me, 'Who is at this moment the first woman in the world?' intending to pay a compliment to me, and thinking that I would return it. I looked at her, and coldly replied, 'She who has borne the greatest number of children;' an answer which greatly confused her.' The Emperor concluded by observing that he could not call her a wicked woman, but that she was a restless intriguante, possessed of considerable talent and influence."—*Voice from St. Helena.* E.

"Madame de Staël possessed very superior powers of mind. She would have made a great man. I saw her once presented to Curran at Mackintosh's; it was the grand confluence between the Rhone and the Saone, and they were both so ugly, that I could not help wondering how the best intellects of France and Ireland could have taken up respectively such residences. Madame de Staël was a good woman at heart, but spoiled by a wish to be, she knew not what. In her own house she was amiable; in any other person's, you wished her gone, and in her own again."—*Moore's Life of Byron.* E.

formed around some of the foreign ambassadors were striving to exercise; and the suspension of the erasures was demanded. The Thermidorians obtained, moreover, a decree enjoining every emigrant, who had returned for the purpose of soliciting his erasure, to repair to his commune, and there await the decision of the committee of general safety. They hoped by this measure to rid the capital of a multitude of intriguers, who contributed to excite agitation there.

The Thermidorians wished at the same time to put a stop to the persecutions directed against the patriots. They had caused many of them, Pache, Bouchotte, and the notorious Heron, to be set at liberty by the committee of general safety. They might, it is true, have made a better choice than this last for the purpose of doing justice to the patriots. The sections had, as we have seen, already presented petitions on the subject of these enlargements; they now petitioned afresh. The committees replied that the patriots who were in confinement ought to be brought to trial, and not to be detained any longer if they were innocent. To propose their trial was to propose their enlargement, for their misdemeanors were generally those political misdemeanors which it is impossible to lay hold of. Setting aside some members of the revolutionary committees, who had distinguished themselves by atrocious excesses, the greater number could not legally be condemned. Several sections came to desire that a few days' delay should be granted them, that they might collect evidence to justify the apprehension and the disarming of those whom they had confined, alleging that, at the first moment, they had not been able either to seek proofs or to assign motives, and offering to furnish them. These propositions which cloaked the desire to assemble and to obtain the delay, were not listened to; and a *projet* for bringing to trial the detained patriots was demanded of the committees.

A violent dispute arose concerning this *projet*. Some were for sending the patriots before the tribunals of the departments; others, distrusting local passions, rejected this mode of trial, and proposed that a commission of twelve members should be chosen from among the Convention, to investigate the cases of the detained persons, to release those against whom the charges preferred were insufficient, and to send the others before the criminal tribunals. They alleged that this commission, strangers to the animosities which agitated the departments, would do better justice, and not confound the patriots compromised by the ardour of their zeal with the guilty men who had participated in the cruelties of the decemviral tyranny. All the violent enemies of the patriots condemned the idea of this commission which was likely to do as the committee of general safety, renewed after the 9th of Thermidor, had done, namely, to release *en masse*. They asked how it was possible for that commission of twelve members to investigate twenty or twenty-five thousand

cases. In reply to this question, they were merely told that it would do like the committee of general safety, which had tried eighty or one hundred thousand at the opening of the prisons. But it was precisely this mode of trial that was found fault with. After a discussion of several days, intermingled with petitions, each bolder than the other, it was at length decided that the patriots should be tried by the tribunals of the departments, and the decree was sent to the committees to have some of its secondary arrangements modified. It was found necessary also to consent to the continuation of the report concerning the deputies compromised in their missions. The Assembly decreed the arrest of Lequinio, Lanot, Lefiot, Dupin, Bô, Piorry, Maxieu, Chaudron-Rousseau, Laplanche, Fouché, and proceedings were commenced against Lebon. At this moment the Convention had as many of its members in prison as in the time of Terror. Thus the partisans of clemency had nothing to regret, and had returned evil for evil.

The constitution had been presented by the commission of eleven. It was discussed during the three months of Messidor, Thermidor, and Fructidor, and was successively decreed with very little alteration. Its authors were Lesage, Daunou, Boissy-d'Anglas, Creuzé-Latouche, Berlier, Louvet, Lareveillère-Lepeaux, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillanne,* Baudin of the Ardennes, and Thibaudeau. Sieyes had declined to form part of that commission, because, on the subject of a constitution, his notions were more peculiar than on any other. Constitutions were the object of the reflections of his whole life. They were his particular vocation. He had one ready made in his head, and he was not a man to sacrifice it. He came therefore to propose it apart from the commission. The Assembly, out of respect for his genius, consented to listen, but did not adopt it. We shall see it brought forward on a subsequent occasion, and it will then be time to make the reader acquainted with that conception, remarkable in the history of the human understanding. That which was adopted was analogous to the progress which the public mind had made. In 1791, men were yet such novices and so benevolent, that they could not conceive the existence of an aristocratic body controlling the will of the national representation, and they had nevertheless admitted and retained with respect, nay almost with affection, the royal power. On reflec-

* "Durand-Maillane, a barrister, was deputy to the Convention, and voted for the King's confinement, and his banishment on the conclusion of peace. After the fall of Robespierre he inveighed bitterly against the Jacobins, and in 1795 was appointed to complete the committee of eleven. Being elected into the council of Ancients, he spoke in favour of the relations of emigrants. After the revolution of Brumaire he was made judge of the court of appeal at Aix, an office which he continued to hold in the year 1806. He was the author of several works, and, among others, of a 'Dictionary of Canon Law.'" —*Biographie Moderne.* E.

tion, however, they would have seen that an aristocratic body is of all countries, and that it is more particularly adapted to republics; that a great state may do very well without a king, but that it can never do without a senate. In 1795, they had just witnessed the disorders to which a single assembly is liable, and they consented to the establishment of a legislative body divided into two assemblies; they were then less irritated against aristocracy than against royalty, because in fact they felt most dread of the latter. Accordingly, they took more care to defend themselves against it in the composition of an executive power. There was in the commission a monarchical party, consisting of Lesage, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillanne, and Boissy-d'Anglas. This party proposed a president. The idea was rejected. "Some day, perhaps," said Louvet, "you will have a Bourbon proposed to you." Baudin of the Ardennes and Daunou proposed two consuls; others proposed three. The preference was given to five directors deciding by a majority. To this executive power were given none of the essential attributes of royalty, as inviolability, the sanction of the laws, the judicial power, the right of peace and war. It had the mere inviolability of the deputies, the promulgation and the execution of the laws, the direction, not the voting, of war, the negotiation, and not the ratification, of treaties.

Such was the basis on which the directorial constitution was founded. The Assembly in consequence decreed:

A Council, called *The Council of the Five Hundred*, composed of five hundred members, of at least thirty years of age, having exclusively the right of proposing laws, one-third to be renewed every year;

A Council, called *The Council of the Ancients*, composed of two hundred and fifty members, of at least forty years of age, all either widowers or married, having the sanction of the laws, to be renewed also by one-third;

An executive Directory, composed of five members, deciding by a majority, to be renewed annually by one-fifth, having responsible ministers, promulgating the laws and enforcing their execution, having the disposal of the military and naval forces, the foreign affairs, the authority of repelling the first hostilities, but not the power to make war without the consent of the legislative body; negotiating treaties and submitting them to the ratification of the legislative body, excepting secret articles which it should have the authority to stipulate if they were not destructive of the patent articles.

The mode of nominating these powers was the following: All the citizens of the age of twenty-one met of right in primary assembly on every first day of the month of Prairial, and nominated electoral assemblies. These electoral assemblies met every 20th of Prairial, and nominated the two Councils; and the two Councils nominated the Directory. It was conceived that

the executive power, being nominated by the legislative power, would be more dependent upon it; there was, moreover, a reason deduced from circumstances. The republic being not as yet interwoven into the habits of France, and being rather an opinion of enlightened men or of persons compromised in the Revolution than a general sentiment, the framers of the new constitution would not intrust the composition of the executive power to the great mass. During the first years especially, the authors of the Revolution, naturally predominating in the legislative body, would choose directors capable of defending their work.

The judicial authority was committed to elective judges. Justices of the peace were instituted. A civil tribunal was established in each department, trying in first instance the causes of the department, and in appeal those of the contiguous departments. There was added a criminal court, composed of five judges and a jury.

There were to be no communal assemblies, but municipal and departmental administrations, composed of three, five, or more members, according to the population: they were to be formed by way of election. Experience led to the adoption of accessory arrangements of great importance. Thus the legislative body designated its residence itself, and might transfer it to any commune that it should think fit to select. No law could be discussed till it had been read three times, unless it was specified to be a measure of urgency and was acknowledged as such by the Council of the Ancients. It was a method of preventing those very sudden resolutions, so speedily rescinded, which the Convention had so frequently taken. Lastly, every society calling itself popular, holding public meetings, having a bureau, tribunes, affiliations, was prohibited. The press was entirely free. The emigrants were banished for ever from the territory of the republic; the national domains were irrevocably secured to the purchasers; all religions were declared free, but were neither acknowledged nor paid by the state.

Such was the constitution by which it was hoped to keep France a republic. One important question was started. The Constituent Assembly, from a parade of disinterestedness, had excluded itself from the new legislative body; would the Convention do the same? Such a determination, it must be confessed, would have been the height of imprudence. Among a fickle people, who, after living fourteen centuries under monarchy, had overthrown it in a moment of enthusiasm, the republic was not so ingrafted upon their manners that its establishment might be left to the mere course of things. The Revolution could not be well defended except by its authors. The Convention was chiefly composed, of Constituents and members of the Legislative Assembly: it comprehended the men who had abolished the ancient feudal constitution on the 14th of July and the 4th of August, 1789, who had demolished the throne on the 10th of

August, who had sacrificed the head of the Bourbon dynasty on the 21st of January, and who had for three years been making unparalleled efforts against all Europe to uphold their work. They alone were capable of effectively defending the Revolution consecrated in the directorial constitution. Thus, without priding themselves upon a vain disinterestedness, they decreed on the 5th of Fructidor (August 22nd), that the new legislative body should be composed of two-thirds of the Convention, and that one new third only should be elected. The question to be decided was whether the Convention should itself designate the two-thirds to be retained, or whether it should leave that duty to the electoral assemblies. After a tremendous dispute, it was agreed on the 13th of Fructidor (August 30th), that this choice should be left to the electoral assemblies. It was decided that the primary assemblies should meet on the 20th of Fructidor (September 6th), to accept the constitution and the two decrees of the 5th and the 13th of Fructidor. It was likewise decided that, after giving their votes upon the constitution and the decrees, the primary assemblies should again meet and proceed forthwith, that is to say in the year III (1795), to the elections for the 1st of Prairial in the following year. The Convention hereby gave notice that it was about to resign the dictatorship, and to put the constitution into operation. It decreed, moreover, that the armies, though usually denied the right of deliberating, should nevertheless assemble on the fields of battle which they should occupy at the moment, for the purpose of voting the constitution. It was but fair, it was said, that those who had defended should be allowed to vote upon it. This was interesting the armies in the Revolution by their very vote.

No sooner were these resolutions adopted, than the enemies of the Convention, so numerous and so diverse, were deeply mortified by them. Most of them cared little about the constitution.* Any constitution would have suited them, provided that it had occasioned a general renewal of all the members of the government. The royalists wished for this renewal, in order to produce disturbance, to bring together the greatest possible number of persons of their choice, and to make the very republic subservient to the cause of royalty: they wished for it more especially in order to get rid of the Conventionalists, so deeply interested in opposing counter-revolution, and to bring forward new men, inexperienced, not compromised, and more easy to be seduced. Many literary men, writers, unknown persons,

* "This constitution communicated new energy to the government and liberty to the people, and held out the promise of peace to all parties, if they would only have remained content with their proper stations in the government, without recurring to the past or looking forward to exclusive dominion. But its duration was as brief as the others which preceded it, for it was unable to establish the authority of the law against the wishes of the different factions, all of which aspired to the government."—*Mignet.* E.

eager to enter upon the political career, not from a spirit of counter-revolution, but from personal ambition, were also desirous of this complete renewal, that there might be a greater number of places for them to occupy. Both these classes mingled among the sections, and excited them against the decrees. The Convention, they said, was determined to cling to power; it talked of the rights of the people, and yet postponed the exercise of them for an indefinite period; it commanded their choice, and would not permit them to prefer the men who were unstained by crimes; it wished to retain by force a majority composed of men who had covered France with scaffolds. Thus, they added, the new legislature would not be purged from all the Terrorists, thus France would not feel quite secure respecting the future, and could not be certain that a horrible system might not be revived. These declamations produced an effect upon many minds; the whole of the *bourgeoisie* of the sections, who were satisfied with the new institutions such as they were given to them, but who had an excessive dread of the return of Terror; sincere but unreflecting men, who dreamt of a faultless republic, and wished to see a new and unstained generation in power; young men smitten with the same chimeras; many, in short, were desirous of novelty, and saw with the keenest regret the Convention retained in power for two or three years longer. The tribe of newspaper-writers was in commotion. A great number of men who possessed a rank in literature, and who had figured in the former assemblies, appeared in the tribunes of the sections. Messrs. Suard, Morellet, Lacretelle, junior,* Fievée, Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dupont de Nemours, Quatremère de Quincy, Delalot, the fiery convert Laharpe, General Miranda, who had escaped from the prisons in which he had been confined for his conduct at Neerwinden, Marchenna, the Spaniard, saved from the proscription of his friends, the Girondins, Lemaître, the head of the royalist agency, signalized themselves by pamphlets or by vehement speeches in the sections. The dissatisfaction was universal.

The plan to be pursued was quite simple—to accept the constitution, and to reject the decrees. This was what people proposed to do in Paris, and what all the sections in France were exhorted to do also. But the intriguers who agitated the sections, and who wished to urge opposition forward to insurrection, desired a more extensive plan. They wished that the primary assemblies, after they had accepted the constitution and rejected

* "Lacretelle, the younger, was the author of an historical account of the Revolution, and assisted in editing several journals of moderate principles. In 1795 he was proscribed for having declared against the Convention in the sectional electoral assembly of Paris, and was afterwards arrested and confined for two years at La Force and the Temple. In 1809 he was a member of the press-office."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

the decrees of the 5th and 13th of Fructidor, should constitute themselves in permanence; that they should declare the powers of the Convention to have expired, and the electoral assemblies free to elect as deputies whomsoever they pleased; lastly, that they should not consent to separate till after the installation of the new legislative body. The agents of Lemaître circulated this plan in the environs of Paris: they wrote to Normandy, where there was much intriguing in favour of the constitution of 1791, to Bretagne, to the Gironde, and to every quarter with which they had relations. One of their letters was seized and read publicly from the tribune. The Convention saw without alarm the preparations making against it, and awaited with calmness the decision of the primary assemblies of all France, certain that the majority would declare in its favour. Nevertheless, suspecting the intention of a new commotion, it ordered some troops to advance, and collected them in the camp of Sablons, near Paris.*

The section of Lepelletier, formerly of St. Thomas, could not fail to distinguish itself on this occasion: it came with those of the Mail, the Butte-des-Moulins, the Champs Elysées, and the Théâtre Français (the Odeon), to present petitions to the Assembly. They all agreed in asking if the Parisians had proved themselves unworthy of confidence, since troops were assembled; they complained that violence was done to their right of election, and employed these insolent expressions—"Deserve our choice, and do not command it." The Convention replied in a firm manner to all these addresses, and merely said that it waited with respect the manifestation of the national will, to which it would submit as soon as it should be known, and to which it would oblige every one else to submit.

The first care of the discontented was to establish a central point for communicating with all the sections, in order to give them one common impulsion, and thus to organize the insurrection. They had examples sufficient before their eyes, to know that this was the very first thing to be thought of. The section of Lepelletier constituted itself the centre; it had a right to this honour, for it had always been the most ardent. It commenced by publishing an act of guarantee equally ill-judged and useless The powers of the constituent body, it said, ceased in presence of the sovereign people; the primary assemblies represented the

* "The Convention perceiving the storm to be gathering, sought assistance and support from the army, which then constituted the great republican class, and whose camp was pitched under the walls of Paris. The multitude had been disorganized, and the citizens gained over by the royalists. The contest soon after became general, but in Paris they distinguished between the act for the establishment of the constitution which they were disposed to adopt, and the decree of re-election which they determined to reject."—*Mignet.* E.

sovereign people; they had a right to express any opinion whatever concerning the constitution and its decrees; they were under the safeguard of each other; and they owed to one another the reciprocal guarantee of their independence. Nobody denied this, except one modification which it was necessary to add to these maxims; namely, that the constituent body retained its powers, till the decision of the majority was known. Beyond this, these vain generalities were only a medium for arriving at another measure. The section of Lepelletier proposed to the forty-eight sections of Paris to nominate each of them a commissioner, to express the sentiments of the citizens of the capital on the constitution and the decrees. Here commenced the infraction of the laws; for the primary assemblies were forbidden to communicate with, and to send commissioners or addresses to, one another. The Convention cancelled the resolution, and declared that it should consider its execution as an attack upon the public safety.

The sections being not yet sufficiently imboldened, gave way, and set about collecting the votes on the constitution and the decrees. They began by expelling, without any legal form, the patriots who came among them to give their votes. In some, they were merely put out at the door of the hall; in others, it was notified to them by posting-bills that they were expected to stay at home, for, if they showed their faces at the section, they would be ignominiously turned out. The persons thus prevented from exercising their rights were very numerous: they thronged to the Convention, to complain of the violence that was done them. The Convention disapproved the conduct of the sections, but refused to interfere, that it might not appear to canvass for votes, and that the very abuse might prove the freedom of the deliberation. The patriots, driven from their sections, had sought refuge in the tribunes of the Convention; they occupied them in great numbers, and daily solicited the committees to restore to them their arms, declaring that they were ready to use them in defence of the republic.

All the sections of Paris, excepting that of the Quinze-Vingts, accepted the constitution and rejected the decrees. The result was not the same in the rest of France. The opposition, as it always happens, was less violent in the provinces than in the capital. The royalists, the intriguers, the ambitious men, who had an interest in urging the renewal of the legislative body and the government, were not numerous any where but in Paris; accordingly, in the provinces, the assemblies were calm, though perfectly free; they adopted the constitution almost unanimously, and the decrees by a great majority. As for the armies, they received the constitution with enthusiasm in Bretagne and La Vendée, at the foot of the Alps, and on the Rhine.* They were full of

* "The Constitution was unanimously adopted by the soldiers; for mili-

men devoted to the Revolution, and attached to it by the very sacrifices which they had made for it. That animosity manifested in Paris against the revolutionary government was wholly unknown in the armies. The requisitionists of 1793, with whom they were filled, had not ceased to cherish the glorious memory of that famous committee, which had guided and subsisted them so much better than the new government. Torn from private life, accustomed to defy hardships and death, fed with glory and illusions, they still had that enthusiasm which began to subside in the interior of France: they were proud to call themselves the soldiers of a republic which they had defended against all the kings of Europe, and which was, in some measure, their work. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by Jourdan, shared the nobleness of sentiment of its brave leader. It was this army that had conquered at Watignies and raised the blockade of Maubeuge; it was this that had conquered at Fleurus and given Belgium to France; it was this which, by the victories of the Ourthe and the Roer, had just given to France the line of the Rhine; it had deserved best of the republic, and was most attached to it. This army had just crossed the Rhine, it halted on the field of battle, and sixty thousand men were seen accepting at once the new republican constitution.

These tidings arrived successively at Paris, where they rejoiced the Convention and deeply mortified the sectionaries. They came every day to present addresses, in which they communicated the vote of their assembly, and proclaimed with insulting joy that the constitution was accepted, and that the decrees were rejected. The patriots, who crowded the tribunes, murmured; but presently the reports sent by the departments were read, almost all signifying the acceptance of the constitution and of the decrees. The patriots then burst forth into furious applause, and by their peals of joy nettled the petitioners of the sections seated at the bar. The last days of Fructidor passed in scenes of this kind. At length, on the 1st of Vendemiaire, year IV (September 23, 1795), the general result of the votes was proclaimed.

The constitution was accepted almost unanimously, and the decrees by an immense majority of the voters. Some thousands of voices, however, had been raised against the decrees, and here and there some had dared to demand a king—a sufficient proof that the utmost freedom had prevailed in the primary assemblies. On the same day, the Convention solemnly declared that the constitution and the decrees were laws of the state. This declaration was followed by prolonged applause.

tary men, who are in the habit of obedience, and of taking the lead from others, generally (unless indeed it be in periods of extreme popular agitation) adopt any form of government that is recommended to them by their officers."—*Lacretelle*. E.

The Convention then decreed that the primary assemblies which had not yet chosen their electors should finish their nomination before the 10th of Vendemiaire (October 2); that the electoral assemblies should meet on the 20th, and conclude their operations at latest by the 29th (October 21); and lastly, that the new legislative body should meet on the 15th of Brumaire (November 6).

This intelligence was a thunderclap to the sectionaries. They had hoped till the last moment that France would give a vote similar to that of Paris, and that they should be delivered from what they called the two-thirds; but the last decree left them without a gleam of hope. Affecting to believe that there was some mistake in the casting up of the votes, they sent commissioners to the committee of decrees to verify the statements. This derogatory application was not unfavourably received. The committee consented to show them the official statements, and to allow them to cast up the votes; they found the enumeration to be correct. From that moment they had no ground for that unlucky objection of a mistake or a wilful error in the summing up; and they had nothing left for it but insurrection. But this was a violent measure, and it was not easy to resolve upon it. The ambitious persons, who were desirous of removing the men of the Revolution, that they might take their places in the republican government; the young men, who were anxious to display their courage, and most of whom had served in the army; and lastly, the royalists, who had no other resource than an attack by main force; could cheerfully expose themselves to the risk of a combat: but the mass of peaceable individuals, urged to figure in the sections by fear of the Terrorists rather than by political courage, were not easy to decide. In the first place, the insurrection was not consistent with their principles. How, in fact, could the enemies of anarchy attack the established and acknowledged power? The parties, it is true, cared little about contradictions; but how could tradesmen, who had never been out of their shops or their counting-houses, dare to attack troops of the line, provided with cannon! The intriguing royalists and the ambitious, nevertheless, introduced themselves into the sections, talked of public interest and honour, said that there was no safety in being still governed by Conventionalists, that they would still be exposed to Terrorism; that, besides, it was disgraceful to yield, and to suffer themselves to be subdued. They addressed themselves to the vanity of the sectionaries. The young men who had come back from the armies blustered a great deal, hurried the timid along, and prevented them from expressing their fears; and every preparation was made for a decisive stroke. Groups of young men paraded the streets, shouting, "Down with the two-thirds!" When the soldiers of the Convention attempted to disperse them, and to prevent them from

setting up seditious cries, they replied with the fire of musketry. There were different riots, and several muskets were fired in the very heart of the Palais Royal.

Lemaître and his colleagues, perceiving the success of their plans, had brought several Chouan chiefs and a certain number of emigrants to Paris: they kept them concealed, and awaited only the first signal to cause them to show themselves. They had succeeded in exciting commotions at Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Verneuil, and Nonancourt. At Chartres, Letellier, a representative, being unable to quell a riot, had blown out his brains. Though these disturbances had been repressed, success in Paris might induce a general movement. Nothing was neglected to foment one, and the success of the conspirators was soon complete.

The plan of the insurrection was not yet resolved upon, but the honest tradesmen of Paris suffered themselves by degrees to be led away by the young men and the intriguers. Proceeding from bravado to bravado, they presently found themselves inextricably entangled. The section of Lepelletier was still the most agitated. The first thing to be done, before thinking of any attempt, was, as we have observed, to establish a central direction. The means of effecting this had long been sought after. It was conceived that the assembly of the electors, chosen by all the primary assemblies of Paris, might become this central authority; but, according to the late decree, this assembly was not to meet before the 20th. Unwilling to wait so long, the section of Lepelletier then devised a resolution, founded on a very singular motive. The constitution, it said, placed an interval of twenty days only between the meeting of the primary assemblies and that of the electoral assemblies. The primary assemblies had met this time on the 20th of Fructidor; the electoral assemblies ought consequently to meet on the 10th of Vendemiaire. Now the Convention had fixed this meeting for the 20th; but this was evidently for the purpose of postponing still longer the carrying of the constitution into effect, and the sharing of power with the new third. In consequence, to provide a safeguard for the rights of the citizens, the section of Lepelletier passed a resolution that the electors already chosen should meet forthwith; this resolution it communicated to the other sections, in order to obtain their approval of it. It was approved by several of them. The meeting was fixed for the 11th at the Théâtre Français (the Odeon).

On the 11th of Vendemiaire (October 3), part of the electors met in the theatre, under the protection of some battalions of the national guard.* A multitude of inquisitive persons, collected

* "The electors, of whom the Duke de Nivernois was appointed president, met under the protection of a few detachments of light troops and grenadiers. The Convention being apprized of these dangerous proceedings, immediately

in the Place de l'Odeon, and soon formed a considerable concourse. The committees of general and public welfare, and the three representatives, who, since the 4th of Prairial, had retained the direction of the armed force, always met on important occasions. They hastened to the Convention, to denounce to it this first step, which evidently denoted a plan of insurrection. The Convention had assembled to hold a funeral solemnity in its hall in honour of the unfortunate Girondins. A motion was made to postpone the ceremony. Tallien opposed it; he said that it would not be worthy of the Assembly to suffer its proceeding to be interrupted, and that it ought to attend to its accustomed duties amidst all dangers. A decree was passed by which any meeting of electors, formed either in an illegal manner, or before the prescribed time or for a purpose foreign to its electoral functions, was enjoined to disperse. To open an outlet for those who might feel disposed to withdraw, the decree added that all those who had been hurried into illegal proceedings, and should return immediately to their duty, should be exempt from prosecution. Some police-officers escorted by only six dragoons, were immediately sent to the Place de l'Odeon to proclaim the decrees. The committees were anxious to avoid as much as possible the employment of force. The crowd had increased at the Odeon, especially towards night. The interior of the theatre was ill-lighted; a multitude of sectionaries filled the boxes; those who took an active part in the events were walking about on the stage in agitation. They durst not deliberate or decide upon any thing. On learning the arrival of the officers sent to read the decree, all ran out to the Place de l'Odeon. The mob had already surrounded them; it rushed upon them, extinguished the torches which they had brought, and obliged the dragoons to sheer off. They then went back into the theatre, congratulating themselves on this success: speeches were made; they promised one another with an oath to resist tyranny, but no measure was taken in support of the decisive step upon which they had just ventured. The night advanced; many of the spectators and the sectionaries withdrew: the theatre got gradually clearer, and was soon left quite empty on the approach of the armed force. The committees had in fact ordered General Menou, appointed since the 4th of Prairial commander of the army of the interior, to despatch a column from the camp of Sablons. This column arrived with two pieces of cannon, and found not a creature either in the Place or in the theatre of the Odeon.

This scene, though without any important result, had nevertheless produced a great sensation. The sectionaries had tried their strength, and had mustered some courage, as is always the case

declared itself permanent, summoned the camp of Sablons to its defence, and appointed a committee of five members with power to adopt every necessary measure for the public safety."—*Mignet.* E.

after a first indiscretion. The Convention and its partisans had beheld with alarm the occurrences of that day, and, more ready to give credit to their adversaries for resolutions than their adversaries were to form them, they had no longer any doubt of the insurrection. The patriots, dissatisfied with the Convention, which had treated them so roughly, but full of their accustomed ardour, felt that they ought to sacrifice their resentments to their cause, and hastened the very same night in multitudes to the committees to offer their aid and to apply for arms. Some had been released from the prisons only on the preceding day, others had just been excluded from the primary assemblies: all had the strongest motives for zeal.* They were joined by a great number of officers struck out of the army-list by Aubry, the reactor. The Thermidorians still predominating in the committees and cordially reconciled with the Mountain, did not hesitate to accept the offers of the patriots. Their opinion was supported by more than one Girondin. Louvet, at one of the meetings which had taken place at the house of a common friend of the Girondins and the Thermidorians, had already proposed to arm the faubourgs again, and even to put the Jacobins once more in operation, with the proviso to silence them again if it should be deemed necessary. No hesitation was consequently felt to deliver arms to all the citizens who applied for them; and, in order to furnish them with officers, those who were at the moment in Paris without employment were given them; the old and brave General Berruyer was appointed to command them. This arming was effected on the morning of the 12th; and tidings of it spread immediately throughout the quarters. This was an excellent pretext for the agitators of the sections, who wished to compromise the peaceful citizens of Paris. The Convention meant, they said, to renew the Reign of Terror; it had just rearmed the Terrorists; it was about to set them upon the honest men; property and person were no longer safe. They ought to lose no time in arming to defend themselves. Accordingly the sections of Lepelletier, the Butte des Moulins, the Contrat Social, the Théâtre Français, the Luxembourg, the Rue Poissonnière, Brutus, and the Temple, declared themselves in rebellion, caused the *générale* to beat in their quarters, and enjoined all the citizens of the national guard to join their battalions and to maintain the public safety, threatened by the Terrorists. The section of Lepelletier immediately constituted itself in permanence, and became the centre of all the counter-revolutionary intrigues. The drums and the clamourers of the sections spread themselves throughout Paris with singular audacity, and gave the signal for insur-

* "The revolutionists had for some time ceased to be feared, and those who had been imprisoned for the events of May, had in consequence been released. From fifteen to eighteen hundred, who had been prosecuted either at Paris, or in the departments, were enrolled under the name of the Battalion of the Patriots of Eighty-Nine."—*Mignet.* E.

rection. The citizens, thus excited by the reports that were circulated, repaired in arms to their sections, ready to comply with all the suggestions of imprudent youths and of a perfidious faction.

The Convention immediately declared itself permanent, and charged its committees to provide for the public safety and the execution of the decrees. It repealed the law which enjoined the disarming of the patriots, and thus legalized the measures adopted by its committees; but at the same time it issued a proclamation to calm the inhabitants of Paris, and to give them confidence in its intentions, and in the patriotism of those to whom it had just restored arms.

The committees, seeing that the section of Lepelletier was becoming the focus of all the intrigues, and that it would probably soon be the head-quarters of the rebels, determined that this section should be surrounded and disarmed that very day. Menou again received orders to leave Sablons with a corps of troops and artillery. General Menou, a good officer, a kind-hearted and moderate citizen, had had a very arduous and turbulent time during the Revolution. When employed in La Vendée, he had been exposed to all the annoyances of the Ronsin party. Upon being summoned to Paris, and threatened with a trial, he had owed his life only to the events of the 9th of Thermidor. Being appointed general of the army of the interior on the 4th of Prairial, and ordered to march upon the faubourgs, he had then had to fight men who were his natural enemies, who were moreover condemned by public opinion, who in their violence were too careless of the lives of others for any one to be very scrupulous about sacrificing theirs: but on this occasion it was the brilliant population of the capital, it was the youth of the best families, it was in short the class that forms the public opinion, which he had to mow down, if it persisted in its imprudence. He was therefore in a cruel perplexity, as the weak man almost always is, who cannot either make up his mind to resign his place, or resolve upon a rigorous execution of his duty. He set his columns in motion very late; he gave the sections time to proclaim whatever they pleased during the daytime of the 12th; he then began secretly to parley with some of their leaders instead of acting; he even declared to the three representatives charged with the direction of the armed force, that he would not have the battalion of the patriots under his command. The representatives replied that that battalion was under the exclusive command of General Berruyer. They urged him to act, without yet denouncing his backwardness and indecision to the two committees. They observed, moreover, the like repugnance in more than one officer, and among others in the two generals of brigade Despierre and Debar, who were not at their post, upon pretext of illness. At length, towards night, Menou advanced, with

Laporte, the representative, against the section of Lepelletier. It was sitting at the convent of the Filles St. Thomas, which stood on the site now occupied by the handsome edifice of the New Exchange. Menou went thither through the Rue Vivienne. He crowded his infantry, his cavalry, and his artillery, together in that street, and placed himself in a position, where he could scarcely have fought at all, encompassed by the multitude of the sectionaries, who closed all the outlets and filled the windows of the houses. Menou ordered his cannon to draw up before the door of the convent, and entered the very hall of the section with Laporte and a battalion. The members of the section, instead of forming a deliberative assembly, were armed and ranged in line, having their president, M. Delalot, at their head. General Menou and Laporte addressed them and demanded the surrender of their arms; they refused it. Delalot, observing the hesitation with which this summons was made, replied with warmth, addressed with great presence of mind some well-timed remarks to Menou's soldiers, and declared that, before they should wrest its arms from the section, they must proceed to the last extremities. To fight in so narrow a space, or to retire for the purpose of battering the hall with cannon, was a painful alternative. However, had Menou spoken with firmness and pointed his guns, it is doubtful whether the resolution of the sectionaries would have held out to the end. Menou and Laporte preferred a capitulation.* They promised to withdraw the troops of the Convention, on condition that the section would immediately disperse. It promised, or feigned to promise, that it would, and part of the battalion filed off for the purpose of retiring. Menou, on his part, started with his troops, and led back his columns, which had great difficulty to force a passage through the crowd which filled the contiguous quarters. While he had the weakness to give way to the firmness of the section of Lepelletier, the latter had returned to the place of its meetings, and, proud of its resistance, was encouraged still more in its rebellion. A report was instantly circulated that the decrees were not executed, that the insurrection remained victorious, that the troops were returning without enforcing the authority of the

* "In the evening General Menou proceeded with his troops to the place of meeting of the section Lepelletier. The infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were all crowded together in the Rue Vivienne. The sectionaries occupied the windows of the houses of this street; several of their battalions drew up in order of battle, and the military force which Menou commanded found itself compromised. In consequence, the general withdrew by a species of capitulation, without having dispersed or disarmed the meeting. Bonaparte, was in a box at the theatre Feydeau, when some of his friends came to inform him of the singular events that were passing. He was curious to witness the particulars of the spectacle. Seeing the conventional troops repulsed, he hastened to the Assembly, to observe the effect of this intelligence. The Convention was in the greatest agitation, loudly accused Menou of treason, and placed him under arrest."—*Las Cases.* E.

Convention. A multitude of the witnesses of this scene hastened to the tribunes of the Assembly, which was in permanence, and apprized the deputies of it. An outcry arose on all sides, "We are betrayed! we are betrayed! summon General Menou to the bar!" The committees were directed to attend and furnish explanations.

At this moment, the committees, informed of what was passing, were in the greatest agitation. It was proposed to arrest Menou and to try him immediately. That, however, would not have remedied the evil: the point was to make amends for what he had neglected to do; but forty members, discussing measures of execution, were not likely to agree and to act with the necessary vigour and precision. Neither were three representatives charged with the direction of the armed force a sufficiently energetic authority. The idea occurred of appointing a chief, as on decisive occasions: and at that moment, which brought to mind all the dangers of Thermidor, the Assembly bethought itself of Barras, the deputy, who, as general of brigade, had been invested with the command on that famous day, and had acquitted himself with all the energy that could be desired. Barras was tall in stature, had a powerful voice, could not make long speeches, but excelled in producing off hand a few energetic and vehement sentences, which conveyed the idea of a resolute and devoted man. He was appointed general of the army of the interior, and the three representatives previously charged with the direction of the armed force were given to him as assistants. One circumstance rendered this selection a most fortunate one. Barras had about him an officer perfectly capable of commanding, and he was not so jealous as to keep in the back-ground a man who possessed greater abilities than himself. All the deputies who had been on mission to the army of Italy knew the young officer of artillery who had achieved the reduction of Toulon, the fall of Saorgio, and the lines of the Royalists. This young officer, promoted to general of brigade, had been dismissed by Aubry, and he was in Paris, unemployed, and reduced almost to indigence.* He had been introduced to

* "On Bonaparte's return to Paris, he was in very destitute circumstances. From time to time he received remittances, I suspect, from his brother Joseph; but with all his economy, these supplies were insufficient. He was therefore in absolute distress. Junot used often to speak of the six months they passed together in Paris at this time. When they took an evening stroll on the boulevard, which used to be the resort of young men, mounted on fine horses, and displaying all the luxuries which they were permitted to show at that time, Bonaparte would declaim against fate, and express his contempt for the dandies, who, as they rode past, would eulogize in ecstasy, the manner in which Madame Scio sang. 'And is it on such beings as these,' he would say, 'that fortune confers her favours? Heavens, how contemptible is human nature!' His friend Junot used sometimes to resort to the gaming-table; he was often successful, and on these occasions he and Bonaparte used to make merry, and pay off their most pressing debts. The latter was at that time attired in the costume he wore almost ever after. He had on a gray great-coat very plainly made, buttoned up to his chin; a round hat which was

Madame Tallien, who had received him with her wonted kindness, and even solicited in his behalf. He was slender in person, below the ordinary height, and his cheeks were hollow and livid; but his fine features, his fixed and piercing eyes, and his firm and original language, attracted notice. He often spoke of a decisive theatre of war, where the republic would find victories and peace—that was Italy. He was incessantly recurring to this subject; therefore, when the lines of the Apennines were lost under Kellermann, the committee sent for him to ask his opinion. From that time he was employed in writing despatches, and was attached to the direction of the military operations. Barras thought of him in the night of the 12th of Vendemiaire; he applied for him as second in command, and his wish was complied with. The two appointments, submitted the same night to the Convention, were instantly approved.* Barras committed the superintendence of the military arrangements to the young general, who immediately took them all upon himself, and set about giving orders with extreme activity.

The *générale* had continued to beat in all the quarters. Emissaries had gone about boasting of the resistance of the section of Lepelletier, exaggerating its dangers, persuading people that these dangers were common to all the sections, piquing their honour, and exciting them to rival the grenadiers of the quarter of St. Thomas. People had thronged from all parts, and a central and military committee had at length formed itself in the section of Lepelletier, under the presidency of Richer-Lerizy, the journalist. The plan of an insurrection was settled; the battalions formed; all the irresolute persons were hurried away; and the entire *bourgeoisie* of Paris, misled by a false point of honour, was about to play a part but little suited to its habits and its interests.

It was now too late to think of marching upon the section of Lepelletier, in order to stifle the insurrection in its birth. The Convention had about five thousand troops of the line; if all the sections were actuated by the same zeal, they could assemble forty thousand men, well armed and well organized; and it was

either drawn over his forehead, so as almost to conceal his eyes, or stuck upon the back of his head, so that it appeared in danger of falling off; and a black cravat very clumsily tied."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

"At this period Napoleon past most of his time in meditation and retirement. He went out but seldom, and had few acquaintances. He endeavoured to forget the sense of mortification and neglect by a more intense application to his professional studies. He sometimes went to the theatre, and frequented the Corazza coffee-house, in the Palais Royal, where the celebrated Talma is said once to have paid his reckoning for him, for which he had left his sword in pledge."—*Hazlitt.* E.

* "When Bonaparte appeared before the committee on occasion of this appointment, he displayed none of those astonishing qualities which distinguished his subsequent conduct. Little of a party man, and summoned for the first time on this great scene, his countenance wore an expression of timidity and bashfulness, which however disappeared in the bustle of preparation and the ardour of battle."—*Mignet.* E.

not with five thousand that the Convention could march against forty thousand, through the streets of a great capital. The most that could be hoped for, was to defend the Convention and to make an intrenched camp of it. This was what General Bonaparte resolved to do. The sections had no cannon; they had given them all up on occasion of the 4th of Prairial; and those who were now the most ardent had been the first to set this example, in order to ensure the disarming of the faubourg St. Antoine. This was a great advantage for the Convention. The entire park of artillery was at the camp of Sablons. Bonaparte immediately ordered Murat,* *chef d'escadron*, to go and fetch it

* "Joachim Murat was born in 1767. His father was the keeper of an humble country inn, who had once been steward to the wealthy family of the Talleyrands. From early youth Murat was distinguished by his daring courage and his skill in horsemanship. He was originally intended for the church, but having in his twentieth year run away with, and fought a duel for, a pretty girl of the neighbourhood, all his ecclesiastical hopes were crushed by the notoriety which this affair brought upon him. He therefore entered the army, made himself conspicuous by his revolutionary enthusiasm, and in one month fought not less than six duels! He soon gained promotion, and in the affair of the sections, made himself so useful to Bonaparte, that when appointed to the command of the army of Italy, that general placed him on his personal staff. Shortly afterwards Murat was promoted to the rank of general of brigade; accompanied Napoleon in his Egyptian expedition; and returned with him to Paris, where he married Caroline Bonaparte, his patron's youngest sister. On the establishment of the Empire, he was created marshal of France, and in 1806 invested with the grand duchy of Berg and Cleves. In 1808 he entered Madrid with a formidable army, and sullied his reputation by his exactions and cruelties. He was afterwards appointed to the throne of Naples, but was rendered constantly uneasy by the system of jealous espionnage pursued towards him by Napoleon. In 1812 he joined the Emperor in his Russian expedition, and was placed over the whole cavalry of the grand army, in which position he rendered himself so conspicuous by his daring that the very Cossacks held him in respect and admiration. When the French reached the heights which overlook Moscow, Murat glancing at his soiled garments, did not think them worthy of an occasion so important as that of entering the Sacred City. He retired therefore to his tent, and soon came out, dressed in his most magnificent costume. His tall plume, the splendid trappings of his steed, and the grace with which he managed the animal, drew forth loud shouts of applause from the Cossacks who were under the walls of the city. As an armistice had been previously agreed upon, he remained for two hours in the midst of his new admirers who pressed round him, and even called him their Hetman, so delighted were they with his courage and generosity. When Napoleon quitted Russia, Murat was left in command, but he was unequal to his trying duties, and returned dispirited to Naples, greatly to the Emperor's dissatisfaction. In the German campaign of 1813 he fought nobly at Dresden and Leipsic, but immediately after this last battle, deserted the Imperial standard. On Napoleon's escape from Elba, Murat put an army of 50,000 men in motion, in order, as he said, to secure the independence of Italy, but was defeated by the Austrians and English. After the battle of Waterloo, he wandered about for some months as a fugitive; but being discovered, was seized, tried, and ordered to be shot, by Ferdinand, the then reigning King of Naples. When the fatal moment arrived, Murat walked with a firm step to the place of execution. He would not accept a chair, nor suffer his eyes to be bound. He stood upright, with his face towards the soldiers, and when all was ready, kissed a cor-

at the head of three hundred horse. That officer arrived at the very moment when a battalion of the section of Lepelletier had come to seize the artillery. He got before that battalion, put horses to the guns, and brought them to the Tuileries. Bonaparte then directed his attention to the defence of all the avenues. He had five thousand troops of the line, a corps of patriots amounting, only since the preceding day, to about fifteen hundred, some gendarmes of the tribunals, disarmed in Prairial, and rearmed on this occasion, lastly the police legion, and some invalids, making altogether about eight thousand men. He distributed his artillery and his troops in the Rue du Cul de Sac Dauphin, Rue L'Echelle, Rue Rohan, Rue St. Nicaise, on the Pont Neuf, the Pont Royal, the Pont Louis XVI., in the Place Louis XV., and the Place Vendôme, in short, at all the points where the Convention was accessible. He placed his cavalry and part of his infantry in reserve at the Carrousel, and in the garden of the Tuileries. He ordered all the provisions in Paris to be brought to the Tuileries, and a depot of ammunition and an hospital for the wounded to be established there. He sent a detachment to secure the depot and to occupy the heights of Meudon, intending to retire thither with the Convention in case of defeat; he intercepted the road to St. Germain, to prevent cannon from being brought to the insurgents; he ordered chests of arms to be conveyed to the faubourg St. Antoine, to arm the section of the Quinze-Vingts, which had alone voted for the decrees, and whose zeal Fréron had gone to rouse. These dispositions were completed on the morning of the 13th. Orders were given to the republican troops to await aggression, and not to provoke it.

During this interval, the committee of insurrection established

nelian on which the head of his wife was engraved, and gave the word thus: 'Save my face—aim at my heart—fire!' Murat left two daughters and two sons; the elder of his sons is a citizen of the United States, and said to be a youth of very superior promise."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

"With respect to Murat's beauty and the nobleness of his figure, which have been so much insisted on, it is a point which will bear discussion. I do not admit that a man is handsome because he is large, and always dressed for a carnival. Murat's features were not good, and I may even add that, considering him as detached from his curled hair, his plumes, and his embroidery, he was plain. There was something of the negro in his countenance, though his nose was not flat; but very thick lips, and a nose, which, though aquiline, had nothing of nobleness in its form, gave to his phisiognomy a mongrel expression at least."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

"'Murat,' said Napoleon, 'is a good soldier—one of the most brilliant men I ever saw on a field of battle. Of no superior talents, without much moral courage, timid even in forming his plan of operations; but the moment he saw the enemy, all that vanished—his eye was the most sure and the most rapid, his courage truly chivalrous. Moreover, he is a fine man, tall, and well-dressed, though at times rather fantastically—in short, a magnificent lazzarone. It was really a magnificent sight to see him in battle heading the cavalry.'"—*Lord Ebrington's Account of his Conversations with Napoleon at Elba.* E.

in the section of Lepelletier had likewise made its dispositions. It had outlawed the committees of government, and created a kind of tribunal for trying those who should resist the sovereignty of the sections. Several generals had come to offer it their services. A Vendean, known by the name of Count de Maulevrier, and a young emigrant, called Lafond, had emerged from their retreats to direct the movement. Generals Duhoux and Danican,* who had commanded the republican armies in La Vendée, had joined them. Danican was a restless spirit, fitter to declaim at a club than to command an army: he had been a friend of Hoche's, and been frequently blamed by him for his inconsistencies. Being displaced, he was in Paris, extremely dissatisfied with the government, and ready to engage in the wildest schemes. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the sections. The resolution being taken to fight, and all the citizens being implicated in spite of themselves, a sort of plan was formed. The sections of the faubourg St. Germain, under the command of Count de Maulevrier, were to start from the Odeon, for the purpose of attacking the Tuileries by the bridges; the sections of the right bank were to attack by the Rue St. Honoré, and by all the cross streets running from the Rue St. Honoré to the Tuileries. A detachment under young Lafond was to secure the Pont-Neuf, in order to place the two divisions of the sectionary army in communication. The young men who had served in the armies, and who were most capable of standing fire, were placed at the head of the columns. Of the forty thousand men of the national guard, twenty or twenty-seven thousand at most were present under arms. There was a much safer manœuvre than that of presenting themselves in deep columns to the fire of the batteries; namely, to make barricades in the streets, and thus shut up the Assembly and its troops in the Tuileries; to occupy the houses which surround them, and keep up from them a destructive fire, to pick off the defenders of the Convention one by one, and thus soon reduce them by famine and balls. But the sectionaries had no notion of any thing but a *coup-de-main*, and thought by a single charge to get to the palace and to force its gates.

Early in the morning, the Poisonnière section stopped the artillery-horses and the arms proceeding to the section of the Quinze-Vingts; that of Mont-Blanc seized the provisions destined for the Tuileries; and a detachment of the section of Le-

* "Danican was descended from a noble family, but was so poor that he began life as a foot-soldier. At the time of the Revolution he was rapidly promoted, and was employed in La Vendée as general of brigade. He was afterwards removed on suspicion of being a royalist. At the period of the 13th of Vendemiaire he embraced the party of the sections, commanded for a short time their armed force, and escaped when he saw the Conventional troops gain the advantage. In 1799 he fought in Switzerland in an emigrant corps, and in 1805 went to reside in England."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

pelletier made itself master of the Treasury. Young Lafond, at the head of several companies, marched towards the Pont-Neuf, while other battalions were coming by the Rue Dauphine. General Cartaux was directed to guard that bridge, with four hundred men and four pieces of cannon. Wishing to avoid a battle, he retired to the quay of the Louvre. The battalions of the sections advanced on all sides, and drew up within a few paces of the posts of the Convention, and near enough to converse with the sentinels.

The troops of the Convention would have had a great advantage in commencing operations, and, had they made a brisk attack, they would probably have thrown the assailants into disorder; but the generals had been instructed to wait for aggression. In consequence, notwithstanding the acts of hostility already committed, notwithstanding the capture of the artillery-horses, notwithstanding the seizure of the provisions destined for the Convention, and of the arms sent off to the Quinze-Vingts, and notwithstanding the death of an orderly hussar, killed in the Rue St. Honoré, they still persisted in not attacking.

The morning had passed in preparations on the part of the sections, in suspense on the part of the Conventional army, when Danican, before he began the combat, thought it right to send a flag of truce to the committees to offer them conditions. Barras and Bonaparte were visiting the posts, when the bearer was brought to them blindfolded, as in a fortress. They ordered him to be taken before the committees. He used language of a very threatening kind, and offered peace on condition that the patriots should be disarmed, and the decrees of the 5th and 13th of Fructidor rescinded. Such conditions could not be acceptable; and, besides, none whatever could be listened to. The committees, however, though they decided not to answer, resolved to appoint twenty-four deputies to go and fraternize with the sections—an expedient which had frequently succeeded, for words have much more effect when men are ready to come to blows, and they are much more disposed to an arrangement that spares the necessity of slaughtering one another. Meanwhile, Danican, not receiving any answer, gave orders for the attack. The firing of small-arms was heard; Bonaparte directed eight hundred muskets and cartouch-boxes to be brought into one of the halls of the Convention, for the purpose of arming the representatives themselves, and employing them, in case of emergency, as a corps of reserve. This precaution indicated the whole extent of the danger. Each deputy hastened to his place, and, according to custom in moments of danger, the Assembly awaited in the most profound silence the result of this combat, the first regular battle that it had yet fought with the rebellious factions.

It was now half-past four o'clock. Bonaparte, accompanied by Barras, mounted a horse in the court of the Tuileries, and

hastened to the post of the cul-de-sac Dauphin, facing the church of St. Roch. The sectionary battalions filled the Rue St. Honoré, and had advanced to the entrance of the cul-de-sac. One of their best battalions had posted itself on the steps of the church of St. Roch, and it was there placed in an advantageous manner for firing upon the gunners of the Convention. Bonaparte, who was capable of appreciating the effect of the first blow, immediately directed his artillery to advance, and ordered a first discharge. The sectionaries replied by a very brisk fire of musketry; but Bonaparte, covering them with grape-shot, obliged them to fall back upon the steps of St. Roch; then, debouching in the Rue St. Honoré, he directed upon the church itself a band of patriots who were fighting at his side with the greatest valour, and who had cruel injuries to revenge. The sectionaries, after an obstinate resistance, were dislodged. Bonaparte, then, turning his guns right and left, made them sweep the whole length of the Rue St. Honoré. The assailants instantly fled on all sides, and retired in the greatest disorder. Leaving an officer to continue the firing and to complete the defeat, he next proceeded to the Carrousel, and hastened to the other posts. Every where he caused grape-shot to be fired, and every where the unfortunate sectionaries, imprudently exposed in deep columns to the effect of the artillery, betook themselves to flight. The sectionaries, though they had very brave men at the head of their columns, fled with the utmost precipitation towards the head-quarters at the Filles St. Thomas. Danican and the officers then discovered the blunder which they had committed in marching upon the guns, instead of barricading the streets and posting themselves in the houses contiguous to the Tuileries. Still they were not discouraged, and they resolved upon a new effort. They determined to join the columns coming from the faubourg St. Germain to make a general attack upon the bridges. Accordingly, they rallied a column of from six to eight thousand men, directed them towards the Pont Neuf, where Lafond was posted with his troops, and formed a junction with the battalions coming from the Rue Dauphine, under the command of the Count de Maulevrier. All advanced together in close column from the Pont Neuf along the Quai Voltaire to the Pont Royal. Bonaparte, present wherever danger required his presence, hastened to the spot. He placed several batteries on the quay of the Tuileries, which is parallel to the Quai Voltaire; he ordered the guns placed at the head of the Pont Royal to advance, and to be pointed in such a manner as to enfilade the quay by which the assailants were coming. Having made these preparations, he suffered the sectionaries to approach: then all at once, he gave orders to fire. A shower of grape from the bridge met the sectionaries in front, another from the quay of the Tuileries, took them obliquely, and carried terror and destruction into their ranks. Young Lafond, full of intrepidity,

rallied around him the steadiest of his men, and again marched upon the bridge, to make himself master of the guns. A redoubled fire drove back his column. He endeavoured in vain to bring it forward a third time: it fled and dispersed under the fire of a well-directed artillery.

The conflict, which had begun at half-past four, was over at six. Bonaparte who, during the action, had displayed an unpitying energy, and who had fired upon the population of the capital, as though it had been Austrian battalions, then gave orders to charge the guns with powder, to complete the dispersion of the insurgents. Some sectionaries had intrenched themselves in the Place Vendôme, in the church of St. Roch, and in the Palais Royal; he made his troops debouch by all the outlets of the Rue St. Honoré, and detached a corps which starting from the Place Louis XV., proceeded through the Rue Royale and along the boulevards. He thus swept the Place Vendôme, cleared the church of St. Roch, invested the Palais Royal, and blockaded it to avoid a night engagement.

Next morning, a few musket-shot were sufficient to produce the evacuation of the Palais Royal and the section of Lepelletier, where the rebels had formed the design to intrench themselves. Bonaparte ordered some barricades formed near the Barrière des Sergens to be removed, and a detachment from St. Germain, which was bringing cannon to the sectionaries, to be stopped. Tranquillity was completely restored on the 14th.* The dead

* The following is an extract from Bonaparte's own account of this memorable transaction which was dictated by him when at St. Helena to Las Cases :—" As soon as Napoleon found himself invested with the command of the forces destined to protect the Assembly, he despatched Murat with three hundred cavalry, to the Sablons, to bring off the artillery to the gardens of the Tuileries. One moment would have been too late. This officer on arriving at the Sablons at two o'clock, fell in with the head of a column of the section Lepelletier, which had come also for the purpose of carrying off the artillery; but his troops being cavalry and the ground a plain, the section retreated, and at six in the morning the forty guns entered the Tuileries. From six o'clock to nine, Napoleon visited all the posts and arranged the positions of his cannon. All the matches were lighted, and the whole of the little army, consisting of only five thousand men, was distributed at the different posts, or in reserve at the garden, and the Place Carrousel. The *générale* beat throughout Paris, and the national guards formed at all the debouches, thus surrounding the palace and gardens. The danger was imminent. Forty thousand national guards well armed and trained, presented themselves as the enemies of the Convention who, in order to increase its forces, armed fifteen hundred individuals, called the Patriots of 1789. These men fought with the greatest valour, and were of the greatest importance to the success of the day. General Cartaux, who had been stationed at Pont Neuf with four hundred men and four pieces of cannon with orders to defend the two sides of the bridge, abandoned his post and fell back under the wickets. At the same time the national guard occupied the garden of the Infanta. They professed to be well-affected towards the Convention, and nevertheless seized on this post without orders. The sectionaries every moment sent women, or themselves advanced unarmed, and waving their hats over their heads, to fraternize with the troops of the line. On the 13th of

12th VENDEMIAIRE, 1795

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were immediately carried away, in order to remove all traces of this combat. There had been from three to four hundred killed and wounded on both sides.

This victory gave great joy to all the sincere friends of the republic, who could not help recognising in this movement the influence of royalism. It restored to the threatened Convention, that is, to the Revolution and its authors, the authority which they needed for the establishment of the new institutions. Yet it was the unanimous opinion that a severe use should not be made of the victory. One charge was quite ready to be preferred against the Convention: people pretended that it had fought only in behalf of Terrorism, and with the intention of re-establishing it. It was of importance that they should not have grounds for imputing to it a design to spill blood. The sectionaries on their part proved that they were not clever conspirators, and that they were far from possessing the energy of the patriots; they had lost no time in returning to their homes, proud of having defied for a moment those guns which had so often broken the lines of Brunswick and Coburg. Provided they were allowed to extol their courage among themselves, but little danger was thenceforth to be apprehended from them. The Convention, therefore, contented itself with displacing the staff of the national guard; with dissolving the companies of grenadiers and chasseurs, which were the best organized, and contained almost all the young men with double queues; with

Vendemiaire, at three o'clock, Danican, general of the sections, sent a flag of truce to summon the Convention to dismiss the troops and disarm the Terrorists. This messenger traversed the posts blindfolded, with all the forms of war. He was then introduced into the midst of the committee of forty, in which he caused a great sensation by his threats. He was sent back towards four o'clock. About the same time seven hundred muskets, belts, and cartridge-boxes, were brought into the hall of the Convention to arm the members themselves as a *corps de reserve*. At a quarter after four some muskets were discharged from the Hôtel de Noailles into which the sectionaries had introduced themselves; the balls reached the steps of the Tuileries. At the same instant Lafond's column debouched by the Quai Voltaire, marching over the Pont Royal. The batteries were then ordered to fire. After several discharges St. Roch was carried, and Lafond's column routed. The Rue St. Honoré, the Rue St. Florentin, and the adjacent places were swept by the guns. About a hundred men attempted to make a stand at the Théâtre de la République, but a few shells from the howitzers dislodged them in an instant. At six o'clock all was over. There were about two hundred killed and wounded on the part of the sectionaries, and nearly as many on the side of the Convention. The faubourgs, if they did not rise in favour of the Convention, certainly did not act against it. It is untrue that in the commencement of the action the troops were ordered to fire with powder only; but it is a fact that when once they were engaged and success had ceased to be doubtful, they fired without ball. On the 14th of Vendemiaire some assemblages still continued to take place in the section Lepelletier; they were however promptly dislodged, and the rest of the day was employed in going over the city, visiting the chief houses of the sections, gathering in arms, and reading proclamations. In the evening order was completely restored, and Paris once more perfectly quiet." E.

putting the national guard for the future under the direction of the general commanding the army of the interior; with giving orders for disarming the section of Lepelletier and that of the Théâtre-Français; and with forming three commissions for trying the leaders of the rebellion, who, however, had almost all of them disappeared.

The companies of grenadiers and chasseurs suffered themselves to be dissolved; the two sections of Lepelletier and the Théâtre-Français delivered up their arms without resistance: all, in short, submitted. The committees, entering into these views of clemency, winked at the escape of the guilty, or allowed them to remain in Paris, where they could scarcely keep themselves concealed. The commissioners pronounced no sentences except for contumacy. Only one of the chiefs was apprehended, namely, young Lafond. He had excited some interest by his courage: there was a wish to save him, but he persisted in declaring himself an emigrant and in avowing his rebellion, so that it was impossible to pardon him. To such a length was indulgence carried, that M. de Castellane, one of the members of the commission formed in the section of Lepelletier, meeting at night a patrole, who cried, "Who goes there?" replied, "Castellane, one of the contumacious!" The consequences of the 13th of Vendemiaire were, therefore, not sanguinary, and the capital was not at all shocked by them. The culprits withdrew, or walked about unmolested, and the drawing-rooms were exclusively occupied with the accounts of exploits which they dared avow. Without punishing those who had attacked it, the Convention contented itself with rewarding those who had defended it; it declared that they had deserved well of their country; it voted gratuities to them; and gave a brilliant reception to Barras and Bonaparte.* Barras, already celebrated for the 9th of Thermidor, became much more so on account of the combat in Vendemiaire. To him was attributed the salvation of the Convention. He was not afraid to allow his young lieutenant to share in his glory. "It is General Bonaparte," said he, "whose prompt and skilful dispositions have saved this Assembly."† These words were applauded. Barras

* "After this memorable conflict, when Bonaparte had been publicly received with enthusiasm by the Convention who declared that he and Barras deserved well of their country, a great change took place in him, and the change in regard to attention to his person was not the least remarkable. He now never went out but in a handsome carriage, and he lived in a very respectable house, Rue des Capucines. In short he had become an important, a necessary personage, and all without noise, as if by magic." — *Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

† "Those who read the bulletin of the 13th of Vendemiaire cannot fail to observe the care which Bonaparte took to cast the reproach of shedding the first blood on the men he calls rebels. He made a great point of representing his adversaries as the aggressors. It is certain he long regretted that day. He often told me he would give years of his life to blot it out from the page

was confirmed in the command of the army of the interior, and Bonaparte in the appointment of his second.

The intriguing royalists were extremely disappointed on seeing the issue of the insurrection of the 13th. They lost no time in writing to Verona that they had been deceived by every body; that money had been wanting; that, "where gold was needed, they scarcely had old rags; that the monarchist deputies, those who had given them promises, had forfeited them and played an infamous game;" that it was "a Jacobin race," in which no trust was to be placed; that, unfortunately, those who wished to serve the cause were not sufficiently "compromised" and "bound;" that "the royalists of Paris, with green collar, black collar, and double queues, who displayed their bravadoes in the pit of the theatres, ran away at the first shot and hid themselves under the beds of the women who endured them."

Lemaître, their chief, had been apprehended together with the different instigators of the section of Lepelletier. A great quantity of papers had been seized at his residence. They feared lest these papers should betray the secret of the plot, and, above all, lest he should speak himself. Nevertheless, they were not disheartened; their creatures continued to act among the sectionaries. The kind of impunity which the latter enjoyed had imboldened them. As the Convention, though victorious, durst not strike them, it therefore acknowledged that public opinion was in their favour; it was, of course, not sure of the justice of its cause, since it hesitated. Though vanquished, they were prouder and loftier than it was, and they again appeared in the electoral assemblies to promote elections conformable with their wishes. The assemblies were to form themselves on the 20th of Vendemiaire and to last till the 30th; the new legislative body was to meet on the 5th of Brumaire. In Paris, the royalist agents procured the election of Saladin, the Conventionalist, whom they had already gained. In some of the departments they provoked quarrels, and some of the electoral assemblies were seen splitting into two distinct parties.

These intrigues, this recovered boldness, contributed greatly to exasperate the patriots, who had seen all their prognostics fulfilled in the events of the 13th, who were proud both of having guessed rightly, and of having overcome by their courage the danger which they had so correctly foreseen. They were anxious that the victory might not prove useless to themselves, that it should lead to severities against their adversaries, and

of his history. He was convinced that the people of Paris were dreadfully irritated against him, and he would have been glad if Barras had never made that speech in the Convention, with the part of which complimentary to himself he was at the time so well pleased."—*Bourrienne*. E.

reparations for their friends confined in the prisons. They pre sented petitions, in which they prayed for the release of the detained persons, the dismissal of the officers appointed by Aubry, the restoration to their rank of those who had been displaced, the trial of the imprisoned deputies, and their reinsertion in the electoral lists, if they were innocent. The Mountain, supported by the tribunes, crowded with patriots, applauded these demands, and energetically claimed their adoption. Tallien, who had connected himself with it, and who was the civil head of the ruling party as Barras was its military head—Tallien strove to repress it. He caused the last demand relative to the reinsertion of the detained deputies in the lists to be withdrawn, as contrary to the decrees of the 5th and 13th of Fructidor. Those decrees, in fact, declared the deputies who were then suspended from their functions ineligible. The Mountain, however, was not easier to manage than the sectionaries; and it seemed as though the last days of that Assembly, which had but one decade more to sit, could not possibly pass without storm.

The very tidings from the frontiers contributed to increase the agitation, by exciting the distrust of the patriots and the inextinguishable hopes of the royalists. We have seen that Jourdan had crossed the Rhine at Düsseldorf, and advanced upon the Sieg; that Pichegru had entered Mannheim, and thrown a division beyond the Rhine. Events so auspicious had not suggested any grand idea to Pichegru who was so highly extolled, and herein he had proved either his perfidy or his incapacity. Agreeably to ordinary analogies, it is to his incapacity that his blunders ought to be attributed; for, even with the desire to betray, a man never throws away occasions for great victories; they always serve to enhance his price. Contemporaries worthy of belief have nevertheless thought that his false manœuvres should be ascribed to treason: he is, therefore, the only general known in history who ever purposely suffered himself to be beaten. It was not a corps that he should have pushed on beyond Mannheim, but his whole army, to take possession of Heidelberg, which is the essential point where the roads running from the Upper Rhine into the valleys of the Neckar and the Mayn cross one another. This would have been gaining the point by which Wurmser could have joined Clairfayt, separating those two generals for ever, securing the point by which it was possible to join Jourdan and to form with him a mass that would have successively overwhelmed Clairfayt and Wurmser. Clairfayt, aware of the danger, quitted the banks of the Mayn and hastened to Heidelberg; but his lieutenant, Quasdanovich, assisted by Wurmser, had succeeded in dislodging from Heidelberg the division which Pichegru had left there. Pichegru was shut up in Mannheim; and Clairfayt, relieved from all fear for his communications with Wurmser, had

immediately marched upon Jourdan. The latter, cooped up between the Rhine and the line of neutrality, could not live there as in an enemy's country, and, having no organized service for drawing his resources from the Netherlands, found himself, as soon as he could neither march forward nor join Pichegru, in a most critical position. Clairfayt, in particular, disregarding the neutrality, had placed himself in such a manner as to turn his left and to throw him into the Rhine. He could not keep his ground there: it was therefore resolved by the representatives, with the assent of all the generals, that he should fall back on Mayence, and blockade it on the right bank. But this position would be no better than the preceding; it would leave him in the same penury; it would expose him to the attacks of Clairfayt in a disadvantageous situation; it would render him liable to lose his route towards Düsseldorf: it was consequently decided that he should retreat, for the purpose of regaining the Lower Rhine. This he did in good order, and without being molested by Clairfayt, who, meditating a grand plan, returned upon the Mayn to approach Mayence.

To these tidings of the retrograde march of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, were added alarming rumours concerning the army of Italy. Scherer had arrived there with two fine divisions of the Eastern Pyrenees, rendered disposable by the peace with Spain: it was nevertheless said that this general did not feel sure of his position, and that he demanded such succours as could be afforded him in *matériel* and supplies, without which he threatened to make a retrograde movement. Lastly, there was talk of a second English expedition bringing Count d'Artois and fresh troops for effecting a landing.

These tidings, which certainly involved nothing alarming for the existence of the republic, still mistress of the course of the Rhine, which had two more armies to send, the one to Italy, the other to La Vendée, which had just learned by the affair at Quiberon to rely upon Hoche, and not to fear the expeditions of the emigrants—these tidings, nevertheless, contributed to rouse the royalists, terrified by Vendémiaire, and to exasperate the patriots, who were dissatisfied at the use which had been made of the victory. The discovery of the correspondence of Lemaître, in particular, produced the most unpleasant sensation. People discovered in it the entire plot which had been so long suspected; they acquired a certainty of a secret agency established in Paris, communicating with Verona, with La Vendée, and with all the provinces of France, exciting counter-revolutionary movements there, and having an understanding with several members of the Convention and of the committees. The very boasting of these paltry agents, who flattered themselves with having gained sometimes generals, at others deputies, and who pretended to have connexions with monarchists and

Thermidorians, contributed to excite still stronger suspicions, and to make them hover over the heads of the deputies of the right side.

Rovère and Saladin were already mentioned, and against them convincing evidence had been obtained. The latter had published a pamphlet against the decrees of the 5th and the 13th of Fructidor, and had just been rewarded for it by the suffrages of the Parisian electors. Lesage of Eure and Loire, La Rivière, Boissy-d'Anglas,* and Lanjuinais, were also pointed out as secret accomplices of the royalist agency. Their silence on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of Vendémiaire had greatly compromised them. The counter-revolutionary journals, by the warm praises which they bestowed upon these men, contributed to compromise them still more. Those same papers, which so highly extolled the seventy-three, loaded the Thermidorians with abuse. It was scarcely possible that a rupture should not ensue. The seventy-three and the Thermidorians still continued to meet at the residence of a mutual friend, but ill-humour and want of confidence prevailed among them. Towards the latter end of the session, they were talking there of the new elections, of the intrigues of royalism to influence them, and of the silence of Boissy, Lanjuinais, La Rivière, and Lesage, during the scenes of Vendémiaire. Legendre, with his usual petulance, censured the four deputies, who were present, for this silence. The latter strove to justify themselves. Lanjuinais dropped the very strange expression of "massacre of the 13th of Vendémiaire," and thus furnished proof either of extraordinary confusion of ideas, or of sentiments very far from republican. At this expression, Tallien flew into a violent passion, and would have retired, saying that he could stay no longer with royalists, and that he would go and denounce them to the Convention. The others surrounded and pacified him, and endeavoured to palliate the expression of Lanjuinais. The party nevertheless broke up in great ill-humour.

Meanwhile the agitation continued to increase in Paris. Distrust was every where augmented, and suspicions of royalism extended to every body. Tallien moved that the Convention should form itself into a secret committee, and he formally denounced Lesage, La Rivière, Boissy-d'Anglas, and Lanjuinais. His proofs were not sufficient; they rested only upon inductions more or less probable, and the accusation was not supported. Louvet, though attached to the Thermidorians, did not support the charge against the four deputies, who were his

* "Boissy-d'Anglas was secretly connected with the royalist faction, and, we are told, entertained a lurking hatred and contempt for the people. He was the intimate friend of Aubry, who is also supposed to have superseded Bonaparte with a view to rob the republic of his talents and future victories." —*Hazlitt.* E.

friends; but he accused Rovère and Saladin, and painted their conduct in glaring colours. He followed their variations from the most vehement terrorism to the most vehement royalism, and obtained a decree for their arrest. L'Homond, compromised by Lemaître, and Aubry, the author of the military reaction, were likewise arrested.

The adversaries of Tallien, by way of reprisal, called for the publication of a letter from the Pretender to the Duke d'Harcourt, in which, remarking on the statements sent to him from Paris, he said, "I cannot believe that Tallien is a royalist of the right sort." It should be recollected that the Paris agents flattered themselves that they had gained Tallien and Hoche. Their habitual boasting, and their calumnies respecting Hoche, are sufficient to justify Tallien. This letter produced but little effect; for Tallien, since the affair of Quiberon and since his conduct in Vendémiaire, so far from being deemed a royalist, was considered as a sanguinary Terrorist. Thus men who ought to have united in saving by their joint efforts a revolution which was their own work, were filled with distrust of one another, and suffered themselves to be compromised, if not gained, by royalism. Owing to the calumnies of the royalists, the last days of this illustrious Assembly ended, as they had begun, in storms and agitation.

Tallien lastly moved the appointment of a commission of five members, charged to propose efficacious measures for saving the Revolution during the transition from one government to another. The Convention nominated Tallien, Dubois-Crancé, Florent Guyot, Roux of La Marne, and Pons of Verdun. The object of this commission was to prevent the manœuvres of the royalists in the elections, and to satisfy the republicans in regard to the composition of the new government. The Mountain, full of ardour, and conceiving that this commission was about to fulfil all its wishes, spread a report, and believed it for a moment, that all the elections were to be annulled, and that the Assembly was about to delay putting the constitution in operation for some time longer. It had in fact persuaded itself that the time was not come for leaving the republic to itself, that the royalists were not sufficiently crushed, and that the revolutionary government was needed for some time longer, in order to quell them completely. The counter-revolutionists affected to circulate the same reports. Thibaudeau, the deputy, who thus far had not gone along either with the Mountain or with the Thermidorians, or with the monarchists, who had nevertheless shown himself a sincere republican, and on whom thirty-two departments had just fixed their choice, because in electing him they had the advantage of not declaring for any party—Thibaudeau could naturally not distrust the state of opinion so much as the Thermidorians. He thought that Tallien and his party calumniated the

nation by wishing to take so many precautions against it; he even supposed that Tallien harboured personal designs, that he meant to place himself at the head of the Mountain and to give himself a dictatorship, upon pretext of preserving the republic from the royalists. He denounced, in a virulent and acrimonious manner this supposed design of dictatorship, and made an unexpected sally against Tallien, which surprised all the republicans, because they could not comprehend its motive. This attack even compromised Thibaudeau in the opinion of the most distrustful, and caused intentions which he never entertained to be ascribed to him. Though he reminded the Assembly that he was a regicide, it was well known from the intercepted letters* that the death of Louis XVI. might be expiated by important services rendered to his heirs, and this quality no longer appeared to be a complete guarantee. Thus, though a firm republican, this sally against Tallien injured him in the estimation of the patriots, and gained him extraordinary praises from the royalists. He was called *Bar of Iron.*

The Convention passed to the order of the day, and awaited the report of Tallien in the name of the commission of five. The result of the labours of this commission was a decree comprehending the following measures:

Exclusion of all emigrants and relatives of emigrants from all functions, civil, municipal, legislative, judicial, and military, till the general peace;

Permission for all those who would not live under the laws of the republic to quit France and to carry their property along with them;

Dismissal of all officers who had not served during the revolutionary system, that is, since the 10th of August, and who had been replaced since the 15th Germinal, that is since the proceedings of Aubry.

These dispositions were adopted. The Convention then decreed in a solemn manner the union of Belgium with France, and its division into departments. At length, on the 4th of Brumaire, at the moment of breaking up, it determined to finish its long and stormy career by a signal act of clemency. It decreed that the punishment of death should be abolished in the French republic, from the time of the general peace. It changed the name of the Place de la Révolution into that of Place de la Concorde; and lastly it pronounced an amnesty for all acts connected with the Revolution, excepting the revolt of the 13th of Vendémiaire. This was setting at liberty men of all parties excepting Lemaître, the only one of the conspirators of Vendémiaire against whom there existed sufficient evidence. The

* *Moniteur*, year IV, p. 150. Letter from d'Entraigues to Lemaître, dated October 10, 1795.

sentence of transportation pronounced against Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, which had been revoked for the purpose of trying them anew, that is, to cause them to be condemned to death, was confirmed. Barrère, who alone had not yet been embarked,* was directed to be put on shipboard. All the prisons were to be thrown open. At half-past two, on the 4th of Brumaire, year IV (October 26, 1795), the president of the Convention pronounced these words: "The National Convention declares that its mission is accomplished and its session is closed." Shouts, a thousand times repeated, of *The republic for ever!* accompanied these words.

Thus terminated the long and memorable session of the National Convention. The Constituent Assembly had the ancient feudal organization to destroy, and to lay the foundation of a new organization: the Legislative Assembly had had to make trial of that organization, in presence of the King, left in the constitution. After a trial of some months, it ascertained and declared the incompatibility of the King with the new institutions and his connivances with leagued Europe: it suspended the King and the constitution, and dissolved itself. The Convention, therefore, found a dethroned king, an annulled constitution, an administration entirely destroyed, a paper money discredited, old skeletons of regiments worn out and empty. Thus it was not liberty that it had to proclaim in presence of an enfeebled and despised throne, it was liberty that it had to defend against all Europe; a very different task. Without being for a moment daunted, it proclaimed the republic in the face of the hostile armies; it then sacrificed the King, to cut off all retreat from itself; it subsequently took all the powers into its own hands, and constituted itself a dictatorship. Voices were raised in its bosom, which talked of humanity when it wished to hear of nothing but energy; it stifled them. This dictatorship, which the necessity of the general preservation had obliged it to arrogate to itself over France, twelve of its members soon arrogated to themselves over it, for the same reason and on account of the same necessity. From the Alps to the sea, from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, these twelve dictators seized upon all, both men and things, and commenced the greatest and the most awful struggle with the nations of Europe ever recorded in history. In order that they might remain supreme directors of this immense work, they sacrificed all parties by turns; and, according to the condition attached to humanity, they had the excesses of their qualities. These qualities were strength and energy; their excess was cruelty. They spilt torrents of blood, till, having become useless from victory, and odious by the abuse of

* "Barrère contrived to be left behind, at the island of Oleron, when his colleagues sailed for Cayenne, upon which Boursault observed, that it was the first time he had ever failed to sail with the wind."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

strength, they fell. The Convention then took the dictatorship again into its own hands, and began by degrees to relax the springs of that terrible administration. Rendered confident by victory, it listened to humanity, and indulged its spirit of regeneration. It aimed at every thing good and great and pursued this purpose for a year; but the parties, crushed under its pitiless authority, revived under its clemency. Two factions, in which were blended, under infinite variety of shades, the friends and the foes of the Revolution, attacked it by turns. It vanquished the one in Germinal and Prairial, the other in Vendémiaire, and till the last day showed itself heroic amidst dangers. Lastly, it framed a republican constitution, and, after a struggle of three years with Europe, with the factions, with itself, mutilated and bleeding, it dissolved itself and transmitted the government of France to the Directory.*

Its memory has remained terrible, but in its favour there need only be alleged one fact, one only, and all reproaches fall before this important fact—it saved us from foreign invasion. The preceding assemblies had bequeathed to it France compromised. The Convention bequeathed France saved to the Directory and the Empire. If, in 1793, the emigrants had returned to France, there would have been left no vestige of the works of the Constituent Assembly and of the benefits of the Revolution. Instead of those admirable civil institutions, those magnificent exploits, which signalized the Constituent Assembly, the Convention, the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire, we should have had the base and sanguinary anarchy which we behold at this day beyond the Pyrenees. In repelling the invasion of the kings leagued against our republic, the Convention ensured to the Revolution an uninterrupted action of thirty years on the soil of France, and gave its works time to become consolidated, and to acquire that strength which enables them to defy the impotent wrath of the enemies of humanity.

To the men who call themselves with pride patriots of 89 the Convention will always be able to say, "You provoked the combat—we sustained and finished it."

* "During this frightful period of three years, the violence of the different factions converted the Revolution into a war, and the house of Assembly into a field of battle. Each party struggled for victory in order to obtain the ascendency. The Girondins tried, and perished; the party of Robespierre tried, and perished also. Every thing was provisional, both power and men and parties and systems; because one thing only was possible, and that was war. A whole year from the time it regained its authority was necessary to enable the Convention to restore the nation to the dominion of the law. It had now returned to the point from which it started, having accomplished its real design, which was to protect and finally consolidate the republic. After having astonished the world, it disappeared from the scene. Three years of dictatorship had been lost to liberty, but not to the Revolution."— *Mignet.* E.

THE DIRECTORY.

INSTALLATION OF THE DIRECTORY—ITS FIRST PROCEEDINGS —LOSS OF THE LINES OF MAYENCE, AND ARMISTICE ON THE RHINE—BATTLE OF LOANO—EXPEDITION OF THE ILE-DIEU.

THE 5th of Brumaire, year IV (October 27, 1795), was the day fixed for putting in force the directorial constitution. On that day, the two-thirds of the Convention retained in the legislative body were to be joined by the third just elected by the electoral assemblies, to divide themselves into two councils, to constitute themselves, and then to proceed to the nomination of the five directors, who were to be invested with the executive power. During these first moments, devoted to the organization of the legislative body and the Directory, the former committees of government were to remain, and to retain the deposit of all the powers. The members of the Convention, sent to the armies or into the departments, were to continue their mission until the installation of the Directory should be notified to them.

A great agitation prevailed in the public mind. The moderate and the vehement patriots showed one and the same irritation against the party which had attacked the Convention on the 13th of Vendémiaire; they were full of alarm; they exhorted one another to unite more closely than ever, in order to resist royalism; they loudly asserted that only such men as were irrevocably bound to serve the cause of the Revolution ought to be called to the Directory and to all public offices; they entertained a great distrust of the deputies of the new third, and anxiously investigated their names, their past lives, and their known or presumed opinions.

The sectionaries, cut down by grape-shot on the 13th of Vendémiaire, but treated with the utmost clemency after the victory, had again grown insolent. Proud of having for a moment sustained the fire, they seemed to imagine that the Convention, in sparing them, had been influenced by respect for their strength, and tacitly acknowledged the justice of their cause. They showed themselves every where, boasted of their exploits, repeating in the drawing-rooms the like impertinences against the great Assembly which had just relinquished power, and

affected to place strong reliance on the deputies of the new third.

These deputies, who were to take their seats among the veterans of the Revolution, and to represent the new opinion which had sprung up in France after a long series of storms, were far from justifying all the distrust of the republicans and all the hopes of the counter-revolutionists. Among them were some members of the old assemblies, as Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dumas, Dupont of Nemours, and the honest and learned Tronchet, who had rendered such important services to our legislation. Next were seen many new men, not those extraordinary men who shine at the outset of revolutions, but men of solid merit, who succeed genius in the career of politics as in that of the arts; for instance, lawyers and administrators, such as Portalis, Siméon, Barbé-Marbois,* Tronçon-Ducoudray. In general, these new deputies, setting aside some decided counter-revolutionists, belonged to that class of moderate men, who, having taken no share in events, having had no opportunity either to do wrong or to deceive themselves, pretended to be attached to the Revolution, but separated it at the same time from what they called its crimes. Though naturally disposed to censure the past, they were already somewhat reconciled with the Convention and the republic by their election, for men willingly forgive an order of things in which they have found places. For the rest, strangers to Paris and to politics, timid as yet upon this new stage, they courted and visited the most distinguished members of the National Convention.

Such was the disposition of minds on the 5th of Brumaire, year IV. The members of the Convention who had been re-elected, met and strove to influence the nominations that were yet to be made, in order to remain masters of the government. By virtue of the celebrated decrees of the 5th and 13th of Fructidor, the number of the Conventionalists in the new legislative body was to be five hundred. If this number were left incomplete by the re-elections, the members present on the 5th of Brumaire were to form themselves into an electoral body for the purpose of completing it. In the committee of public welfare, a list was drawn up, in which were inserted many decided Mountaineers. This list was not wholly approved of. However, none but known patriots were placed in it. On the 5th, all the depu-

* "Barbé-Marbois was son of the director of the mint at Metz. In 1792 he went to Vienna as assistant to the ambassador; and on his return to Paris remained in obscurity till 1795. At that period he was deputed to the Council of Ancients, but in 1797 was condemned to banishment. He was recalled to France after the 18th of Brumaire, was appointed councillor of state, and, in 1801, director of the public treasury. In 1805 he was appointed grand officer of the Legion of Honour. He was the author of several esteemed works, among which are an 'Essay on the Means of Inspiring a Taste for Virtue.'"—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

ties present, forming a single assembly, constituted themselves an electoral body. In the first place, they completed the two-thirds of Conventionalists who were to sit in the legislative body; they then drew up a list of all the deputies married and past the age of forty, from which they took by lot two hundred and fifty to compose the Council of the Ancients.

On the following day, the Council of the Five Hundred assembled at the Riding-house, in the old hall of the Constituent Assembly, chose Daunou president, and Rewbel, Chénier, Cambacérès, and Thibaudeau, secretaries. The Council of the Ancients met in the former hall of the Convention, called Lareveillère-Lepeaux to the chair, and Baudin, Lanjuinais, Bréard, and Charles Lacroix, to the bureau. These selections were suitable, and proved that in both councils the majority was attached to the republican cause. The councils declared that they were constituted, notified this to each other by messages, provisionally confirmed the powers of the deputies, and deferred the verification of them till after the organization of the government.

The most important of all the elections was yet to take place, namely that of the five magistrates to be invested with the executive power. On this choice depended at once the fate of the republic and the fortune of individuals. The five directors, in fact, having the nomination of all the public functionaries, could compose the government at pleasure, and fill it with men attached or hostile to the republic. They would be masters moreover of the destiny of individuals; they would have it in their power to open to them, or to shut them out of, the career of public employments, to reward or to discourage talents faithful to the cause of the Revolution. The influence which they must exercise would therefore be immense. In consequence, all were deeply interested in the choice that was about to be made.

The Conventionalists met to consider of this choice. All agreed that they ought to choose regicides, in order to give themselves surer guarantees. Opinions, after wavering for some time, settled in favour of Barras, Rewbel, Sieyes, Lareveillère-Lepeaux, and Le Tourneur. Barras had rendered important services in Thermidor, Prairial, and Vendémiaire; he had been in some sort the legislator-general opposed to all the factions; the last battle, of the 13th of Vendémiaire, had in particular given him great consequence, though the merit of the dispositions belonged to young Bonaparte. Rewbel, shut up in Mayence during the siege, and frequently called into the committees since the 9th of Thermidor, had adopted the opinion of the Thermidorians, shown aptness for and application to business, and a certain vigour of character. Sieyes was regarded as the first speculative genius of the time. Lareveillère-Lepeaux had voluntarily associated himself with the Girondins on the day of

their proscription, had come back to his colleagues on the 9th of Thermidor, and had opposed with all his might the two factions which had alternately attacked the Convention. A mild and humane patriot, he was the only Girondin whom the Mountain did not suspect, and the only patriot whose virtues the counter-revolutionists durst not deny. He had but one defect, in the opinion of certain persons, namely the deformity of his person, upon which it was alleged the directorial mantle would sit but ill. Lastly, Le Torneur, known for a patriot and esteemed on account of his character, had formerly been an officer of engineers, and had lately succeeded Carnot in the committee of public welfare, but was far from possessing his talents. Some of the Conventionalists were for placing among the five directors one of the generals who had most distinguished themselves at the head of the armies, as Kleber, Moreau, Pichegru, or Hoche; but the Assembly was afraid of giving too much influence to the military, and would not call any of them to the supreme power. To render the elections certain, the Conventionalists agreed among themselves to resort to an expedient which, without being illegal, had very much the appearance of a trick. Agreeably to the constitution, the Council of the Five Hundred was to present to the Council of the Ancients a list of ten candidates for each directorship; and out of these ten that council was to choose one. Thus for the five dictatorships it was necessary to present fifty candidates. The Conventionalists, who had the majority in the Five Hundred, agreed to place Barras, Rewbel, Sieyes, Lareveillère-Lepeaux, and Le Tourneur, at the head of the list, and then to add forty-five unknown names, none of which could possibly be chosen. In this manner a preference was forced for the five candidates whom the Conventionalists were desirous of calling to the Directory.

This plan was strictly followed; but, as one name was wanting to make up the forty-five, that of Cambacérès was added, to the great satisfaction of the new third and of all the moderates. When the list was presented to the Ancients, they appeared to be extremely displeased at this manner of forcing their choice. Dupont of Nemours moved an adjournment. "The forty-five persons who complete this list," said he, "are no doubt not unworthy of your choice, for, in the contrary case, it would be evident that an attempt has been made to do you violence in favour of five individuals. No doubt, these names which reach you for the first time belong to men of modest virtue, and who are also worthy of representing a great republic; but it requires time to become acquainted with them. Their very modesty, which has kept them concealed, compels us to make inquiries before we can appreciate their merit, and authorizes us to demand an adjournment." The Ancients, though dissatisfied with this procedure, shared the sentiments of the majority of the Five Hundred, and confirmed the choice of the five persons who had

thus been forced upon them. Out of two hundred and eighteen votes, Lareveillère Lepeaux obtained two hundred and sixteen, such was the unanimity of esteem for that excellent man; Le Tourneur obtained one hundred and eighty-nine; Rewbel, one hundred and seventy-six; Sieyes, one hundred and fifty-six; Barras, one hundred and twenty-nine. This last was more of a party man than the others; it was therefore natural that he should excite greater difference of opinion and gain fewer votes.

The election of these five persons gave the greatest satisfaction to the revolutionists, who thus saw themselves assured of the government. It was yet to be ascertained whether the five directors would accept the appointment. There was no doubt respecting three of them, but two were known to care very little about power. Lareveillère-Lepeaux, a simple, modest man, but little qualified for the management of affairs and of men, sought and found no pleasure but in the Jardin des Plantes with the brothers Thouin. It was doubtful whether he could be prevailed upon to accept the functions of director. Sieyes, with a mighty mind, capable of conceiving every thing, a matter of business as well as a principle, was nevertheless incapable, from disposition, of the duties of government. Perhaps too, full of spleen against a republic which was not constituted to his fancy, he would not be disposed to accept the direction of it. In fact, it was requisite that, among these five individuals, men of business or of action, there should be one of pure and well known virtue. Such a one was found among them by the acceptance of Lareveillère-Lepeaux. As for Sieyes, his repugnance was not to be overcome; he declined, alleging that he considered himself unfit for the government.

It was necessary to provide another in his stead. There was a man who enjoyed immense reputation in Europe — namely, Carnot. His military services, though important, were exaggerated: to him were attributed all our victories; and, though he had been a member of the great committee of public welfare, the colleague of Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon, it was known that he had opposed them with great energy. In him was seen the union of a great military genius with a stoic character. His reputation and that of Sieyes were the two greatest of the time. The best thing that could be done to give consideration to the Directory was to supply the place of one of these two reputations by the other. Carnot was accordingly inserted in the new list beside the men who rendered his nomination compulsory. Cambacérès was also added to the list, which contained only eight unknown persons. The Ancients, however, had no hesitation in preferring Carnot; he obtained one hundred and seventeen votes against one hundred and thirteen, and became one of the five directors.

Thus Barras, Rewbel, Lareveillère-Lepeaux, Le Tourneur, and Carnot, became the five magistrates invested with the govern-

ment of the republic. Among these five persons there was not a man of genius, nor even any man of high reputation, excepting Carnot. But what was to be done at the end of a sanguinary revolution, which, in a few years, had devoured several generations of men of genius of every description? In the assemblies there was not left one extraordinary orator, in diplomacy there remained not one celebrated negotiator. Barthelemy alone, by his treaties with Prussia and Spain, had gained a sort of consideration, but he inspired the patriots with no confidence. In the armies, great generals were already formed, and still greater were training;* but there was yet no decided superiority, and, besides, a distrust was entertained of the military. Thus, as we have observed, there were but two men of high reputation, Sieyes and Carnot. As it was impossible to gain the one, the other was secured. Barras had action; Rewbel and Le Tourneur were assiduous at business; Lareveillère-Lepeaux was a discreet and upright man: it would have been difficult at the moment to compose the supreme magistracy in any other way.

The state of things on the accession of these five magistrates to power was deplorable; and it required great courage and virtue in some, and great ambition in others, to accept the task that was imposed upon them. A combat was just over, in which it had been found necessary to call in one faction to fight another. The patriots who had spilt their blood had become importunate; the sectionaries had not ceased to be daring. The affair of the 13th of Vendémiaire had, in short, not been one of those victories followed by terror, which, while they subject the government to the yoke of the victorious faction, deliver it at least from the vanquished faction. The patriots had lifted their heads again; the sectionaries had not submitted. Paris was full of intriguers of all parties, agitated by every kind of ambition, and plunged into the deepest distress.

At this time, as in Prairial, there was a scarcity of the first necessaries of life in all the great communes: the paper-money produced confusion in trade, and left the government without resources. The Convention having refused to assent to the disposal of the national domains for thrice their value in 1790 in paper, the sales had been suspended; the paper, which could only come back by means of the sales, had continued in circulation, and its depreciation had made alarming progress. To no purpose had the scale of proportion for diminishing the loss of

* "Under the stern rule of the Convention, which knew no excuse for ill success, and stimulated by opportunities which seemed to offer every prize to honourable ambition, arose a race of generals whom the world scarcely ever saw equalled, and of whom there certainly never at any other period flourished so many in the same service. In those early wars, and summoned out by the stern proscription, were trained men whose names began already to stir the French soldier as with the sound of the trumpet."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

those who received the assignats been devised; that scale reduced them only to a fifth, whereas they had not even the one-hundred-and-fiftieth of the primitive value. The state, receiving nothing but paper for the taxes, was ruined as well as private individuals. It levied, it is true, one-half of the land-tax in kind, which furnished some supplies for the consumption of the armies; but the means of transport were frequently wanting, and those articles remained in the magazines till they were spoiled. To add to its expenditure, it was obliged, as we know, to feed Paris. It furnished the ration at a price in assignats which scarcely covered the hundredth part of the cost. This expedient, however, was the only possible one for supplying the annuitants and the public functionaries, who were paid in assignats, with bread at least; but this obligation had raised the expenditure to an enormous amount. Having nothing but paper to defray it, the state had issued assignats without limit, and had increased the quantity of them in a few months from twelve to twenty-nine thousand million. The old returns and the sums in the treasury reduced the actual amount in circulation to nineteen thousand million, which exceeded all the amounts known in finance. To keep down the issues as much as possible, the commission of five, instituted in the last days of the Convention for devising extraordinary means of police and finance, had induced the Assembly to decree in principle an extraordinary war-contribution of twenty times the land-tax, and ten times the tax on patents, which might produce about six or seven thousand million in paper. But this contribution was decreed only in principle; and, meanwhile, inscriptions of *rentes* were given to the contractors, which they received at a ruinous rate. A *rente* of five francs was allowed for a capital of ten. An experiment was also made of a voluntary loan at 3 per cent., which was ruinous and ill filled.

In this dreadful distress, the public functionaries, being unable to live upon their salaries, gave in their resignation. The soldiers left the armies, which had lost one-third of their effective force, and returned to the towns, where the weakness of the government allowed them to remain unmolested. Thus to supply five armies and an immense capital, with the mere faculty of issuing assignats without value; to recruit those armies; to reconstitute the entire government between the two hostile factions—such was the task of the five magistrates who had just been called to the supreme administration of the republic.

The necessity of order is so great in all communities, that they naturally favour its re-establishment, and wonderfully second those who undertake the duty of reorganizing them: but it would be impossible to reorganize them, unless they were favourably disposed towards it, and we ought not the less to acknowledge the courage and the efforts of those who venture to undertake such enterprises. The five directors, on taking pos-

session of the Luxembourg, found not a single article of furniture there. The keeper lent them a rickety table, a sheet of letter-paper, and an inkstand, for the purpose of writing the first message, notifying to the two councils that the Directory was constituted.* In the treasury there was not a sou in specie. Every night the assignats necessary for the service of the following day were printed, and they were issued quite wet from the presses of the republic. The greatest uncertainty respecting supplies prevailed; and for several days there had been nothing but a few ounces of bread or rice to distribute among the people.

The first demand made was for funds. According to the new constitution, it was requisite that every expense should be preceded by a demand for funds, with an allotment to each ministry. The two councils granted the demand, and then the treasury, which had been rendered independent of the Directory, paid the sums granted by the decree of the two councils. The Directory demanded at first three thousand million in assignats, which was granted, and which it would be necessary to exchange immediately for specie. Was it the duty of the treasury or of the Directory to negotiate this exchange? That was the first difficulty. The treasury, if it made bargains itself, would be overstepping the duty of mere superintendence. That difficulty, however, was removed by assigning to it the negotiation of the paper. The three thousand million could produce at most twenty or twenty-five million of livres. That sum could do no more than supply the first current wants. A plan of finance was immediately taken into consideration, and the Directory intimated to the two councils that it should submit that plan to them in a few days. Meanwhile it was necessary to feed Paris, which was destitute of every thing; and there was no longer any organized system of requisitions. The Directory demanded the faculty of requiring, by way of summons, in the departments contiguous to that of the Seine, the quantity of two hundred and fifty thousand quintals of corn, on account of the land-tax payable in kind. The next care of the Directory was to demand a number of laws for the repression of all kinds

* "When the directors entered the Luxembourg, there was not a piece of furniture in it. They procured a small wooden table, one of the feet of which was destroyed by age, upon which they deposited a bundle of letter-paper and a writing-desk, which fortunately they had taken the precaution to bring from the committee of public safety. Who would believe that in a closet, seated upon four straw chairs round this table, in front of some half-kindled billets of wood, the whole borrowed from the housekeeper Dupont, the members of the new government, after having examined all the difficulties, nay, I would say, the horrors of their situation, determined boldly to meet every obstacle, and to rescue France from the abyss in which she was plunged, or perish? They drew out upon a sheet of letter-paper the act by which they declared they had entered upon their functions; an act which they immediately addressed to the legislative assemblies."—*Bailleul.* E.

of disorders, and especially of desertion, which was daily diminishing the strength of the armies. At the same time, it set about appointing the persons who were to compose the administration. Merlin of Douai was called to the ministry of justice; Aubert-Dubayet was removed from the army of the coast of Cherbourg to take the portfolio of war; Charles de Lacroix was placed at the head of foreign affairs, Faypoult, over the finances, and Benezech, an enlightened administrator, was appointed to the interior. It then studied to find, among the multitude of applicants by whom it was beset, the men best qualified to fill public offices. In this precipitation, it was not possible to avoid making some very bad selections. It employed, in particular, a great number of patriots, who had rendered themselves too conspicuous to be discreet and impartial. The 13th of Vendémiaire had rendered them necessary, and caused the alarm which they had excited to be forgotten. The entire government, directors, ministers, agents of all sorts, was thus formed in hatred of the 13th of Vendémiaire, and of the party which had brought about that day. The Conventional deputies themselves were not yet recalled from their missions; and for this the Directory needed but to omit to notify its installation to them; it meant thus to allow them time to finish their work. Fréron, sent to the South, to repress the counter-revolutionary fury there, was consequently enabled to continue his tour in those unhappy districts. The five directors laboured without intermission, and displayed, in the first moments, the same zeal that the members of the great committee of public welfare had exhibited in the ever-memorable days of September and October, 1793.

Unluckily, the difficulties of this task were aggravated by defeats. The retreat which the army of the Sambre and Meuse had been forced to make gave rise to the most alarming rumours. Owing to the most vicious of all plans and the treason of Pichegru, the projected invasion of Germany had been quite unsuccessful, as we have seen. The intention was to cross the Rhine at two points, and to occupy the right bank with two armies. Jourdan, leaving Düsseldorf after the most favourable passage of the river, had found himself upon the Lahn, cooped up between the Prussian line and the Rhine, and destitute of every thing, in a neutral country, where he could not live at discretion. This distress, however, would have lasted but for a few days, if he could have advanced into the enemy's country and joined Pichegru, who had found in the occupation of Mannheim so easy and so unexpected a way of crossing the Rhine. Jourdan would have repaired by this junction the fault of the plan of campaign prescribed to him; but Pichegru, who was still discussing the conditions of his defection with the agents of the Prince of Condé, had thrown but an insufficient corps beyond the Rhine. He was bent on not crossing the river with the bulk of his army, and left Jourdan alone *en flèche* in the midst of Ger-

many. This position could not last. All who had the least notion of war were alarmed for Jourdan. Hoche, who, while commanding in Bretagne, cast a look of interest on the operations of the other armies, adverted to the subject in all his letters. Jourdan was therefore, at length obliged to retreat and to recross the Rhine; and in so doing he acted very judiciously, and deserved esteem for the manner in which he conducted his retreat.

The enemies of the republic triumphed on occasion of this retrograde movement, and spread the most alarming reports. Their malicious predictions were realized at the very moment of the installation of the Directory. The fault of the plan adopted by the committee of public welfare consisted in dividing its forces, and thus leaving to the enemy, who occupied Mayence, the advantage of a central position, and in thereby suggesting to him the idea of collecting his troops, and directing his entire mass against one or other of our two armies. To this situation General Clairfayt was indebted for a happy inspiration, which attested a genius that he had not previously displayed, and that he displayed no more in such a manner as to profit by it. A corps of nearly thirty thousand French blockaded Mayence. Clairfayt, master of that fortress, could debouch from it, and overwhelm the blockading corps, before Jourdan and Pichegru had time to come up. He actually seized the most suitable moment for this operation with great precision. No sooner had Jourdan retired upon the Lower Rhine by Düsseldorf and Neuwied, than Clairfayt, leaving a detachment to watch him, proceeded to Mayence, and there concentrated his forces, with the intention of debouching suddenly upon the blockading corps. That corps, under the command of General Schaal, extended in a semicircle around Mayence, and formed a line of nearly four leagues. Though great care had been taken to fortify it, still its extent did not permit it to be accurately closed. Clairfayt, who had examined it, had discovered more than one easily accessible point. The extremity of this semicircular line, which was to support itself on the upper course of the Rhine, left an extensive meadow between the last intrenchments and the river. It was upon this point that Clairfayt resolved to make his principal effort. On the 7th of Brumaire (October 29), he debouched by Mayence with an imposing force, but yet not considerable enough to render the operation decisive. Military men have, in fact, censured him for having left on the right bank a corps which, had it been employed on the left bank, would inevitably have brought ruin upon a part of the French army. Clairfayt despatched along the meadow, which occupied the space between the line of blockade and the Rhine, a column which advanced with the musket on the arm. At the same time, a flotilla of gun-boats ascended the river to second the movement of this column. He directed the rest of his army to march upon

the front of the lines, and made arrangements for a prompt and vigorous attack. The French division, finding itself at once attacked in front, turned by a corp filing along the river, and cannonaded by a flotilla, whose balls reached its rear, took fright and fled in disorder. The division of St. Cyr, which was placed next to it, then found itself uncovered and likely to be overwhelmed. Fortunately, the firmness and judgment of its general extricated it from danger. He shifted from front to rear, and executed his retreat in good order, sending word to the other divisions to do the same. From that moment the whole semicircle was abandoned; St. Cyr's division retreated towards the army of the Upper Rhine; Mengaud's and Renaud's divisions, which occupied the other part of the line, finding themselves separated, fell back upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse, a corps of which, commanded by Marceau, advanced without accident into the Hundsrück. The retreat of these two latter divisions was extremely difficult, and would have been impossible, had Clairfayt, comprehending the whole importance of his admirable manœuvre, acted with stronger masses and with sufficient rapidity. In the opinion of military men, he might, after breaking the French line, have rapidly turned the divisions which were descending towards the Lower Rhine, surrounded them, and cooped them up in the elbow formed by the Rhine from Mayence to Bingen.

Clairfayt's manœuvre was not the less admirable, and it was considered as the first of the kind executed by the allies. While it had broken up the lines of Mayence, Wurmser had made a simultaneous attack upon Pichegru, taken from him the bridge of the Neckar, and then driven him within the walls of Mannheim. Thus the two French armies, thrown beyond the Rhine, retaining, it is true, Mannheim, Neuwied, and Düsseldorf, but separated from one another by Clairfayt, who had driven off the force blockading Mayence, were liable to incur great risks before a bold and enterprising general. The last event had given them a violent shock: some of the fugitives had run home into the interior; and an absolute destitution added to the discouragement of the defeat. Luckily, Clairfayt was in no hurry to act, and took more time than was necessary for concentrating all his forces.

These sad tidings, reaching Paris between the 11th and 12th of Brumaire, at the very moment of the installation of the Directory, contributed greatly to augment the difficulties of the new republican organization. Other events, less dangerous in reality, though quite as serious in appearance, were occurring in the West. A fresh landing of emigrants threatened the republic. After the disastrous descent at Quiberon, which, as we have seen, was attempted with only part of the forces prepared by the English government, the wrecks of the expedition had been carried on board the English fleet, and then landed on the little

island of Ouat. Thither the unfortunate families of the Morbihan had been conveyed, who had hastened to meet the expedition, and the remnant of the emigrant regiments. An epidemic disease and violent dissensions prevailed on that little rock. After some time, Puisaye, who had been recalled by all the Chouans (who had broken the pacification, and who attributed the disaster at Quiberon to the English alone and not to their former chief), had returned to Bretagne, where he had made every preparation for renewing hostilities with double vigour. While the Quiberon expedition was on foot, the chiefs of La Vendée had not stirred, because the expedition had not come to their country, because they were forbidden by the Paris agents to second Puisaye, and lastly, because they waited for success before they durst again commit themselves. Charette alone had engaged in an altercation with the republican authorities concerning various disorders committed in his district, and certain military preparations which he was reproached with making, and he had almost come to an open rupture with them. He had just received, by way of Paris, new favours from Verona, and the appointment of commander-in-chief of the Catholic districts, which was the particular object of his wishes. This new dignity, while it cooled the zeal of his rivals, had singularly excited his own. He had hopes that a new expedition would be sent to these coasts; and, Commodore Warren having offered him the stores remaining from the Quiberon expedition, he had no longer hesitated; he had made a general attack on the beach, driven back the republican posts, and secured some powder and muskets. The English had at the same time landed on the coast of the Morbihan the unfortunate families whom they had dragged after them, and who were perishing with hunger and want in the isle of Ouat. Thus the pacification was broken, and war again began.

The three republican generals, Aubert-Dubayet, Hoche, and Canclaux, who commanded the three armies called the armies of Cherbourg, of Brest, and of the West, had long considered the pacification as broken not only in Bretagne, but also in Lower Vendée. They had all three met at Nantes, but could not resolve upon any thing. They nevertheless held themselves in readiness to hasten individually to the first point that should be threatened. A new landing was talked of; it was said, and this was perfectly true, that the Quiberon division was only the first, and that another was coming. Aware of the fresh dangers which menaced the coast, the French government appointed Hoche to the command of the army of the West. The conqueror at Weissenburg and Quiberon was, in fact, the man to whom in this imminent danger the whole national confidence was due. He immediately repaired to Nantes to supersede Canclaux.

The three armies destined to overawe the insurgent provinces had been reinforced by some detachments from the North, and

by several of the divisions which the peace with Spain rendered disposable. Hoche obtained authority to draw fresh detachments from the two armies of Brest and Cherbourg, to strengthen that of La Vendée. He thus increased it to forty-four thousand men. He established strongly intrenched posts on the Nantes Sèvre, which runs between the two Vendées, and which separated Stofflet's country from that of Charette. His aim in this was to divide those two chiefs, and to prevent them from acting in concert. Charette had entirely thrown off the mask, and proclaimed war anew. Stofflet, Sapinaud, Scepeaux, jealous of seeing Charette appointed generalissimo, intimidated also by the preparations of Hoche, and uncertain of the coming of the English, did not yet stir. At last, the English squadron made its appearance, at first in the bay of Quiberon, and afterwards in that of Ile Dieu, facing Lower Vendée. It had on board two thousand English infantry, five hundred horse fully equipped, skeletons of emigrant regiments, a great number of officers, arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing for a considerable army, funds in metallic specie, and lastly the prince so long expected.* A still more considerable force was to follow, if the expedition was at all successful at its outset, and if the prince received proofs of a sincere desire that he should put himself at the head of the royalist party. No sooner was the expedition descried from the coast than all the royalist chiefs sent messengers to the prince, to assure him of their devoted attachment, to claim the honour of his presence, and to concert measures. Charette, master of the coast, was best situated for concurring in the disembarkation; and his reputation, as well as the wishes of all the emigrants, directed the expedition towards his district. He also sent agents to concert a plan of operations.

Hoche was meanwhile making his preparations with his wonted activity and resolution. He formed the plan of despatching three columns, from Challans, Clisson, and St. Hermine, three points situated on the circumference of the country, to Belleville, which was the head-quarters of Charette. These three columns, twenty or twenty-two thousand strong, were destined by their mass to overawe the country, to destroy Charette's principal establishment, and to throw him by a brisk and vigorous attack into such disorder, that he should not be

* "The broken remains of the Quiberon expedition were landed in the isle of Houat, where they were soon after joined by an expedition of two thousand five hundred men from England, which took possession of the Isle Dieu, and where the Count d'Artois assumed the command. Several partial insurrections about the same time broke out in Brittany; but from want of concert among the royalist chiefs they came to nothing. Soon afterwards, the English expedition, not having met with the expected co-operation, abandoned Isle Dieu, which was found to be totally unserviceable as a naval station, and returned with the Count d'Artois to Great Britain. From that moment the affairs of the royalists rapidly declined in all the western provinces."—*Alison.* E.

able to protect the landing of the emigrant prince. Hoche, accordingly, marched off these three columns, and united them again at Belleville, without encountering any obstacles. Charette, whose principal force he hoped to meet with and to fight, was not at Belleville; he had collected eight or nine thousand men, and proceeded towards Luçon, with a view to transfer the theatre of the war to the south of the country, and to divert the attention of the republicans from the coasts. His plan was well conceived, but it failed through the energy opposed to it. While Hoche was entering Belleville with his three columns, Charette was before the post of St. Cyr, which covers the road from Luçon to Les Sables. This post he attacked with all his forces. Two hundred republicans intrenched in a church made an heroic resistance, and gave the Luçon division, which heard the cannonade, time to hasten up to their relief. Charette, taken in flank, was completely beaten, and his band, being dispersed, was obliged to return to the interior of the Marais.

Hoche, not finding the enemy before him, and discovering the real intention of his movement, led back his columns to the points from which they had started, and began to form an intrenched camp at Soullans near the coast, for the purpose of dashing upon the first corps that should attempt to land. During this interval, the emigrant prince, surrounded by a numerous council and the envoys of all the Breton and Vendean chiefs, continued to deliberate on the plans for landing, and allowed Hoche time to prepare his means of resistance. The English ships, keeping within sight of the coast, continued to excite the fears of the republicans and the hopes of the royalists.

Thus, from the earliest days of the installation of the Directory, a defeat before Mayence, and a threatened landing in La Vendée, were subjects of alarm of which the enemies of the government most maliciously availed themselves to render its establishment more difficult. It caused explanations and contradictions to be published relative to part of the reports that were circulated concerning the situation of the two frontiers, and furnished information respecting the events that had just occurred. It was not possible to deny the defeat sustained before the lines; but it caused the declamations of the alarmists to be met with this reply, that we still retained Düsseldorf and Neuwied; that Mannheim was yet in our possession; that consequently the army of the Sambre and Meuse had two *têtes de pont*, and the army of the Rhine one, for debouching, whenever it should suit them, beyond the Rhine; that we were therefore in the same situation as the Austrians, since, if they were enabled by Mayence to act upon both banks, so were we too by Düsseldorf, Neuwied, and Mannheim. This reasoning was just; but it remained to be seen whether the Austrians, following up their success, would not soon take from us Neuwied and Mannheim, and establish themselves on the left bank between the Vosges

and the Moselle. As for La Vendée, the government communicated the vigorous dispositions made by Hoche, which were satisfactory to considerate minds, but which did not prevent enthusiastic patriots from conceiving apprehensions, and the counter-revolutionists from circulating them.

Amidst these dangers, the Directory redoubled its efforts for reorganizing the government, the administration, and especially the finances. Three thousand million in assignats had been granted to it, as we have seen, and had produced at the utmost some twenty million livres. The voluntary loan at three per cent. opened in the last days of the Convention, had just been suspended; for the state promised a real *rente* for a paper capital, and thus made a ruinous bargain. The extraordinary war-tax proposed by the commission of five had not yet been carried into execution, and excited complaints, as a last revolutionary act of the Convention towards those who were liable to the payment of it. All the public institutions were on the point of being broken up.* The individuals compensated according to the scale of proportion raised such bitter complaints, that it was found necessary to suspend the compensations. The post-masters paid in assignats, gave notice that they must resign, for the insufficient relief afforded by the government did not cover their losses. The post-office was likely soon to become unproductive, that is to say, all communications, even in writing, were about to cease in all parts of the territory. The plan of the finances intended to be presented in a few days, was therefore to be given immediately. This was the most urgent want of the state, and the first duty of the Directory. It was at length communicated to the commission of the finances.

The mass of the assignats in circulation might be computed at twenty thousand million. Even reckoning the assignats at the one-hundredth and not the one-hundred-and-fiftieth of their value, they would form a real amount of no more than 200 million: it is certain that they would not figure for more in the circulation, and that the holders could not pay them away for a higher value. One might have reverted all at once to reality, not take assignats for more than they were really worth, not admit them, unless at the current value, either in dealings between individuals or in payment of the taxes or for the national domains. That prodigious and frightful mass of paper, that enormous debt, would then have immediately disappeared. There would be left nearly seven thousand million livres' worth in domains, including the national domains in Belgium and the

* "The servants of government and the public creditors, paid in mandates at par, were literally dying of famine. Employment from government, instead of being solicited, was universally shunned; persons in every kind of public service sent in their resignations; and the soldiers deserted from the armies in as great crowds as they had flocked to it during the reign of Terror."—*Alison*. E.

national forests: thus there were immense resources for withdrawing those twenty thousand millions reduced to two hundred, and for meeting fresh expenses. But this great and bold determination was difficult to adopt. It was repelled both by scrupulous minds who considered it as a bankruptcy, and by the patriots who cried out that it was a scheme for ruining the assignats.

Both were rather shallow. This bankruptcy, if it were one, was inevitable, as was proved in the sequel. The question was merely to abridge the evil, that is, the confusion, and to re-establish order in the worth of effects, the only justice that the states owes to every one. At first sight, indeed, it would be a bankruptcy to take at the moment for one franc an assignat which had been issued in 1790 for 100 francs, and which then contained the promise of the worth of 100 francs in land. Upon this principle, the twenty thousand million in paper must have been taken for twenty thousand million livres, and paid integrally; but the national domains would scarcely have paid a third of that sum. Even in case the sum could have been paid integrally, it must be asked how much the state had received in issuing these twenty thousand million? Four or five thousand million perhaps. Those who received them from its hands had not taken them for more, and it had already reimbursed by the sales an equal value in national domains. There would therefore have been a cruel injustice towards the state, that is towards all payers of taxes, to consider the assignats according to their primitive value. It was therefore necessary to consent not to take them but at a reduced value. This had even begun to be done, when the scale of proportion was adopted.

Most certainly, if there were persons still holding the first assignats issued, and who had kept without exchanging them a single time, these would be exposed to an enormous loss; for, having taken them nearly at par, they would now have to submit to the whole reduction. But this was an absolutely false fiction. Nobody had kept assignats by them, for nobody hoards paper: every one had got rid of them as soon as possible, and each had sustained a portion of the loss. Every body had suffered his share of this pretended bankruptcy, and therefore it was no longer one. The bankruptcy of a state consists in making some individuals, namely the creditors, support the debt which one does not wish to make all the tax-payers support. Now, if every body had more or less suffered his share of the depreciation of the assignats, there was no bankruptcy for any one. Lastly, a still stronger reason than any of the others could be adduced. If the assignat had fallen in some hands only, and lost only for some individuals, it had now passed into the hands of the speculators in paper, and it would have been this class rather than that of the real sufferers, who would have reaped the benefit of a silly restoration of value. Thus Calonne, in a pamphlet written in

London, observed very sensibly that people were egregiously mistaken, who believed France to be overwhelmed with the burden of the assignats; and that this paper-money afforded the means of becoming bankrupt without declaring herself so. To express himself more correctly, he should have said that it afforded the means of making the bankruptcy bear upon every body, that is, of rendering it null.

It was, therefore, reasonable and just to revert to reality, and to take the assignat for no more than it was worth. The patriots said that it was ruining the assignat, which had saved the Revolution, and looked upon this idea as a conception springing from the brain of the royalists. Those who pretended to reason with more enlightened views and a better acquaintance with the subject, asserted that paper would be deprived at once of all its value, and that the circulation could no longer be carried on, for want of the paper which would have perished, and for want of the metals which were hoarded or had gone to other countries. Time convinced those who thus argued of their error; but a simple calculation ought to have put them immediately in the way of forming a more correct opinion. In reality the twenty thousand million of assignats represented less than two hundred million; now, according to all calculations, the circulation could not formerly be carried on with less than two thousand million, in gold or silver. If, therefore, the assignats constituted no more than two hundred million in the circulation, with what were the rest of the transactions carried on? It is very evident that the metals must circulate in very great quantity, and they did actually circulate, but in the provinces and in the country, far from the eyes of the government. Besides, the metals, like all commodities, always come to the spot to which need calls them, and, had paper been driven away, they would have returned, as they did actually return when it perished of itself.

It was, therefore, a double error, and one deeply rooted in men's minds, to consider the reduction of the assignat to its real value as a bankruptcy, and as a sudden destruction of the means of circulation. It had only one inconvenience, but it was not this for which it was censured, as we shall presently see. The commission of the finances, cramped by the ideas which prevailed, could adopt only in part the real principles of the matter. After concerting with the Directory, it decided upon the following plan.

Until, by the new plan, the sale of the domains and the collection of the taxes should bring back not fictitious but real values, it would be necessary still to employ assignats. It was proposed to extend the issue to thirty thousand million, but to engage not to go beyond that point. On the 30th of Nivose, the plate was solemnly broken up. Thus the public was set at ease respecting the quantity of the new issues. For the thirty

thousand million issued, there were to be devoted national domains to the amount of one thousand million. Consequently the assignat, which in circulation was really worth only the one-hundred-and-fiftieth part, and much less, would be liquidated at one-thirtieth, which was a very great advantage given to the holders of paper. Another thousand million in lands was set apart for rewarding the soldiers of the republic—a recompence which had long been promised them. Five out of the seven, therefore, still remained to be disposed of. In these five were the national forests, the moveable property of the emigrants and of the crown, the royal residences, and the possessions of the Belgian clergy. There were then five thousand million still disposable. But the difficulty consisted in disposing of that amount. The assignat had, in fact, been the means of putting it in circulation before the property was sold. But if the assignat were suppressed, as only ten thousand million could be added to the existing twenty, a sum which represented at most one hundred million of livres, how was the value of the property to be realized beforehand, and to be employed in defraying the expenses of the war? This was the only objection that could be made to the liquidation of the paper and to its suppression. A sort of notes, called *cedules hypothécaires*, which had been talked of in the preceding year, were resorted to. According to this old plan, the government was to borrow and to give to the lenders notes conveying a special mortgage on particular properties. In order to raise this loan, it was to have recourse to financial companies, which were to take off these notes. In short, instead of a paper, the circulation of which was forced, which had but a general mortgage on the national domains, and which was daily fluctuating in value, there was created by the notes a voluntary paper, to which was attached a mortgage upon some particular estate or house, and which could not undergo any other change in value than that of the very object which it represented. It was not a paper-money; it was not liable to fall because it was not forcibly put into circulation; but, on the other hand, one might not find means to dispose of it. In short, the difficulty still consisting at this time, as at the outset of the Revolution, in putting the value of the property into circulation, the question was, whether it would be better to force the circulation of that value, or to leave it voluntary. The former expedient being completely exhausted, it was natural that it should be proposed to try the other.

It was decided, therefore, that, after increasing the paper to thirty thousand million, after having set apart one thousand million to absorb it, and reserved the worth of one thousand million in lands for the soldiers of the country, notes should be made for a sum proportionate to the public wants, and that negotiations should be set on foot with financial companies for these notes. The national forests were not to be thus assigned;

they were to be retained by the state. They formed nearly two out of the five thousand million remaining disposable. Companies were to be treated with for the alienation of their produce for a certain number of years.

The consequence of this plan, founded on the reduction of the assignats to their real value, was to admit them no longer but at the current worth in all transactions. Till they could be withdrawn by the sale of the thousand million appropriated to them, they were no longer to be taken by individuals or by the state, but for their value at the moment. Thus all confusion in dealings would cease, all fraudulent payments were rendered impossible. The state would receive by means of the taxes real values, which would cover at least the ordinary expenses, and it would have in future to pay with the domains the extraordinary expenses only of the war. The assignat was to be received at par only in the arrears of the impositions, arrears which were considerable and amounted to thirteen thousand million. Thus those who were behindhand in their payments were furnished with an easy method of discharging their arrears, on condition that they should do it immediately; and the sum of thirty thousand million reimbursable in national property at one-thirtieth, was diminished by so much.

This plan, adopted by the Five Hundred, after a long discussion in secret committee, was immediately carried to the Ancients. While the Ancients were engaged in discussing it, new questions were submitted to the Five Hundred, on the manner of recalling to their colours the soldiers who had deserted into the interior, and on the mode of nominating the judges, municipal officers, and functionaries of all kinds, whom the electoral assemblies, which were agitated by the passions of Vendémiaire, had not had time or inclination to nominate. Thus did the Directory labour without intermission, and furnish fresh subjects of deliberation for the two councils.

The plan of finance submitted to the Ancients rested on sound principles; it presented resources, for the resources of France were still immense: unfortunately, it did not surmount the real difficulty, for it did not render those resources actual enough. It is very evident that, with taxes which would suffice for her annual expenditure as soon as the paper should cease to render the receipts illusory, with seven thousand million for reimbursing the assignats and providing for the extraordinary expenses of the war—France possessed resources. The difficulty consisted, while founding a plan on sound principles and adapting it to the future, in providing for the present.

Now the Ancients were of opinion that the assignats ought not to be so speedily renounced. The faculty of creating ten thousand million more furnished at most a resource of one hundred million, and this was but little while awaiting the receipts

which the new plan was to procure. Besides, should they find companies to treat for the working of the forests for twenty or thirty years? Should they find any to take the notes, that is the free assignats? In this uncertainty about rendering the national domains available for the new means, ought they to renounce the former method of expending them, namely the forced assignats? The Council of the Ancients, which most strictly investigated the resolutions of the Five Hundred, and which had rejected more than one of them, put its *veto* upon the financial scheme, and refused to sanction it.

This rejection caused great anxiety, and the public mind again plunged into the most painful uncertainty. The counter-revolutionists, delighted with this conflict of ideas, asserted that the difficulties of the situation were insuperable, and that the republic would be ruined by the state of the finances. The most enlightened men, who are not always the most resolute, entertained this apprehension. The patriots, irritated to the highest degree on perceiving that there had been an idea of abolishing the assignats, cried out that the government intended to destroy that last revolutionary creation which had saved France; they insisted that, without groping about so long, it ought to re-establish the credit of the assignats by the means of 1793, the *maximum, requisitions, and death.* A violence and an excitement was manifested which reminded people of the most turbulent years. To crown our misfortunes, affairs on the Rhine had grown worse;* Clairfayt, without profiting like a great captain by his victory, had nevertheless derived from it new advantages. Having called La Tour's corps to him, he had marched upon Pichegru, attacked him on the Pfrim and on the canal of Frankendal, and gradually driven him back to Landau. Jourdan had advanced upon the Nahe, through a difficult country, and displayed the noblest zeal in carrying on the war among tremendous mountains, in order to extricate the army of the Rhine; but his efforts could do no more than damp the ardour of the enemy, without repairing our losses.

If then the line of the Rhine was left us in the Netherlands, it was lost higher up at the Vosges, and the enemy had taken from us an extensive semicircle around Mayence.

In this state of distress, the Directory sent a most urgent despatch to the Council of Five Hundred, and proposed one

* "At this period the military situation of the republic was far from brilliant; its victories had diminished at the close of the Convention; and there was a relaxation in the discipline of the troops. Besides, the generals disappointed at having signalized their command by so few victories, and not having the support of an energetic government, began to incline to insubordination. The Convention had directed Pichegru and Jourdan to surround and make themselves masters of Mayence, in order that they might by that means occupy the whole line of the Rhine. This scheme entirely failed through the misconduct of Pichegru."—*Mignet.* E.

of those extraordinary resolutions which had been taken on the decisive occasions of the Revolution. This was a forced loan of six hundred million in real value, either specie or assignats at the current value, divided among the wealthiest classes. This was giving an opening to a new series of arbitrary acts, such as Cambon's forced loan from the rich; but, as this new loan was requirable immediately, as it was likely to bring back all the assignats in circulation and to furnish besides a surplus of three or four hundred million in specie, and it was absolutely necessary to find at length prompt and energetic resources, it was adopted.

It was decided that the assignats should be received at the rate of one hundred for one; two hundred million of loan would therefore suffice to absorb twenty thousand million of paper. All that came in was to be burnt. It was hoped that the paper, being thus almost entirely withdrawn, would rise, and that, in case of emergency, the government would be able to issue more, and to avail itself of this resource. Out of the six hundred million there would remain to be raised four hundred million in specie, which would furnish resources for the first two months, for the expenditure of this year (year IV, 1795-6) was estimated at one thousand five hundred million.

Certain adversaries of the Directory, who, without caring much about the state of the country, merely wished to thwart the new government at any rate, raised the most alarming objections. This loan, they said, would run away with all the specie in France, nay there was not even enough to pay it—as if the state, in taking four hundred million in metal, would not pour them back into the circulation, by purchasing corn, cloth, leather, iron, &c. The state was not going to burn any thing but the paper. The question was, whether France could furnish immediately four hundred million's worth of articles of consumption, and burn two hundred million in paper which was pompously called twenty thousand million. She certainly could. The only inconvenience was in the mode of collection, which was likely to be vexatious and on that account less productive. But what was to be done? To confine the assignats to thirty thousand million, that is to say, to make a provision beforehand of only one hundred real millions, then to destroy the plate, and to depend for the supply of the state on the alienation of the revenue of the forests and the disposal of the notes, that is, on the issue of a voluntary paper, had appeared too bold. Uncertain as to what could be raised voluntarily, the Councils thought it best to compel the French to contribute extraordinarily.

By means of the forced loan, it was argued, part at least of the paper would come back; it would come back with a certain quantity of specie; then again there would still be the plate, which would have acquired more value by the absorption of the greater part of the assignats. The other resources were not on

this account renounced; it was decided that part of the domains should be noted—a tedious operation, for it was necessary to mention every property in the note, and then to make a bargain with the financial companies. The sale of the houses situated in towns, of lands under three hundred acres, and lastly of the possessions of the Belgian clergy, was decreed. The alienation of all the late royal residences, excepting Fontainebleau, Versailles, and Compiègne, was resolved upon. The moveable property of the emigrants was also to be sold forthwith. All these sales were to take place by auction.

The government durst not yet decree the reduction of the assignats to the currency, which would have put an end to the greatest evil, that of ruining all those who received them, private individuals as well as the state. It was afraid of destroying them all at once by this simple measure. It was decided that in the forced loan they should be received at one hundred for one; that in the arrears of contributions they should be received at their full value, in order to encourage the payment of those arrears, which were to bring in thirteen thousand million; that the reimbursement of capital should be still suspended, but that the *rentes* and interest of all kinds should be paid at the rate of ten for one, which again would be ruinous for those who received their income at that rate. The payment of the land-tax and rents of farms was kept upon the former footing, that is, half in kind and half in assignats. The customs were to be paid half in assignats and half in specie. This exception was made in favour of the customs, because there was abundance of specie on the frontiers. There was likewise an exception in favour of Belgium. The assignats had not found their way thither; it was decided that the forced loan, or the taxes, should there be levied in specie.

The government, therefore, returned timidly to specie, and durst not boldly cut the difficulty, as is usual in such cases. Thus the forced loan, the sale of domains, the arrears, in bringing back considerable quantities of paper, allowed more to be issued. Some receipts in specie might also fairly be reckoned upon.

The two most important determinations, after the laws of finance, were the determinations relative to desertion, and to the mode of nominating the functionaries not yet elected. The one was to serve to recompose the armies, the other to complete the organization of the communes and of the tribunals.

Desertion to the foreign enemy, a crime extremely rare, was to be punished with death. A warm discussion took place relative to the penalty to be inflicted on crimping. In spite of the opposition, the same punishment was fixed for it as for desertion to the enemy. All furloughs granted to young men of the requisition were to expire in ten days. The pursuit of the young men who had abandoned their colours, committed to the municipalities,

was slack and ineffective; it was given to the gendarmerie. Desertion to the interior was to be punished with imprisonment for the first time, and with chains for the second. The great requisition of August 1793, which was the only measure of recruiting that had been adopted, produced men enough to fill the armies; it had sufficed for the last three years to keep them on a respectable footing, and it might still suffice, with the aid of a law which should ensure its execution. The new arrangements were combated by the opposition, which tended naturally to diminish the action of the government, but they were adopted by the majority of the two councils.

Many of the electoral assemblies, agitated by the decrees of the 6th and the 13th of Fructidor, had wasted their time and not completed the nomination of the individuals who were to compose the local administrations and the tribunals. Such of them as were situated in the provinces of the West had not been able to do so, on account of the civil war. Others had been guilty of negligence and the abandonment of their rights. The Conventional majority, to ensure the homogeneousness of the government, and a homogeneousness entirely revolutionary, proposed that the Directory should have the nominations. It is natural that the government should inherit all the rights which the citizens renounce, that is, that the action of the government should make up for that of individuals. Thus, in those cases where the assemblies had suffered the constitutional term to expire, where they had not cared to exercise their rights, it was natural that the Directory should be called upon to nominate. To convoke new assemblies would be violating the constitution, which forbade that; it would be rewarding revolt against the laws; in short, it would be opening a door to fresh troubles. There were besides analogies in the constitution which must lead to a resolution of the question in favour of the Directory. It was empowered to make the nominations in the colonies, and to appoint successors to the functionaries who had died or resigned in the interval between one election and another. The opposition did not fail to attack this arrangement. Dumolard in the Council of the Five Hundred, Portalis, Dupont of Nemours, Tronçon-Ducoudray, in the Council of the Ancients, maintained that this was conferring a royal prerogative on the Directory. This minority, which secretly leant more to monarchy than to the republic, here changed parts with the republican majority, and supported democratic ideas with the utmost exaggeration. In other respects, the warm and solemn discussion was not disturbed by any outburst of passion. The Directory had the nominations, on the sole condition of choosing from among those who had already been honoured with the suffrages of the people. Principles led to this solution; but policy recommended it still more strongly. New elections were avoided for the moment,

and greater homogeneousness was given to the whole administration, to the tribunals, and to the government.

The Directory had, therefore, the means of procuring funds, of recruiting the army, of completing the organization of the administration and of justice. It had the majority in the two councils. A temperate opposition arose, it is true, in the Five Hundred and in the Ancients; some voices of the new third disputed its authority with it, but this opposition was calm and decorous. It seemed to respect its extraordinary situation and its arduous labours. No doubt it respected also in this government, elected by the Conventionalists and upheld by them, the Revolution still all-powerful and deeply enraged. The five Directors had shared the general task among them. Barras had the *personnel*, and Carnot the movement of the armies; Rewbel, the foreign affairs; Le Tourneur and Lareveillère-Lepeaux, the internal administration. They nevertheless deliberated all together on every important measure. They had long made shift with the most wretched furniture; but at length they had obtained from the Garde-Meuble such things as were necessary for fitting up the Luxembourg, and they began to represent the French republic in a worthy manner. Their antechambers were full of applicants, among whom it was not always easy to choose. The Directory, faithful to its origin and its nature, always selected the most decisive men. Warned by the insurrection of the 13th of Vendémiaire, it had provided a considerable and imposing force to secure Paris and the seat of the government from a fresh *coup de main*. Young Bonaparte, who had figured on the 13th of Vendémiaire, had been appointed to the command of this army, called the army of the interior.* He had entirely reorganized and placed it in the camp of Grenelle. He had collected into a single corps, by the name of the legion of police, part of the patriots who had offered their services on the 13th of Vendémiaire. Most of these patriots belonged to the old gendarmerie, dissolved after the 9th of Thermidor, which was itself full of old soldiers of the French Guards. Bonaparte then organized the constitutional guard of the Directory and that of the Councils. This imposing and well-directed force was capable of overawing every body, and keeping the parties in order.

Steady in its course, the Directory pronounced itself still more

* "The few months during which Bonaparte was at the head of the army of the interior were replete with difficulties and disturbance; and he frequently had occasion to harangue the people at the sections and the faubourgs. One day, while he was addressing the crowd, a fat woman interrupting him, said, 'Never mind these smart officers who, so that they themselves get fat, do not care who else is starved.' Napoleon, who was then very thin, turned round and replied, 'Look at me, good woman, and then tell me, which of us two is the fattest.' This repartee turned the laugh against her, and the mob dispersed."—*Hazlitt*. E.

decidedly on a great number of measures of detail. It persisted in not notifying its installation to the Conventional deputies on mission in the departments. It enjoined all the managers of theatres not to suffer any other air to be sung than the Marseillaise. The *Réveil du Peuple* was proscribed. This measure was deemed puerile: it would certainly have been more dignified to prohibit all songs; but it was desirable to enliven the republican enthusiasm, which unfortunately had somewhat cooled. The Directory caused some royalist journals, which had continued to write with the same violence as in Vendémiaire, to be prosecuted. Though the liberty of the press was unlimited, the law of the Convention against writers who should advocate the restoration of royalty, furnished a medium of repression in extreme cases. Richer-Serizy was prosecuted; Lemaître and Brottier, whose correspondence with Verona, London, and La Vendée proved their quality of royalist agents and their influence in the disturbances of Vendémiaire, were brought to trial. Lemaître was condemned to death as the principal agent. Brottier was acquitted. It was ascertained that two secretaries of the committee of public welfare had furnished them with important papers. The three deputies, Saladin, Lhomond, and Rovère, put under arrest on account of the 13th of Vendémiaire, after their re-election had been declared by the electoral assembly of Paris, were reinstated by the two councils, on the ground that they were already deputies at the time of the proceedings against them, and that the forms proscribed by the constitution in regard to deputies, had not been observed. Cormatin, and the Chouans seized with him for infraction of the pacification, were also brought to trial. Cormatin was banished for having secretly continued to foment civil war; the others were acquitted, to the great displeasure of the patriots, who complained bitterly of the indulgence of the tribunals.

The conduct of the Directory towards the minister of the court of Florence proved still more strongly the republican rigour of its sentiments. It had been at length agreed with Austria to deliver up to her the daughter of Louis XVI., the only one left of the family that had been confined in the Temple, on condition that the deputies placed in her hands by Dumouriez should be given up to the French advanced posts.* The princess set out from the Temple on the 28th of Frimaire (December the

* "The princess royal experienced from the period of her brother's death, a mitigated captivity. Finally, on the 19th of December, 1795, this last remaining relic of the family of Louis, was permitted to leave her prison and her country, in exchange for Lafayette and others, whom on that condition Austria delivered from captivity. She became afterwards the wife of her cousin, the Duke d'Angouleme, and obtained by the manner in which she conducted herself at Bordeaux, in 1815, the highest praise for gallantry and spirit."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

It was of this princess that Napoleon observed to one of his ministers, "She is the only man of the family." E.

19th). The minister of the interior went himself to fetch her, and conducted her with the greatest respect to his hotel, whence she set out accompanied by persons of her own selection. An ample provision was made for her journey, and she was thus conveyed towards the frontiers. The royalists did not fail to make verses and allusions concerning the unfortunate prisoner, at length restored to liberty. Count Carletti, the minister of Florence, who had been sent to Paris on account of his known attachment to France and the Revolution, applied to the Directory for permission to see the princess, in his quality of minister of an allied court. That minister had become suspected, no doubt wrongfully, on account of the very exaggeration of his republicanism. It was scarcely conceivable that the minister of an absolute prince, and above all, of an Austrian prince, could be so republican. The only answer given by the Directory was an order to quit Paris immediately, but it declared at the same time that this measure was purely personal to the envoy, and not to the court of Florence, with which the French republic continued on terms of friendship.

It was now six weeks at most since the Directory was instituted: it began to settle itself; the parties accustomed themselves to the idea of an established government, and, thinking less of overthrowing it, prepared to oppose it within the limits marked out by the constitution. The patriots, not renouncing their favourite idea of a club, had assembled at the Pantheon; they already met to the number of more than four thousand, and formed an assembly very much like that of the old Jacobins. Faithful, however, to the letter of the constitution, they had avoided what it forbade in the meetings of citizens, namely the organization of a political assembly. Thus they had not a bureau; they had not provided themselves with tickets; the persons present were not divided into spectators and members; there existed neither correspondence nor affiliation with other societies of the same kind. With these exceptions, the club had all the characteristics of the old parent society, and its passions, still older, were on that account the more stubborn.

The sectionaries had composed societies more analogous to their tastes and manners. At this time, as under the Convention, they numbered in their ranks some secret royalists, but in very small number; most of them were enemies, from fear or fashion of the Terrorists and of the Conventionalists, whom they affected to confound, and whom they were vexed to find again almost all in the new government. Societies had been formed at which the newspapers were read, at which the members conversed on political subjects with the politeness and in the tone of the drawing-rooms, and where dancing and music succeeded reading and conversation. The winter began, and these gentry indulged in pleasure as an act of opposition to the revolutionary system—a system which nobody thought of revi-

ving, for there were no St. Justs, no Robespierres, no Couthons, to bring us back by terror to impossible manners.

The two parties had their newspapers. The patriots had *Le Tribun du Peuple, L'Ami du Peuple, L'Eclaireur du Peuple, L'Orateur plébéien, Le Journal des Hommes Libres.* These papers were thoroughly Jacobin. *La Quotidienne, L'Eclair, Le Véridique, Le Postillon, Le Messager, La Feuille du Jour,* passed for royalist papers. The patriots, in their club and their journals, though the government certainly was strongly attached to the Revolution,* manifested great irritation. It was, it is true, not so much with it as with events that they were angry. The reverses on the Rhine, the new movements in La Vendée, the alarming financial crisis, were with them a motive for reverting to their favourite ideas. If the armies were beaten, if the assignats fell, it was because the government was indulgent, because it knew not how to recur to great revolutionary means. The new financial system, in particular, which denoted a desire to abolish the assignats, and which seemed to forebode their speedy suppression, had greatly irritated the patriots.

Their adversaries needed no other cause of complaint than this very irritation. Terror, according to them, was ready to rise again. Its partisans were incorrigible; it was to no purpose that the Directory did all that they wished; they were not satisfied; they were again bestirring themselves; they had reopened the old den of the Jacobins, and there they were again hatching all sorts of crimes.

Such were the labours of the government, the march of mind, and the state of parties, in Frimaire, year IV (November and December, 1795).

The military operations, continued in spite of the season, began to promise more propitious results, and to afford the new administration some compensation for its arduous efforts. The zeal with which Jourdan had advanced into the Hundsrück through a frightful country, and without any of the material resources which ought to have mitigated the sufferings of his army, had somewhat re-established our affairs on the Rhine. The Austrian generals, whose troops were as much worn out as ours, finding themselves exposed to a series of obstinate combats in the heart of winter, proposed an armistice, during which the

* "The Directorial government which was warmly attached to the Revolution, endeavoured to recall the enthusiasm and unanimity of its first years. 'You,' they wrote to their agents, 'whom we call to participate in our labours; you, whose duty it is, in conjunction with ourselves, to put the republican constitution in operation; your first feeling, your chief virtue should be that decided wish, that patriotic faith, which has produced its happy enthusiasts and performed its miracles. Surely it is a highly interesting spectacle to see the banners of liberty waving over every house, the republican motto over every door! Go on, hasten the day when the sacred name of the republic shall be voluntarily engraven on every heart.'"—*Mignet.* E.

Imperial and the French armies should retain the positions which they then occupied. The armistice was accepted, on condition of ten days' notice being given before recommencing hostilities. The line which separated the two armies, following the Rhine from Düsseldorf to above Neuwied, left the river there, formed a semicircle from Bingen to Mannheim, passing along the foot of the Vosges, rejoined the Rhine above Mannheim, and did not leave it again as far as Basle. Thus we had lost all that semicircle on the left bank. It was, however, a loss which a more well-conceived manœuvre might repair. The principal misfortune consisted in having lost for the moment the ascendency of victory. The armies, exhausted with fatigue, entered into cantonments, and all the necessary preparations began to be made for enabling them in the following spring to open a decisive campaign.

On the frontiers of Italy, the season had not yet wholly forbidden military operations. The army of the Eastern Pyrenees had been removed to the Alps. The march from Perpignan to Nice had taken considerable time, and the want of provisions and shoes had rendered it still slower. At length, towards the month of November, Augereau came with a superb division, which had already signalized itself in the plains of Catalonia. Kellermann, as we have seen, had been obliged to draw back his right wing, and to relinquish the immediate communication with Genoa. He had his left on the high Alps, and his centre at the Col de Tende. His right was placed behind the line called the line of Borghetto, one of the three which Bonaparte had reconnoitred and marked out in the preceding year, in case of a retreat. Devins, quite proud of his petty success, was resting in the Riviera of Genoa, and making a great parade of his plans, without executing any of them. The brave Kellermann was impatiently awaiting the reinforcements from Spain, to resume the offensive and to recover his communication with Genoa. He wished to terminate the campaign by a brilliant action, which should restore the Riviera to the French, open to them the door to the Apennines and to Italy, and detach the King of Sardinia from the coalition. Barthelemy, our ambassador in Switzerland, was constantly repeating that a victory towards the maritime Alps would gain us an immediate peace with Piedmont, and the definitive concession of the line of the Alps. The French government agreed with Kellermann upon the necessity of attacking, but not upon the plan to be adopted, and sent Scherer, who was already advantageously known for his success at the battle of the Ourthe and in Catalonia, to supersede him. Scherer arrived in the middle of Brumaire, and resolved to attempt a decisive action.

The reader is aware that the chain of the Alps, when it takes the name of Apennines, runs very close to the Mediterranean from Albenga to Genoa, leaving between the sea and the crest of the mountains only narrow and rapid slopes, scarcely three

leagues in extent. On the opposite side, on the contrary, that is, towards the plains of the Po, the slopes decline gently for a space of twenty leagues. The French army, placed on the maritime declivities, was encamped between the mountains and the sea. The Piedmontese army, under Colli, established in the intrenched camp below Ceva, on the other side of the Alps, guarded the entrance to Piedmont against the left of the French army. The Austrian army was partly on the crest of the Apennines at Rocca-Barbenne, partly on the maritime slope in the basin of Loano, communicated thus with Colli by its right, occupied by its centre the crest of the mountains, and intercepted the line of coast by its left, so as to cut off our communications with Genoa. At the sight of such a state of things, an idea occurred. If the French, operating in force upon the right and centre of the Austrian army, were to drive it from the summit of the Apennines, and to take from it the upper crests, they would thus separate it from that of Colli, and, marching rapidly along those crests, they would enclose its left in the basin of Loano between the mountains and the sea. This plan had suggested itself to Massena, one of the generals of division, who had proposed it to Kellermann. It occurred also to Scherer, and he purposed carrying it into execution.

Devins, after making some attempts, during August and September, on our line of Borghetto, had renounced all idea of making an attack for that year. He was ill, and Wallis had been sent, on his application, to succeed him. The officers thought only of indulging in the dissipations of winter in Genoa and its environs. Scherer, having procured for his army some provisions and twenty-four thousand pair of shoes, of which it was in absolute want, fixed his movement for the 2nd of Frimaire (November the 23rd). He started with thirty-six thousand men to attack forty-five thousand; but the excellent choice of the point of attack compensated for the inequality of force. He directed Augereau to drive the left of the enemy into the basin of Loano; Massena to fall upon their centre at Rocca-Barbenne, and to make himself master of the summit of the Apennines; lastly, he ordered Serrurier to keep in check Colli, who formed the right on the opposite slope. Augereau, while pushing the Austrian right into the basin of Loano, was to act but slowly; Massena, on the contrary, was to file rapidly along the crests, and turn the basin of Loano, in order to shut up the Austrian left there; and Serrurier was to deceive Colli by false attacks.

On the morning of the 2nd of Frimaire (November 23d, 1795), the French cannon awoke the Austrians, who had no expectation of a battle. The officers hastened from Loano and Finale to put themselves at the head of their astonished troops. Augereau attacked with vigour, but without precipitation. He was stopped by the brave Roccavina. This general, placed on a knoll, in the middle of the basin of Loano, defended it with ob-

stinacy, and suffered himself to be surrounded by Augereau's division, but still refused to surrender. When encompassed, he rushed headlong upon the line that hemmed him in, and rejoined the Austrian army, cutting his way through a French brigade.

Scherer, repressing the ardour of Augereau, obliged him to employ his small arms only before Loano, that he might not push the Austrians too speedily on their line of retreat. Meanwhile Massena, charged with the brilliant part of the plan, climbed, with the vigour and boldness which distinguished him on all occasions, the crests of the Apennines, surprised d'Argenteau, who commanded the right of the Austrians, threw him into extreme disorder, drove him from all his positions, and encamped in the evening on the heights of Melogno, which formed the circumference of the basin of Loano, and closed its rear. Serrurier, by firm and well calculated attacks, had occupied Colli and the whole right of the enemy.

In the evening of the 2nd, the troops encamped, in dreadful weather, on the positions which they had occupied. On the morning of the 3rd, Scherer continued his operation; Serrurier, having been reinforced, began to attack Colli more seriously, in order to cut him off completely from his allies; Massena continued to occupy all the crests and outlets of the Apennines; Augereau, ceasing to restrain himself, vigorously pushed the Austrians, whose rear had been intercepted. From that moment they commenced their retreat, in tremendous weather, and by miserable roads. Their right and centre fled in disorder on the back of the Apennines; their left, pent in between the mountains and the sea, retired with difficulty along the shore by the road of La Corniche. A storm of wind and snow prevented so active a pursuit as might otherwise have taken place; nevertheless, five thousand prisoners, several thousand killed, forty pieces of cannon, and immense magazines, were the fruit of this battle, one of the most disastrous that the allies had fought since the beginning of the war, and one of the most skilfully conducted on the part of the French, in the judgment of military men.

Piedmont was in consternation at these tidings. Italy gave itself up for lost, and was cheered only by the season, which was too far advanced for the French to follow up their operations. Considerable magazines served to mitigate the hardships and the privations of the army. There needed a victory so important to raise the drooping spirits, and to give strength to the new government. It was published and hailed with great joy by all the genuine patriots.

At the same moment, affairs took a no less favourable turn in the provinces of the West. Hoche, having increased the army which occupied the two Vendées to forty-four thousand men, having placed intrenched posts on the Nantes Sèvre, so as to separate Stofflet from Charette, having dispersed the first

assemblage formed by Charette, and guarding by a camp at Soullans the whole coast of the Marais, was in a condition to oppose a landing. The English squadron, lying at the Ile-Dieu, was on the contrary in a very melancholy position. The island on which the expedition had so injudiciously landed, presented only a surface without shelter, without resources, and less than three-quarters of a league in extent. The shore of the island offered no safe anchorage. The ships were there exposed to all the fury of the wind over a bottom of rocks, which cut their cables and placed them every night in the greatest danger. The opposite coast, on which it was proposed to land, was one vast beach, without any depth of water, upon which the waves broke incessantly, and where boats, owing to the violence of the breakers, could not reach the shore without running the risk of foundering. Every day increased the dangers of the English squadron and the resources of Hoche. The French prince had been at the Ile-Dieu above six weeks. All the envoys of the Chouans and of the Vendeans surrounded him, and, mingling with his staff, each presented his ideas and strove to obtain their adoption. All were desirous of having the prince among them; but they all agreed in one thing, that he ought to land as soon as possible, no matter to what point the preference was given.

It must be confessed that, owing to this stay of six weeks at Ile-Dieu, in face of the coast, the landing had become difficult. Long hesitation ought no more to precede a descent, than the passage of a river, since the enemy is put on the alert, and apprized of the point threatened. The determination to land on the coast being once taken, notice should have been given to all the chiefs, and the descent should have been effected unawares, at a point which would have permitted the troops to remain in communication with the English squadron, and to which the Vendeans and the Chouans could have directed considerable forces. Assuredly, if the expedition had landed on the coast without threatening it so long, forty thousand royalists of Bretagne and La Vendée might have been collected before Hoche would have time to move his regiments. When we recollect what happened at Quiberon, the facility with which the landing was effected, and the time that it took to assemble the republican troops, we shall be convinced that the landing would have been very easy, had it not been preceded by a long cruise off the coast. While the name of Puisaye paralyzed all the chiefs, that of the prince would have rallied them all, and have caused risings in twenty departments. It is true that the new invaders would afterwards have had severe battles to fight, that they would have been obliged to disperse perhaps before the enemy, to run away like partisans, to hide themselves in the woods, to reappear, hide again, and lastly to run the risk of being taken and shot. Such is the price of thrones. There was nothing unworthy in *chouanning* in the forests of Bretagne, or in the

marshes and moors of La Vendée. A prince issuing from those retreats to ascend the throne of his ancestors would not have been less glorious than Gustavus Vasa, emerging from the mines of Dalecarlia. Moreover, it is probable that the presence of the prince would have excited such zeal in the royalist districts that a numerous army, continually at his side, would have permitted him to attempt enterprises of importance. It is probable that none of those about him would have had sufficient genius to conquer the young plebeian who commanded the republican army; but at least they might have given him some trouble to conquer them. There are frequently many consolations in a defeat; Francis I. found great consolations in that of Pavia.

If the landing was practicable at the time when the squadron arrived, it was no longer so after passing six weeks at the Ile-Dieu. The English seamen declared that it would soon be impossible to keep the sea, and that it was absolutely necessary to come to some determination; the whole coast of Charette's country was covered with troops; there was no possibility of landing unless beyond the Loire, near the mouth of the Vilaine, or in the country of Scepeaux, or in Bretagne in Puisaye's. But the emigrants and the prince would not land any where but in that of Charette, in whom alone they placed confidence. Now the thing was impracticable on Charette's coast. The prince, according to the assertion of M. de Vauban, solicited the English ministry to recall him. The ministry at first refused, unwilling that the cost of its expedition should be thrown away. However, it left the prince at liberty to pursue whatever course he thought proper.

From that moment, every preparation was made for departure. Long and useless instructions for the royalist chiefs were drawn up. They were told that superior orders prevented for a moment the execution of a descent; that Messrs. Charette, Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Scepeaux, must arrange among themselves to bring together a force of twenty-five or thirty thousand men beyond the Loire, which, united to the Bretons, might form a picked corps of forty or fifty thousand men, sufficient to protect the landing of the prince; that they should be apprized of the point of landing as soon as these preliminary measures were taken; and that all the resources of the English monarchy would be employed in seconding the efforts of the royalist provinces. To these instructions were added a few thousand pounds sterling for each chief, some muskets, and a small quantity of powder. These things were put ashore at night on the coast of Bretagne. The provisions with which the English had loaded their squadron were spoiled and thrown into the sea. They were obliged also to throw over the five hundred horses belonging to the English cavalry and artillery, which were almost all diseased from being so long on shipboard.

The English squadron set sail on the 15th of November (Brumaire 26th), and at its departure left the royalists in consternation. They were told that it was the English who had obliged the prince to go back; they were indignant, and again gave full scope to their abhorrence of the perfidy of England. The most incensed was Charette, and he had some reason to be so, for he was the most compromised. Charette had taken up arms again in the hope of a great expedition, in the hope of immense means, which would counterbalance the inequality of force between him and the republicans; this hope disappointed, he could have no other prospect but that of infallible and very speedy destruction. The threat of a descent had drawn upon him all the forces of the republicans; and this time he was obliged to renounce all hope of negotiating; he had nothing to expect but to be shot without mercy, and without even having any right to complain of an enemy by whom he had already been so generously pardoned.

He resolved to sell his life dearly and to employ his last moments in desperate efforts. He fought several actions with a view to get upon the rear of Hoche, to break through the line of the Nantes Sèvre, to throw himself into Stofflet's country, and to force this colleague to resume his arms. He could not accomplish this purpose, and was driven back into the Marais by Hoche's columns. Sapinaud, whom he had prevailed upon to arm again, surprised the town of Montaigu, and endeavoured to reach Châtillon; but he was stopped before that place, beaten, and obliged to disperse his corps. The line of the Sèvre could not be broken. Stofflet, behind that fortified line, was obliged to keep quiet, and besides he was not disposed to resume arms. He beheld with secret pleasure the destruction of a rival who had been loaded with titles, and who had intended to deliver him up to the republicans. Scepeaux, between the Loire and the Vilaine, durst not yet stir. Bretagne was disorganized by discord. The division of Morbihan, commanded by George Cadoudal, had revolted against Puisaye. This was at the instigation of the emigrants, who surrounded the French prince, and who had retained their old resentment against the latter chief. They wished to deprive him of the command of Bretagne, but it was the division of Morbihan alone that threw off the authority of the generalissimo.

Such was the state of things when Hoche commenced the great work of pacification. This young general, a skilful politician as well as soldier,* clearly perceived that it was not by

* "Young Hoche was every way qualified for the important but difficult duty with which he was charged—the pacification of La Vendée. Endowed by nature with a clear judgment, an intrepid character, and an unconquerable resolution, firm, sagacious, and humane, he was eminently fitted for that mixture of gentleness and resolution which is necessary to heal the wounds, and subdue the passions, of civil war. This rare combination of civil and

arms that he must endeavour to conquer an enemy with whom it was impossible to grapple, and who was nowhere to be come at. He had already despatched several moveable columns in pursuit of Charette; but heavily armed soldiers, who were obliged to carry every thing with them and were unacquainted with the country, could not equal in speed peasants carrying nothing but their musket, who were sure of finding provisions every where, and acquainted with every ravine and every copse. In consequence, he immediately ordered all pursuit to cease, and formed a plan which, being followed up with firmness and perseverance, could not fail to restore peace to those desolated districts.

The inhabitant of La Vendée was at once peasant and soldier. Amid the horrors of civil war, he had not ceased to cultivate his fields and to attend to his cattle. His musket was at his side, hid beneath straw or in the ground. At the first signal of his chiefs, he hastened to them, attacked the republicans, then stole away through the woods, returned to his fields, and again concealed his piece; and the republicans found but an unarmed peasant, in whom they could not by any means recognise a soldier. In this manner the Vendeans fought, subsisted, and continued to be almost inaccessible. While they still possessed the means of annoyance and of recruiting themselves, the republican armies, whom a ruined administration could no longer support, were in want of every thing, and found themselves in a state of utter destitution.

The Vendeans could not be made to feel the war except by devastations—a course which had been tried during the time of terror, but which had only excited furious resentments without putting an end to the civil war.

Hoche, devised an ingenious method of reducing the country without laying it waste, by depriving it of its arms, and taking part of its produce for the supply of the republican army. In the first place, he persisted in the establishment of several intrenched camps, some of which, situated on the Sèvre, separated Charette from Stofflet, while others covered Nantes, the coast, and Les Sables. He then formed a circular line, which was supported by the Sèvre and the Loire, and tended to envelop progressively the whole country. This line was composed of very strong posts, connected by patroles, so as to leave no free space by which an enemy who was at all numerous could pass. These posts were directed to occupy every hamlet and village, and to disarm them. To accomplish this, they were to seize the cattle, which usually grazed together, and the corn

military qualities might have rendered him a formidable rival of Napoleon, and possibly endangered the public peace, had he not united to these shining parts a patriotic heart and a love of liberty, which rendered him superior to all temptation; and more likely, had he lived, to have followed the example of Washington, than the footsteps of Cæsar or Cromwell."—*Alison*. E.

stowed away in the barns; they were also to secure the principal inhabitants: they were not to restore the cattle and the corn, nor to release the persons taken as hostages, till the peasants should have voluntarily delivered up their arms. Now, as the Vendeans cared much more about their cattle and their corn than about the Bourbons and Charette, they could not fail to surrender their arms. In order not to be overreached by the peasants, who might give up a few wretched muskets and keep the others, the officers charged with the disarming were to demand the list of enrolment kept in every parish, and to require as many muskets as there were persons enrolled. In default of these registers, it was recommended to them to make an estimate of the population, and to require a number of muskets equal to one-fourth of the male portion of it. After receiving the arms, they were faithfully to restore the cattle and the corn, with the exception of a part to be levied by the name of a tax, and to be collected in magazines formed on the rear of that line. Hoche had directed that the inhabitants should be treated with the utmost mildness, and that the most scrupulous punctuality should be observed in restoring their cattle, their corn, and especially their hostages. He had particularly recommended to the officers to have intercourse with them, to treat them well, to send them even sometimes to his head-quarters, and to make them presents of corn or other things. He had also enjoined the greatest respect to be paid to the *curés*. The Vendeans, said he, have but one real sentiment, that is, attachment to their priests. These latter want nothing but protection and tranquillity; let us ensure both to them, let us add some benefits, and the affections of the country will be restored to us.

That line, which he called the line of disarming, was to envelop Lower Vendée circularly, to advance by degrees, and at length to embrace the whole of it. As it advanced, it left behind it the disarmed country, reduced, nay even reconciled with the republic. It moreover protected it against a return of the insurgent chiefs, who usually punished submission to the republic and the surrender of arms by devastations. Two moveable columns preceded it, to fight those chiefs and to seize them if possible; and, cooping them up more and more, it could not fail at last to enclose and to secure them. The utmost vigilance was recommended to all the commandants of posts, to keep them constantly connected by means of patroles, and to prevent the armed bands from breaking through the line and again carrying the war upon its rear. But, in spite of all their caution, it was nevertheless possible that Charette and some of his partisans might elude the vigilance of the posts, and pass the line of disarming; yet, even in this case, they could not pass with more than a few persons, and they would find themselves in disarmed districts, restored to tranquillity and security, pacified

by kind treatment, and intimidated besides by that vast net of troops which encompassed the country. The case of a revolt on the rear was provided against. Hoche had given orders that one of the moveable columns should immediately fall back upon the insurgent commune, and that, to punish it for not having surrendered all its arms, and having again made use of them, its cattle and corn should be taken away and its principal inhabitants seized. The effect of these punishments was certain, and, dispensed with justice, they were calculated to inspire not hatred but a salutary fear.

Hoche's plan was immediately carried into execution in the months of Brumaire and Frimaire (November and December). The line of disarming, passing through St. Gilles, Légé, Montaigu, and Chantonnay, formed a semicircle, the right extremity of which was supported by the sea and the left by the river Lay, and which was progressively to hem Charette in impracticable morasses. It was chiefly by the manner of its execution that a plan of this nature could succeed. Hoche directed his officers by luminous instructions, full of sound reason, and was indefatigable in attending to all the details. It was not merely a war, it was a great military operation, which required as much prudence as energy. The inhabitants soon began to surrender their arms, and to become reconciled with the republican troops. Hoche granted relief to the indigent from the magazines of the army; he himself saw the inhabitants detained as hostages, caused them to be kept a few days, and sent them away satisfied. To some he gave cockades, to others police caps, sometimes even corn to such as had none for sowing their fields. He was in correspondence with the *curés*, who placed great confidence in him, and acquainted him with all the secrets of the country. He thus began to acquire a great moral influence—a real power, with which it was requisite to terminate such a war. Meanwhile, the magazines formed on the rear of the line of disarming gradually filled; great numbers of cattle were collected; and the army began to live in abundance through the simple expedient of levying a tax and fines in kind.

Charette had sought refuge in the woods, with one hundred and fifty men as desperate as himself. Sapinaud, who, at his instigation, had again taken arms, offered to lay them down a second time, on the mere condition that his life should be spared. Stofflet, pent up in Anjou with his minister Bernier, collected there all the officers who had forsaken Charette and Sapinaud, and strove to enrich himself with their spoils. At his headquarters at Lavoir, he kept a sort of court, composed of emigrants and officers. He enrolled men and levied contributions, upon pretext of organizing the territorial guards. Hoche watched him very attentively, hemmed him in more and more by intrenched camps, and threatened him with a speedy disarming, on the first cause of dissatisfaction. An expedition

ordered by Hoche into Le Loroux, a district which had a sort of independent existence, without obeying either the republic or any chief, struck terror into Stofflet. Hoche sent this expedition to bring away the wine and the corn in which Le Loroux abounded, and of which the city of Nantes was utterly destitute. Stofflet was alarmed, and solicited an interview with Hoche, for the purpose of protesting his adherence to the treaty, interceding for Sapinaud and the Chouans, making himself in some sort the mediator of a new pacification, and securing by these means the continuance of his influence. He wished also to discover Hoche's intentions in regard to him. Hoche enumerated the grievances of the republic, and intimated that, if he afforded an asylum to all the brigands, if he continued to levy men and money, if he was determined to be any thing more than the temporary chief of the police of Anjou and to play the part of prince, he would carry him off immediately and then disarm his province. Stofflet promised the utmost submission, and retired full of apprehensions respecting the future.

Hoche had at the moment difficulties of a very different kind to encounter. He had drawn to his army part of the two armies of Brest and Cherbourg. The imminent danger of a landing had procured him these reinforcements, which had increased the number of the troops collected in La Vendée to forty-four thousand men. The generals commanding the armies of Brest and Cherbourg claimed the troops which they had lent, and the Directory seemed to approve of their claims. Hoche wrote that the operation which he had commenced was one of the utmost importance, that, if the troops which he had spread like a net around the Marais were taken from him, the submission of Charette's district and the destruction of that chief, which were near at hand, would be indefinitely deferred; that it would be better to finish what was so far advanced, before proceeding elsewhere; that he would then be the first to return the troops that he had borrowed, and even to assist the general commanding in Bretagne with his own, for the purpose of carrying into execution there the measures which were already found to have such happy effects in La Vendée. The government, struck with the reasons of Hoche, called him to Paris, with the intention of approving of all his plans, and giving him the command of the three armies of La Vendée, Brest, and Cherbourg. He was summoned thither at the end of Frimaire, to concert with the Directory the operations destined to put an end to the most calamitous of all wars.

Thus terminated the campaign of 1795. The reduction of Luxemburg, the passage of the Rhine, the victories in the Pyrenees, followed by the peace with Spain, and the destruction of the emigrant army at Quiberon, distinguished the beginning and the middle of it. The end was less prosperous. The return

of the armies across the Rhine, the loss of the lines of Mayence and of part of the territory at the foot of the Vosges, for a moment dimmed the brilliancy of our triumphs. But the victory of Loano, opening to us the door to Italy, re-established the superiority of our arms; and the operations of Hoche in the West commenced the real pacification of La Vendée, which had been so often and so vainly proclaimed.

The coalition, reduced to England, Austria, and a few princes of Germany and Italy, had reached the term of its efforts, and would have demanded peace but for its recent victories on the Rhine. These gained Clairfayt an immense reputation; and it seemed to be the opinion that the next campaign would open in the heart of our provinces on the Rhine.

Pitt, who needed subsidies, called parliament together again in autumn, in order to apply for fresh sacrifices. The people of London continued to cry out for peace as obstinately as ever. The Corresponding Society had met in the open air, and had voted the boldest and most threatening addresses against the war-system and in behalf of parliamentary reform. When the king went to open the parliament, his carriage was pelted with stones, the glasses were broken, and it was even believed that an air-gun had been discharged at it.* Pitt, riding through the streets on horseback, was recognised by the populace, pursued to his own house and covered with mud. Fox and Sheridan, more eloquent than they had ever been, called him severely to account. Holland conquered, the Netherlands incorporated with the French republic, their conquest rendered definitive in some measure by the reduction of Luxemburg, enormous sums spent on La Vendée, unfortunate Frenchmen exposed to be uselessly shot, were serious charges against the judgment and policy of the administration. The expedition to Quiberon, in particular, excited general indignation. Pitt attempted to excuse himself by saying that English blood had not been spilt. "True," replied Sheridan, with an energy which it is difficult to transfuse into another language; "true, English blood has not been spilt, but English honour has oozed from every pore." Pitt, unimpassioned as usual, called all the events of the year mishaps, for which those ought to be prepared who stand the chance of arms; but he laid great stress on the recent victories of Austria on the Rhine; he greatly exaggerated their import-

* "On occasion of the king's going to parliament at its opening in 1795, the general discontent broke out into open outrages of the most disgraceful kind. The royal carriage was surrounded by an immense crowd of turbulent persons, loudly demanding peace and the dismissal of Mr. Pitt. One of the windows was broken by a stone or bullet from an air-gun; showers of stones were thrown at the state-coach both going and returning from parliament; and the monarch narrowly escaped the fury of the populace in his way from St. James's Palace to Buckingham House."—*Alison*. E.

ance, and the facilities which they were likely to afford for treating with France. As usual, he asserted that our republic was approaching the term of its power; that an inevitable bankruptcy must plunge it into complete confusion and impotence; that, in continuing the war a year longer, the allies had gained a great point, that of reducing the common enemy to extremity. He solemnly promised that if the new French government should appear to establish itself and to assume a regular form, the first opportunity for negotiating should be seized. He then asked for a new loan of three millions sterling and for restrictive laws against the press and against the political societies, to which he attributed the outrages committed upon the king and himself. The Opposition replied that the boasted victories on the Rhine were victories only of a day; that defeats in Italy had since destroyed the effect of the advantages obtained in Germany; that the French republic, always held at bay, sprang up stronger at the opening of each successive campaign, that the assignats had long been done up, that they had completed their service, that the resources of France were elsewhere, and besides, if she were exhausting herself, Great Britain was exhausting herself much more rapidly; that the debt, every day increasing, was overwhelming, and must soon crush the three kingdoms. As for the laws relative to the press and to the political societies, Fox, in a transport of indignation, declared that if they were adopted, the English people would have no resource left but resistance, and that he considered resistance no longer as a question of right but of prudence. This proclamation of the right of insurrection excited a great tumult, which ended in compliance with the demands of Pitt: he carried his motions for a new loan and for repressive measures, and promised to open a negotiation as soon as possible. The parliament was prorogued to the 2nd of February, 1796.

Pitt had no thoughts whatever of peace. He merely meant to make demonstrations, in order to satisfy opinion, and to hasten the success of his loan. The possession of the Netherlands by France rendered all idea of peace intolerable to him. He promised himself, in fact, to seize a moment for opening a feigned negotiation and offering inadmissible conditions.

Austria, in order to satisfy the Empire, which cried out for peace, had caused overtures to be made through Denmark. That power had proposed, on behalf of Austria, to the French government, the formation of a European congress; the French government had replied that a congress would render all negotiation impossible, because it would be necessary to reconcile too many interests; that, if Austria was desirous of peace, she had but to make direct overtures for it; that France was determined to treat individually with all her enemies, and to arrange matters with themselves without any mediator. This reply was just; for a congress would complicate the peace with Austria

with the peace with England and the Empire, and render it impossible. In fact, Austria desired no other answer, for she did not mean to negotiate. She had lost too much, and her last successes had led her to hope too much, for her to consent to lay down her arms. She strove to infuse fresh courage into the King of Sardinia, terrified by the victory of Loano, and promised him a numerous army and another general for the ensuing campaign. The honours of a triumph were decreed to General Clairfayt, on his entry into Vienna; his carriage was drawn by the people; and the favours of the court were added to the demonstrations of popular enthusiasm.

Thus ended, for all Europe, the fourth campaign of this memorable war.

THE DIRECTORY.

CONTINUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF THE DIRECTORY—CREATION OF MANDATS—DISCONTENT OF THE JACOBINS—CONSPIRACY OF BABŒUF.

THE republican government was cheered and strengthened by the events with which the campaign had just terminated. The Convention, by uniting Belgium with France, and by incorporating it with the constitutional territory, had imposed upon its successors the obligation to treat with the enemy on no other condition than the line of the Rhine. New efforts, and a new campaign, more decisive than the preceding, were required to force the house of Austria and England to consent to our aggrandizement. To attain this end, the Directory laboured with energy to complete the armies, to re-establish the finances, and to repress the factions.

It particularly laid stress upon the execution of the laws relative to the young requisitionists, and obliged them with the utmost rigour to rejoin the armies. It had caused all kinds of exemptions to be annulled, and had formed in every district a commission of medical men to decide upon cases of infirmity. A great number of young men had thrust themselves into the administrations, where they plundered the republic and showed the worst spirit. The strictest orders were given to admit into the public offices none but men who did not belong to the requisition. The finances, in particular, attracted the attention of the Directory; it caused the forced loan of six hundred millions to be raised with extreme activity. But it was obliged to wait for the proceeds of that loan, for the alienation of the produce of the national forests, for the sale of the domains of three hundred acres, and for the collection of the arrears of contributions: meanwhile it was necessary to provide for expenses which unfortunately came all at once, because the installation of the new government was the time to which all payments were deferred, and because the winter was the season destined for preparations for the next campaign. But, while awaiting the moment for all these returns, the Directory had been obliged to avail itself of the resource which some had insisted on its retaining—that of assignats. But it had already issued in one month from twelve to fifteen thousand millions, in order to procure a few millions in specie, and it was on the point of not being able to make them pass any where. It conceived the idea of issuing a current

paper at a short date, which should represent the revenue of the year, as is done in England with exchequer bills, and as we are now doing with royal *bons*. By the name of rescriptions it issued bills payable to bearer at the Treasury, with the specie which was to come in immediately either from the forced loan, which in Belgium was demandable in cash, or from the customs, or from the first treaties with the companies which should undertake the working of the forests. At first it issued thirty millions in these rescriptions, and soon raised them to sixty, availing itself of the assistance of bankers for the purpose.

Financial companies were no longer prohibited. It thought of employing them for the creation of a bank, which credit needed, especially at a moment when it was imagined that all the specie had been carried out of France. It formed a company, and proposed to give up to it a certain quantity of national domains, to serve for the capital of a bank. This bank was to issue notes, which would have lands for their pledge, and would be payable at sight like all bank-notes. It was to lend to the state these notes to an amount proportionate to the lands given in pledge. This was, as we see, another way of drawing upon the value of the national domains: it was in fact resorting to the expedient of bank-notes, instead of employing that of assignats.

The success was not very probable; but, in its unfortunate situation, the government tried every thing and was right to do so. Its most meritorious operation was abolishing the rations, and restoring freedom of traffic in articles of consumption. We have seen what efforts it cost the government when it took upon itself to bring corn to Paris; and what an expense was entailed upon the exchequer, which paid for the corn in real value, and sold it again to the people of the capital for nominal value. Scarcely a two-hundredth part of the expense was repaid, so that the republic was nearly at the entire cost of feeding the population of Paris.

Benezech, the new minister of the interior, who had felt the inconvenience of this system, and who conceived that circumstances would permit it to be relinquished, advised the Directory to have the courage to give it up. Commerce began to revive; corn began to circulate; the people insisted on being paid their wages in cash, and thenceforward they could afford to buy their own bread, which was at a moderate price in specie. Benezech, in consequence, proposed to the Directory to suppress the distribution of rations which were paid for in assignats, and to continue them only to the indigent, or to the annuitants and the public functionaries whose annual income was under a thousand livres. All others, excepting these three classes, were to supply themselves at the bakers by the way of free trade.

This was a bold measure, and required real courage. The Directory carried it into immediate execution, regardless of the

rage which it might excite in the populace, and the means of disturbance with which it might furnish the two factions conspiring against the tranquillity of the republic.

Besides these measures, it devised others which could not prove less prejudicial to private interests, but which were quite as necessary. A want particularly felt by the armies, and always felt by them after long wars, was that of horses. The Directory applied to the two councils for authority to levy all horses kept for luxury, and to take every thirtieth horse employed in tillage and draught on paying for it. The receipt for the horse was to be taken in payment of taxes. This measure, though harsh, was indispensable and was adopted.

The two councils seconded the Directory and manifested the same spirit, with the exception of the still temperate opposition of the minority. Some discussions had arisen relative to the verification of the powers, the law of the 3rd of Brumaire, the successions of emigrants, the priests, the occurrences in the South, and parties had begun to declare themselves.

The verification of the powers had been referred to a commission which had numerous inquiries to make relative to the members whose eligibility could be contested. Its report, therefore, could not be made till very late, after the legislature had been sitting upwards of two months. It gave rise to many altercations respecting the application of the law of the 3rd of Brumaire. This law, as we have seen, granted an amnesty for all offences committed during the Revolution, excepting such as related to the 13th of Vendémiaire: it excluded from public offices the relatives of emigrants and those persons who, in the electoral assemblies, had set themselves in rebellion against the decrees of the 5th and 13th of Fructidor. It had been the last act of energy of the Conventional party, and was singularly offensive to men of moderate sentiments and to the counter-revolutionists who concealed themselves behind them. It was necessary to enforce it in regard to several deputies, and especially to one Job Aymé, deputy of the Drôme, who had raised the electoral assembly of his department and was accused of belonging to the companies of Jesus. A member of the Five Hundred ventured even to demand a repeal of that law. This motion caused all the parties to throw off the reserve which they had hitherto maintained. A dispute similar to those which had decided the Convention arose in the Five Hundred. Louvet ever stanch to the revolutionary cause, rushed to the tribune to defend the law. Tallien, who had performed so conspicuous a part since the 9th of Thermidor, and who had been prevented by the want of personal consideration from attaining a seat in the Directory, here showed himself the constant advocate of the Revolution, and delivered a speech which produced a great sensation. Preceding speakers had recapitulated the circumstances under which the law had been passed; they

seemed to insinuate that it was an abuse of the victory of Vendémiaire in regard to the vanquished; and a great deal had been said concerning the Jacobins and their new audacity. "Let them cease to alarm us," exclaimed Tallien, "by talking of terror, by reminding us of epochs totally different from the present, by exciting apprehensions of their return. Times are, indeed, greatly changed. In the epochs on which people are so fond of descanting, the royalists did not lift an audacious head; the fanatical priests, the returned emigrants, were not protected; the chiefs of the Chouans were not acquitted. Why then compare circumstances which have no resemblance to each other? It is too evident that the intention is to sit in judgment on the 13th of Vendémiaire, on the measures which have followed that memorable day, and on the men who, amid these great dangers, saved the republic. Well then, let our enemies ascend this tribune; the friends of the republic will defend us there. The very men, who, in those disastrous circumstances, urged the misguided multitude to the cannons' mouth, would now reproach us with the efforts which we were obliged to make to repulse it: they would fain procure the repeal of the measures which the most imminent danger forced you to take; but no, they will not succeed. The law of the 3rd of Brumaire, the most important of those measures, will be upheld by you, for it is necessary to the constitution, and assuredly you are determined to uphold the constitution."—"Yes, yes, we are," cried a multitude of voices. Tallien then moved the expulsion of Job Aymé. Several members of the new third opposed it. The discussion became extremely warm; the law of the 3rd of Brumaire was sanctioned anew; Job Aymé was expelled, and the inquiry concerning those members of the new third to whom the same dispositions were applicable was continued.

The next question related to the emigrants and their right to successions not yet open. A law of the Convention had, with a view to prevent the emigrants from receiving any aid, seized their patrimony, and declared the successions to which they had a claim forfeited and vested in the republic. In consequence, the property of their relatives had been laid under sequestration. A resolution was proposed in the Five Hundred for authorizing the division and the seizure of the portion belonging to the emigrants, in order that the sequestration might be removed. A very warm opposition arose in the new third. This measure, which was quite revolutionary, was impugned on grounds deduced from the common law; it was alleged to involve a violation of property. This resolution was, nevertheless, adopted. In the Ancients, it fared otherwise. This council, from the age of its members, and its function of supreme examiner, had more moderation than that of the Five Hundred. It partook less of the opposite passions. It was less revolutionary than the majority, and much more so than the minority. Like every inter-

mediate body, it had an intermediate spirit, and rejected the measure, because it would lead to the execution of a law which it considered as unjust. The councils afterwards decreed that the Directory should be supreme judge of the applications for erasure from the list of emigrants. They renewed all the laws against the priests who had not taken the oath, or who had retracted it, and against those whom the authorities of the departments had sentenced to banishment. They decreed that these priests should be treated as returned emigrants, if they appeared again upon the territory. They merely consented to put into confinement such of them as were infirm and could not expatriate themselves.

Another subject greatly agitated the councils and produced an explosion in them. Fréron was still prosecuting his mission in the South, and composing the administrations and the tribunals of ardent revolutionists. The members of the companies of Jesus, the counter-revolutionists of all kinds, who had been committing murders ever since the 9th of Thermidor, found themselves in their turn exposed to new reprisals and raised loud outcries. Simeon, the deputy, had already made temperate remonstrances. Jourdan of Aubagne, a man of an ardent mind, and Isnard, the ex-Girondin, complained vehemently in the Five Hundred; and filled several sittings with their declamations. The two parties were strongly excited. Jourdan and Talot quarrelled in the Assembly itself, and had nearly come to blows. Their colleagues interposed and separated them. A commission was appointed to make a report on the state of the South.

These different scenes caused the parties to declare themselves more decidedly. The majority in the councils was great, and wholly devoted to the Directory. The minority, though a cipher, grew daily bolder, and openly manifested a spirit of reaction. It was the continuation of the same spirit which had displayed itself ever since the 9th of Thermidor, and which had at first justly attacked the excesses of terror, but which, becoming from day to day more severe and more excited, at length ventured to sit in judgment on the entire Revolution. Some of the members of the Conventional two-thirds voted with the minority, and some of the members of the new third with the majority.

The Conventionalists seized the opportunity with which the anniversary of the 21st of January was about to furnish them, to put their colleagues suspected of royalism to a painful test. They proposed a festival to celebrate, every 21st of January, the death of the late King, and on their motion it was decided that every member of the two councils and of the Directory should on that day take an oath of hatred to royalty. This formality of an oath, so frequently employed by parties, never could be considered as a guarantee; it has never been any thing but an annoyance of the conquerors, who have taken delight in forcing

the conquered to perjure themselves. The proposal was adopted by the two councils. The Conventionalists awaited with impatience the sitting of the 1st of Pluviose (January 21st), to see their colleagues of the new third ascend the tribune. Each of the councils sat that day in solemn state. An entertainment was prepared in Paris, which was to be attended by the Directory and all the authorities. When the oath was to be pronounced, some of the new members appeared embarrassed. Dupont of Nemours, the ex-Constituent, who was a member of the Ancients, who retained to an advanced age a great vivacity of disposition, and showed the boldest opposition to the existing government — manifested upon this occasion some vexation, and, after pronouncing the words, *I swear hatred to royalty*, added, *and to every kind of tyranny*. This was one way of revenging himself, and of swearing hatred to the Directory under evasive words. Violent murmurs arose, and Dupont was obliged to adhere to the official form. In the Five Hundred, one André would have used the same expression as Dupont, but he was in like manner obliged to observe the usual form. The president of the Directory delivered an energetic speech, and the whole government thus made the most revolutionary profession of faith.

At this juncture the deputies who had been exchanged for the daughter of Louis XVI. arrived. These were Quinette, Bancal, Camus, Lamarque, Drouet, and Beurnonville, the ex-minister at war. They made a report of their captivity; the Assembly heard it with profound indignation, and bestowed on them just demonstrations of interest; and amidst general satisfaction they took that place which the Convention had ensured to them in the councils. It had been decreed, in fact, that they should be by right members of the legislative body.

Such were the proceedings of the government and of parties during the winter of the year IV (1795-6).

France, which wished for a government and for the re-establishment of the laws, began to be satisfied with the new state of things, and would even have entirely approved it, but for the efforts that were required of her for the salvation of the republic. The rigorous execution of the laws concerning the requisitions, the forced loan, the levy of the thirtieth horse, and the wretched state of the annuitants paid in assignats were grievous subjects of complaint: but for these causes, she would have deemed the new government excellent. It is only the select few of a nation who are alive to glory, to liberty, to noble and generous ideas, and who consent to make sacrifices for them. The mass wishes for quiet, and to have to make as few sacrifices as possible. There are moments when this entire mass is roused, moved by deep and mighty passions: such instances had been seen in 1789, when the French had been obliged to conquer liberty, and in 1793 when they were

forced to defend it. But, exhausted by these efforts, the great majority of France was unwilling to make any more.* It required an able and vigorous government to secure the resources requisite for the salvation of the republic. Fortunately, the youth of the country, ever ready for an adventurous life, offered great resources for recruiting the armies. At first, they showed great unwillingness to leave their homes, and yielded after some resistance. When transferred to the camps, they acquired a decided partiality for war, and performed prodigies of valour. It was much more difficult to manage and to reconcile with the government those from whom sacrifices in money were demanded.

The enemies of the Revolution, taking for their text the new sacrifices required from France, declaimed in their journals against the requisition, the forced loan, the forced levy of horses, the state of the finances, the distress of the annuitants, and the strict execution of the laws relating to emigrants and priests. They affected to consider the government as being still a revolutionary government, and as having all its despotism and violence. According to them, it was impossible to place confidence in it any longer, and to feel security respecting the future. They inveighed particularly against the design of a new campaign. They alleged that the government was sacrificing the peace, the property, the lives of the citizens to the mania of conquest, and seemed mortified that the Revolution had the honour of giving Belgium to France. It was not surprising, they said, that the government should have such a spirit and such projects, since the Directory and the councils were full of the members of an Assembly which had sullied itself with all sorts of crimes.

The patriots, who were never behindhand with reproaches and recriminations, on the contrary considered the government as too weak, and were quite ready to accuse it of indulgence to the counter-revolutionists. According to them, emigrants and priests were suffered to return; the conspirators of Vendémiaire were every day acquitted; the young men of the requisition were not sent back with sufficient severity to the armies; and the forced loan was too leniently raised. They disapproved, in particular, of the financial system, which appeared likely to be adopted. We have already seen that the idea of abolishing the assignats had exasperated them, and that they had immediately demanded the

* "The age was far removed from France of the 14th of July, 1789, with its enthusiastic feelings, its high resolves, its ardent aspirations, its popular magistrates, and its buoyant population; it was still further removed from France of the 10th of August, when a single class had usurped the whole authority of the state, and borne to the seat of government its vulgar manners and sanguinary ideas, its distrust of all above, and its severity to all beneath itself. Society had now emerged, weakened and disjointed, from the chaos of revolution."—*Alison*. E.

revolutionary means which in 1793 had raised paper to par. The intention of having recourse to the financial companies, and of establishing a bank, revived all prejudices. The government, they said, was going to give itself up again to stockjobbers; it was about, by establishing a bank, to ruin the assignats and to destroy the paper-money of the republic, in order to substitute for it a private paper created by jobbers. They were incensed at the abolition of the rations. To restore a free trade in articles of consumption, to cease to feed the city of Paris, was an attack on the Revolution. It was an attempt to starve the people and to drive them to despair. On this point the journals of royalism seemed to agree with those of Jacobinism, and Benezech, the minister, was loaded with invectives by all parties.

One measure raised the indignation of the patriots against the new government to the highest pitch. The law of the 3rd of Brumaire, while pardoning all offences relative to the Revolution, nevertheless excepted particular crimes, such as robbery and murder, which were still amenable to the laws. Thus the proceedings, commenced during the latter time of the Convention against the authors of the massacres of September, were prosecuted like ordinary proceedings against murder. At the same time, the conspirators of Vendémiaire were brought to trial and almost all acquitted. The proceedings against the authors of September were, on the contrary, extremely strict. The patriots were enraged. Babœuf,* a furious Jacobin, who had been confined in Prairial, and recovered his liberty by the effect of the law of amnesty, had commenced a paper in imitation of that of Marat, by the title of the *Tribun du Peuple*. It is easy to conceive

* "Babœuf was the son of a collector of the salt-tax, and in 1777 entered into the service of a gentleman, who gave him some sort of education, and made him his confidential man of business. He soon afterwards married a chambermaid, made himself conspicuous by his revolutionary doctrines, and in 1792 was appointed elector of the department of Somme. On the overthrow of Robespierre, he turned journalist, styled himself Gracchus, and wrote with severity against the Jacobins, to whom he gave the title of Terrorists. He afterwards attacked Tallien and the Thermidorians, and on the establishment of the Directory published his 'Tribune of the People,' in which he displayed the most extravagant democracy. Being brought before the minister of police, Babœuf confessed himself the author of a plan of insurrection, and showed great firmness, refusing to name his accomplices. He was condemned to death in 1797, and, on learning his sentence, stabbed himself, but his body was nevertheless dragged to the scaffold and beheaded."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

"Gracchus Babœuf, who called himself the 'Tribune of the People,' was a bold man, of an excited imagination, and fantastically attached to an extraordinary kind of democracy. This man, who possessed great power over his party, prepared it by his journal for the reign of, what he called, general happiness."—*Mignet.* E.

"On being arrested, Babœuf wrote thus to the Directory: 'Whatever may be my fate, my name will be placed with those of Barnevelt and Sidney; whether conducted to death or to banishment, I am certain of arriving at immortality."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

what the imitation of such a model was likely to be. Babœuf's paper, more violent than Marat's, was not cynical but low. What extraordinary circumstances had provoked was here reduced to a system, and supported with a folly and a frenzy hitherto unknown. When ideas which have engrossed the public mind are approaching their end, they stick fast in some heads and are transformed into mania and idiocy. Babœuf was the head of a sect afflicted with mental malady, who insisted that the massacre of September had been incomplete, and that it ought to be renewed and rendered general, in order that it might be definitive. They publicly preached up the agrarian law, which the Hebertists themselves had never dared to do, and employed a new expression, the *common happiness*, to denote the aim of their system. This expression alone characterized in them the utmost limit to the tyranny of demagogues. It makes one shudder to read Babœuf's pages. In upright minds they excited pity; the alarmists pretended to believe in the approach of a new Terror, and it is true that the meetings of the society of the Pantheon afforded a specious pretext for their apprehensions. It was in the spacious church of St. Geneviève that the Jacobins had recommenced their club, as we have observed.* More numerous than ever, they amounted to nearly four thousand, vociferating all together, till the night was far advanced. By degrees they had overstepped the limits of the constitution, and given themselves all that it had forbidden, namely a bureau, a president, and tickets. In short, they had resumed the character of a political assembly. There they declaimed against the emigrants and the priests, the stockjobbers, the bloodsuckers of the people, the plan of a bank, the suppression of the rations, the abolition of the assignats, and the proceedings instituted against the patriots.

The Directory, finding itself daily more and more firmly established, began to feel solicitous to please moderate and reasonable minds. It deemed it right to visit with severity this outburst of the Jacobin faction. The constitution of the existing laws furnished it with the means of doing so; and it resolved to employ them. In the first place, it ordered several numbers of Babœuf's paper to be seized, as instigating to the overthrow of the constitution; it then caused the Pantheon to be shut up, as well as the places of meeting of several other societies formed by the *gilded youth*, where the members read the newspapers and amused themselves with dancing. These latter were situated in

* "The democrats had re-established their club at the Pantheon, and it was for some time tolerated by the Directory. The society, however, became daily more numerous and more alarming to the government, which at first endeavoured to restrain it within bounds, but its sittings were in a short time prolonged to a late hour. The democrats at length repaired thither in arms, and projected an expedition against the Directory and the Councils, who then determined on making an open attack upon them."—*Mignet*. E.

the Palais-Royal and the Boulevard des Italiens, and were called *Société des Echecs, Salon des Princes, Salon des Arts.* There was little to be feared from them, and they were comprehended in the measure merely to show impartiality. The ordinance was published and executed on the 8th of Ventose (February 27, 1796). A resolution proposed by the Five Hundred added another condition to those which were already imposed by the constitution on the popular societies: they were not to consist of more than sixty members.

Benezech, the minister, accused by both parties, tendered his resignation. The Directory refused to accept it, and wrote him a letter commending his services. The letter was published. The new system relative to articles of consumption was maintained; the indigent, the annuitants, and the public functionaries, who had not an income of one thousand francs were alone supplied with rations. Something was likewise done for the unfortunate *rentiers* who were still paid in paper. The two councils decreed that they should receive ten for one in assignats; a very trifling augmentation, for the assignats had fallen to the two-hundredth part of their nominal value.

To the measures which it had just adopted, the Directory added that of at last recalling the Conventional deputies on mission. It appointed commissioners of the government in their stead. These commissioners, with armies or administrations, represented the Directory, and superintended the execution of the laws. They had not, as formerly, unlimited powers in the armies; but, in an emergency, when the power of the general was insufficient, such as a requisition for provisions or troops, they were authorized to adopt a decision on the spur of the moment, which was carried into execution and afterwards submitted to the approbation of the Directory. Complaints were made against many of the functionaries appointed by the Directory at the first moment of its installation; it enjoined its civil commissioners to keep an eye upon them and to point out those whom it would be proper to supersede.

In order to watch the factions, which, being now obliged to conceal themselves, were likely to act in the dark, the Directory resolved upon the institution of a special ministry of police.

The police is an important object in times of disturbance. The three preceding assemblies had appropriated to it a numerous committee; the Directory did not deem it right to leave it among the auxiliary duties of the ministry of the interior, and proposed to the two councils to establish a special ministry. The opposition pretended that it was an inquisitorial institution, which was true, and which unfortunately was inherent in a time of factions, and especially of obstinate factions, and factions that were obliged to plot in secret. The plan was approved. Cochon, the deputy, was placed at the head of this new ministry. The Directory wished moreover for laws to regulate the

liberty of the press. The constitution declared it to be unlimited, excepting the dispositions which might become necessary for repressing its excesses. The two councils, after a solemn discussion, rejected every restrictive *projet de loi*. The parts were again reversed in this discussion. The partisans of the Revolution, who should have been partisans of unlimited liberty, demanded means of repression; and the opposition, whose secret sentiments inclined rather to monarchy than to the republic, voted for unlimited liberty—so strongly are parties governed by their interest. For the rest, the decision was discreet. The press may be unlimited without danger; truth alone is formidable; that which is false is impotent; the more it exaggerates, the weaker it becomes. There never yet was a government that was overthrown by lies. What signified it if a Babœuf extolled the agrarian law, if a *Quotidienne* depreciated the grandeur of the Revolution, slandered its heroes, and strove to set up banished princes again! The government had only to allow them to declaim: a week's exaggeration and lies exhaust all the pens of pamphleteers and libellers. But a government must have time and philosophy before it admits these truths. It was perhaps not time for the Convention to listen to them. The Directory which was more tranquil and more settled, ought to have begun to hearken to and to practise them.

The last measures of the Directory, such as the closing of the Pantheon, the refusal to accept the resignation of Benezech, the recall of the Conventionalists on mission, and the change of certain functionaries, produced the best effect. They gave confidence to those who dreaded the revival of Terror; they condemned to silence such as affected to dread it; and they gratified sober minds who wished the government to place itself above all parties. The continuity and activity of the operations of the Directory contributed not less than all the rest to gain it esteem. People began to hope for quiet, and to associate the idea of stability with the existing system. The five directors were surrounded by a certain degree of state. Barras, a man of pleasure, did the honours of the Luxembourg. He acted in some measure for his colleagues. Society wore nearly the same aspect as in the preceding year. It exhibited a singular medley of conditions, great freedom of manners, an inordinate fondness for amusements, and extraordinary luxury.* The saloons of the director

* The following is the Duchess d'Abrantes's account of the state of society in Paris at this period: "All those delightful reunions which formerly constituted the charm of intimate acquaintance now no longer existed, or were poisoned by odious politics, which engendered sharp contradiction, anger, quarrels, frequently terminating in ruptures between husband and wife, brother and sister, and sometimes between father and son. Such was the picture presented by society in Paris at the period of which I am now treating, that is, 1796. The word society was vulgarly used to designate assemblages of persons; but, in point of fact, there were no social meetings.

were full of generals, who had finished their education and made their fortune in a couple of years; of contractors and men of business, who had enriched themselves by speculations and rapine; of exiles, who had returned and were seeking to connect themselves with the government; of men of superior talents, who began to have confidence in the republic, and wished to take their place in it; and lastly, of intriguers, who were running after favour. Women of high and low birth came to these saloons to display their charms, and sometimes to use their influence at a moment when any thing might be demanded and obtained. If at times manners had neither that decorum nor that dignity, on which so much stress is now laid in France, and which are the fruit of a polished, tranquil, exclusive society, there prevailed an extreme freedom of mind, and that great abundance of positive ideas, which the sight and the practice of great things suggests. The men who composed that society were not controlled by any kind of routine; they did not repeat insignificant traditions; what they knew, they had learned by their own experience. They had witnessed the greatest events in history. They had taken part, they were still taking part, in them; and it is easy to conceive what ideas such a spectacle must have excited in young minds, ambitious and full of hope. There young Hoche shone in the first rank, who from a private in the French guards had become in one campaign general-in-chief, and acquired in two years the most finished education. Handsome, of polished manners, renowned as one of the first captains of his time, and scarcely twenty-seven years of age, he was the hope of the republicans, and the idol of those females smitten with beauty, talent, and glory. Beside him was already remarked young Bonaparte, who had not yet acquired renown, but whose services at Toulon and on the 13th of Vendémiaire were well known, whose character and person astonished by their singularity, and whose understanding struck by its originality and vigour.* In this

Private individuals were afraid of appearing wealthy by receiving company habitually, and they contented themselves with frequenting those public assemblages, where at that time the best society was to be found. Such was the system adopted, not only in regard to concerts, but also to balls." E.

* Madame Bourrienne has drawn a curious and striking portrait of Bonaparte, as he appeared in Paris previous to his departure for the army of Italy, which we subjoin: "At this period (towards the close of the year 1795) I remarked that Bonaparte's character was reserved, and frequently gloomy. His smile was hypocritical and often misplaced; and I recollect that he one day gave us one of those specimens of savage hilarity which prepossessed me against him. He was telling us that, being before Toulon, where he commanded the artillery, one of his officers was visited by his wife, to whom he had been but a short time married, and whom he tenderly loved. A few days after, orders were given for another attack upon the town, in which this officer was to be engaged. His wife came to General Bonaparte, and with tears entreated him to dispense with her husband's services on that day. The general was inexorable, as he himself told us. The moment of the attack arrived, and the officer, though a very brave man, as Bonaparte assured us,

society, Madame Tallien fascinated by her beauty, Madame Beauharnais by her grace, Madame de Staël displayed all the brilliancy of her intellect, heightened by circumstances and by liberty.*

Those young men called to govern the state chose their wives, some from among the ladies formerly of rank, who deemed themselves honoured by an alliance with them, others out of families enriched by the times, who were desirous of ennobling wealth by reputation. Bonaparte had just married the widow of the unfortunate General Beauharnais. Every one was anxious to fix his destiny, and foreboded a brilliant career for himself. Roads to fortune were open to all. The war upon the continent, the naval war, the tribune, the magistracy, in short a great republic to defend and govern—these were grand objects, worthy to inflame every mind! The government had recently made a valuable acquisition; it was that of an ingenious and profound writer, who had devoted his youthful talents to reconcile opinion with the new republic. M. Benjamin Constant† had recently

felt a presentiment of his approaching death. He turned pale and trembled. He was stationed beside the general, and, during an interval when the firing from the town was very strong, Napoleon called out to him, 'Take care, there is a bomb-shell coming.' The officer, instead of moving to one side, stooped down, and was literally severed in two. The general laughed loudly while he described this event with horrible minuteness. There was always something eccentric in Bonaparte's behaviour. He would often slip away from us at the theatre without saying a word, and, when we supposed he had quitted it, we would suddenly discover him in the second or third tier, sitting alone in a box, and looking rather sulky." E.

* "Madame de Staël was always in her element in Parisian society, and exhibited herself there to the greatest advantage; she could not live happily without the excitements and novelties that Paris alone could supply; and when these were withdrawn, not all the vivacity of her genius, nor all the warmth of her heart, could protect her from the benumbing influence of ennui."—*Edinburgh Review*. E.

† "Benjamin de Constant de Rebecque, born at Lausanne in 1767, and one of the most distinguished authors and orators of the liberal party on the left side of the French chamber of deputies, was the son of a general in the Dutch service, who had retired into his native country, French Switzerland, and commanded the militia there. Young Benjamin was educated at Brunswick, in Germany, and, at a later period, studied the law. At the period of the Revolution he went to Paris, and, with equal courage and sternness of purpose, opposed both anarchy and despotism. In 1797 he distinguished himself by the fire of his orations, which caused his election to the office of tribune. He was the principal cause of the appointment of Talleyrand to the foreign office by the Directory in the same year. His speeches and writings rendered him odious to the First Consul, and he was consequently dismissed from his station in 1802. Similarity of sentiment connected him with Madame de Staël, with whom he travelled through several countries, till Napoleon permitted him to return to Paris for a limited period. In 1814 Constant showed himself zealous for the cause of the Bourbons; he suffered himself, however, to be elected councillor of state by Napoleon; and on the return of the King retired to Brussels. In 1816 he was allowed to return to Paris, and in 1819 was elected a member of the chamber of deputies. He was the author of several works, some of which are held in high repute." —*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

published a pamphlet entitled *De la Force du Gouvernement*, which had produced a strong sensation. He therein demonstrated the necessity of rallying round a government which was the only hope of France and of all parties.

A daily recurring subject of anxiety was that of the finances. The recent measures were but an adjournment of the difficulty. A certain quantity of domains had been given to the government to sell, the letting of the great forests, and the forced loan; and the plate of the assignats had been left it as a last resource. To anticipate the produce of these different resources, it had, as we have seen, created sixty millions of rescriptions, something like exchequer bills or royal *bons*, payable with the first specie that should reach the public coffers. But these rescriptions had not obtained currency without great difficulty. The bankers, who met to concert a plan for a territorial bank, founded on the national domains, separated amidst shouts uttered by the patriots against jobbers and brokers. The forced loan was levied much more slowly than had been expected. The assessment rested on extremely arbitrary bases; as the loan was to be raised from the wealthiest classes, every one complained; and each portion of it to be levied occasioned an altercation with the collectors. In two months, scarcely a third of it had been received. Some millions in specie and some thousand millions in paper had been collected. In the inadequacy of this resource, recourse had once more been had to the last engine left to the government for the purpose of supplying the deficiency of all the others—the plate for assignats. The issues had been extended during the last two months to the unheard-of sum of forty-five thousand millions. Twenty thousand millions had furnished scarcely one hundred millions, for the assignats were not worth more than the two-hundredth part of their nominal value. The public decidedly refused to take them, for they were good for nothing. They could not serve for the reimbursement of credits which were suspended; they could pay only half the rents and taxes, the other half of which was paid in kind; they were refused in the markets, or taken at their reduced value; lastly, they were taken in the sale of the domains, only at the same rate as in the markets, owing to the sales by auction; which caused the offer to rise in proportion to the depreciation of the paper. It was therefore impossible to put them to any use that could give them value. An issue, the limit of which was not known, gave reason to expect still more extraordinary figures for the purpose of expressing very moderate sums. Thousands of millions signified at most millions. This fall, to which we have already adverted, when the government refused to forbid the sale of the national domains by auction, was now realized.

Those minds in which the Revolution had left its prejudices, for all systems and all powers do leave them, wished that

assignats might be raised by setting apart a great quantity of domains in mortgage for them, and by resorting to violent measures to make them circulate. But there is nothing which it is so impossible to re-establish as the reputation of paper-money: it was therefore found absolutely necessary to renounce the assignats.

One may ask why the paper-money was not immediately abolished, by reducing it to its real value, which was about two hundred millions at most, and by demanding payment of the taxes, and for the national domains, either in specie, or in assignats at their current worth. Specie was in fact again making its appearance, and that in some abundance, especially in the provinces; thus it was an egregious error to apprehend its scarcity; for the paper reckoned as two hundred millions in the circulation: but another reason prevented the relinquishment of paper-money. The only resource, it should be borne in mind, consisted in the national domains. Their sale was considered as by no means certain, and above all, as not very near at hand. Unable, therefore, to wait till their value should come spontaneously to the exchequer by sales, it was necessary to represent it beforehand in paper, and to issue it for the purpose of withdrawing it afterwards: in short, it was necessary to spend the value before it was received. This necessity of spending before selling suggested the idea of the creation of a new species of paper-money.

The notes which were a special mortgage upon each domain would require long delays, because it was requisite that they should bear the description of each; besides, they would depend on the will of the taker, and would not remove the real difficulty. A paper was devised, which, by the name of *mandats* was to represent a fixed value in land. Every domain was to be delivered, without sale by auction and upon a mere *procès-verbal*, for a price in mandats equal to that of 1790 (twenty-two times its annual worth).

Mandats, to the amount of two thousand four hundred millions, were to be created, and domains to the like amount, according to the estimate of 1790, were to be immediately appropriated to them. Thus these mandats could not undergo any other variation than that of the domains themselves, since they represented a fixed quantity of them. It would not thence absolutely result that they should be on a par with money, for the domains were not worth so much as in 1790; but, at any rate, they must have the same value as the domains.

It was resolved to employ part of these mandats to withdraw the assignats. The plate of the assignats was broken up on the 30th of Pluviose: 45,500 millions had been issued. By the different returns, either by means of loans or of arrears, the circulating quantity had been reduced to 36,000 millions and was soon to be further reduced to 24,000. These 24,000 millions, reduced to one-thirtieth, represented 800 millions: it was de-

creed that they should be exchanged for 800 millions in mandats, which was a liquidation of the assignat at one-thirtieth of its nominal value. Six hundred millions more in mandats were to be issued for the public service, and the remaining 1200 were to be deposited in the chest with three keys, to be taken out by decree as they were wanted.

This creation of mandats was a reprint of the assignats, with a lower figure, another denomination, and a fixed value with respect to the domains. It was as if there had been created, besides the 24,000 millions that were to be left in circulation, 48,000 millions more, which would have made 72,000; it was as if it had been decided that these 72,000 millions should be taken in payment for domains, at thirty times their value in 1790, which would suppose 2400 millions' worth of domains to be mortgaged. Thus the figure was reduced, the relation to the domains fixed, and the name changed.

The mandats were created on the 26th of Ventose. The domains were to be sold immediately, and delivered to the bearer of the mandat on a mere *procès-verbal*. Half the price was to be paid in the first decade, the other half in three months. The national forests were set apart; and the 2400 millions' worth of domains were taken from those of less than three hundred acres. The measures which accompany a paper-money were immediately adopted. The mandat being the money of the republic, all payments were to be made in mandats. Credits stipulated in specie, rents, interest of capital, taxes excepting the arrears, the *rentes* on the state, the pensions and salaries of the public functionaries, were all to be paid in mandats. There were great discussions on the land-tax. Those who foresaw that the mandats were liable to fall, like the assignats, proposed that, to ensure to the state a certain return, the land-tax should continue to be paid in kind. Others objected strongly against the difficulties of the collection, and it was decided that it should be paid in mandats, as well as the customs, the registration and stamp-duty, the posts, &c. But the government did not stop there. It was deemed right to accompany the creation of the new paper with the severities that usually accompany forced values. It was declared that silver and gold should be no longer considered as merchandise, and that paper could thenceforward not be sold against gold and gold against paper. After the experience gained on former occasions, this was a miserable measure. Another that was adopted was not less so, and injured the Directory in the public opinion. This was, the shutting up of the Exchange. It ought to have known that the closing of a market does not prevent a thousand others from being established elsewhere.

In making mandats the new money and putting them every where in the place of specie, the government committed an egregious error. Even if it kept up its value, the mandat could

never equal the standard of money. The mandat, it is true, was worth as much as the land, but it could not be worth more. Now land was not worth half as much as in 1790; even a patrimonial estate worth 100,000 francs would not have fetched 50,000 in money. How could 100,000 francs in mandats have been equal in value to 100,000 in specie? This difference then ought at least to have been admitted. The government, therefore, could not help finding, independently of all the other causes of depreciation, a first mistake arising from the depreciation of the domains.

The pressure was so urgent that, till the mandats themselves should be ready to be issued, promises of mandats were put into circulation. The promises were presently circulating at a value far inferior to their nominal value. People were extremely alarmed. They said to themselves that the new paper, from which so much was hoped, was about to fall like the assignats, and to leave the republic without any resource. There was, however, a cause for this anticipated fall, and it might very soon be removed. It was requisite that instructions should be addressed to the local administrations, for their guidance in the extremely complicated cases that must arise from the sale of the domains upon a mere *procès-verbal*. It took considerable time to draw up these instructions, before the sales could commence. During this interval the mandat fell, and it was said that its value would soon be so low, that the state would refuse to open the sales and to give up the domains for such a consideration; that the same thing would happen to the mandats as had happened to the assignats; that they would gradually fall to nothing, and that then they would be taken in payment for domains, not at their value when issued, but at their reduced value. Malevolent persons thus spread the idea that the new paper was a lure, that the domains would never be alienated, and that the republic was determined to reserve them to itself, as an apparent and everlasting pledge for all the kinds of paper that it should be pleased to issue. The sales, nevertheless, were opened. The subscriptions were numerous. The mandat of one hundred francs had passed at fifteen. It rose successively to thirty, forty, and in some places to eighty francs. Hopes, therefore, were for a moment entertained of the success of the new operation.

It was amid factions secretly conspiring against it that the Directory prosecuted its labours. The agents of royalty had continued their clandestine intrigues. The death of Lemaître had not dispersed them. Brottier, who was acquitted, had become the chief of the agency. Duverne de Presle,* Laville-

* "Duverne-de-Presle, an officer in the royal navy, was denounced as one of the contrivers of a royalist conspiracy. He was arrested at the barracks of

Heurnois, and Despernelles, had joined him, and secretly formed the royal committee. These wretched agitators had no more influence than in time past. They intrigued, loudly demanded money, wrote a great many letters, and promised wonders. They were always the channel of communication between the pretender and La Vendée, where they had numerous agents. They persisted in their ideas, and, when they saw the insurrection quelled by Hoche and ready to expire under his strokes, they confirmed themselves more and more in the system of doing every thing in Paris, even by a movement in the interior. They boasted, as in the time of the Convention, of being in connexion with several deputies of the new third, and they concluded that they ought to temporize, to influence public opinion by the newspapers, to decry the government, and to prepare things in such a manner that the elections of the next year should bring in a new third of deputies entirely counter-revolutionary. They thus flattered themselves that they should destroy the republican constitution by means of the constitution itself. This plan was certainly the least chimerical, and it is the one that affords the most favourable idea of their intelligence.

The patriots were on their part contriving plots, but fraught with a different kind of danger, owing to the means which they had at their disposal. Driven from the Pantheon, absolutely condemned by the government, which had separated itself from them, and which had turned many of them out of the places that it had given them, they had declared against it and become its irreconcilable enemies. Finding themselves closely followed and watched, they had seen no other resource but to conspire most secretly, and in such a manner that the chiefs of the conspiracy should remain absolutely unknown. They had chosen four to form a secret directory of public welfare. Babœuf and Drouet were of the number. The secret directory was to communicate with twelve principal agents, who were unacquainted with one another, and who were to organize societies of patriots in all the quarters of Paris. These twelve agents, each thus acting by himself, were forbidden to name the four members of the secret directory; they were to speak and to enforce obedience in the name of a mysterious and supreme authority, which was instituted to direct the efforts of the patriots towards what was called the *common happiness*. In this manner the prime movers of the conspiracy could scarcely be laid hold of, and, if even one were seized, that circumstance would not ensure the

the military academy, and summoned by the Directory before a council of war. He was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, but ultimately purchased his pardon by turning evidence against the persons accused with him. He was afterwards said to have served in the police."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

apprehension of the others. This organization was actually established agreeably to Babœuf's plan: societies of patriots existed all over Paris, and, through the medium of the twelve principal agents, received the impulse of an unknown authority.

Babœuf and his colleagues were considering what method should be employed to effect what they called *the deliverance*, and to whom the authority should be consigned, when the Directory should be despatched, the councils dispersed, and the people put in possession of their sovereignty. They still felt too much distrust of the provinces and of public opinion, to run the risk of an election and to convoke a new assembly. They meant merely to appoint one composed of chosen Jacobins selected from each department. They meant to make this selection themselves, and to complete the Assembly by adding to it all the Mountaineers of the old Convention who had not been re-elected. Even these Mountaineers did not seem to them to give sufficient guarantees, for many of them had adhered, before the close of the Convention, to what they called *liberticide* measures, and had even accepted office under the Directory. They had, nevertheless, chosen sixty-eight of them who were considered the purest, and had agreed upon their admission into the new assembly. That assembly was to take all the powers into its hands till the *common happiness* was ensured.

It was deemed right to consult the Conventionalists not re-elected, most of whom were in Paris Babœuf and Drouet entered into communication with them. Great discussions arose on the choice of the means. The Conventionalists considered those proposed by the insurrectional directory as too extraordinary. They wished for the re-establishment of the old Convention, with the organization prescribed by the constitution of 1793. At length, the arrangements were agreed upon, and the insurrection was fixed for the month of Floreal. The means which the secret directory purposed to employ were truly terrible. In the first place it had put itself in correspondence with the principal cities of France, so that the Revolution might be simultaneous and every where alike. The patriots were to issue from their quarters, bearing banners inscribed with these words: *Liberty, Equality, Constitution of* 1793, *Common Happiness.* Whoever should resist the sovereign people was to be put to death; as were also the five directors, certain members of the Five Hundred, and the general of the army of the interior. The insurgents were to make themselves masters of the Luxembourg, the treasury, the telegraph, the arsenals, and the depot of artillery at Meudon. To induce the people to rise, and to pay them no longer with empty promises, all the inhabitants in easy circumstances were to be forced to board and lodge every man who should have taken part in the insurrection. The bakers and the wine-dealers were to be required to furnish the people with bread and drink, for which an indemnity was to be paid

them by the republic, upon pain of being hanged from the lamp in case of refusal. Every soldier who should go over to the side of the insurrection should have his equipments for his own property, be paid a sum of money, and be at liberty to return to his home. The insurgents hoped in this manner to gain all those who disliked the service. As for professed soldiers, who had contracted a fondness for war, they meant to give them the houses of the royalists to plunder. To keep up the armies to their complement, and to replace those who should be allowed to return to their homes, they purposed granting to the soldiers such advantages as would induce the spontaneous levy of a multitude of new volunteers.

We see what terrible and insensate combinations these desperate spirits had conceived. They had appointed Rossignol, ex-general of La Vendée, to command the Parisian army of insurrection. They had tampered with that police legion which constituted part of the army of the interior, and which had been composed of patriots, gendarmes of the tribunals, and old French Guards. It actually mutinied, but too soon, and was dissolved by the Directory. Cochon, the minister of the police, who was watching the progress of the conspiracy, of which he had been apprized by an officer of the army of the interior, whom the insurgents had attempted to gain, suffered it to proceed that he might secure all its threads. On the 20th of Floreal, Babœuf, Drouet, and the other chiefs and agents, were to meet at a cabinet-maker's in the Rue Bleue. Officers of police, stationed in the environs, seized the conspirators and immediately conducted them to prison. They apprehended also the ex-Conventionalists Laignelot,* Vadier, Amar, Ricord, Choudieu, Buonarotti the Piedmontese, Antonelle, ex-member of the Legislative Assembly, and Pelletier de St. Fargeau, brother of him who had been assassinated. Application was forthwith made to the two councils to put Drouet, who was a member of the Five Hundred, under accusation; and the whole of the prisoners were sent before the national court, which was not yet formed, but which the government immediately set about organizing. Babœuf, whose vanity equalled his fanaticism, wrote an extraordinary letter to the Directory, which showed in a striking manner the delirium of his mind. "I am a power," he wrote to the five directors; "you need not then be afraid to treat with me as with an equal. I am the chief of a formidable sect, which you will not destroy by sending me to death, and which, after my execution, will be

* "Laignelot, deputy from Paris to the Convention was born in 1752. Before the Revolution he cultivated letters and wrote tragedies. He voted for the King's death, and distinguished himself as a violent Jacobin. After the overthrow of Robespierre, he spoke against that party, but subsequently, on the establishment of the Directory, joined the conspiracy of Babœuf, and, being acquitted, devoted himself wholly to literature, and published a tragedy entitled Rienzi."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

only more exasperated and more dangerous. You have yet but a single thread of the conspiracy; you have done nothing in apprehending a few individuals; chiefs will spring up again continually. Spare the useless effusion of blood; you have not yet made much noise, make no more, treat with the patriots: they recollect that you were formerly sincere republicans; they will forgive you, if you will concur with them in the salvation of the republic."

The Directory took no notice of this extravagant letter, but ordered the institution of proceedings. These proceedings were likely to be long continued, for it was resolved that all the forms should be duly observed. This last act of vigour completely established the Directory in public opinion. The end of the winter approached; the factions were watched and repressed; the administration was directed with zeal and with care; the renewed paper-money alone caused uneasiness; it had nevertheless furnished momentary resources towards making the first preparations for the campaign.

THE DIRECTORY.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796—DEATH OF STOFFLET AND CHARETTE—PACIFICATION OF LA VENDEE—CONQUEST OF PIEDMONT AND LOMBARDY BY GENERAL BONAPARTE—BATTLES OF MONTENOTTE, MILLESIMO, AND LODI; ESTABLISHMENT AND POLICY OF THE FRENCH IN ITALY—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE BY GENERALS JOURDAN AND MOREAU; BATTLE OF RASTADT AND OF ETTLINGEN—FRENCH ARMIES ON THE DANUBE AND ON THE ADIGE.

THE season for military operations had now arrived. The English ministry, always wily in its policy, had made those overtures to the French government which public opinion expected from it. It had directed Wickham, its agent in Switzerland, to address some insignificant questions to Barthelemy, the minister of France. The object of these overtures, made on the 17th of Ventose (March 8th, 1796), was to inquire whether France was disposed for peace, whether she would consent to a congress for discussing its conditions, and whether she would intimate beforehand the principal bases on which she was resolved to treat.

Such an inquiry was only a vain satisfaction given by Pitt to the English nation, in order that he might be authorized by a refusal to demand new sacrifices. Had Pitt really been sincere, he would not have employed an agent without powers to make this overture; he would not have proposed a European congress, which, from the complicated nature of the questions, could not bring any thing to a close, and which, moreover, France had already refused to Austria, through the medium of Denmark; lastly, he would not have inquired on what bases the negotiation was likely to be opened, since he knew that, according to the constitution, the Netherlands had become part of the French territory, and that the existing government could not consent to the separation of that country from it. The Directory, unwilling to pass for dupes, caused the following answer to be given to Wickham: that neither the form nor the object of this procedure tended to prove its sincerity; that, nevertheless, in order to demonstrate its pacific intentions, it consented to give a reply to questions which did not deserve any; and that it declared that it was willing to treat on no other bases than those fixed by the constitution. This was declaring, in a definitive manner, that France would never relinquish Belgium. The letter of the Directory, written with temper and

firmness, was immediately published together with that of Wickham. This was the first instance of a frank and firm diplomacy, without boasting.

Every one approved of the conduct of the Directory, and on both sides preparations were made in Europe for renewing hostilities. Pitt demanded of the English parliament a new loan of seven millions sterling, and he endeavoured to negotiate another of three millions for the emperor. He had taken great pains to persuade the King of Prussia to break his neutrality and to engage again in the conflict. He had offered him funds, and had represented to him, that, when the war should be over and all parties exhausted, he would possess a decided superiority. The King of Prussia, resolving to shun his first faults, would not suffer himself to be misled, and persisted in his neutrality. One part of his army, stationed in Poland, was employed in the incorporation of the new conquests; the other, drawn up along the Rhine, was ready to defend the line of neutrality against any of the powers that should violate it, and to take under its protection such of the states of the empire as should claim the Prussian mediation. Russia, still liberal of promises, sent as yet no troops, and was engaged in organizing that portion of Poland which had fallen to her share.

Austria, inflated with her successes at the close of the preceding campaign, prepared for war with ardour, and indulged the most presumptuous hopes. The general to whom she owed this slight favour of fortune had nevertheless been displaced, notwithstanding all the brilliancy of his glory. Clairfayt had displeased the aulic council, and had been succeeded in the command of the army of the Lower Rhine by the young Archduke Charles, of whom great hopes were entertained, though no one had yet any foreboding of his talents. He had displayed in the preceding campaigns the qualities of a good officer. Wurmser still commanded the army of the Upper Rhine. To decide the King of Sardinia to continue the war, a considerable reinforcement had been sent to the imperial army which was fighting in Piedmont; and Beaulieu, who had gained great reputation in the Netherlands, was appointed to the command of it. Spain, beginning to enjoy peace, was attentive to the new struggle that was about to commence, and now, more enlightened respecting her true interests, her wishes were in favour of France.

The Directory, zealous as a new government, and anxious to give *éclat* to its administration, meditated important projects. It had put its armies on a respectable footing; but it had only been able to send them men, without furnishing them with the supplies which they needed. All Belgium had been laid under contribution for the subsistence of the army of the Sambre and Meuse; extraordinary efforts had been made to furnish that of the Rhine, in the heart of the Vosges, with provisions. But it

had not been possible either to afford them means of transport or to remount their cavalry. The army of the Alps had lived upon the stores taken from the Austrians after the battle of Loano; but it had neither shoes nor clothing, and its pay was in arrear.* The victory of Loano had thus been productive of no result. The armies of the western provinces were, thanks to the attention of Hoche, in a better state than any of the others, without, however, being provided with all that they needed. In spite of this want of many essential articles, our armies, accustomed to hardships, to live by expedients, and moreover inured to war by their glorious campaigns, were disposed to attempt great things.

The Directory meditated vast projects. It was anxious to finish in the spring the war in La Vendée, and then to take the offensive on all points. Its object was to push forward the armies of the Rhine into Germany, in order to blockade and besiege Mayence, to complete the submission of the princes of the empire, to separate Austria, to transfer the theatre of war to the heart of the hereditary dominions, and to subsist its troops at the expense of the enemy in the rich valleys of the Mayn and the Neckar. With respect to Italy, it cherished still more vast ideas, which had been suggested to it by General Bonaparte. The victory of Loano had not been followed up: according to that young officer, the French ought to gain a second, to force the King of Sardinia to make peace or to take his dominions from him, then to cross the Po, and to wrest from Austria the fairest jewel of her crown—Lombardy. There was the theatre of decisive operations, there they might inflict the severest blow on Austria, conquer equivalents to pay for the Netherlands, decide peace, and perhaps liberate beautiful Italy. Besides, this course would afford the means of feeding and restoring the poorest of our armies amidst the most fertile country in the world.

The Directory, adopting these ideas, made some changes in the command of its armies. Jourdan retained the command which he had so well deserved, and continued at the head of the army of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru, who had betrayed his country, and whose guilt was already suspected, was succeeded by Moreau, who commanded in Holland. Pichegru was offered the embassy to Sweden, which he refused. Beurnonville, who had lately returned from captivity, replaced Moreau in the command of the French army in Holland. Scherer, with whom the government was dissatisfied on account of the little advantage which he had derived from the victory of Loano, was removed. A young and enterprising man was re-

* "An idea of the penury of the army may be collected from the correspondence of the commander-in-chief, who appears to have once sent Massena a supply of twenty-four francs to provide for his official expenses."—*Jomini.* E.

quired to try a bold campaign. Bonaparte, who had already distinguished himself in the army of Italy, and who was, moreover, so impressed with the advantages of a march beyond the Alps, appeared to be the fittest man to succeed Scherer. He was therefore promoted from the command of the army of the interior to that of the army of Italy; and immediately set out for Nice. Full of ardour and joy, he declared, at starting, that in a month he would be either in Milan or in Paris.* This ardour appeared rash; but in a young man, and in a hazarduous enterprise, it was a good omen.

Similar changes had been made in the armies which occupied the insurgent provinces. Hoche, who had been summoned to Paris, to concert with the Directory a plan for putting an end to the civil war, had there obtained the most deserved favour, and received the strongest testimonies of esteem. The Directory, acknowledging the excellence of his plans, had approved of them all; and, that no one might have it in his power to thwart the execution of them, it had united the three armies of the coasts of Cherbourg, the coasts of Brest, and of the West, into one, by the name of the army of the coasts of the Ocean, and had given the supreme command of it to Hoche. This was the largest army of the republic, for it amounted to one hundred thousand men, extended over several provinces, and required in the commander a combination of very extraordinary powers, civil and military. A command so vast was the strongest proof of confidence that could be given to a general. Hoche certainly deserved it. Possessing, at the age of twenty-seven, such a variety of qualities, military and civil, as frequently becomes dangerous to liberty, cherishing even a lofty ambition, he had not that culpable boldness of mind which is capable of impelling an illustrious commander to aspire to more than the quality of citizen: he was a sincere republican, and equalled Jourdan in patriotism and integrity. Liberty might applaud his successes without fear and wish him victories.

Hoche had passed scarcely a month in Paris. He had returned immediately to the West, that he might complete the pacification of La Vendée by the end of winter or the beginning of spring. His plan of disarming and pacification had been reduced into articles, and converted into an ordinance by the Directory. It was agreed, conformably with this plan, that a disarming cordon should surround the insurgent provinces, and

* "It may be imagined with what delight Napoleon, aged scarcely twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his own powers, and his perfect knowledge of the country. His mind was made up to the alternative of conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words to a friend at taking leave of him. 'In three months,' he said, 'I will be either at Milan or at Paris,' intimating at once his desperate resolution to succeed, and his sense that the disappointment of all his prospects must be the consequence of a failure."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

scour them in succession. Until their complete pacification, they were to be subject to military law. All the towns were declared in a state of siege. It was acknowledged in principle that the army was to live at the expense of the insurgent country; consequently Hoche was authorized to levy the taxes and the forced loan, either in kind or in specie, as was most convenient to him, and to form magazines and chests for the supply of the army. The towns, which the country sought to starve by withholding from them articles of consumption, were to be provisioned in a military manner by columns attached to the principal of them. Pardon was granted to all the rebels who should lay down their arms. As for the chiefs, such of them as should be taken in arms were to be shot; those who should submit were to be either confined or kept under *surveillance* in particular towns, or conducted out of France. The Directory, approving Hoche's plan, which consisted in first pacifying La Vendée before meddling with Bretagne, authorized him to finish his operations on the left bank of the Loire, before he should bring back his troops to the right bank. As soon as La Vendée should be completely reduced, a line of disarming was to inclose Bretagne, from Granville to the Loire, and thus advance across the Breton peninsula to the extremity of the Finistère. It was for Hoche to fix the moment when these provinces, appearing to him to be reduced, should be relieved from military law, and readmitted to the constitutional system.

Hoche, on his arrival at Angers, towards the end of Nivose, found his operations greatly deranged by his absence. The success of his plan, depending particularly on the manner in which it should be executed, indispensably required his presence. His place had been ill-supplied by General Willot. The line of disarming which embraced Lower Vendée had made little progress. Charette had crossed it, and got again upon his rear. The regular system of provisioning had not been well followed up; the army had frequently been in want of necessaries, had fallen again into insubordination, and had committed acts calculated to alienate the inhabitants. Sapinaud, after making, as we have seen, a hostile attempt on Montaigu, had offered to submit, and had obtained from General Willot a ridiculous peace, to which Hoche could not consent. Lastly Stofflet, still playing the part of prince, and Bernier his prime minister, were reinforcing themselves with the deserters who had forsaken Charette, and making secret preparations. The cities of Nantes and Angers were in want of provisions. The patriots, who had fled from the surrounding country, were crowded together there, and launched out in the clubs into furious declamations, worthy of Jacobins. Lastly, it was reported that Hoche had been recalled to Paris only to be stripped of his command. Some said that he had been displaced as a royalist, others as a Jacobin.

His return silenced all these rumours, and repaired all the evils occasioned by his absence. He gave directions for recommencing the disarming, for filling the magazines, and for provisioning the towns; he declared them all in a state of siege; and, thenceforth authorized to exercise a military dictatorship in them, he shut up the Jacobin clubs formed by the refugees, and particularly a society known at Nantes by the appellation of *Chambre ardente*. He refused to ratify the peace granted to Sapinaud; he occupied his district, and left to himself the option of quitting France or hiding in the woods at the risk of being taken and shot. He hemmed in Stofflet more closely than ever, and renewed the pursuit of Charette. He committed to Adjutant-general Travot, who combined with great intrepidity all the activity of a partisan, the task of pursuing Charette with several columns of light infantry and cavalry, so as to leave him neither rest nor hope.

Pursued night and day, Charette had now no means of escape. The inhabitants of the Marais, disarmed and watched, could no longer afford him assistance. They had already delivered up seven thousand muskets, several pieces of cannon, and forty barrels of powder; and it was impossible for them to betake themselves to arms. Had it even been in their power, they would not have done so, because they were happy in the quiet which they enjoyed, and had no inclination to expose themselves to fresh devastations. The peasants came to acquaint the republican officers with the roads which Charette was taking, with the retreats where he was for a moment resting his head; and when they could secure some of those who accompanied him, they brought and delivered them up to the army. Charette, attended by scarcely a hundred devoted servants, and followed by a few women who administered to his pleasures, had nevertheless no thoughts of surrendering. Full of confidence, he sometimes caused his hosts to be put to death, when he was apprehensive of being betrayed by them. It was said that he ordered a *curé* to be murdered, whom he suspected of having denounced him to the republicans. Travot fell in with him several times, killed about sixty of his men, several of his officers, and among the rest his brother. He had now only about forty or fifty men left.

While Hoche was thus causing Charette to be harassed without intermission, and prosecuting his plan of disarming, Stofflet saw with consternation that he was surrounded on all sides, and was well aware that, when Charette and Sapinaud were destroyed and all the Chouans subdued, he should not be long suffered to retain the princely kind of state which he had arrogated to himself in Upper Anjou. He thought that it would not be right to wait till all the royalists were exterminated before he began to act: alleging as a pretext a regulation of Hoche's, he again raised the standard of revolt and resumed arms. Hoche

was at this moment on the banks of the Loire, preparing to set out for the Calvados, that he might judge from actual observation of the state of Normandy and Bretagne. He immediately deferred his departure, and made his preparations for taking Stofflet, before his revolt could acquire any importance. Hoche was otherwise pleased that Stofflet himself furnished him with occasion to break the pacification. This war embarrassed him but little, and authorized him to treat Anjou like the Marais and Bretagne. He despatched his columns from several points at once, from the Loire, the Layon, and the Nantes Sèvre. Stofflet, assailed on all sides, could not keep his ground. The peasants of Anjou were still more sensible of the benefits of peace than those of the Marais; they had not responded to the call of their old chief, and had allowed him to begin the war with the profligates of the country, and the emigrants with whom his camp was filled. Two assemblages which he had collected were dispersed, and he was obliged to betake himself, like Charette, to the woods. But he had neither the obstinacy nor the dexterity of that chief, and his district was not so favourably disposed for concealing a troop of marauders. He was delivered up by his own followers. Lured to a farm-house, upon pretext of a conference, he was seized, bound, and given up to the republicans. It is asserted that his trusty minister, the Abbé Bernier, had a hand in this treachery. The capture of this chief was of great importance, on account of the moral effect which it could not fail to produce in those parts. He was conveyed to Angers; and, after undergoing an examination, he was shot, on the 7th of Ventose, in the presence of an immense concourse.*

These tidings produced the greatest joy and anticipations of the speedy conclusion of the civil war in that unfortunate country. Hoche, amid the arduous duties of this kind of warfare, was overwhelmed with disgust. The royalists called him a villain and a drinker of blood; this was natural enough, though he resorted to the fairest means for destroying them: but the patriots themselves annoyed him by their calumnies. The refugees of La Vendée and Bretagne, whose fury he checked, and whose indolence he thwarted by ceasing to feed them as soon as they could return with safety to their lands, denounced him to the Directory. The authorities of the towns also which he placed in a state of siege complained of the establishment of the military system, and denounced him. Communes subjected to fines, or to the military levy of the taxes, complained in their turn. There was an incessant chorus of complaints and

* "That intrepid Vendean chief, Stofflet, pressed by the forces of the republic, after braving and escaping a thousand dangers, was at length betrayed by one of his own followers at the farm of Pegrimaud, where he was seized, gagged, conducted to Angers, and executed."—*Jomini*. E.

remonstrances. Hoche, whose temper was irritable, was several times driven to despair, and formally tendered his resignation. The Directory refused it, and cheered him by new testimonies of confidence and esteem. It made him a national present of two fine horses—a present which was not merely a reward, but an indispensable aid. This young general, who was fond of pleasure, who was at the head of an army of one hundred thousand men, and who had at his disposal the revenues of several provinces, was frequently in want of necessaries. His appointments, paid in paper, were reduced to nothing. He was in want of horses, saddles, bridles, and he solicited permission to take, on paying for them, six saddles, six bridles, horse-shoes, a few bottles of rum, and some loaves of sugar, from the stores left by the English at Quiberon—an admirable example of delicacy, which our republican generals frequently gave, and which daily grew more rare as our invasions became more extended, and as the manners of our military men became corrupted by the effect of conquests and of the manners of a court.

Encouraged by the government, Hoche continued his efforts for finishing his work in La Vendée. The complete pacification now depended entirely on the capture of Charette. That chief, reduced to extremity, sent to Hoche to demand permission to retire to England. Hoche granted it, agreeably to the authority which he found for doing so in the ordinance of the Directory relative to the chiefs who should submit. But Charette had made this application merely to gain a short respite, and had no intention of availing himself of the permission. The Directory, on its part, was resolved not to pardon Charette, because it conceived that this famous chief would always be a firebrand in the country. It wrote to Hoche, desiring him not to enter into any compromise. But, when Hoche received these new orders, Charette had already declared that his application was only a feint to obtain a few moments' rest, and that he wanted no pardon from republicans.* He had again betaken himself to the woods.

Charette could not escape the republicans much longer. Pursued at once by columns of infantry and cavalry, watched by troops of disguised soldiers, denounced by the inhabitants, who were anxious to save their country from devastation, tracked in the woods like a wild beast, he fell, on the 2nd of Germinal (March 23), into an ambuscade laid for him by Travot. Armed to the teeth, and surrounded by some brave fellows, who strove

* "When the Directory offered Charette a safe retreat into England with his family, and a million of francs for his own maintenance, he replied, 'I am ready to die with arms in my hands, but not to fly and abandon my companions in misfortune. All the vessels of the republic would not be sufficient to transport my brave soldiers into England. Far from fearing your menaces, I will myself come to seek you in your own camp.'" E.

to cover him with their own bodies, he defended himself like a lion, and at length fell, after receiving several sabre wounds. He would not deliver his sword to any but the brave Travot, who treated him with all the respect due to such extraordinary courage. He was taken to the republican head-quarters, and admitted to table by Hedouville, chief of the staff. He conversed with great serenity, and showed no concern about the fate that awaited him. Conveyed first to Angers, he was afterwards removed to Nantes, to end his life in the same place that had witnessed his triumph. He underwent an examination, at which he answered with great calmness and temper. He was questioned concerning the pretended secret articles of the treaty of La Jaunaye, and confessed that there existed none. He attempted neither to palliate his conduct nor to excuse his motives. He acknowledged that he was a servant of royalty, and that he had striven with all his might to overthrow the republic. He behaved with dignity, and showed great unconcern. When led forth to execution, amidst an immense concourse of people, who were not generous enough to forgive him for the calamities of civil war, he retained all his assurance. He was covered with blood, had lost three fingers in the last combat, and carried his arm in a sling. A handkerchief was wrapped round his head. He would neither suffer his eyes to be bandaged, nor kneel down. Standing erect, he removed his arm from the sling, gave the signal, and instantly fell dead.* This was on the 9th of Germinal (March 30). Thus died that celebrated man, whose indomitable courage brought so many evils upon his country, and might have covered him with glory in a different career. Compromised by the last attempt at invasion which had been made upon these coasts, he would not again recede, and closed his life under the influence of despair. He is said to have expressed strong resentment against the princes whom he had served, and by whom he considered himself as having been abandoned.

* "After his capture, Charette entered into Nantes preceded by a numerous escort, closely guarded by gendarmes, and generals glittering in gold and plumes; himself on foot, with his clothes torn and bloody, pale and attenuated; yet more an object of interest than all the splendid throng by whom he was surrounded. Such was his exhaustion from loss of blood, that he fainted on leaving the Quarter of Commerce; but no sooner was his strength revived by a glass of water, than he marched on, enduring for two hours, with heroic constancy, the abuse of the populace. He was conducted to the military commission, and sentenced to death. On the following morning he was brought out on the scaffold. The roll of drums, the assemblage of all the troops and national guard, and a countless multitude of spectators, announced the great event which was approaching. At length the hero appeared, descended with a firm step the prison stairs, and walked to the place where his execution was to take place. A breathless silence prevailed. Charette advanced to the appointed place, bared his breast, and himself gave the command, uttering, with his last breath, the words 'Vive le Roi!'"—*Alison.* E.

The death of Charette caused as much joy as the most glorious victory over the Austrians. His death decided the termination of the civil war. Hoche, conceiving that there was nothing more for him to do in La Vendée, withdrew from it the mass of his troops, for the purpose of carrying them beyond the Loire, and disarming Bretagne. He left, however, forces sufficient to repress the solitary robberies which usually follow civil wars, and to complete the disarming of the country. Before he went to Bretagne, he had to quell an insurrectionary movement which broke out in the vicinity of Anjou, towards Le Berry. This was only the business of a few days. He then proceeded with twenty thousand men into Bretagne, and, adhering to his plan, inclosed it with a vast cordon from the Loire to Granville. The wretched Chouans could not withstand an effort so powerful and so well concerted. Scepeaux, between the Vilaine and the Loire, first tendered his submission. He delivered up a considerable quantity of arms. The nearer the Chouans were pushed to the sea, the more obstinate they grew. Having spent their ammunition, they fought hand to hand, with daggers and bayonets. At length they were driven back to the very sea. The Morbihan, which had long separated itself from Puisaye, surrendered its arms. The other divisions successively followed this example. All Bretagne was soon reduced, and Hoche had nothing to do but to distribute his hundred thousand men into a multitude of cantonments, that they might watch the country, and be enabled to subsist with the greater ease. The duties which still required his attention consisted only in matters of administration and police. A few more months of mild and able government were requisite to appease animosities and to re-establish peace. Notwithstanding the outcry of the furious of all parties, Hoche was feared, beloved, and respected, in the country, and the royalists began to forgive a republic that was so worthily represented. The clergy, in particular, whose confidence he had continued to gain, were wholly devoted to him, and gave him correct information of every matter that it was interesting for him to know. All things promised peace and the end of horrible calamities. England could no longer reckon upon the provinces of the West for attacking the republic in its own bosom. She beheld, on the contrary, one hundred thousand men, half of whom became disposable, and might be employed in some enterprise injurious to her: Hoche, in fact, had formed a grand plan, which he reserved for the middle of the summer. The government, pleased with the services which he had rendered, and wishing to reward him for the disgusting task that he had so ably performed, obtained for him, as for the armies which gained important victories, a declaration that the army of the Ocean and its commander had deserved well of the country.

Thus La Vendée was pacified so early as the month of

Germinal, before any of the armies had taken the field. The Directory was enabled to attend without uneasiness to its great operations, and even to draw useful reinforcements from the coasts of the Ocean.

The fifth campaign of liberty was about to commence. It was going to open on the two finest military theatres in Europe—on those most beset with obstacles, with accidents, with lines of defence and attack. These were, on the one hand, the extensive valley of the Rhine and the two transverse valleys of the Mayn and the Neckar; and, on the other, the Alps, the Po, and Lombardy. The armies which were about to take the field were the most inured to war that had ever been seen under arms. They were sufficiently numerous to cover the ground on which they were to act, but not to render combinations useless, and to reduce war to a mere invasion. They were commanded by young generals, free from all routine, emancipated from all tradition, but yet well informed and roused by great events. Every thing, therefore, concurred to render the conflict obstinate, varied, fertile in combinations, and worthy of the attention of men.

The plan of the French government was, as we have seen, to invade Germany, in order to maintain its armies in an enemy's country, to detach the princes from the Empire, to invest Mayence, and to threaten the hereditary states. It purposed, at the same time, to make a bold attempt upon Italy, with a view to maintain its armies and to wrest that rich country from Austria.

Two fine armies, of from seventy to eighty thousand men each, were given upon the Rhine to two celebrated generals. About thirty thousand famished soldiers were given to an unknown, but bold young man, to try Fortune beyond the Alps.

Bonaparte arrived at the head-quarters at Nice on the 6th of Germinal (March 27). Every thing there was in a deplorable state. The troops were in the utmost distress. Without clothing, without shoes, without pay, sometimes without food,* they nevertheless endured their privations with extraordinary fortitude. Owing to that industrious spirit which characterizes the French soldier, they had organized plunder, and descended by turns and in bands into the plains of Piedmont to procure provisions. The artillery was absolutely destitute of horses. The cavalry had been sent to the rear, to seek subsistence on the

* "The misery of the French army, until these Alpine campaigns were victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco. could, according to Bonaparte's authority, scarce bear description. The officers for several years had received no more than eight livres a month (twenty pence sterling a-week) in name of pay, and staff-officers had not among them a single horse. Berthier preserved as a curiosity, an order of the day, dated Albenga, directing an advance of four louis d'or to every general of division, to enable them to enter on the campaign."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

banks of the Rhone. The thirtieth horse and the forced loan had not yet been levied in the South, on account of the troubles. Bonaparte had been furnished, as his sole resource, with two thousand louis in money, and a million in bills, part of which were protested. With a view to supply the deficiency, negotiations were set on foot with the Genoese government, in order to obtain from it some resources. Satisfaction for the outrage on the Modeste frigate had not yet been obtained, and, in reparation of that violation of neutrality, the senate of Genoa was required to grant a loan, and to deliver up to the French the fortress of Gavi, which commands the road from Genoa to Milan. The recall of the Genoese families expelled for their attachment to France was likewise insisted upon. Such was the state of the army when Bonaparte joined it.

It exhibited a totally different aspect in regard to the men who composed it. They generally consisted of soldiers who had hastened to the armies at the time of the levy *en masse*, well informed, young, accustomed to privations, and inured to war by the combats of giants amid the Pyrenees and the Alps. The generals were of the same quality. The principal were Massena, a young Nissard, of uncultivated mind, but precise and luminous amidst dangers, and of indomitable perseverance; Augereau, formerly a fencing-master, whom great bravery and skill in managing the soldiers had raised to the highest rank; Laharpe, an expatriated Swiss, combining information with courage; Serrurier, formerly a major, methodical and brave; lastly Berthier, whom his activity, his attention to details, his geographical acquirements, and his facility in measuring with the eye the extent of a piece of ground or the numerical force of a column, eminently qualified for a useful and convenient chief of the staff.

This army had its depots in Provence. It was ranged along the chain of the Alps, connecting itself by its left with that of Kellermann, guarding the Col di Tende, and stretching towards the Apennines. The active army amounted at most to thirty-six thousand men. Serrurier's division was at Garession, beyond the Apennines, to observe the Piedmontese in their entrenched camp of Ceva. Augereau's, Massena's, and Laharpe's divisions, forming a mass of about thirty thousand men, were on this side of the Apennines.

The Piedmontese, to the number of twenty or twenty-two thousand men, and under the command of Colli, were encamped at Ceva, on the back of the mountains. The Austrians, thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand strong, were advancing by the roads of Lombardy towards Genoa. Beaulieu, who commanded them, had distinguished himself in the Netherlands. Though advanced in years, he possessed all the ardour of youth. The enemy had therefore about sixty thousand men to oppose to the thirty thou-

sand whom Bonaparte had to bring into line; but the Austrians and the Piedmontese were far from agreeing. Pursuant to the old plan, Colli was for covering Piedmont; while Beaulieu wished to keep himself in communication with Genoa and the English.

Such was the respective force of the two parties. Though Bonaparte had already acquired reputation with the army of Italy, he was thought very young to command it. Short, slender, without any thing remarkable in his appearance but Roman features and a bright and piercing eye, there was nothing in his person or past life to make an impression upon men. He was not received with much cordiality. Massena owed him a grudge for having gained an influence over Dumerbion in 1794. He addressed the army in energetic language. "Soldiers," said he, "you are ill-fed and almost naked. The government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience, your courage, do you honour, but procure you neither glory nor advantage. I am going to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world; you will there find large cities, rich provinces; you will there find honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, would your courage fail you?" The army hailed this language with delight: young generals who all had their fortune to make, poor and adventurous soldiers, desired nothing better than to see the beautiful countries to which they were bound. Bonaparte made an arrangement with a contractor, and procured for his soldiers part of the arrears of their pay. He gave to each of his generals four louis in gold, which shows what was then the state of their fortunes. He afterwards removed his head-quarters to Albenga, and made all the authorities proceed along the coast under the fire of the English gunboats.

The plan to be followed was the same that had suggested itself the year before at the battle of Loano. To penetrate by the lowest heights of the Apennines, to separate the Piedmontese from the Austrians by bearing strongly on their centre—such was the very simple idea conceived by Bonaparte on a survey of the situation. He commenced operations so early that he had hopes of surprising his enemies and throwing them into disorder. However, he was not able to anticipate them. Before he arrived, General Cervoni had been sent forward upon Voltri, quite close to Genoa, to intimidate the senate of that city, and to force it to consent to the demands of the Directory. Beaulieu, apprehensive of the result of this step, hastened to get into action, and moved his army upon Genoa, partly on one slope of the Apennines partly on the other. Bonaparte's plan, therefore, was still practicable, excepting his intention of surprising the Austrians. Several roads led from the back of the Apennines to their maritime slope: in the first place that running by the

Bocchetta to Genoa, then that of Acqui and Dego, which crosses the Apennines at the Col de Montenotte, and debouches in the basin of Savona. Beaulieu left his right wing at Dego, despatched his centre under d'Argenteau to the Col de Montenotte, and proceeded himself with his left by the Bocchetta and Genoa, upon Voltri, along the coast. Thus his position was the same as that of Devins at Loano. Part of the Austrian army was between the Apennines and the sea; the centre under d'Argenteau was on the very summit of the Apennines, at the Col de Montenotte, and was connected with the Piedmontese encamped at Ceva, on the other side of the mountains.

The two armies, breaking up at the same time, met by the way, on the 22nd of Germinal (April 11). Along the coast, Beaulieu fell in with the advanced guard of Laharpe's division, which had been detached upon Voltri, to alarm Genoa, and repulsed it. D'Argenteau, with the centre, crossed the Col de Montenotte, with the intention of falling at Savona upon the centre of the French army, during its supposed march towards Genoa. At Montenotte he found only Colonel Rampon, at the head of twelve hundred men, and obliged him to fall back into the old redoubt of Montelegino, which intercepted the Montenotte road. The brave colonel, aware of the importance of this position, obstinately resisted all the efforts of the Austrians. Thrice was he attacked by the whole of the enemy's infantry, and thrice did he repulse it. Amidst the most galling fire, he called upon his soldiers to swear that they would die in the redoubt rather than give it up. The soldiers swore, and remained all night under arms. This act of courage saved the plans of General Bonaparte, and perhaps decided the fate of the campaign.

Bonaparte was at this moment at Savona. He had not caused the Col de Montenotte to be intrenched, because a general never intrenches himself when he is determined to take the offensive. He learned what had occurred during the day at Montelegino and Voltri. He immediately perceived that the moment was come for putting his plan in execution, and manœuvred in consequence. The very same night, he drew back his right, formed by Laharpe's division, and engaged along the coast with Beaulieu, and sent it by the Montenotte road to meet d'Argenteau. He then despatched Augereau's division upon the same point, to support Laharpe's. He ordered Massena's division to march by a by-road to the other side of the Apennines, so as to bring it into the very rear of d'Argenteau's corps. On the morning of the 23rd (April 12), all his columns were in motion, and he was on an elevated knoll,* whence he saw Laharpe and Augereau

* "Napoleon placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better to judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manœuvres which might become necessary."—*Jomini.* E.

marching upon d'Argenteau, and Massena coming by a circuit upon his rear. The Austrian infantry made a brave resistance; but, enveloped on all sides by superior forces, it was put to the rout, and left two thousand prisoners and several hundred slain. It fled in disorder towards Dego, where the rest of the army was.

Thus Bonaparte, whose intention Beaulieu supposed it to be to file off along the coast upon Genoa, had suddenly slipped away, and, proceeding by the road which crosses the Apennines, had broken through the enemy's centre and victoriously debouched beyond the mountains.

In his estimation, it was nothing to have overwhelmed the centre, so long as the Austrians were not separated for ever from the Piedmontese. He proceeded on the same day (23rd), to Carcare, to render his position more central between the two allied armies. He was in the valley of the Bormida, which runs into Italy. Lower down, before him, and at the extremity of the valley, were the Austrians, who had rallied at Dego, guarding the road from Acqui into Lombardy. On his left, he had the gorges of Millesimo, which join the valley of Bormida, and in which the Piedmontese were posted, guarding the road to Ceva and Piedmont. It was requisite, therefore, that at one and the same time his left should force the gorges of Millesimo, to make itself master of the Piedmont road, and that in front he should take Dego, to open for himself the road to Acqui and Lombardy. Then, master of both roads, he would have separated the allies for ever, and might fall at pleasure upon either of them. On the morning of the next day, the 24th (April 13th), he pushed forward his army; Augereau, towards the right, attacked Millesimo, and Massena's and Laharpe's divisions advanced into the valley upon Dego. The impetuous Augereau dashed with such spirit upon the gorges of Millesimo that he forced them, entered, and reached the extremity before General Provera, who was on a height, had time to fall back. The latter was posted in the ruins of the old castle of Cossaria. Finding himself enveloped. he attempted to defend himself there. Augereau surrounded and summoned him to surrender. Provera began to parley, and wanted to treat. It was of importance not to be stopped by this obstacle, and the troops immediately mounted to the assault of the position. The Piedmontese poured upon them a deluge of stones, and rolled down enormous rocks, which crushed whole lines. The brave Joubert* nevertheless encouraged his men, and climbed the height at their head. On arriving within a little

* "Joubert had studied for the bar, but at the Revolution he was induced to adopt the profession of arms. He was tall, thin, and naturally of a weak constitution, but he had strengthened his frame amidst fatigues, camps, and mountain warfare. He was intrepid, vigilant, and active. In 1796 he was made a general of division. He was much attached to Napoleon. He fell gloriously at the battle of Novi."—*Hazlitt*. E.

distance, he sunk pierced by a ball. At this sight, the soldiers fell back. They were obliged to encamp in the evening at the foot of the height; here they protected themselves by some abattis, and kept watch the whole night to prevent the escape of Provera. The divisions sent to act at the bottom of the valley of the Bormida had meanwhile marched upon Dego and made themselves masters of the approaches to it. The morrow was to be the decisive day.

Accordingly, on the 25th (April 14), the attack again became general on all points. On the left, Augereau, in the gorge of Millesimo, repulsed all the efforts made by Colli to extricate Provera, fought him the whole day, and drove Provera to despair. At length the latter laid down his arms at the head of fifteen hundred men. Laharpe and Massena, on their part, fell upon Dego, where the Austrian army had been reinforced, on the 22nd and 23rd, by corps brought from Genoa. The attack was terrible. After several assaults, Dego was taken; the Austrians lost part of their artillery, and left four thousand prisoners, among whom were twenty-four officers.

During this action, Bonaparte had remarked a young officer, named Lannes,* charging with great intrepidity. He made him colonel on the field of battle.

* "Jean Lannes, who for his impetuous valour was called the Rolando and the Ajax of the French camp, was born in 1769. His parents were poor and intended him for some mechanical pursuit, but he was resolved to be a soldier. One of the first actions in which he was engaged was that of Millesimo, where he distinguished himself so highly that he was made a colonel on the field. At the bridge of Lodi he exhibited equal intrepidity. He had taken one ensign, and was about to seize a second from the Austrians, when his horse fell under him, and twelve cuirassiers raised their sabres to cut him down. Lannes instantly sprung on the horse of an Austrian officer, killed the rider, and fought his way through the cuirassiers, killing two or three and wounding more. Soon afterwards he was made general of division. In the Egyptian expedition he was always foremost in danger. He returned to France with Napoleon, whom he assisted to overthrow the Directory. He accompanied the First Consul over St. Bernard and fought nobly at Montebello, which afterwards gave him his title, and at Marengo. Lannes was afterwards sent ambassador to Portugal, and on his return was made marshal of France, and then Duke of Montebello. He was not very successful in Spain; he took indeed Saragossa, but stained his character there by perfidy, as well as cruelty. After the fall of this place, he retired to an estate which he had purchased near Paris, but, being recalled to the field, a cannon-ball at the battle of Essling carried away his right leg and the foot and ankle of the left. Napoleon showed great grief upon the occasion. On the ninth day of his wound, Lannes, grasping the Emperor's hand, said, 'Another hour and your majesty will have lost one of your most zealous and faithful friends.' And so indeed it proved. Lannes possessed dauntless courage, but was vulgar, and even coarse in his manners."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

"About the time of his marriage, Lannes was twenty-eight years of age, five feet five or six inches high, slender and elegant, his feet, legs, and hands being remarkable for their symmetry. His face was not handsome, but it was expressive; and when his voice pronounced one of those military thoughts, which had acquired for him the appellation of the Roland of the army, his eyes, said Junot, which appear so small, become immense, and dart

After four days' fighting, the army needed repose; but scarcely had the soldiers rested from the fatigues of battle before the din of arms was heard. It was one of the Austrian corps, which had been left on the maritime slope of the Apennines, and which was recrossing the mountains. So great was the disorder, that this corps had got, before it was aware of it, into the middle of the French army. The brave Wukassovich, who commanded these six thousand grenadiers, thought to save himself by a bold stroke and had taken Dego. It was requisite therefore to begin the battle again, and to renew the efforts of the preceding day. Bonaparte galloped to the spot, rallied his columns, and urged them upon Dego. They were stopped by the Austrian grenadiers; but they returned to the charge, and at length, led on by Adjutant-general Lanusse, who held up his hat on the point of his sword, they forced their way into Dego, and recovered their conquest, making some hundreds of prisoners.

Thus Bonaparte was master of the valley of the Bormida. The Austrians fled towards Acqui, upon the Milan road; the Piedmontese, after they had lost the gorges of Millesimo, retired upon Ceva and Mondovi. He was master of all the roads; he had nine thousand prisoners; and he spread consternation before him. By skilfully managing the mass of his forces, and directing it now upon Montenotte and now upon Millesimo and Dego, he had crushed the enemy every where by rendering himself superior to him on every point. This was the moment for taking a grand determination. Carnot's plan enjoined him to neglect the Piedmontese and stick to the Austrians. Bona-

flashes of lightning. Junot also told me that he looked upon Lannes as the bravest man in the army, because his courage was invariably the same. The same coolness with which he re-entered his tent he carried into the midst of the battle, the hottest fire, and the most difficult emergencies. Besides this, Junot considered him to possess the most rapid conception and accurate judgment of any person he had ever met with, except the First Consul. He was also amiable, faithful in friendship, and a good patriot. One curious trait in his character was the obstinacy with which he refused to have his hair cut short. In vain Napoleon entreated him to cut it off, he still retained a short, thick cue, full of powder and pomatum."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

"Marshal Lannes was one of the most gallant men our armies could at any time boast of. His life was too short for his friends; but his career of honour and glory was without a parallel."—*Duke de Rovigo.* E.

"The education of Lannes had been much neglected. However, he improved greatly; and, to judge from the astonishing progress he made, he would have been a general of the first class. He had great experience in war. He had been in fifty-four pitched battles, and in three hundred combats of different kinds. He was a man of uncommon bravery, cool in the midst of fire; and possessed of a clear, penetrating eye, ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might present itself. Violent and hasty in his expressions, sometimes even in my presence, he was ardently attached to me. In the midst of his anger he would not suffer any one to join him in his remarks. On that account, when he was in a choleric mood it was dangerous to speak to him, as he used to come to me in his rage, and say, such and such persons were not to be trusted. As a general, he was greatly superior to Moreau or to Soult."—*Voice from St. Helena.* E.

parte thought the Piedmontese army of too much consequence to be left in his rear: he was aware, moreover, that one stroke would be sufficient to destroy it; and he deemed it more prudent to complete the ruin of the Piedmontese. He did not therefore enter the valley of the Bormida and descend towards the Po in pursuit of the Austrians; but, turning to the left, he penetrated into the gorges of Millesimo and took the road to Piedmont. Laharpe's division alone was left in the camp of San Benedetto, commanding the course of the Belbo and the Bormida, to watch the Austrians. The soldiers were worn out with fatigue: they had fought on the 22nd and 23rd at Montenotte, on the 24th and 25th at Millesimo and Dego; they had lost and retaken Dego on the 26th, had rested only on the 27th, and were again marching on the 28th upon Mondovi. Amidst these rapid marches, there had not been time to make regular distributions; they were destitute of every thing and ventured to pillage. Bonaparte, indignant, proceeded against the culprits with great severity, and displayed as much energy in re-establishing discipline as in pursuing the enemy. He had won in a few days the utmost confidence of the soldiers. The generals of division were overcome. They listened with attention, nay with admiration, to the terse and figurative language of the young captain. On the heights of Monte Zemoto, which it is necessary to cross in order to reach Ceva, the army descried the lovely plains of Piedmont and Italy.* It beheld the Tanaro, the Stura, the Po, and all those rivers that run into the Adriatic; it saw in the back-ground the high Alps covered with snow; it was struck by the view of those beautiful plains of the *land of promise*.† Bonaparte was at the head of his troops: he was moved. "Annibal," he exclaimed, "crossed the Alps; as for us, we have turned them." This expression explained the campaign to every capacity. What destinies then opened before us!

Colli defended the intrenched camp of Ceva only just long enough to slacken our march a little. This excellent officer had contrived to cheer his soldiers and to keep up their courage. He had no longer any hope of beating his formidable enemy; but he determined to retreat foot by foot, and to give the Austrians time to come to his relief, in rejoining them by a circuitous march. He had received a promise to this effect. He halted behind the Cursaglia, in advance of Mondovi. Serrurier, who, on the opening of the campaign, had been left at Garessio to

* "The arrival of the army on the heights of Monte Zemoto was a sublime spectacle. The immense and fertile plains of Piedmont lay before them. The Po, the Tanaro, and a multitude of other rivers, meandered in the distance; in the horizon, a white girdle of snow and ice, of a stupendous height, surrounded these rich valleys—this promised land. Those gigantic barriers, which seemed the limits of another world, which nature had delighted in rendering thus formidable, and to which art had contributed all its resources, had fallen, as if by enchantment."— *Las Cases*. E.

† Bonaparte's own expression.

watch Colli, had just rejoined the army. It had thus one more division. Colli was covered by the Cursaglia, a deep and rapid stream, which falls into the Tanaro. On the right, Joubert endeavoured to cross, but he failed, and narrowly escaped drowning. In the front, Serrurier attempted to cross the bridge of St. Michael. He succeeded; but Colli, suffering him to pass, fell upon him unawares with his best troops, and obliged him to recross in disorder. The situation of the army was ticklish. On its rear was Beaulieu, who was reorganizing himself; and it was necessary to finish with Colli as speedily as possible. At the same time, it appeared scarcely possible to carry the position, if it were vigorously defended. Bonaparte ordered a fresh attack to be made on the following day. On the 2nd of Floreal (April 21) the troops marched upon the Cursaglia, when they found the bridges abandoned. Colli had made the resistance of the preceding day merely to retard the retreat. He was surprised in line at Mondovi. Serrurier decided the victory by taking the principal redoubt, that of La Bicoque. Colli left three thousand killed or prisoners, and continued to retreat. Bonaparte arrived at Cherasco, an ill defended place, but important from its position at the conflux of the Stura and the Tanaro, and easy to arm with artillery taken from the enemy. In this position, Bonaparte was twenty leagues from Savona, his point of departure, ten leagues from Turin, and fifteen from Alexandria.

The court of Turin was in confusion. The king, who was very obstinate, would not yield. The ministers of England and Austria beset him with their remonstrances, and advised him to shut himself up in Turin, to send his army beyond the Po, and thus to imitate the great examples of his ancestors. They terrified him with the revolutionary influence which the French were likely to exercise in Piedmont; they demanded for Beaulieu the three fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, and Valenza, that he might shut himself up and defend himself in the triangle which they form with the bank of the Po. It was to this that the King of Sardinia felt the strongest repugnance. To give his three principal fortresses to his ambitious neighbour of Lombardy, was an idea that he could not brook. Cardinal Costa decided him to throw himself into the arms of the French. He represented to him the impossibility of resisting so rapid a conqueror, the danger of irritating him by a long resistance, and thus driving him to revolutionize Piedmont, and all to serve a foreign and even inimical ambition—that of Austria. The king yielded, and caused overtures to be made by Colli to Bonaparte. They reached Cherasco on the 4th of Floreal (April 23); Bonaparte had not powers to sign a peace, but he was at liberty to sign an armistice, and he resolved to do so. He had not followed the plan of the Directory, which enjoined him to complete the reduction of the Piedmontese; but his aim had not been to conquer Piedmont; he merely wished to secure his rear. To con-

quer Piedmont he mus thave taken Turin, and he had neither the requisite artillery, nor forces sufficient to furnish a blockading corps and to reserve an active army. Besides, the campaign would then have been confined to a siege. By arranging with Piedmont, and requiring the necessary guarantees, he might push on in security after the Austrians and drive them from Italy. It was said around him that he ought not to grant any conditions, that he ought to dethrone a king who was a kinsman of the Bourbons, and spread the French Revolution in Piedmont. This was the opinion of many soldiers, officers, and generals, in the army, and especially of Augereau, who was born in the faubourg St. Antoine, and entertained its sentiments. Young Bonaparte was of a different opinion. He was aware of the difficulty of revolutionizing a monarchy which was the only military one in Italy, and in which old manners were preserved unchanged; he had no wish to raise up obstacles in his route; his aim was to march rapidly to the conquest of Italy, which depended on the destruction of the Austrians, and their expulsion beyond the Alps. He would not, therefore, do any thing that might complicate his situation and retard his march.

In consequence, he assented to an armistice; but he represented that, in the respective state of the armies, an armistice would be ruinous to him if certain guarantees for the security of his rear were not given; he therefore required that the three fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria, should be given up, with all the magazines which they contained, which would supply his army, and which the republic would afterwards account for; that the roads of Piedmont should be thrown open to the French, which would considerably abridge the distance between France and the banks of the Po; that stations should be prepared on these roads for the troops that should pass along them; and lastly, that the Sardinian army should be dispersed in the fortresses, so that the French army might have nothing to fear from it. These conditions were accepted, and the armistice was signed at Cherasco on the 9th of Floreal (April 29), with Colonel Lacoste and Count Latour.

It was agreed that plenipotentiaries should set out immediately for Paris to treat for a definitive peace. The three fortresses demanded were delivered up, with immense magazines. From that moment the army had its line of operation covered by the three strongest places in Piedmont; it had safe, commodious roads, much shorter than those running through the Riviera of Genoa; it had abundance of provisions; it was reinforced by a multitude of soldiers, who, at the sound of victory, quitted the hospitals; it had a numerous artillery, taken at Cherasco, and from the different places; it possessed a great number of horses; it was supplied with every thing;* and the

* "The soldiers who had no distributions during the first eight or ten days

promises of the general were fulfilled. Within the first few days after its entrance into Piedmont, it had plundered, because, in its rapid marches, it had received no rations. When it had appeased its hunger, order was restored. The Count de St. Marsan, the Sardinian minister, visited Bonaparte, and contrived to please him; even the king's son was desirous to see the young conqueror, and lavished testimonies of esteem, which made an impression upon him. Bonaparte adroitly returned the flatteries which they paid him; he cheered them in regard to the intentions of the Directory, and the dangers of revolution. He was sincere in his protestations, for he already cherished an idea, of which he cleverly afforded a glimpse in the different interviews. Piedmont had sacrificed all her interests by allying herself with Austria: it was to France that she ought to ally herself; France was her natural friend, for she could not covet her dominions, from which she was separated by the Alps; she could, on the contrary, defend Piedmont against Austria, and even obtain aggrandizements for her. Bonaparte could not suppose that the Directory would consent to give any part of Lombardy to Piedmont; for it was not yet conquered, and, if there was an idea of conquering it, it was only for the purpose of making it an equivalent for the Netherlands; but a vague hope of aggrandizement might dispose Piedmont to ally herself with France, which would procure the latter a reinforcement of twenty thousand excellent troops. He promised nothing, but he contrived by a few words to excite the cupidity and the hopes of the cabinet of Turin.

Bonaparte, who, with a positive mind, possessed a strong and lofty imagination, and was fond of exciting those whom he addressed, resolved to proclaim his successes in a new and striking manner. He sent Murat, his aide-de-camp, to present solemnly to the Directory twenty-one pair of colours taken from the enemy. He then addressed the following proclamation to his soldiers:

"Soldiers! in a fortnight you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one pair of colours, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners,* and killed or wounded more than ten thousand men; you had hitherto been fighting for barren rocks, rendered glorious by your courage, but useless to the country; you now rival by your services the army of Holland and of the Rhine. Destitute of every thing, you have supplied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon,

of this campaign, now began to receive them regularly. Pillage and disorder, the constant attendants of rapid movements, ceased; discipline was restored; and the appearance of the army improved daily amidst the abundance and resources presented by this fine country. Its losses were repaired. Previous to this period, the misery of the French had exceeded all description."—*Las Cases.* E.

* In reality, only from ten to eleven thousand.

crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy, and often without bread. The republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have endured. Thanks be to you for it, soldiers! Your grateful country will owe to you its prosperity; and, if your conquest at Toulon foreboded the glorious campaign of 1793, your present victories forebode one still more glorious. The two armies which so lately attacked you boldly are fleeing affrighted before you; the perverse men who laughed at your distress, and rejoiced in thought at the triumphs of your enemies, are confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, you have done nothing, since more remains to be done. Neither Turin nor Milan is your's; the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin are still trampled upon by the murderers of Basseville.* There are said to be among you some whose courage is subsiding, and who would prefer returning to the summits of the Apennines and of the Alps. No; I cannot believe it. The conquerors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi, are impatient to carry the glory of the French people to distant countries!"

When these tidings, these colours, these proclamations, arrived one after another at Paris, they produced extreme joy. On the first day, it was a victory which opened the Apennines and gave two thousand prisoners; on the second, it was a still more decisive victory, which separated the Piedmontese from the Austrians and gave six thousand prisoners. The following days brought news of farther successes: the destruction of the Piedmontese army at Mondovi, the submission of Piedmont at Cherasco, and the certainty of a speedy peace, which foreboded others. The rapidity of these successes, and the number of the prisoners, surpassed every thing that had yet been seen. The language of these proclamations, imbued with the spirit of antiquity, astonished people's minds. They every where asked who this young general was, whose name, known to some appreciators and unknown to France, burst forth for the first time. They could not yet well pronounce it, and they said with joy that the republic saw new talents daily springing up to shed

* "Three years before the French had sustained an actual injury from the See of Rome, which was yet unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the tricolour, and proposed to exhibit the scutcheon containing the emblems of the republic over the door of the French consul. The Pope had intimated his desire that this should not be attempted; the French, however, pursued their purpose, and a popular commotion arose. The carriage of the French envoy, named Basseville, was attacked in the streets, his house was broken into by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. This affair happened in 1793, but was not forgotten in 1796."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

"Basseville received a thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen; he was dragged into the streets holding his bowels in his hands, and at length left on a field-bed in a guard-house, where he expired."—*Montholon.* E.

lustre upon, and to defend her. The Councils decided three several times that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, and decreed a festival to Victory, for the purpose of celebrating the prosperous commencement of the campaign. The aide-de-camp sent by Bonaparte presented the colours to the Directory. The ceremony was imposing. Several foreign ambassadors were on that day received, and the government appeared surrounded by a consideration which it had not hitherto enjoyed.

After the submission of Piedmont, General Bonaparte had nothing to hinder him from marching in pursuit of the Austrians, and hastening to the conquest of Italy.* The news of the victories of the French had deeply agitated all the states of that peninsula. It was requisite that he who had entered it should be a profound politician as well as a great captain, in order to conduct himself there with prudence. Every body knows what an aspect it exhibits to one emerging from the Apennines. The Alps, the loftiest mountains in Europe, after describing an immense semicircle from east to west, in which they embrace Upper Italy, turn short and run all at once in an oblique line towards the south, thus forming a long peninsula, washed by the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Bonaparte, coming from the west, and having crossed the chain at the point where it lowers, and runs off, by the name of the Apennines, to form the peninsula, had before him the beautiful semicircle of Upper Italy, and on his right that long narrow peninsula which forms Lower Italy. A number of petty states divided that country, which always sighed after a united government without which a nation cannot be great.

Bonaparte had passed through the state of Genoa, situated on this side of the Apennines, and Piedmont, which is on the other. Genoa, an ancient republic, founded by Doria, was the only one of the Italian governments that retained any real energy. Placed for the last four years between the two belligerent armies, it had contrived to maintain its neutrality, and had thus secured all the advantages of commerce. Between its capital and the tract of coast, it numbered nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants; it kept in general from three to four

* It was at this period that Bonaparte wrote to the Directory in the following energetic terms: "The King of Sardinia has surrendered at discretion, given up three of his strongest fortresses, and the half of his dominions. If you do not choose to accept his submission, but resolve to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few weeks and give me warning; I will get possession of Valenza and march upon Turin. On the other hand, I shall impose a contribution of some millions on the Duke of Parma, and detach twelve thousand men to Rome, as soon as I have beaten Beaulieu, and driven him across the Adige, and when I am assured that you will conclude peace with the King of Sardinia, and strengthen me by the army of Kellermann. As to Genoa, by all means oblige it to pay fifteen millions."—*Napoleon's Secret Correspondence.* E.

thousand troops; in case of emergency, it could arm all the peasants of the Apennines, and form an excellent militia of them; and it possessed large revenues. Two parties divided it; the party adverse to France had had the ascendency, and expelled several families. The Directory had to require the recall of these families and an indemnity for the outrage committed on the Modeste frigate.

On leaving Genoa, and advancing to the right into the peninsula, along the southern declivity of the Apennines, you first come to happy Tuscany, situated on the two banks of the Arno, in the mildest climate, and in one of the best sheltered parts of Italy. One portion of this tract formed the small republic of Lucca, peopled with one hundred and forty thousand inhabitants; the rest constituted the grand-duchy of Tuscany, lately governed by the Archduke Leopold, and now by the Archduke Ferdinand. In this country, the most enlightened and the most polished in Italy, the philosophy of the eighteenth century had kindly germinated. Leopold had there introduced his admirable legislative reforms, and successfully tried experiments most honourable to humanity. The Bishop of Pistoja had even commenced a sort of religious reform by propagating Jansenist doctrines there. Though the Revolution had alarmed the weak and timid minds of Tuscany, yet it was there that France had most appreciators and friends. The archduke, though Austrian, had been one of the first princes in Europe to recognise the republic. He had a million of subjects, six thousand troops, and a revenue of fifteen millions. Unfortunately, Tuscany was the least able of all these principalities to defend itself. After Tuscany came the States of the Church. The provinces subject to the Pope, situated on both sides of the Apennines, and extending to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, were the worst administered in Europe. They had only their admirable agriculture, an ancient tradition of remote ages, which is common to all Italy, and which makes amends for the absence of industry long banished from her bosom. Excepting in the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, where a profound contempt for the government of priests prevailed, and in Rome, the ancient abode of science and the arts, where a few nobles had participated in the philosophy of all the grandees of Europe, men's minds had remained in the most disgraceful barbarism. A superstitious and ferocious populace, and idle and ignorant monks, composed that population of two million and a half of subjects. The army amounted to four or five thousand men, every body knows of what quality. The Pope, a vain, ostentatious prince, jealous of his authority and that of the Holy See, entertained a deep hatred for the philosophy of the eighteenth century. He had thought to recover for the chair of St. Peter part of its influence by displaying great pomp, and had undertaken works useful to the arts. Reckoning upon the majesty of his person and the persuasion of his words, which

was great, he had formerly undertaken a journey to Vienna, to bring back Joseph II. to the doctrines of the Church, and to counteract philosophy, which seemed to be taking possession of the mind of that prince. This attempt had not been successful. The pontiff, filled with horror of the French Revolution, had launched his anathema against it; and preached a crusade. He had even winked at the murder of Basseville, the French agent in Rome. Inflamed by the monks, his subjects shared his hatred against France, and were seized with fanatic fury on hearing of the success of our arms.

The extremity of the Peninsula and Sicily compose the kingdom of Naples, the most powerful state in Italy, most like Rome in ignorance and barbarism, and still worse governed, if possible. There reigned a Bourbon, a mild, imbecile prince, devoted to one kind of pursuit, fishing and field sports. These occupations engrossed all his time; and, while he was engaged in them, the government of his kingdom was abandoned to his wife, an Austrian princess, sister of the Queen of France. This princess, a woman of a capricious disposition, of licentious passions, having a favourite sold to the English, the minister Acton, conducted the affairs of the kingdom in a senseless manner. The English, whose policy it always was to gain a footing on the continent, by controlling the petty states bordering upon its coasts, had endeavoured to make themselves the patrons of Naples, as well as of Portugal and Holland. They excited the hatred of the queen against France, and infused with that hatred the ambition to rule Italy.

Such were the principal states in the Peninsula on the right of Bonaparte. Facing him, in the semicircle of Upper Italy, there was first, on the slope of the Apennines, the duchy of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, comprising five hundred thousand inhabitants, keeping three thousand troops, furnishing a revenue of four millions, and governed by a Spanish prince, formerly a pupil of Condillac, but who, in spite of a sound education, had fallen under the yoke of monks and priests. A little farther to the right, likewise on the declivity of the Apennines, was the duchy of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, peopled with four hundred thousand inhabitants, having six thousand men under arms, and subject to the last descendant of the illustrious house of Este. This distrustful prince was so alarmed at the spirit of the age, that by dint of fear he had become a prophet, and foretold the Revolution. His predictions were quoted. In his terror, he had not forgotten to make provision against the strokes of fortune, and had amassed immense wealth by oppressing his people.* Avaricious and timid, he was despised by his subjects,

* "The Duke of Modena was a man of moderate abilities; his business was hoarding money, and his pleasure consisted in nailing up, with his own princely hands, the tapestry which ornamented churches on days of high holiday, from which he acquired the nickname of the Royal Upholsterer. But

who were the most enlightened and the most malicious in Italy, and the most disposed to embrace the new ideas. Farther on, beyond the Po, came Lombardy, governed for Austria by an archduke. This beautiful and productive plain, situated between the waters of the Alps which fertilize it, and those of the Adriatic which bring to it the wealth of the East, covered with corn, rice, pastures, herds of cattle, and rich beyond all the provinces in the world, was dissatisfied with its foreign masters. It was still Guelph, notwithstanding its long slavery. It contained twelve hundred thousand inhabitants. Milan was always one of the most enlightened cities in Italy. Less favoured in regard to the arts than Florence or Rome, it approached nearer to the illumination of the North, and contained a great number of persons who wished for the civil and political regeneration of the people. The last state in Upper Italy was the ancient republic of Venice. This republic, with its old aristocracy inscribed in the golden book, its state inquisition, its silence, its jealous and captious policy, had ceased to be a formidable power either to its subjects or to its neighbours. With its continental provinces, situated at the foot of the Tyrol, and those of Illyria, it numbered nearly three millions of subjects. It could raise so many as fifty thousand Sclavonians, good soldiers, because they were well disciplined, well fed, and well paid. It was rich in ancient wealth; but for two centuries its commerce had been transferred to the Ocean, which wafted its treasures to the islanders of the Atlantic. It still possessed a few ships; the passages of the lagoons were almost choked up; but it was yet powerful in revenues. Its policy consisted in amusing its subjects, in lulling them by pleasure and repose, and in observing the strictest neutrality in regard to other states. Yet the nobles of the main land were jealous of the golden book, and impatiently endured the yoke of the aristocracy intrenched in the lagoons. In Venice itself, the citizens, a wealthy class, began to think. In 1793, the coalition had forced the senate to declare against France: it had yielded, but had reverted to its neutral policy, as soon as the powers began to treat with the French republic. As we have seen elsewhere, it had been as eager as Prussia and Tuscany to send an ambassador to Paris. Now, too, complying with the remonstrances of the Directory, it had just given notice to the head of the house of Bourbon, then Louis XVIII. to quit Verona. That prince had accordingly departed, declaring that he should insist on the restitution of a suit of gilt armour given by his ancestor Henry IV. to the senate, and on the

his birth was illustrious as the descendant of that celebrated hero of Este, the patron of Tasso and Ariosto; and his alliance was no less splendid, having married the sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette and of Joseph II.; then his daughter was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, the governor of Milan."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

erasure of the name of his family from the pages of the golden book.

Such was Italy at that time. The general spirit of the age had penetrated thither, and inflamed many minds. All the inhabitants did not wish for a revolution, especially when they recollected the frightful scenes which had imbrued the French Revolution in blood; but all desired, though in different degrees, a reform; and there was not a heart but throbbed at the idea of the independence and unity of the Italian father-land. That nation of husbandmen, tradesmen, artists, nobles—the priests alone excepted, who know no country but the Church—was fired with the hope of seeing all the divisions of the peninsula united into one, under one and the same government, republican or monarchical, but Italian. Assuredly a population of twenty millions, with an excellent soil, admirable coasts, spacious and magnificent cities, might compose a glorious and powerful state. It lacked but an army. Piedmont alone, always engaged in the wars of the continent, had brave and well-disciplined troops. Nature, indeed, was far from having refused natural courage to the other portions of Italy; but natural courage is nothing without a strong military organization. Italy had not a regiment that could bear the sight of the French or Austrian bayonets.

On the approach of the French, the enemies of political reform had been struck with consternation. Its partisans had been transported with joy. The entire mass was in anxiety; it had vague, uncertain presentiments; it knew not whether it ought to hope or to fear.

Bonaparte on entering Italy had orders, and for his object, to drive the Austrians out of it. His government being desirous, as we have stated, to procure peace, meant to conquer Lombardy, merely to restore it to Austria, and to compel her to cede the Netherlands. Bonaparte could not therefore think of emancipating Italy. Besides, with some thirty thousand men, how could he proclaim a political object? Still, if the Austrians were driven beyond the Alps, and his power firmly established, he might exercise great influence, and in the course of events attempt great things. If, for instance, the Austrians, beaten at all points, on the Po, on the Rhine, and on the Danube, were obliged to cede even Lombardy; if the people, truly inflamed for liberty, were to declare in favour of it on the approach of the French armies; then great destinies would open for Italy. But in the mean time it was incumbent on Bonaparte not to proclaim any object, lest he should irritate the princes whom he left in his rear. His intention, therefore, was not to show any revolutionary project, but at the same time not to damp the ardour of imaginations, and to await the effects of his presence upon the Italian people.

Accordingly, he had avoided encouraging the discontented in Piedmont, because he there saw a country difficult to revolutionize, a strong government, and an army the alliance of which might be serviceable to him.

No sooner was the armistice of Cherasco signed than he again set out. Many persons in the army disapproved of advancing.* What! said they, we are but thirty odd thousand; we have not revolutionized either Piedmont or Genoa; we are leaving behind us governments which are secretly our enemies; and we are going to attempt the passage of a great river, the Po, to traverse Lombardy, and perhaps to decide by our presence the republic of Venice to throw fifty thousand men into the scale! Bonaparte had orders to advance, and he was not a man to fail to comply with a bold order; but he executed it because he approved of it, and he approved of it for profound reasons. Piedmont and Genoa would embarrass us much more, said he, if they were in revolution; thanks to the armistice, our line of march is now secured by three fortresses; all the governments of Italy will submit to us if we can drive the Austrians beyond the Alps; Venice will tremble if we are victorious at her side; the sound of our cannon will even decide her to ally herself with us: we must advance then, not only beyond the Po, but likewise the Adda and the Mincio, to the beautiful line of the Adige; there we will besiege Mantua, and we will make all Italy tremble on our rear. The head of the young general, heated by his march, conceived even still more gigantic projects than those which he avowed to his army. He proposed, after annihilating Beaulieu, to penetrate into the Tyrol, to cross the Alps a second time, and to throw himself into the valley of the Danube, for the purpose of joining there the armies which had started from the banks of the Rhine. This colossal and imprudent plan was a tribute which a great and enterprising mind could not fail to pay to the twofold presumption of youth and success. He wrote to his government soliciting authority to carry it into execution.

He had taken the field on the 20th of Germinal (April 11): the submission of Piedmont was complete on the 9th of Floreal (April 28), by the armistice of Cherasco; it had taken him eighteen days. He set out immediately in pursuit of Beaulieu. He had stipulated with Piedmont that Valenza should be delivered up to him, that he might pass the Po at that place; but this condition was a feint, it was not at Valenza that he intended to cross the river. Beaulieu, when informed of the armistice,

* "Many thought it madness to attempt the conquest of Italy with so small an army, and with a hostile kingdom in their rear. These persons were for revolutionizing Piedmont before they ventured further, but Bonaparte was of opinion that they ought not to halt till they reached the Adige. This counsel prevailed. To dare is in critical circumstances often the means of success; as to carry into effect what to others appears madness is the surest sign of genius."—*Hazlitt.* E.

had thought to possess himself by surprise of the three fortresses of Tortona, Valenza, and Alexandria. He succeeded in surprising Valenza only, into which he threw the Neapolitans; then, seeing Bonaparte advancing rapidly, he hastened to recross the Po, that he might place that river between himself and the French army. He went and encamped at Valeggio, at the conflux of the Po and the Tesino, near the apex of the angle formed by those two rivers. He there threw up some intrenchments, to strengthen his position and to oppose the passage of the French army.

Bonaparte, on quitting the dominions of the King of Sardinia and entering those of the Duke of Parma, was met by envoys from that prince, who came to solicit the clemency of the conqueror. The Duke of Parma was related to the King of Spain: it was requisite, therefore, to show him some indulgence, which, moreover, suited the views of the general. Still, he might fairly exercise upon him some of the rights of war. Bonaparte received his envoys at the passage of the Trebbia. He affected to be angry that the Duke of Parma had not availed himself, for making peace, of the moment when Spain, his relative, was treating with the French republic. He then granted an armistice, demanding a tribute of two millions in money, of which the chest of the army was much in need; sixteen hundred horses, requisite for the artillery and the baggage; a great quantity of wheat and oats; leave to pass through the duchy; and the establishment of hospitals for the sick at the expense of the prince. The general did not stop there. As an Italian, he was a lover and a connoisseur of the arts; he knew how much they add to the splendour of an empire, and the moral effect which they produce on the imagination of men. He demanded twenty pictures, to be chosen by French commissioners and sent to Paris.* The envoys of the duke, glad to appease at this price the anger of the general consented to all his demands, and hastened to execute the conditions of the armistice. They offered, however, a million to save the picture of St. Jerome. Bonaparte said to the army: "This million we should soon spend, and we shall find plenty more to conquer. A masterpiece is everlasting; it will adorn the country." The million was refused.

Bonaparte, having secured the advantages of conquest without its embarrassments, pursued his march. The condition inserted in the armistice of Cherasco, relative to the passage of

* "It was on this occasion that Napoleon exacted a contribution of works of art to be sent to the Museum at Paris, being the first instance of the kind that occurs in modern history."—*Hazlitt.* E.

"The republic had already received and placed in its Museum the masterpieces of the Dutch and Flemish schools. The Romans carried away from conquered Greece the statues which adorn the Capitol. Every capital of Europe contained the spoils of antiquity, and no one had ever thought of imputing it to them as a crime."—*Thibaudeau.* E.

the Po at Valenza and the direction of the principal French columns towards that town, induced a belief that Bonaparte would attempt the passage of the river in its environs. While the main body of his army was already collected at the point where Beaulieu was expecting him to cross, on the 17th of Floreal (May 6), he took a corps of three thousand five hundred grenadiers, together with his cavalry and twenty-four pieces of cannon, descended along the Po, and arrived on the morning of the 18th at Placentia, after a march of sixteen leagues in thirty-six hours. The cavalry had seized all the boats which it found on the banks of the river, and taken them along with it to Placentia; it had also taken a great quantity of forage, and the medical stores of the Austrian army. A barge carried the advanced guard commanded by Colonel Lannes. No sooner had that officer reached the other bank, than he dashed with his grenadiers upon some Austrian detachments, which were running upon the left bank of the Po, and dispersed them. The rest of the grenadiers successively crossed the river, and began to construct a bridge for the passage of the army which had received orders to descend in its turn to Placentia. Thus, by a feint and a bold march, Bonaparte found himself beyond the Po, with the additional advantage of having turned the Tesino. Had he crossed higher up, besides the difficulty of doing so in the presence of Beaulieu, he would have come upon the Tesino, and have had to cross that too. But at Placentia, he avoided that inconvenience, for the Tesino had already joined the Po.

On the 18th of May, Liptai's division, which was the first to receive the information, proceeded to Fombio, at a little distance from the Po, on the road to Pizzighitone. Bonaparte, sensible of the danger of suffering it to establish itself in a position where the whole Austrian army was likely to rally, and might then oblige him to receive battle with the river Po at his back, hastened to attack it with all the forces that he had at hand. Rushing upon this division, which had intrenched itself, he dislodged it after a sanguinary action, and took from it two thousand prisoners. The rest of the division gained the road to Pizzighitone, and went and shut itself up in that place.

On the evening of the same day, Beaulieu, apprized of the passage of the Po at Placentia, came up to the support of Liptai's division. Not aware of the disaster which it had sustained, he fell in with the French advanced posts, was warmly received, and obliged to fall back in the utmost haste. Unfortunately, the brave General Laharpe, so useful to the army for his intelligence and his intrepidity, was killed by his own soldiers amidst the darkness of the night. The whole army regretted the loss of this brave Swiss, whom the tyranny of Berne had driven to France.*

* "Laharpe was a Swiss of the canton of Vaud. He was an officer of dis-

The Po being crossed, the Tesino turned, and Beaulieu beaten and unable to keep the field, the route to Milan was open. It was natural that a conqueror of twenty-six should be impatient to enter that city. But Bonaparte was desirous, above all, to complete the destruction of Beaulieu. With this view, he meant not merely to fight him; he meant to turn him, to cut off his retreat, and to oblige him, if possible, to lay down his arms. To accomplish this object, it was necessary that he should anticipate him at the passage of the rivers. A great number of rivers descend from the Alps, and, running through Lombardy, fall into the Po or the Adriatic. Besides the Po and the Tesino, there are the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, the Adige, and many others. Bonaparte now had before him the Adda, which he had not been able to turn like the Tesino, because he must then have gone as high as Cremona before he crossed the Po. The passage of the Adda is at Pizzighitone, but the wrecks of Liptai's division had just thrown themselves into that place. Bonaparte hastened to ascend the Adda to reach the bridge of Lodi. Beaulieu was there before him. It was impossible, therefore, to anticipate him at the passage of that river. But he had with him at Lodi only twelve thousand infantry and four thousand horse. Two other divisions, under Colli and Vukassovich, had made a circuit to Milan, to throw a garrison into the citadel, and were then to return to the Adda, to cross it at Cassano, a great way above Lodi. By endeavouring, then, to cross the Adda at Lodi, in spite of the presence of Beaulieu, Bonaparte might possibly reach the other bank before the two divisions, which were to pass at Cassano, had completed their movement. There would then be a hope of cutting them off.

Bonaparte was before Lodi on the 20th (May 9). That town is situated on the same bank along which the French army was coming. Bonaparte caused it to be attacked unawares, and penetrated into it in spite of the Austrians. The latter, then quitting the town, retired by the bridge, and went to rejoin the main body of their army on the other bank. This bridge it was necessary to pass over, on leaving Lodi, in order to cross the Adda. Twelve thousand infantry and four thousand horse were drawn up on the opposite bank; twenty pieces of artillery enfiladed the bridge; a host of sharpshooters was posted on the bank. It was not customary in war to confront such difficulties. A bridge defended by sixteen thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery was an obstacle which nobody would have attempted to surmount. The whole French army had sheltered itself from the fire behind the walls of Lodi, awaiting the orders of the

tinguished bravery, and much beloved by his troops, though of an unquiet temper. It was remarked that, during the action of Fombio, on the evening preceding his death, he had appeared absent and dejected, giving no orders, seemingly deprived of his usual faculties, and overwhelmed by some fatal presentiment."—*Hazlitt*. E.

general. Bonaparte sallied from the town, explored the banks of the river, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot, and, having formed his plan, returned to Lodi to put it in execution. He ordered his cavalry to go up the Adda and to endeavour to ford it above the bridge; he then caused a column of six thousand grenadiers to be formed: he went through the ranks, encouraged them, and communicated extraordinary courage by his presence and his words. He then ordered them to debouch by the gate leading to the bridge, and to debouch in a run. He had calculated that, from the rapidity of the movement, the column would not have time to suffer much. This formidable column closed its ranks and debouched in a run upon the bridge. A tremendous fire was poured upon them. The entire head of the column was struck down. It nevertheless advanced: having reached the middle of the bridge, it hesitated; but the generals encouraged it by their voices and by their example. It recovered itself, advanced, rushed upon the guns, and killed the gunners who attempted to defend them. At this moment, the Austrian infantry approached in its turn to support its artillery; but, after what it had just achieved, the terrible column was not afraid of bayonets; it dashed upon the Austrians at the moment when the cavalry, which had found a ford, was threatening their flanks; it overthrew them, dispersed them, and took two thousand prisoners.*

* The following is Bourrienne's account of the celebrated battle of Lodi:

"It now remained to cross the river; but thirty pieces of cannon placed in battery, some at the further end of the old bridge, and some a little above, and others a little below it, on the left bank, in order to produce a cross-fire, seemed to render such an enterprise next to impossible. More than one brave republican general recommended a pause, which must have ended in a retreat, but Bonaparte, keeping his eyes fixed, and his hand pointing at the bridge, said, 'That is the way to Milan—to Rome—to the possession of all Italy,—we must cross, let it cost what it may. It must not be said that the tributary Adda stopped those heroes who had forced the Po!' On this occasion the French were pretty well supplied with artillery, and their first operation was to open a heavy fire across the river on the enemy's guns. General Beaumont, who commanded their cavalry, was sent to pass the Adda at a ford about a league above the bridge, and he took with him some flying artillery, with which he was to cannonade the right flank of the Austrians. By an inconceivable imbecility, the ford was not sufficiently guarded, and Beaumont, though not without difficulty, passed through it with his horses and guns. As soon as Bonaparte saw that the heads of the French cavalry were forming on the left bank of the Adda, and that the manœuvre gave great uneasiness to the Austrians, he pointed his sword at the bridge and sounded the charge. It was on the 10th of May, and about six o'clock in the evening, when 4000 picked men, shouting 'Vive la République,' advanced on the bridge, which was literally swept by the enemy's guns. The first effect was tremendous; the French were involved in a murderous hailstorm of cannon-balls, grape-shot, and musket-balls;—they stopped—for a moment they wavered. Then Bonaparte, and Lannes, and Berthier, and Massena, and Cervoni, and Dallemagne, and Dupas, threw themselves at the head of the columns, which dashed across the bridge, and up to the mouths of the enemy's

This most daring deed struck the Austrians with astonishment, but, unfortunately it proved useless. Colli and Vukassovich had succeeded in gaining the causeway of Brescia, and could no longer be cut off. If the result had failed, at least the line of the Adda was carried, the courage of the soldiers was elevated to the highest pitch, and their devotion to their general was unbounded. In their gaiety they conceived a singular idea,

guns. Lannes was the first to reach the left bank of the Adda, Napoleon the second. The Austrian artillerymen were bayoneted at their guns before Beaulieu could get to their rescue, for this doomed old general had kept his infantry too far in the rear of the bridge. By this means also the French infantry was allowed time to debouch from the *tête-du-pont*, and form in pretty good order. The battle, however, was not over. Though stupid, Beaulieu was brave, and the Austrian troops had not yet lost their dogged obstinacy. They concentrated a little behind the river—they put their remaining artillery in battery, and for some minutes it seemed doubtful whether they would not drive their foes back to the blood-covered bridge, or into the waters of the Adda. But, in addition to Beaumont, who acted with his cavalry on their right flank, Augereau now came up from Borghetto to the opportune assistance of his comrades. Then Beaulieu retreated, but in such good order that the French made few prisoners. The shades of night closed over a scene of horror;—between the town and the bridge of Lodi, and the scene of the prolonged action on the left bank, 2500 men and 400 horses on the part of the Austrians lay dead or wounded, and the French could not have left fewer than 2000 men in the same condition, although Bonaparte owned only to the loss of 400. This battle, which he used to call 'the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi,' carried his fame to the highest pitch, while the great personal bravery he displayed in it endeared him to the troops. The men, who cannot always appreciate military genius and science, know perfectly well how to estimate courage, and they soon idolize the commander that shows himself ready to share in their greatest dangers. It was on this occasion that the soldiers gave Bonaparte the honorary and affectionate nickname of 'The little Corporal.' He was then slight in figure and had almost an effeminate appearance. 'It was a strange sight,' says a French veteran, 'to see him on that day on foot on the bridge, under a *feu-d'enfer*, and mixed up with our tall grenadiers—he looked like a little boy!' Those men of routine and prescription, the Austrian officers, who adhered to the old system of warfare, could not comprehend his new conceptions and innovations. 'This beardless youth ought to have been beaten over and over again,' said poor Beaulieu, 'for who ever saw such tactics!' A day or two after the battle of Lodi, an old Hungarian officer, who did not know his person, was brought prisoner to the French commander-in-chief. 'Well,' said Bonaparte, 'What do you think of the state of the war now?'—'Nothing can be worse on your side,' replied the old martinet 'Here you have a youth who absolutely knows nothing of the rules of war; to-day he is in our rear, to-morrow on our flank, next again in our front. Such gross violations of the principles of the art of war are not to be supported!'" E.

"Some one having read at St. Helena an account of the battle of Lodi, in which it was said that Bonaparte displayed great courage in crossing the bridge, and that Lannes passed it after him, 'Before me!' cried Bonaparte with much warmth, 'Lannes passed first, and I only followed him. It is necessary to correct that on the spot.' And the correction was accordingly made in the margin of the book."—*Hazlitt.* E.

"Vendémiaire and Montenotte," said the Emperor, "never induced me to look on myself as a man of a superior class; it was not till after Lodi that I was struck with the possibility of becoming famous. It was then that the first spark of my ambition was kindled."—*Las Cases.* E.

which serves to illustrate the national character. The oldest of the soldiers assembled, one day, and, seeing that their general was very young, they took it into their heads to make him pass through all the ranks: at Lodi they made him corporal, and when he appeared in the camp, they saluted him by the title since become so famous of the *little corporal.** We shall find them hereafter conferring others upon him, according as he merited them.

The Austrian army had insured its retreat upon the Tyrol. It would have been of no use to follow it. Bonaparte then resolved to fall upon Lombardy, to take possession of, and to organize it. The remains of Liptai's division had intrenched themselves at Pizzighitone and might convert it into a fortification. He proceeded thither to drive them from the place; he then sent Massena before him to Milan; Augereau fell back to occupy Pavia. He wished to overawe that great city, celebrated for its university, and to show it one of the finest divisions of the army. Serrurier's and Laharpe's divisions were left at Pizzighitone, Lodi, Cremona, and Cassano, to guard the Adda.

Bonaparte at length set out for Milan. On the approach of the French army, the partisans of Austria, and all those who were terrified at the reputation of our soldiers, who were reported to be as barbarous as they were brave, had fled and covered the roads to Brescia and the Tyrol. The archduke had set out, and had been seen to shed tears on leaving his beautiful capital. The majority of the Milanese gave way to hope, and awaited our army in the most favourable mood. When they had received the first division commanded by Massena, and saw those soldiers, whom report painted in such frightful colours, respecting property and person, and manifesting the benevolence natural to their character, they were filled with enthusiasm and treated them with the utmost kindness. The patriots had assembled from all parts of Italy, and awaited the young conqueror, whose exploits were so rapid, and whose Italian name sounded so sweetly to their ears. The Count de Melzi was immediately sent to meet Bonaparte, and to promise him obedience.† A national guard was formed and clothed in the three colours, green, red, and white. The Duke de Serbelloni was appointed to command it. A triumphal arch was erected to receive the French general. On the 26th of Floreal (May 15), a month after the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte made his entry

* "How subtle is the chain which unites the most trivial circumstances to the most important events! Perhaps this very nickname contributed to the Emperor's miraculous success on his return from Elba in 1815. While he was haranguing the first battalion he met, which he found it necessary to parley with, a voice from the ranks exclaimed, 'Vive notre petit caporal! We will never fight against him.'"—*Las Cases.* E.

† "It was in memory of this mission, that Napoleon, when King of Italy, created the duchy of Lodi, in favour of Melzi."—*Montholon.* E.

into Milan. The whole population of the capital went forth to meet him. The national guard was under arms. The municipality came and delivered to him the keys of the city. Acclamations accompanied him all the way to the Serbelloni palace, where quarters were prepared for him. He had now won the imagination of the Italians, as well as that of the soldiers, and he could act by moral force as powerfully as by physical force.

It was not his intention to stay long in Milan, any more than he had done at Cherasco after the submission of Piedmont. He meant to remain there merely sufficient time to organize the province temporarily, to draw from it the resources requisite for his army, and to regulate every thing upon his rear. His plan was still to hasten afterwards to the Adige and Mantua, and if possible to penetrate into the Tyrol and beyond the Alps.

The Austrians had left two thousand men in the citadel of Milan. Bonaparte caused it to be immediately invested. It was agreed with the commandant of the citadel that he should not fire upon the city, for it was Austrian property, which he had no interest in destroying. The operations of the siege were forthwith commenced.

Bonaparte, without entering into any specific engagement with the Milanese, or promising them an independence which he could not ensure to them, nevertheless encouraged sufficient hopes to excite their patriotism. He held energetic language to them, and said that, to obtain liberty, they ought to deserve it by assisting to emancipate Italy for ever from Austria. He instituted a provisional municipal administration; he caused national guards to be every where formed, in order to give Lombardy a commencement of military organization. He then turned his attention to the wants of his army, and was obliged to impose on the Milanese a contribution of twenty millions. This measure appeared to him detrimental, because it must retard the march of the public mind; but it was indispensable, and it excited nevertheless no very great discontent. Owing to the magazines found in Piedmont, and to the corn furnished by the Duke of Parma, the army had abundance of provisions. The soldiers grew fat, eating good bread and good meat, and drinking excellent wine. They were satisfied, and began to observe strict discipline. All that was now left to be done, was to clothe them. They had still the same old clothes as in the Alps; they were in rags, and were imposing only by their renown, their martial bearing, and their admirable discipline. Bonaparte soon found new resources. The Duke of Modena, whose states bordered upon the Po, below those of the Duke of Parma, despatched envoys to obtain the same conditions as the latter. This avaricious prince, seeing all his predictions realized, had fled to Venice with his treasures, leaving the government of his domi-

minions to a regency. Not wishing, however, to ruin them, he applied to negotiate. Bonaparte could not grant peace, but he was at liberty to grant armistices, which were equivalent to it, and which rendered him master of all the states of Italy. He required ten millions, supplies of all kinds, horses, and pictures.

With the resources which he had thus obtained in the country, he established on the banks of the Po large magazines, hospitals furnished with necessaries for the accommodation of fifteen thousand sick, and filled all the chests of the army. Deeming himself rich enough, he even sent off some millions to Genoa for the Directory. As he knew, moreover, that the army of the Rhine was in want of funds, and that this penury prevented it from taking the field, he sent a million, by way of Switzerland, to Moreau. It was an act of kindness to a comrade, that was both honourable and serviceable to himself; for it was of importance that Moreau should take the field, to prevent the Austrians from directing their principal forces against Italy.

On consideration of all these things, Bonaparte was still more confirmed in his plans. It was not necessary, in his opinion, to march against the princes of Italy; it was requisite to act against the Austrians only. So long as he should be able to resist them and to prevent their return into Lombardy, all the Italian states, trembling under the ascendency of the French army, would submit one after another. The Dukes of Parma and Modena had submitted. Rome and Naples would do the same, if he continued master of the gates of Italy. It was requisite, in like manner, not to be precipitate in regard to the people, and, without overthrowing governments, to wait till the subjects should rise of their own accord.

But, amidst these just ideas, these vast plans, he was stopped short by a most mortifying circumstance. The Directory was enchanted with his services. Carnot, on reading his despatches, written with energy and precision, but with extreme warmth of imagination, was alarmed at his gigantic plans. He justly thought, that to attempt to traverse the Tyrol and to cross the Alps a second time was too extravagant a scheme, nay, even impossible; but, in his turn, to correct the plan of the young general, he conceived another far more dangerous. Lombardy being conquered, the French ought to advance, according to Carnot, into the Peninsula, to punish the Pope and the Bourbons of Naples, and to drive the English from Leghorn, where the Duke of Tuscany suffered them to be masters. To this end, Carnot, in the name of the Directory, ordered the army of Italy to be divided into two: one part, under Kellermann, to be left in Lombardy; the other, under the command of Bonaparte, to march upon Rome and Naples. This disastrous plan renewed the fault which the French have always committed, that of penetrating into the Peninsula before they were masters of

Upper Italy. It is not with the Pope or with Naples that the possession of Italy ought to be disputed, but with the Austrians. In this case the line of operation is not on the Tiber, but on the Adige. Impatience to possess has always urged us on to Rome and Naples, and, while we have been overrunning the Peninsula, we have always found the road closed upon us. It was natural that republicans should wish to chastise a Pope and a Bourbon; but they committed the same blunder as the ancient kings of France.

Bonaparte, in his plan for throwing himself into the valley of the Danube, had kept the Austrians alone in view. It was the exaggeration of truth in a sound but young mind. With such a conviction, then, he could not consent to march into the Peninsula; besides, aware of the importance of unity of direction in a conquest which required as much political as military genius, he could not endure the idea of sharing the command with an old general, brave but of moderate abilities, and full of vanity. This was in him that just egotism of genius, which is anxious to perform its task alone, because it feels that itself alone is capable of performing it. He behaved here as in the field of battle. He hazarded his future prospects, and tendered his resignation in a letter equally respectful and bold.* He was aware that the Directory durst not accept it; but it is certain that he would much rather have resigned than obeyed, because he could not consent to suffer his glory and the army to be thrown away in the execution of a vicious plan.

Opposing the most luminous reason to the errors of Carnot, he said that the French ought to continue to make head against the Austrians and to attend to them alone; that a mere division, marching upon the Po and Ancona, would frighten the Peninsula, and force Rome and Naples to beg for quarter. He prepared immediately to leave Milan, to hasten to the Adige, and to lay siege to Mantua. There he purposed to wait for fresh orders from the Directory and a reply to his despatches.

He published a new proclamation to his soldiers, which could not fail to strike their imagination strongly, and which was also calculated to make a powerful impression on that of the Pope and the King of Naples:

"Soldiers! you have rushed like a torrent from the top of the Apennines; you have overthrown, dispersed, every thing that opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has returned to her natural sentiments of peace and

* The following are the terms in which Napoleon addressed Carnot on this occasion: "Kellermann would command the army as well as I; for no one is more convinced than I am of the courage and audacity of the soldiers; but to unite us together would ruin every thing. I will not serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; and it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is, like government, decided in a great degree by tact." E.

friendship for France. Milan is yours, and the republican flag waves throughout all Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generosity alone. The army which proudly threatened you finds no longer any barrier to secure it against your courage: the Po, the Tesino, and the Adda, have not stopped you for a single day; those highly vaunted bulwarks of Italy have proved insufficient; you have passed them as rapidly as the Apennines. These successes have produced joy in the bosom of the country; your representatives have ordered a festival dedicated to your victories, which are celebrated in all the communes of the republic. There your fathers, your mothers, your wives, your sisters, your sweethearts, are rejoicing in your achievements, and boasting with pride that you belong to them. Yes, soldiers! you have done much; but is there nothing more left for you to do? Shall it be said of us that we knew how to conquer, but not how to follow up the victory? Shall posterity reproach you with having found a Capua in Lombardy? But I see you already running to arms. Well! let us set out! We have still forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels to gather, injuries to revenge. Let those who have whetted the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely assassinated our ministers, who burned our ships at Toulon—let those tremble! The hour of vengeance has struck; but let not the people be alarmed; we are friends of the people every where, and more particularly of the descendants of the Brutuses, the Scipios, and the great men whom we have taken for our models. To re-establish the Capitol, to set up there with honour the statues of the heroes who rendered it celebrated; to rouse the Roman people, stupified by several centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories. They will form an epoch with posterity. You will have the immortal glory of changing the face of the finest portion of Europe. The French people, free, and respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify her for the sacrifices of all kinds that she has been making for the last six years. You will then return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens pointing to you, will say, *He belonged to the army of Italy.*"*

After a stay of only a week at Milan, he left it on the 2nd of Prairial (May 22), to proceed to Lodi, and to advance towards the Adige.

While Bonaparte was pursuing his march, an unexpected event suddenly recalled him to Milan. The nobles, the monks, the servants of the fugitive families, a multitude of creatures of the Austrian government, prepared a revolt against the French army. They spread a report that Beaulieu, having been reinforced, was at hand with sixty thousand men; that the Prince

* "On reading over this proclamation one day at St. Helena, the Emperor exclaimed, 'And yet they have the folly to say that I could not write!'" —*Las Cases.* E.

of Condé was coming through Switzerland upon the rear of the republicans, and that they were on the brink of destruction. The priests, availing themselves of their influence over some of the peasantry, who had suffered from the passage of the army, excited them to take arms. Bonaparte having just quitted Milan, the moment was deemed favourable for carrying the revolt into execution, and for raising all Lombardy on his rear. The garrison of the citadel of Milan gave the signal by a sortie. The tocsin was immediately rung throughout the whole surrounding country; and armed peasants repaired to Milan, to make themselves masters of the city. But the division which Bonaparte had left to blockade the citadel quickly forced the garrison to fall back within its walls, and drove out the peasants who ventured to make their appearance. In the environs of Pavia the insurgents were more successful. They entered that city, and made themselves masters of it, in spite of the three hundred men whom Bonaparte had left in garrison there. These three hundred men, fatigued or sick, shut themselves up in a fort, to escape being slaughtered. The insurgents surrounded the fort, and summoned it to surrender. A French general, passing at that moment through Pavia, was seized, and obliged, while a dagger was held to his throat, to sign an order commanding the garrison to open its gates. The order was signed and executed.

This revolt might produce disastrous consequences. It might provoke a general insurrection and bring ruin on the French army. The public mind of a nation is always more advanced in the cities than in the country. While the population of the cities of Italy was declaring for us, the peasants, excited by the monks, and suffering severely from the passage of the armies, were most unfavourably disposed. Bonaparte was at Lodi, when, on the 4th of Prairial (May 24), he received intelligence of the occurrences at Milan and Pavia. He immediately turned back with three hundred horse, a battalion of grenadiers, and six pieces of cannon. Order was already restored in Milan. He pursued his route to Pavia, sending the Archbishop of Milan before him. The insurgents had pushed an advanced guard as far as the village of Binasco. Lannes dispersed it. Bonaparte, conceiving that it behoved him to act with promptitude and energy, in order to put an end to the evil in its birth, caused the village to be set on fire, that the sight of the flames might strike terror into Pavia. On arriving before that city, he halted. It contained thirty thousand inhabitants; it was enclosed within an old wall, and it was occupied by seven or eight thousand insurgent peasants. They had closed the gates and manned the walls. To take this city with three hundred horse and one battalion was no easy matter; yet there was no time to lose, for the army was already on the Oglio, and it required the presence of its general. In the night, Bonaparte caused a threatening proclamation to be posted on the gates of Pavia, in which he said

that a misled mob, without any real means of resistance, was defying an army triumphant over kings, and meant to plunge the people of Italy into ruin; that, adhering to his intention of not making war upon the people, he would pardon this act of madness, and leave a door open for repentance; but that those who should not instantly lay down their arms should be treated as rebels, and their villages burned. The flames of Binasco, he added, ought to serve as a warning to them. In the morning, the peasants, who were masters of the city, refused to deliver it up. Bonaparte ordered the walls to be cleared with grape and howitzer-shot: he then brought up his grenadiers, who broke open the gates with hatchets. They forced their way into the city, and had to sustain a combat in the streets. The resistance, however, was not long. The peasants fled, and left unfortunate Pavia to the wrath of the conqueror. The soldiers, with loud shouts, demanded leave to pillage. Bonaparte, by way of giving a severe example, allowed them three hours to plunder.* They were scarcely a thousand men, and they could not do any great mischief in so large a city as Pavia. They fell upon the goldsmiths' shops, and secured a considerable quantity of jewellery. The most censurable act was the pillage of the Mont de Piété, but fortunately, in Italy, as in every other country where there are poor and vain individuals among the great, the Monts de Piété were full of articles belonging to the higher classes of the country. The houses of Spallanzani and Volta were preserved by the officers, who themselves guarded the dwellings of those illustrious votaries of science—an example doubly honourable to France and to Italy.

Bonaparte then despatched his horse to the surrounding country, and ordered a great number of the insurgents to be put to death. This prompt severity produced universal submission, and overawed the party in Italy which was hostile to liberty and to France. It is painful to be obliged to employ such means; but Bonaparte was compelled to resort to them, upon pain of sacrificing his army and the destinies of Italy. The party of the monks trembled: the sufferings of Pavia, passing from mouth to mouth, were exaggerated; and the French army recovered its formidable reputation.

This affair finished, Bonaparte immediately returned to rejoin the army, which was on the Oglio, and about to enter the Venetian territory.

On the approach of the French army, the question so much agitated in Venice, whether to take part with Austria or France, was discussed anew by the senate. Some of the old oligarchy, who

* "Pavia," said the Emperor, "is the only place I ever gave up to pillage. I had promised it to the soldiers for twenty-four hours; but after three hours I could bear it no longer, and put an end to it. Policy and morality are equally opposed to the system. Nothing is so certain to disorganize and completely ruin an army."—*Las Cases.* E.

had retained a degree of energy, would have wished the republic to form an immediate alliance with Austria, the natural protector of all old despotisms; but Austrian ambition was dreaded for the future, and the vengeance of France at the moment. Besides, it would be necessary to take arms, a resolution extremely unpleasant to an enervated government. Some young members of the oligarchy, equally energetic, but less infatuated than their elders, likewise recommended a courageous determination. They proposed to raise a formidable armament, but to maintain the neutrality, and to threaten with fifty thousand men either of the powers which would violate the Venetian territory. This was a strong resolution, but too strong to be adopted. Some prudent persons, on the contrary, proposed a third course, namely an alliance with France. Battaglia, the senator, a man of an acute, sagacious, and temperate mind, adduced arguments, which the lapse of time has invested, as it were, with the character of prophecies. In his opinion, neutrality, even an armed neutrality, was the worst of all determinations. It was impossible to make themselves respected, whatever force they displayed; and, not having attached either of the parties to their cause, they would sooner or later be sacrificed by both. It was absolutely necessary therefore to decide either for Austria or for France. Austria was for the moment driven out of Italy; and, even supposing her to possess the means of returning, she could not do so in less than two months, during which time the republic might be destroyed by the French army. Besides, the ambition of Austria was always more to be dreaded by Venice. She had always coveted her provinces in Illyria and Upper Italy, and would seize the first opportunity to possess herself of them. The only guarantee against this ambition was the power of France, which had nothing to envy Venice for, and which would always have an interest in defending her. France, it was true, professed principles which were repugnant to the Venetian nobility; but it was high time to make some indispensable sacrifices to the spirit of the age, and to yield to the nobles of the main land those concessions which could alone bind them to the republic and to the golden book. With some slight modifications in the ancient constitution, they might satisfy the ambition of all classes of Venetian subjects and attach France to them; if, moreover they should take arms for the latter, they might hope, perhaps, to be rewarded for the services which they should have rendered by the spoils of Austria in Lombardy. In every case, repeated Battaglia, neutrality would be the very worst course for all parties.

This opinion, the wisdom of which time has demonstrated, too deeply wounded the pride and the prejudices of the old Venetian aristocracy to be adopted. It must also be observed that sufficient reliance was not placed on the duration of the French power in Italy, for Venice to seek an alliance with it. There

was an ancient Italian adage which said that *Italy was the grave of the French*, and the Venetians were apprehensive lest they should afterwards find themselves exposed, without defence, to the wrath of Austria.

To these three courses one more convenient was preferred, and one more conformable with the routine and the weakness of this old government—unarmed neutrality. It was decided that *proveditori* should be sent to meet Bonaparte, to assure him of the neutrality of the republic, and to claim the respect due to the Venetian territory and subjects. A great dread of the French prevailed, but they were known to be easy and sensible to kind treatment. Orders were issued to all the agents of the government, to receive and to treat them in the best manner, and to pay particular attention to the officers and generals in order to gain their goodwill.

Bonaparte, on his arrival in the Venetian territory, had as much need of prudence as Venice herself. This power, though in the hands of an enfeebled government, was still great. It behoved him not to indispose it to such a degree as to oblige it to taken up arms; for then Upper Italy would be no longer tenable for the French; but it was also requisite, while observing the neutrality, to compel Venice to suffer us to remain upon her territory, to allow us to fight, and even to supply ourselves with provisions, there, if possible. She had granted a passage to the Austrians: that was the reason which it would be necessary to urge for taking every liberty and demanding every thing, while continuing within the limits of neutrality.

Bonaparte, on entering Brescia, published a proclamation, in which he declared that, in passing through the Venetian territory in pursuit of the imperial army, to which a passage had been granted, he should respect the territory and the inhabitants of the republic of Venice; that he should make his army observe the strictest discipline; that whatever it should take should be paid for; and that he should not forget the old ties which united the two republics. He was very cordially received by the Venetian proveditore of Brescia, and continued his march. He had crossed the Oglio, which is the next stream to the Adda; he arrived before the Mincio, which, issuing from the lake of Garda, winds through the plain of the Mantuan, then, after a course of some leagues, forms a new lake, and at last falls into the Po. Beaulieu, reinforced by ten thousand men, had posted himself on the line of the Mincio, to defend it. An advanced guard of four thousand foot and two thousand horse was drawn up in advance of the river, at the village of Borghetto. The mass of the army occupied the position of Valeggio, beyond the Mincio; the reserve was a little farther back at Villa Franca; and detached corps guarded the course of the Mincio, above and below Valeggio. The Venetian town of Peschiera is situated on the Mincio, at the very point where it issues from the lake of

Garda. Beaulieu, who wished to have that place, in order to gain a firmer support for the right of his line, deceived the Venetians, and, upon pretext of obtaining a passage for fifty men, surprised the town and placed in it a strong garrison. It had a bastioned enclosure and eighty pieces of cannon.

Bonaparte, in advancing upon this line, wholly neglected Mantua, which was on his right, and which he had not yet time to blockade, and supported his left towards Peschiera. His plan was to cross the Mincio at Borghetto and Valeggio. To this end, it was requisite that he should deceive Beaulieu in regard to his intention. On this occasion, he had recourse to the same stratagem as at the passage of the Po. He directed one corps upon Peschiera and another upon Lonato, so as to alarm Beaulieu about the Upper Mincio, and to make him suppose that he designed to cross at Peschiera, or to turn the lake of Garda. At the same time, he directed his most serious attack against Borghetto. That village, situated in advance of the Mincio, was, as we have stated above, guarded by four thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the 9th of Prairial (May 29), Bonaparte commenced the engagement. He had always had great trouble to make his cavalry fight. It was not accustomed to charge, because formerly very little use had been made of it, and it was besides intimidated by the high reputation of the German cavalry. Bonaparte was determined to bring it into action at all hazards, because he attached great importance to the services that it was capable of rendering. In advancing upon Borghetto, he distributed his grenadiers and his carbiniers on the right and left of his cavalry; he placed the artillery in the rear, and, having thus enclosed it, he launched it upon the enemy. Supported on either side, and led on by the impetuous Murat, it performed prodigies, and put to flight the Austrian squadrons. The infantry then attacked the village of Borghetto and took it. The Austrians, retiring from it by the bridge leading from Borghetto to Valeggio, attempted to break it down. They actually succeeded in destroying one arch. But some grenadiers, led by General Gardanne, plunged into the Mincio, which was fordable in some places, and crossed it, holding their muskets above their heads, in defiance of the fire from the opposite heights. The Austrians fancied that they beheld the column of Lodi, and retired without destroying the bridge. The broken arch was repaired, and the army was enabled to cross. Bonaparte instantly started to ascend the Mincio with Augereau's division, in pursuit of the Austrians; but they declined battle the whole day. Leaving Augereau's division to continue the pursuit, he returned to Valeggio, where he found Massena's division beginning to make their soup. All at once the charge sounded, and the Austrian hussars dashed into the middle of the village. Bonaparte had scarcely time to escape. He mounted a horse and soon ascertained that this was one of the enemy's

corps left to guard the Lower Mincio, and which was ascending the river to rejoin Beaulieu in his retreat towards the mountains. Massena ran to arms and gave chase to this division, which, however, succeeded in rejoining Beaulieu.

The Mincio was thus crossed. Bonaparte had decided for a second time the retreat of the Imperialists, who threw themselves definitively into the Tyrol. He had gained an important advantage, that of making his cavalry fight, and curing it of its dread of the Austrian cavalry. To this he attached great consequence. Before his time but little use was made of the cavalry, and he had judged that it might be rendered very serviceable by employing it to cover the artillery. He had calculated that the light artillery and the cavalry, seasonably employed, were capable of producing the effect of a mass of infantry of ten times the number. He began already to take a great liking to young Murat, who knew how to make his squadrons fight—a merit which he then considered as very rare among the officers of that arm. The surprise which had endangered his person suggested another idea, namely to form a corps to which he gave the name of guides. It was to consist of picked men, and its destination was to accompany him wherever he went. In this case, his personal safety was but a secondary consideration with him: he perceived the advantage of having always at hand a devoted corps, capable of the boldest actions. We shall hereafter see him in fact deciding important engagements by employing of twenty-five of these brave fellows. He gave the command of this corps to a cavalry officer, possessing great coolness and intrepidity, and afterwards well-known by the name of Bessières.*

* "Jean Baptiste Bessières was born in 1768. His family was of humble origin. At an early age he obtained admission into the Constitutional Guard of Louis XVI., and on the dissolution of that body was attached to the legion of the Pyrenees. In 1796 he joined the army of Italy, and was noticed for his bravery by Bonaparte, who entrusted him with the command of his *guides*, a corps which by successive augmentations became in the sequel the famous Imperial Guard, of which Bessières retained the command till his death. He attended the Emperor throughout his German campaigns, and fought at Jena, Friedland, and Eylau, exhibiting both valour and prudence. He then went to Spain, and defeated Cuesta in a pitched battle, which opened the way for the French to Madrid. At Wagram he led the French horse against the Austrian flank, and in 1812 went through the Russian campaign with honour. The opening of the next saw him in the place of Murat—at the head of the cavalry of the whole army. He was killed in the evening before the battle of Lutzen while forcing a defile. Marshal Bessières was an excellent soldier and a good man, and did all in his power to mitigate the horrors of war."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

"Bessières was a stouter man than Lannes, and, like him, he was from the South, as the accent of both sufficiently testified; like him too, he had a mania for powder, but with a striking difference in the cut of his hair: a small lock at each side projected like little dogs' ears, and his long and thin Prussian cue supplied the place of the *cadogan* of Lannes. He had good

Beaulieu, on evacuating Peschiera, had retreated to the Tyrol. A combat had taken place with the Austrian rear-guard, and it was not till after a very brisk action that the French army entered the town. The Venetians having been unable to recover it from Beaulieu, it had ceased to be neutral, and the French were authorized to establish themselves there. Bonaparte knew that the Venetians had been deceived by Beaulieu, and he resolved to avail himself of that circumstance to obtain from them all that he wished. He wanted the line of the Adda, and more particularly the important city of Verona, which commands the river; but, above all, he wanted to obtain supplies.

Foscarelli, the proveditore, an old Venetian oligarch, strongly wedded to his prejudices and full of hatred against France, was commissioned to repair to Bonaparte's head-quarters. He had been told that the general was highly enraged at what had happened at Peschiera, and report represented his anger as dreadful. Binasco and Pavia attested his severity; two armies destroyed and Italy conquered attested his power. The proveditore arrived at Peschiera full of terror, and, on setting out, he wrote to his government: *May God be pleased to accept me as a victim!* He was charged with the special mission of preventing the French from entering Verona. That city, which had afforded an asylum to the Pretender, was in the most painful anxiety. Young Bonaparte, who was subject to violent gusts of passion, but who could also feign them, omitted nothing to increase the fright of the proveditore. He inveighed vehemently against the Venetian government, which pretended to be neutral, and could not enforce respect for its neutrality; which, in suffering the Austrians to seize Peschiera, had exposed the army to the loss of a great number of brave fellows before that place. He said that the blood of his comrades cried for vengeance, and a signal vengeance they must have. The proveditore made many excuses for the Venetian authorities, and then adverted to the essential point, which was Verona. He declared that he had orders to forbid both the belligerent powers the entry into that city. Bonaparte replied that it was then too late; that Massena

teeth, a slight cast in the eye, but not to a disagreeable extent; and a rather prepossessing address."—*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

"Bessières, Duke of Istria, always continued good, humane, and generous; of antique loyalty and integrity; and, whether considered as a citizen or a soldier, an honest, worthy man. He often made use of the high favour in which he stood to do extraordinary acts of kindness, even to people of very different ways of thinking from himself. He was adored by the guards, in the midst of whom he passed his life. At the battle of Wagram, a ball struck him off his horse, without doing him any further injury. A mournful cry arose from the whole battalion, upon which Napoleon remarked, the next time he saw him, 'Bessières, the ball which struck you drew tears from all my guard. Return thanks to it. It ought to be very dear to you.' After living like Bayard, Bessières died like Turenne. He was sincerely attached to the Emperor. Indeed, he almost worshipped him; and would certainly never have abandoned his person or his fortunes."—*Las Cases.* E.

had already marched thither; that perhaps at that very moment he was setting fire to it, to punish a city which had had the insolence to consider itself for a moment as the capital of the French empire.* The proveditore renewed his supplications, and Bonaparte, affecting to be somewhat appeased, replied that the utmost he could do was, if Massena had not already entered by main force, to grant a delay of twenty-four hours, after which he would employ bombs and cannon.

The awe-struck proveditore retired. He returned to Verona, where he gave directions for admitting the French. On their approach, the wealthiest inhabitants, conceiving that they should not be forgiven for the residence of the Pretender in their city, fled in great numbers to the Tyrol, carrying with them their most valuable effects. The Veronese, however, soon regained confidence, on seeing the French, and on convincing themselves with their own eyes that these republicans were not so barbarous as rumour had represented them.

Two other Venetian envoys arrived at Verona to see Bonaparte. Erizzo and Battaglia, senators, had been chosen for this mission. The latter was the person who had recommended an alliance with France, and it was hoped at Venice that these new ambassadors would succeed better than Foscarelli in pacifying the general. He actually received them much more favourably than Foscarelli; and, now that he had attained the object of his wishes, he affected to be appeased, and to consent to listen to reason. What he wanted for the future was provisions, and, if possible, an alliance between Venice and France. It was requisite to be by turns haughty and winning. He was both. "The first law," said he, "for men is to live. I would gladly spare the republic of Venice the trouble of feeding us; but, since the fortune of war has obliged us to come hither, we are forced to live where we happen to be. Let the republic of Venice furnish my soldiers with what they need: she may afterwards settle with the French republic." It was agreed that a Jew contractor should procure for the army all that it wanted, and that Venice should secretly pay this contractor, that she might not appear to violate the neutrality by supplying the French. Bonaparte then adverted to the subject of an alliance. "I have just occupied the Adige," said he; "I have done so because I must have a line, because that is the best, and because your government is incapable of defending it. Let it arm fifty thousand men, let it place them on the Adige, and I will restore to it the towns of Verona and Porto Legnago. For the rest,"

* "To the Venetian commissioners, Napoleon, from the first, used the most insulting and rigorous language. 'Venice,' said he, 'by daring to give an asylum to the Count de Lille, a pretender to the throne of France, has declared war against the republic. I know not why I should not reduce Verona to ashes—a town which has had the presumption to esteem itself the capital of France."—*Memoirs of Prince Hardenberg.* E.

added he, "you must be pleased to see us here. What France sends me to do in these parts is entirely for the interest of Venice. I am come to drive the Austrians beyond the Alps, perhaps to constitute Lombardy an independent state: can nothing more advantageous be done for your republic? If she would unite with us, no doubt she would be handsomely rewarded for that service. We are not making war upon any government: we are the friends of all those who shall assist us to confine the Austrian power within its proper limits."

The two Venetians retired, struck by the genius of this young man, who, alternately threatening and caressing, imperious and supple, and conversing on all subjects, military and political, with equal profundity and eloquence, demonstrated that the statesman was as precocious in him as the warrior. "*That man,*" they observed, writing to Venice, "*will some day have great influence over his country.*"*

Bonaparte was at length master of the line of the Adige, to which he attached so much importance. He attributed all the blunders committed in the ancient campaigns of the French in Italy to the injudicious choice of the defensive line. The lines are numerous in Upper Italy, for a multitude of rivers run from the Alps to the sea. The largest and the most celebrated of them, the Po, which traverses all Lombardy, was in his opinion bad, as being too extensive. In his opinion, an army could not guard a stream fifty leagues in length. A feint might always open the passage of a large river. He had himself crossed the Po, a few leagues from Beaulieu. The other rivers, such as the Tesino, the Adda, the Oglio, falling into the Po, mingled with it, and had the same inconveniences. The Mincio was fordable, and, besides, that also fell into the Po. The Adige alone, coming from the Tyrol and running to the sea, covered all Italy. It was deep, and had only one channel, of no great extent, from the mountains to the sea. It was covered by two fortified places, Verona and Porto Legnago, which were very near each other, and which, without being strong, were capable of withstanding a first attack. Lastly, on leaving Legnago, it traversed impassable morasses, which covered the lower part of its course. The rivers farther on in Upper Italy, such as the Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, were fordable, and, besides, were turned by the high-road from Tyrol, which debouched behind them. The Adige had the advantage of being placed at the outlet of that road, which runs through its own valley.

Such were the reasons which had decided Bonaparte in favour of that line, and a glorious campaign proved the accuracy of his judgment. This line being occupied, it now behoved him to think of commencing the siege of Mantua. This place was situated

* The date of this prediction is June 5, 1796.

on the Mincio; it was behind the Adige, and was covered by that river. It was regarded as the bulwark of Italy. Situated amidst a lake formed by the waters of the Mincio, it communicated with the main land by five dikes. Notwithstanding its ancient fame and that which a long campaign procured it, this fortress had inconveniences which diminished its real strength. Seated amidst marshy exhalations, it was liable to fevers; in the next place, the *têtes de chaussées* being carried, the besieged would be driven back into the place, and might be blockaded by a corps far inferior to the garrison. Bonaparte calculated upon taking it before a new army could come to the succour of Italy. On the 15th of Prairial (June 14) he ordered the *têtes de chaussées*, one of which was formed by the suburb of St. George, to be attacked, and carried them. From that moment, Serrurier, with eight thousand men, was enabled to blockade a garrison composed of fourteen thousand, ten of which were under arms and four in the hospitals. Bonaparte caused the works of the siege to be commenced, and the whole line of the Adige to be put in a state of defence. Thus, in less than two months, he had conquered Italy. The point now was, to keep it. This was matter of doubt, and it was the test by which people meant to try the young general.

The Directory had just replied to Bonaparte's letters on the plan for dividing the army and marching into the Peninsula. The ideas of Bonaparte were too correct not to strike Carnot's mind, and his services too eminent to admit of his resignation being accepted. The Directory hastened to write to him, to approve of his plans, to confirm him in the command of all the forces acting in Italy, and to assure him of the entire confidence of the government.* If the magistrates of the republic had possessed the gift of prophecy, they would have done well to accept the resignation of this young man, though he was right in the opinion which he supported, and though his retirement would have deprived the republic of Italy and of a great captain; but at the moment they beheld in him nothing but youth, genius, and victory, and they felt that interest and showed that respect which all these things inspire.

The Directory imposed on Bonaparte a single condition—that of making Rome and Naples feel the power of the republic. All the sincere patriots in France insisted on this. The Pope, who had anathematized France, preached a crusade against her, and suffered her ambassador to be assassinated in his capital, certainly deserved chastisement. Bonaparte, now at liberty to act as he pleased, thought to obtain all these results without quitting

* "The Directory (wrote Carnot to Napoleon) has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal have decided the matter in your favour. Kellermann will remain at Chamberry, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."—*Memoirs of Prince Hardenberg.* E.

the line of the Adige. While one part of the army was guarding that line, and another was besieging Mantua, he thought, with a mere division, moved *en échelon*, in rear, upon the Po, to make the whole Peninsula tremble, and to force the Pontiff and the Queen of Naples to sue for republican clemency. News arrived that a strong army, detached from the Rhine, was coming to dispute the possession of Italy with her conquerors. This army, which was to pass through the Black Forest, the Vorarlberg, and the Tyrol, could not arrive in less than a month. He had, therefore, time to finish every thing in his rear without removing too far from the Adige, and so as to be able, by a mere retrograde march, to bring himself again in face of the enemy.

It was high time, indeed, that he should think of the rest of Italy. The presence of the French army there developed opinions with extraordinary rapidity. The Venetian provinces could no longer endure the aristocratic yoke. The city of Brescia manifested a strong inclination to revolt. Throughout all Lombardy, and especially in Milan, the public mind was making rapid progress. The duchies of Modena and Reggio, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, would no longer have either their old duke or the Pope. On the other hand, the adverse party became more hostile. The Genoese aristocracy was very unfavourably disposed, and meditated mischievous designs on our rear. Gerola, the Austrian minister, was the secret instigator of all these projects. The state of Genoa was full of petty fiefs dependent on the empire. The Genoese nobles invested with these fiefs collected deserters, banditti, Austrian prisoners who had contrived to escape, and the Piedmontese soldiers who had been disbanded, and formed troops of partisans known by the name of *Barbets*. They infested the Apennines at the place where the French army had entered; they stopped the couriers, plundered our convoys, slaughtered the French detachments, when they were not numerous enough to defend themselves, and excited apprehension respecting the road to France. In Tuscany, the English had made themselves masters of the port of Leghorn, owing to the protection of the governor, and French commerce was treated as that of an enemy. Lastly, Rome was making hostile preparations: England promised her a few thousand men; and Naples, always agitated by the caprices of a violent queen, promised to equip a formidable force. The imbecile king, leaving his sports for a moment, had publicly implored the aid of Heaven. He had, in a solemn ceremony, taken off his royal ornaments, and laid them at the foot of the altar. The whole populace of Naples had applauded and raised horrible vociferations; a multitude of wretches, incapable of handling a musket or facing a French bayonet, demanded arms, and insisted on marching against our army.

Though in these movements there was nothing very alarming

to Bonaparte, so long as he had a disposable force of six thousand men, still it was necessary that he should hasten to quell them, before the arrival of the new Austrian army required the presence of all his forces on the Adige. Bonaparte began to receive from the army of the Alps some reinforcements, which allowed him to employ fifteen thousand men in the blockade of Mantua and of the citadel of Milan, and twenty thousand in guarding the Adige, and to despatch a division upon the Po to execute his projects relative to the south of Italy.

He repaired first to Milan, to cause the trenches to be opened around the citadel, and to hasten its surrender. He ordered Augereau, who was on the Mincio, very near the Po, to cross that river at Borgo Forte and to march upon Bologna; and he directed Vaubois to proceed from Tortona to Modena, with four or five thousand men, who had come from the Alps. In this manner he could send eight or nine thousand men into the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and thence threaten the whole Peninsula.

He awaited for some days the subsiding of the inundations on the Lower Po, before he set his column in motion. But the court of Naples, as feeble as it was violent, had passed from a state of fury to despondence. On receiving intelligence of the recent victories of the French in Upper Italy, it had sent Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli to make its submission to the conqueror. Bonaparte referred for peace to the Directory, but he thought it right to grant an armistice. It did not suit him to push on so far as Naples with a few thousand men, and especially when he expected the arrival of the Austrians. For the moment he was content with disarming that power, with depriving Rome of her support, and with embroiling her with the coalition. He could not impose contributions on her, as on the petty princes whom he had at hand; but she engaged to open all her ports to the French, to withdraw from England five sail of the line and a great number of frigates furnished by her, and lastly, to withdraw from Austria the two thousand four hundred horse who were serving in her ranks. This corps of cavalry was to remain sequestered in the power of Bonaparte, who was to have a right to make it prisoner on the first violation of the armistice. Bonaparte was well aware that such conditions would not be relished by the government; but at the moment it was of importance to him to have no annoyance in his rear, and he required no more than he believed that he could obtain. The King of Naples having submitted, the Pope could not resist; then the expedition to the right of the Po would be, as he intended that it should be, an expedition of a few days, and should return to the Adige.

He signed this armistice, and then set out to cross the Po and to put himself at the head of the two columns which he was directing upon the States of the Church, that of Vaubois coming from the Alps to reinforce him, and that of Augereau, which

was falling back from the Mincio upon the Po. He attached great importance to the situation of Genoa, because it was placed on one of the two roads leading to France, and because its senate had always shown energy. He was aware that he must have demanded the expulsion of twenty feudatory families of Austria and Naples to ensure the domination of France in that state; but he had no orders on that subject, and he was, moreover, afraid of revolutionising. He contented himself, therefore, with addressing a letter to the senate, in which he insisted that the governor of Novi, who had protected the banditti, should be punished in an exemplary manner, and that the Austrian minister should be ordered to leave Genoa. He then demanded a categorical explanation. "Can you," he asked, "or can you not, clear your territory of the murderers who infest it? If you cannot take measures, I will take them for you. I will cause the towns and villages to be burned in which a murder shall be committed; I will cause the houses to be burned that shall afford an asylum to the murderers, and punish in an exemplary manner the magistrates who shall tolerate them. The murder of a Frenchman must bring woe upon whole communes which have not prevented it." To obviate diplomatic delays, he sent Murat, his aide-de-camp, to carry his letter and to read it himself to the senate. "There needs," he observed, writing to Faypoult, the minister, "a kind of communication that shall electrify those gentry." At the same time, he despatched Lannes with twelve hundred men to chastise the imperial fiefs. The mansion of Augustin Spinola, the principal instigator of the revolt, was burned. The Barbets taken in arms were shot without mercy. The senate of Genoa, in consternation, displaced the governor of Novi, dismissed Gerola, the minister, and promised to have the roads guarded by its own troops. It sent Vincent Spinola to Paris to come to an arrangement with the Directory about all matters in dispute, about the indemnity due for the Modeste frigate, about the expulsion of the feudatory families, and about the repeal of the exiled families.

Bonaparte then proceeded to Modena, where he arrived on the 1st of Messidor (June 19), and on the same day Augereau entered Bologna.

The enthusiasm of the Modenese was extreme. They went to meet him, and sent a deputation to compliment him. The principal of them beset him with solicitations, and implored him to emancipate them from the yoke of their duke, who had carried off the wealth squeezed out of them to Venice. As the regency left by the duke had faithfully adhered to the terms of the armistice, and Bonaparte had no reason to exercise the rights of conquest on the duchy, he could not satisfy the Modenese. It was, besides, a question of which policy counselled the adjournment. He contented himself with holding out hopes, and recommended quiet. He set out for Bologna. The fort of Urbino

was on his route; it was the first place belonging to the Pope. He sent to summon it; the castle surrendered. It contained sixty pieces of cannon of large calibre, and a few hundred men. Bonaparte sent off this heavy artillery for Mantua, to be employed in the siege. He arrived at Bologna, where Augereau's division had preceded him. The joy of the inhabitants was most vehement.* Bologna is a city of about fifty thousand souls, magnificently built, celebrated for its artists, its men of science, and its university. There love for France and hatred for the Holy See were carried to the highest pitch. Bonaparte was not afraid there to suffer sentiments of liberty to burst forth; for he was in the possessions of a declared enemy, the Pope, and he was justified in exercising the right of conquest. The two legations of Ferrara and Bologna beset him with their deputies; and he granted to them a provisional independence, promising to cause it to be acknowledged at the peace.

The Vatican was in alarm, and immediately sent a negotiator to intercede in its favour. D'Azara, the ambassador of Spain, known for his abilities and his partiality for France, and the minister of a friendly power, was chosen. He had already negotiated for the Duke of Parma. He arrived at Bologna, to lay the tiara at the feet of the victorious republic. Adhering to his plan, Bonaparte, who would not yet either demolish or build up, required in the first place that the legations of Bologna and Ferrara should remain independent, that the city of Ancona should receive a French garrison, that the Pope should give twenty-one millions, corn, cattle, and one hundred pictures or statues: these conditions were accepted. Bonaparte had a long conversation with D'Azara, and left him full of enthusiasm. He wrote a letter, in the name of the republic, to Oriani, the celebrated astronomer, desiring to see him. That modest cultivator of science was thunderstruck in the presence of the young conqueror, and paid homage to him only by his embarrassment. Bonaparte omitted nothing to honour Italy, and to rouse her pride and her patriotism. He was not a barbarous conqueror come to ravage, but a champion of liberty come to rekindle the torch of genius in the ancient land of civilization. He left Monge, Berthollet, and the brothers Thouin, whom the Directory had sent to him, to select the articles destined for the museums of Paris.

On the 8th of Messidor (June 26), he crossed the Apennines with Vaubois's division and entered Tuscany. The duke, in alarm, sent to him Manfredini, his minister. Bonaparte strove to allay his fears, but without disclosing his intentions. Meanwhile, his column proceeded by forced marches to Leghorn,

* "Napoleon's appearance at Bologna was the signal for universal intoxication. The people at once revolted against the papal authority, while the general encouraged the propagation of every principle which was calculated to dismember the ecclesiastical territories."—*Alison.* E.

entered the city unawares, and took possession of the English factory. Spannochi, the governor, was seized, put into a post-chaise, and sent to the grand-duke, with a letter explaining the motives of this act of hostility committed against a friendly power. He was told that his governor had violated all the laws of neutrality, by oppressing French commerce, by affording an asylum to the emigrants and to all the enemies of the republic; and it was added that, out of respect for his authority, the punishment of an unfaithful servant was left to himself. This act of vigour proved to all the neutral states that the French general would take their police into his own hands, if they could not manage it themselves. All the vessels of the English could not be secured; but their commerce sustained a great loss. Bonaparte left a garrison at Leghorn, and appointed commissioners to see that every thing belonging to the English, the Austrians, and the Russians, was given up. He then proceeded himself to Florence, where the grand-duke gave him a magnificent reception.* Having passed three days there, he recrossed the Po, on his return to his head-quarters at Roverbella, near Mantua. Thus in twenty days, and with one division marched *en échelon* on the right of the Po, he had overawed the powers of Italy, and ensured tranquillity during the fresh struggles which he had still to maintain against the Austrian power.

While the army of Italy was acquitting itself with such glory of the task imposed upon it in the general plan of the campaign, the armies of Germany had not yet put themselves in motion. The difficulty of forming magazines and procuring horses had kept them so long inactive. Austria, on her part, who would have had the strongest interest in briskly commencing the campaign, was inconceivably dilatory in her preparations, so that she would not be in a state to commence hostilities before the middle of Prairial (the beginning of June). Her armies were on a formidable footing and far superior to ours. But our successes in Italy had obliged her to detach Wurmser with thirty thousand of her best troops from the Rhine, to collect and reorganize the wrecks of Beaulieu's army. The Aulic council, which had resolved to take the offensive, and to carry the theatre of the war into the heart of our provinces, thenceforth thought only of keeping the defensive, and opposing our invasion. It would

* "Bonaparte contented himself with seizing on the grand-duke's seaport of Leghorn, confiscating the English goods which his subjects had imported, and entirely ruining the once flourishing commerce of the dukedom. It was a principal object with the French to seize the British merchant-vessels, who, confiding in the respect due to a neutral power, were lying in great numbers in the harbour; but the English merchantmen had such early intelligence, as enabled them to set sail for Corsica, although a very great quantity of valuable goods fell into the possession of the French. While Bonaparte was thus violating the neutrality of the grand-duke and destroying the commerce of his state, that unhappy prince was compelled to receive him at Florence, with all the respect due to a valued friend."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

even have gladly suffered the armistice to continue: but it was denounced, and hostilities were to commence on the 12th of Prairial (May 31).

We have already given an idea of the theatre of war. The Rhine and the Danube, issuing, the one from the high Alps, the other from the Alps of Swabia, after approaching each other in the environs of the Lake of Constance, separate, and run, the first of them towards the north and the second towards the east of Europe. Two transverse and almost parallel valleys, those of the Mayn and the Neckar form as it were two passes through the chain of the Swabian Alps into the valley of the Danube, or from the valley of the Danube into that of the Rhine.

This theatre of war and the plan of operation suitable to it were not then so well known as, owing to great examples, they now are. Carnot, who directed our plans, had formed a theory for himself from the celebrated campaign of 1794, which had gained him so much glory in Europe. At that period, the enemy's centre, intrenched in the forest of Mormale, could not be touched: the French had filed off upon his wings, and by attacking them had obliged him to retreat. This example had deeply engraven itself in Carnot's memory. Endowed with an innovating but systematic mind, he had formed a theory from that campaign, and persuaded himself that it was always requisite to act at once on both wings of an army, and to strive invariably to overpower them. Military men have considered this idea as a real advance, and as being far preferable to the system of cordons, tending to attack the enemy at all points: but on Carnot's mind it had changed into a settled and dangerous system. The circumstances which here presented themselves held out a still stronger inducement to follow this system. The army of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the Rhine and Moselle were both placed upon the Rhine at points very far distant from one another: two valleys ran off at these points and debouched upon the Danube. There were sufficient motives for Carnot to form the French into two columns, one of which, ascending along the Mayn, the other along the Neckar, should thus tend to fall upon the wings of the Imperial army, and to force them to retire upon the Danube. He therefore directed Generals Jourdan and Moreau to set out, the former from Düsseldorf, the latter from Strasburg, and to advance separately into Germany. As a great captain and a shrewd critic have remarked, and as facts have since proved, to form into two corps was at once to give the enemy the faculty and the idea of concentrating himself, and of overwhelming one or other of these corps with the entire mass of his forces. Clairfayt had made very nearly this manœuvre in the late campaign, by first driving Jourdan back upon the Lower Rhine, and then falling upon the lines of Mayence. If even the enemy's general were not a supe-

rior man, we forced him to adopt this plan, and suggested to him an idea which genius ought to have inspired.

The invasion was therefore concerted on this vicious plan. The means of execution were as injudicious as the plan itself. The line which separated the armies ran along the Rhine from Düsseldorf to Bingen, then described an arc from Bingen to Mannheim, by the foot of the Vosges, and followed the Rhine again to Basle. Carnot's intention was that Jourdan's army, debouching by Düsseldorf and the *tête de pont* of Neuwied, should cross, to the number of forty thousand men, to the right bank, to get at the enemy; that the rest of that army, twenty-five thousand strong, setting out from Mayence, under the command of Marceau, should ascend the Rhine, and, filing off in the rear of Moreau, should clandestinely cross the river in the environs of Strasburg. Generals Jourdan and Moreau joined in representing the inconveniences of this plan to the Directory. Jourdan, reduced to forty thousand men on the Lower Rhine, might be overwhelmed and destroyed, while the rest of his army would lose incalculable time in ascending from Mayence to Strasburg. It was much more natural that the passage near Strasburg should be effected by the extreme right of Moreau. This mode of proceeding promised quite as much secrecy as the other, and would not occasion a loss of valuable time to the armies. This modification was admitted. Jourdan, availing himself of the two *têtes de pont* which he had at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, was to cross first, to draw the enemy upon him, and thus to divert his attention from the Upper Rhine, where Moreau had to effect a passage by main force.

The plan being thus fixed, preparations were made for putting it into execution. The armies of the two nations were nearly equal in force. Since the departure of Wurmser, the Austrians had on the whole line of the Rhine one hundred and fifty and a few odd thousand men, cantoned between Basle and the environs of Düsseldorf. The French had as many, exclusively of forty thousand who occupied Holland, and were maintained at its own expense. There was, however, a difference between the two armies. The Austrians had, in their one hundred and fifty thousand men, nearly thirty-eight thousand horse, and one hundred and fifteen thousand foot: the French had more than one hundred and thirty thousand foot, but at most only fifteen or eighteen thousand horse. This superiority in cavalry gave the Austrians a great advantage, especially for retreat. The Austrians had another advantage, that of being commanded by a single general. Since the departure of Wurmser, the two Imperial armies had been placed under the supreme command of the young Archduke Charles, who had already distinguished himself at Turcoing, and from whose talents great things were augured. The French had two excellent generals, but acting separately, at a great distance from one another, and under the

direction of a cabinet seated two hundred leagues from the theatre of the war.

The armistice expired on the 11th of Prairial (May 30). Hostilities commenced by a general reconnoissance of the advanced posts. Jourdan's army extended, as we have seen, from the environs of Mayence to Düsseldorf. He had at Düsseldorf a *tête de pont* for debouching on the right bank; he could then ascend between the Prussian line of neutrality and the Rhine to the banks of the Lahn, with a view to proceed from the Lahn to the Mayn. The Austrians had from fifteen to twenty thousand men under the Prince of Wirtemberg scattered between Mayence and Düsseldorf. Jourdan sent Kleber to debouch by Düsseldorf with twenty-five thousand men. That general made the Austrians fall back, beat them on the 16th of Prairial (June 4) at Alten Kirchen, and ascended the right bank between the line of neutrality and the Mayn. When he had proceeded as high as Neuwied, and had covered that *débouché*, Jourdan, availing himself of the bridge which he had at that point, crossed the river with part of his troops and rejoined Kleber on the right bank. He thus found himself with nearly forty-five thousand men on the Lahn, on the 17th (June 5). He had left Marceau with thirty thousand before Mayence. The Archduke Charles,* who was near Mayence, on learning that the French were repeating the excursion of the preceding year, and again debouching by Düsseldorf and Neuwied, crossed with part of his forces to the right bank to oppose their march. Jourdan purposed to attack the corps of the Prince of Wirtemberg before he should be reinforced; but, being obliged to defer his intention for a day, he lost the opportunity, and was himself attacked at Wetzlar on the 19th (June 7). He bordered the Lahn, having his right on the Rhine, and his left on Wetzlar. The archduke, pressing with the mass of his forces on Wetzlar, beat his extreme left, formed by Lefebvre's division, and obliged it to fall back. Jourdan, beaten on the left was obliged to support himself on his right, which was near the Rhine; and was thus pushed toward that river. To avoid being thrown into it, he must attack the archduke. In this event he would be obliged to fight with his back to the Rhine; he might thus, in case of defeat, have to regain with difficulty his bridges at Neuwied and Düsseldorf, and perhaps sustain a disastrous rout. A battle would therefore be dangerous and perhaps useless, since he had accomplished his object by attracting the attention of the enemy, and drawing off the Austrian forces from the Upper to the Lower Rhine. He thought it best, therefore to fall back, and gave

* Napoleon entertained a high opinion of this illustrious military chief: "Prince Charles," said he, "is a man whose conduct can never attract blame. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man; and that includes every thing when said of a prince." —*Duchess d'Abrantes.* E.

orders for retreat, which was effected coolly and firmly. He recrossed at Neuwied, and directed Kleber to descend again to Düsseldorf, and there return to the left bank. He recommended to him to march slowly, but not to involve himself in any serious action. Kleber, finding himself too closely pressed at Ukerath, and hurried away by his martial instinct, instantly faced about, and dealt the enemy a vigorous but useless blow; after which he regained his intrenched camp at Düsseldorf. Jourdan, in advancing for the purpose of afterwards falling back, had performed an ungrateful task for the benefit of the army of the Rhine. Ill-informed persons might in fact consider this manœuvre as a defeat; but the devotedness of that brave general disregarded every consideration, and he waited, to resume the offensive, till the army of the Rhine should have profited by the diversion that he had just operated.

Moreau, who had displayed extraordinary prudence, firmness, and coolness, in the operations in which he had been previously engaged in the North, made all necessary dispositions for worthily performing his task. He had resolved to cross the Rhine at Strasburg. This large fortress was an excellent point of departure. He could there collect a great number of boats and troops, and a large quantity of provisions. The woody islands, which stud the course of the Rhine at this point, favoured the passage of the river. The fort of Kehl, situated on the right bank, might be easily surprised; once in our possession, it might be repaired and employed to protect the bridge which was to be thrown across before Strasburg.

Every thing being prepared for this purpose, and the attention of the enemy being directed to the Lower Rhine, Moreau ordered, on the 26th of Prairial (June 14), a general attack on the intrenched camp of Mannheim. The object of this attack was to fix upon Mannheim the attention of General Latour, who commanded the troops of the Upper Rhine under the Archduke Charles, and to confine the Austrians within their line. This attack, directed with skill and vigour, was completely successful. Immediately afterwards Moreau despatched part of his troops upon Strasburg. It was reported that they were going to Italy, and provisions were bespoken for them all through Franche-Comté, in order to give an air of semblance to that rumour. Other troops set out from the environs of Huningen to descend to Strasburg; and, these, it was asserted were going to garrison Worms. These movements were so concerted that the troops should arrive at the destined point on the 5th of Messidor (June 23). Accordingly, on that day twenty-eight thousand men were collected, either in the polygon of Strasburg, or in the environs, under the command of General Desaix. Ten thousand men were to endeavour to cross below Strasburg, in the environs of Gambsheim; and fifteen thousand were to pass from Strasburg to Kehl. On the evening of the 5th (June 23rd), the gates of

Strasburg were shut, that information of the passage might not be given to the enemy. In the night, the troops proceeded in silence towards the river. The boats were taken into the Mabile branch, and from the Mabile branch into the Rhine. The large island of Ehrlen Rhine offered a favourable stepping-stone for the passage. The boats landed upon it two thousand six hundred men. These brave fellows, to avoid giving an alarm by the report of fire-arms, rushed with the bayonet upon the troops stationed in the island, pursued them, and did not allow them time to break down the little bridges which connect it with the right bank. They crossed these bridges at their heels, and, though neither the artillery nor the cavalry could follow them, they had the hardihood to debouch alone in the extensive plain which borders the river, and to approach Kehl. The Swabian contingent was encamped at some distance, at Wilstett. The detachments sent from it, and especially the cavalry, rendered the situation of the French infantry which had dared to debouch on the right bank very dangerous. It hesitated not, however, to despatch the boats which had brought it, and thus to compromise its retreat, for the purpose of fetching succours. More troops arrived; they advanced upon Kehl, attacked the intrenchments with the bayonet, and carried them. The artillery found in the fort was immediately turned upon the enemy's troops coming from Wilstett, and they were repulsed. A bridge was then thrown over from Strasburg to Kehl, and finished the next day, the 7th (June 25th). The whole army now crossed it.* The ten thousand men sent to Gambsheim were unable to attempt the passage, on account of the swelling of the river. They ascended to Strasburg, and crossed there by means of the bridge which had just been constructed.

This operation had been executed with secrecy, precision, and boldness; but the distribution of the Austrian troops from Basle to Mannheim served materially to diminish the difficulty and the merit of it. The prince of Condé was with three thousand eight hundred men towards the Upper Rhine, at Breisach; the Swabian contingent, to the number of seven thousand five hundred, was near Wilstett, opposite to Strasburg, and nearly eight thousand men under Starrai, were encamped between Strasburg and Mannheim. The enemy's forces, therefore, were not formidable at this point, but this advantage itself was owing to the secrecy of the passage, and that secrecy to the prudence with which it had been prepared.

* "Such was the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, which at the time was celebrated as an exploit of the most glorious character. Without doubt, the secrecy, rapidity, and decision with which it was carried into effect, merit the highest eulogium. But the weakness and dispersion of the enemy's forces rendered it an enterprise of comparatively little hazard; and it was greatly inferior both in point of difficulty and danger, to the passage of the same river in the following campaign at Dursheim."—*Alison*. E.

This situation afforded occasion for the most splendid triumphs. If Moreau had acted with the rapidity of the conqueror of Montenotte, he might have fallen upon the corps scattered along the river, destroyed them one after another, and even overwhelmed Latour, who recrossed from Mannheim to the right bank, and who at the moment had at most only thirty-six thousand men. He might thus have put the whole army of the Upper Rhine *hors de combat*, before the Archduke Charles could return from the banks of the Lahn. History demonstrates that rapidity is all-powerful in war, as in all situations of life. Anticipating the enemy, it destroys in detail; striking blow after blow, it gives him no time to recover himself, demoralizes him, takes from him all his presence of mind and courage. But this rapidity, of which we have just seen such bright examples on the Alps and on the Po, supposes more than mere activity; it supposes a great object, a great mind to conceive it, and great passions to dare pretend to it. Nothing great whatever is to be accomplished without passions, and without the ardour and the daring which they impart to the conceptions. Moreau, a man of luminous and firm mind, had not that impetuous ardour which, in the tribune, in war, and in all situations, hurries men away, and elevates them in spite of themselves to vast destinies.

Moreau took from the 7th to the 10th of Messidor (June 25th to the 28th) to assemble his divisions on the right bank of the Rhine. That of St. Cyr, which he had left at Mannheim, was coming by forced marches. While waiting for that division, he had at his disposal fifty-three thousand men, and he saw about twenty thousand scattered around him. On the 10th (June 28th), he attacked ten thousand Austrians intrenched on the Renchen, beat them, and took eight hundred prisoners. The wrecks of this corps fell back upon Latour, who was ascending the right bank. On the 12th (June 30th), St. Cyr having arrived, the whole army was beyond the river. It numbered sixty-three thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, forming a total of seventy-one thousand men. Moreau gave the right to Ferino, the centre to St. Cyr, the left to Desaix. He was at the foot of the Black Mountains.

The Alps of Swabia form a chain, which, as is well known, sends forth the Danube to the east and the Rhine to the north. Through this chain wind the Neckar and the Mayn to throw themselves into the Rhine. They are mountains of moderate height, covered with wood and intersected by narrow defiles. The valley of the Rhine is separated from that of the Neckar by a chain called the Black Mountains. Moreau, removed to the right bank, was now at the foot of them. He would be obliged to cross them to debouch in the valley of the Neckar. The Swabian contingent and Condé's corps were ascending towards Switzerland, to guard the upper passes of the Black

Mountains. Latour, with the principal corps, was coming from Mannheim for the purpose of securing the lower passes by Rastadt, Ettlingen, and Pforzheim. Moreau might without inconvenience have disregarded the detachments retiring toward Switzerland, and have borne down with the entire mass of his forces upon Latour. He must infallibly have overwhelmed him. He might then have debouched as conqueror, in the valley of the Neckar, before the Archduke Charles. But, in general prudent, he directed Ferino to follow with his right the detached corps of the Swabians and of Condé; he despatched St. Cyr with the centre direct for the mountains, for the purpose of occupying certain heights, and himself skirted the foot of them to descend to Rastadt before Latour. This march was the double effect of his caution and of Carnot's plan. He wished to cover himself every where, and at the same time to extend his line towards Switzerland, that he might be ready to support by the Alps the army of Italy. Moreau set himself in motion on the 12th (June 30th). He marched between the Rhine and the mountains, through an unequal country, insterspersed with woods and intersected by torrents. He advanced with circumspection, and did not arrive at Rastadt till the 15th (July 3rd). He was still in time to overwhelm Latour, who had not yet been rejoined by the Archduke Charles. That prince, after receiving intelligence of the passage, was coming by forced marches with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men. He left thirty-six thousand on the Lahn, and twenty-seven thousand before Mayence, to make head against Jourdan, the whole under the command of General Wartensleben. He made all possible haste, but the heads of his columns were still at a great distance. Latour, after leaving a garrison in Mannheim, had at most thirty-six thousand men. He was ranged along the Murg, which falls into the Rhine, having his left at Gernsbach, in the mountains; his centre at their foot towards Kuppenheim, a little in advance of the Murg; his right in the plain along the woods of Niederbuhl, which extend to the banks of the Rhine; and his reserve at Rastadt. It would have been imprudent in Latour to fight before the arrival of the Archduke Charles. But, deriving confidence from his position, he determined to resist, for the purpose of covering the high-road which leads from Rastadt to the Neckar.

Moreau had only his left with him: his centre, under St. Cyr, had staid behind, to take possession of some posts in the Black Mountains. This circumstance diminished the inequality of the forces. On the 17th (July 5th), he attacked Latour. His troops behaved with great intrepidity, took the position of Gernsbach on the Upper Murg, and penetrated to Kuppenheim, towards the centre of the enemy's position. But in the plain his divisions found it difficult to debouch, under the fire of the artillery and in presence of the numerous Austrian cavalry. They never-

theless pushed on to Niederbuhl and Rastadt, and succeeded in making themselves masters of the Murg at all points. A thousand prisoners were taken.

Moreau halted on the field of battle, without attempting to pursue the enemy. The archduke had not yet arrived, and he might still have overwhelmed Latour; but he thought that his troops were too much fatigued, he deemed it necessary to call St. Cyr to him, that he might act with a greater mass of force, and he waited till the 21st (July 9th), before making a new attack. This interval of four days allowed the archduke to arrive with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men, and gave an equal chance to the combatants.

The respective position of the two armies was nearly the same. They were both in a line perpendicular to the Rhine, with one wing in the mountains, the centre at the foot of them, and the left in the woody and marshy plain bordering the Rhine. Moreau, who was slow of conviction, but who had still time to be convinced, because he still retained the coolness requisite for correcting his faults, had perceived, when engaged at Rastadt, the importance of making his principal effort in the mountains. In fact, he who was master of them possessed the avenues to the valley of the Neckar, the principal object in dispute. He had it in his power, besides, to fall upon his adversary and to drive him into the Rhine. Moreau had an additional reason for fighting in the mountains; this was his superiority in infantry and his inferiority in cavalry. The archduke was as well aware as he of the importance of establishing himself there, but he had in his numerous squadrons a strong reason too for keeping in the plain. He rectified the position taken by Latour; he threw the Saxons into the mountains to meet Moreau; he sent reinforcements to the plateau of Rothensol, on which his left supported itself; he deployed his centre at the foot of the mountains in advance of Malsch, and his cavalry in the plain. He meant to attack on the 22nd (July 10th). Moreau anticipated him, and attacked on the 21st (July 9th).

General St. Cyr, whom Moreau had called in, and who formed the right, attacked the plateau of Rothensol. He displayed that precision, and that skill in manœuvring, which distinguished him throughout his glorious career. Finding himself unable to dislodge the enemy from a formidable position, he surrounded him with riflemen, then ordered a charge to be sounded, and feigned a flight to induce the Austrians to quit their position and to pursue the French. This stratagem was successful: the Austrians, seeing the French advance, and then flee in disorder, dashed after them. General St. Cyr, who had troops ready, then threw them upon the Austrians, who had quitted their position, and made himself master of the plateau. From that moment he kept advancing, intimidated the Saxons destined to attack our right, and obliged them to fall back. At Malsch, in

the centre, Desaix had a brisk action with the Austrians, took and lost that village, and finished the combat by taking possession of the last heights that border the foot of the mountains. In the plain our cavalry had not been engaged, and Moreau had kept on the skirt of the woods.

The battle was, therefore, indecisive excepting in the mountains. But that was the important point, for, in following up his success, Moreau might extend his right wing around the archduke, take from him the avenues to the valley of the Neckar, and drive him into the Rhine. It is true that the archduke, if he lost the mountains which were his base, could, in his turn, deprive Moreau of his, which was the Rhine; he might renew his effort in the plain, beat Desaix, and, advancing along the Rhine, blow Moreau into the air. On these occasions, it is the least bold who is compromised: it is he who fancies that he is cut off who really is so. The archduke deemed it prudent to retire, lest he might by a hazardous movement compromise the Austrian monarchy, which had no other support than his army. This resolution, which led to the retreat of the imperial armies, and exposed Germany to an invasion, has been censured. We may admire those sublime darings of genius which obtain great results at the expense of great dangers; but we must not make a law of them. Prudence alone is a duty in the situation in which the archduke was, and we cannot blame him for having retreated, in order to reach the valley of the Neckar before Moreau, and thus cover the hereditary states. Accordingly, he immediately formed the resolution of abandoning Germany, which no line was capable of covering, and ascending the Mayn and the Neckar to the grand line of the hereditary states, that of the Danube. This river, covered by the two fortresses of Ulm and Ratisbon, was the surest rampart of Austria. In concentrating his forces there, the archduke was at home, *à cheval* on a large river, with forces equal to those of the enemy, with the power of manœuvring on both banks, and of overwhelming one of the two invading armies. The enemy, on the contrary, would be very far from his home, at an immense distance from his base, without that superiority of forces which compensates for the danger of that distance, with the disadvantage of a frightful country to traverse for the purpose of invading, and to traverse again for the purpose of returning, and lastly with the inconvenience of being divided into two corps and commanded by two generals. Thus the Imperialists would gain in approaching the Danube as much as the French would lose. But, to ensure all these advantages, it was necessary that the archduke should reach the Danube without defeat; and, after that, it was requisite that he should retire with firmness, but without exposing himself to the risk of any engagement.

After leaving a garrison at Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel,

and Mannheim, he ordered Wartensleben to retire foot by foot through the valley of the Mayn, and to gain the Danube, fighting daily enough to keep up the courage of his troops, but not enough to involve himself in a general action. He pursued the same course himself with his army. He proceeded with it to Pforzheim in the valley of the Neckar, and halted there no longer than was requisite to collect his artillery, and to allow time for its retreat. Wartensleben fell back with thirty thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse; the archduke with forty thousand infantry and eighteen thousand cavalry; amounting in the whole to one hundred and three thousand men. The remainder was in fortresses, or had filed off by the Upper Rhine into Switzerland, before General Ferino, who commanded Moreau's right.

Jourdan's army, as soon as Moreau had decided the retreat of the Austrians, again crossed the Rhine at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, manœuvring as it had always done, and proceeding towards the Lahn, with the intention of afterwards debouching into the valley of the Mayn. The French armies advanced, therefore, in two columns, along the Mayn and the Neckar, following the two imperial armies, which made a most admirable retreat. The numerous squadrons of the Austrians, hovering in the rear-guard, overawed by their mass, covered their infantry from the insults of the French, and frustrated all their efforts to get at it. Moreau, who had not had any fortress to mask on leaving the Rhine, marched with seventy-one thousand men. Jourdan, who had to blockade Mayence, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, and who had been obliged to devote twenty-seven thousand men to these various purposes, marched with only forty-six thousand, and was very little superior to Wartensleben.

According to the vicious plan of Carnot, it was still necessary to attack the wings of the enemy, that is to say, to relinquish the essential object, that of a junction of the two armies. This junction would have enabled the French to direct upon the Danube a mass of one hundred and fifteen or twenty thousand men, an enormous, an overwhelming mass, which would have thrown out all the calculations of the archduke, foiled all his efforts to concentrate himself, crossed the Danube before his face, taken Ulm, and from that base threatened Vienna and shaken the imperial throne.*

Agreeably to Carnot's plan, Moreau was to support himself on the Upper Rhine and the Upper Danube, Jourdan towards Bohemia. Moreau was furnished with an additional reason for appuying on this point, namely the possibility of communicating with the army of Italy by the Tyrol, which presupposed the exe-

* On this subject, the reader should refer to the arguments employed by Napoleon, and which he has supported by such striking examples.

cution of the gigantic plan of Bonaparte, justly disapproved of by the Directory. As Moreau wished at the same time not to be too far separated from Jourdan, and to extend his left hand to him while he gave the right to the army of Italy, he was seen on the banks of the Neckar occupying a line of fifty leagues. Jourdan, on his part, directed to follow up Wartensleben, was obliged to separate from Moreau; and, as Wartensleben, a commonplace general, comprehending nothing of the archduke's plan, instead of approaching the Danube, proceeded towards Bohemia with the intention of covering it, Jourdan, in order to comply with his instructions, was obliged to extend himself more and more. Thus the two hostile armies were both doing the contrary to what they ought to have done. There was this difference between Wartensleben and Jourdan, that the former disobeyed an excellent order, and the latter was obliged to comply with a bad one. Wartensleben's fault was his own, Jourdan's was that of Carnot, the director.

Moreau fought a battle at Canstadt for the passage of the Neckar, and then penetrated into the defiles of the Alb, a chain of mountains separating the Neckar from the Danube, as the Black Mountains separate it from the Rhine. He cleared these defiles, and debouched in the valley of the Danube, about the middle of Thermidor (the end of July), after a month's march. Jourdan, after proceeding from the banks of the Lahn to those of the Mayn, and fighting a battle at Friedberg, halted before the city of Frankfurt, which he threatened to bombard unless it were given up to him immediately. The Austrians complied only on condition of a suspension of arms for two days. This suspension would allow them to cross the Mayn, and to gain a considerable start; but it would save an interesting city, the resources of which might prove serviceable to the army. Jourdan assented to it. The place was given up on the 28th of Messidor (July 16th). Jourdan levied contributions on this city, but acted with great moderation, and even displeased his army by the lenity which he showed to an enemy's country. The report of the opulence in which the army of Italy lived had inflamed the imaginations of the army, and excited a wish to live in the same manner in Germany. Jourdan ascended the Mayn, made himself master of Wurzburg on the 7th of Thermidor (July 25th), and then debouched beyond the mountains of Swabia, on the banks of the Naab, which falls into the Danube. He was nearly on a level with Moreau, and at the same time, that is, about the middle of Thermidor (the beginning of August) Swabia and Saxony had acceded to the neutrality, sent agents to Paris to treat for peace, and consented to contributions. The Saxon and Swabian troops retired, and thus reduced the Austrian army by about twelve thousand men, of little use it is true, and fighting without zeal.

Thus, about the middle of summer, our armies, masters of Italy, the whole of which they controlled, masters of half of Germany, which they had overrun as far as the Danube, threatened Europe. It was two months since La Vendée had been subdued. One hundred thousand men were in the West, and fifty thousand of them might be detached in any direction. The promises of the directorial government could not be more gloriously accomplished.

THE DIRECTORY.

INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE — FALL OF THE MANDATS — ATTACK ON THE CAMP OF GRENELLE BY THE JACOBINS —RENEWAL OF THE FAMILY COMPACT WITH SPAIN, AND PROJECT OF A QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE — NEGOTIATIONS IN ITALY — CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES; ARRIVAL OF WURMSER ON THE ADIGE; BATTLES OF LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE—OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE; BATTLE OF NERESHEIM; MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES AGAINST JOURDAN — MARCH OF BONAPARTE FOR THE BRENTA; BATTLES OF ROVEREDO, BASSANO, AND ST. GEORGE; RETREAT OF WURMSER TO MANTUA — RETURN OF JOURDAN TO THE MAYN; BATTLE OF WURZBURG; RETREAT OF MOREAU.

FRANCE had never appeared greater abroad than during this summer of 1796; but her internal situation was far from corresponding with her external glory. Paris exhibited a singular spectacle: the patriots, furious ever since the apprehension of Babœuf, Drouet, and their other chiefs, execrated the government, and wished the republic no more victories, since they proved beneficial to the Directory. The declared enemies of the Revolution stoutly denied them; the men who were tired of it affected not to believe them. Some recently-enriched upstarts, who owed their wealth to jobbing or contracts, displayed unbounded luxury,* and manifested the most ungrateful indifference for that revolution which had made their fortune. This moral state was the inevitable result of a general weariness in the nation, of inveterate passions in the parties, and of cupidity excited by a financial crisis. But there were still republican and enthusiastic Frenchmen, who retained their old sentiments, whose hearts rejoiced at our victories, who, so far from denying them, on the contrary hailed the tidings of them with transport, and pronounced with affection and admiration the names of Hoche, Jourdan, Moreau, and Bonaparte. These were desirous that

* "In the midst of the wreck of ancient opulence, modern wealth began to display its luxury; and the riches of the bankers and those who had made fortunes in the Revolution, began to shine with unprecedented lustre. Splendid hotels sumptuously furnished in the Grecian taste were embellished by magnificent fêtes."—*Lacretelle.* E.

fresh efforts should be made, that the evil-disposed and the indifferent should be obliged to contribute, with all their means, to the glory and the greatness of the republic.

To dim the lustre of our triumphs, the parties fell to work to decry the generals. They were particularly bitter against the youngest and the most brilliant of them, against Bonaparte, whose name had in two months become so glorious. He had, on the 13th of Vendémiaire, struck great terror into the royalists, and they did not spare him in the newspapers. It was known that he had manifested a very imperious disposition in Italy; people were struck by the manner in which he treated the states of that country, granting or refusing at pleasure armistices which decided peace or war; they knew that, without making the treasury the vehicle, he had transmitted funds to the army of the Rhine. They therefore took delight in maliciously reporting that he was intractable, and that he was about to be removed. A great general would thus have been lost to the republic, and a vexatious glory cut short in its outset. Accordingly, the malcontents assiduously circulated the most absurd reports. They went so far as to say that Hoche, who was then in Paris, was going off to arrest Bonaparte in the midst of his army. The government wrote a letter to Bonaparte, contradicting these rumours, and repeating the assurance of its entire confidence. It caused this letter to be published in all the papers. The brave Hoche, incapable of any mean jealousy of a rival who had raised himself in two months above the greatest generals of the republic, wrote to disavow the part that was ascribed to him. It may not be amiss to quote this letter, so honourable to the two young heroes. It was addressed to the minister of the police, and published:

"Citizen Minister—Men who, concealed or unknown during the first years of the foundation of the republic, now think only of seeking the means of destroying it, and speak of it merely to slander its firmest supporters, have for some days past been spreading reports most injurious to the armies, and to one of the general officers who commanded them. Can they then no longer attain their object by corresponding openly with the horde of conspirators resident at Hamburg? Must they, in order to gain the patronage of the masters whom they are desirous of giving to France, vilify the leaders of the armies? Do they imagine that these, as weak as in times past, will suffer themselves to be calumniated without daring to reply, and to be accused without defending themselves? Why is Bonaparte then the object of the wrath of these gentry? is it because he beat their friends and themselves in Vendémiaire? is it because he is dissolving the armies of kings, and furnishing the republic with the means of bringing this honourable war to a glorious conclusion? Ah! brave young man, where is the republican soldier whose heart does not burn with the desire to imitate

thee! Courage, Bonaparte! lead our victorious armies to Naples, to Vienna; reply to thy personal enemies by humbling kings, by shedding fresh lustre over our armies, and leave to us the task of upholding thy glory!

"I have smiled with pity on hearing a man, in other respects of very shrewd understanding, express an alarm which he does not feel, respecting the powers conferred on the French generals. You are acquainted with almost all of them, citizen minister. Which of them is it, supposing him even to possess sufficient authority over his army to induce it to march against the government—which of them is it, I ask, who would ever attempt to do so, without being immediately crushed by his comrades? The generals are scarcely acquainted, scarcely correspond, with one another. Their number ought to make people easy respecting the designs which are gratuitously ascribed to one of them. Who is ignorant how powerfully envy, ambition, and hatred, influence men—and I believe I may add, love of country and honour? Cheer up, then, ye modern republicans!

"Some journalists have carried their absurdity so far as to state that I am going to Italy to arrest a man whom I esteem, and with whom the government has the greatest reason to be satisfied. It may be asserted that, in the times in which we live, few general officers would undertake the duty of gendarmes, though many may be disposed to combat the factions and the factious.

"During my stay in Paris, I have seen men of all opinions. I have been enabled to appreciate some of them at their just value. Some there are who think that the government cannot proceed without them. They raise an outcry, that they may obtain places. Others, though nobody cares about them, imagine that their destruction has been sworn. They cry out, to render themselves interesting. I have seen emigrants, more Frenchmen than royalists, weep with joy at the recital of our victories; I have seen Parisians throw doubts upon them. It has appeared to me that one party, daring, but without means, was desirous of overthrowing the present government, in order to introduce anarchy in its stead; that a second, more dangerous, more adroit, and which numbers friends every where, was aiming at the destruction of the republic, in order to give back to France the rickety constitution of 1791 and a thirty years' civil war; that lastly, a third, if it is capable of despising the other two, and assuming over them that empire which is conferred on it by the laws, will conquer them, because it is composed of genuine, laborious, and upright republicans, whose means are talents and virtues, because it numbers among its partisans every good citizen and the armies, who assuredly have not been conquering for these five years merely to suffer the country to be enslaved."

This letter put an end to all the reports, and imposed silence on the malicious circulators of them.

Amidst its glory, the government excited pity by its poverty. The new paper-money had kept its ground for a very short time, and its fall deprived the Directory of an important resource. It will be recollected, that on the 26th of Ventose two thousand four hundred millions of mandats had been created, and a corresponding value in national domains had been pledged for them. One part of these mandats had been appropriated to the withdrawing of the twenty-four thousand millions remaining in circulation, and the remainder to the supply of current wants. It was, in some sort, as we have observed, a new edition of the old paper, with a new title and a new figure. For the twenty-four thousand millions in assignats were given eight hundred millions in mandats, and, instead of creating forty-eight thousand millions more in assignats, one thousand six hundred millions in mandats were created. The difference was, therefore, in the title and the figure, and also in the pledge; for the assignats, owing to the effect of the sales by auction, did not represent a determinate value in domains; the mandats, on the contrary, as they were capable of procuring domains on the mere offer of the price in 1790, exactly represented the sum of two thousand four hundred millions. All this did not prevent their fall. It was owing to various causes. France would not have any more paper, and was determined to place no more confidence in it. Now, let the guarantees be ever so good, if people will no longer regard them, they are as though they did not exist. Then, the figure of the paper, though reduced, was not sufficiently reduced. Twenty-four thousand millions in assignats were converted into eight hundred millions in mandats; the old paper, therefore, was reduced to one-thirtieth, and it ought by right to have been reduced to the two hundred and twentieth, for twenty-four thousand millions were worth at most one hundred and twenty millions. To throw them back into circulation for eight hundred millions, by converting them into mandats, was an error. It is true that there was appropriated to them a like value in domains; but an estate which in 1790 was worth one hundred thousand francs would not at this time sell for more than thirty thousand or twenty-five thousand. Consequently the paper, bearing this new title and this new figure, even while exactly representing domains, must like them be worth no more than one-third of the money. Now, to attempt to make it circulate at par, as had been done, was again to support a fallacy. Thus, if there had even been a possibility of restoring confidence to the paper, the exaggerated supposition of its value must still have made it fall; therefore, though its circulation was forced every where, people would not countenance it for a moment. The violent measures which it was possible to impose in 1793 were at this time powerless. Nobody

bargained but for a money price. That specie, which was supposed to be hoarded or carried abroad, found its way into circulation. That which had been hidden came forth; that which had quitted France returned. The southern provinces were full of piasters, which came from Spain, and were introduced among us from necessity. Gold and silver come, like all commodities, whithersoever the demand calls them; only their price is higher and keeps up till the quantity is sufficient and the want is supplied. Some rogueries were also committed by means of payments in mandats, because the laws, giving the forced currency of money to paper, allowed it to be employed in acquitting written engagements; but people scarcely durst avail themselves of that faculty, and as for all stipulations, they were made in specie. In all the markets nothing was to be seen but gold and silver, and the wages of the lower classes were paid in no other medium. One would have imagined that there was no paper in France. The mandats were in the hands of speculators only, who received them from the government and sold them to the purchasers of national domains.

In this manner, the financial crisis, though existing for the state, had almost ceased to affect individuals.* Commerce and industry, availing themselves of the first moment of quiet, and of some communications reopened with the continent in consequence of our victories, began to resume some activity.

It is not requisite, as governments have had the vanity to assert, to encourage production in order that it may prosper; all that it needs is, not to be thwarted. It takes advantage of the first moment to develop itself with wonderful activity. But, if the circumstances of private individuals were improved, the government, that is to say, its chiefs, its agents of all kinds, military men, administrators or magistrates, and its creditors, were reduced to extreme distress. The mandats which were given to them were powerless in their hands; they could make but one use of them, namely, pass them to speculators in paper, who took one hundred francs for five or six, and afterwards sold these mandats to the purchasers of national domains. Thus the annuitants were perishing of hunger; the functionaries were giving up their places, and, contrary to the usual custom, instead of soliciting appointments people were resigning them. The armies of Germany and Italy, living at the enemy's cost, were protected from the general want; but the armies of the interior were in extreme distress. Hoche had nothing with which to subsist his soldiers but the articles of consumption levied in the provinces of

* "Government and all the persons who received payment from it, including the public creditors, the army, and the civil servants were still suffering the most severe privations; but the crisis had passed with the great bulk of individuals in the state. The fall in the value of the assignats had been so excessive, that no one would take either them, or their successors in change." —*Alison.* E.

the West, and he was obliged to maintain the military system in those provinces in order to have a right to levy in kind the supplies which he needed. As for the officers and himself, they had not wherewithal even to procure clothing and other necessaries. The supply of the stations established in France for the troops marching through the country had frequently failed, because the contractors would no longer make advances. The detachments sent from the coasts of the Ocean to reinforce the army of Italy had been stopped by the way. Hospitals had even been shut up, and the unfortunate soldiers who filled them turned out of the asylum which the republic owed to their infirmities, because they could no longer be supplied either with medicines or with food. The gendarmerie was entirely disorganized. Being neither clothed nor equipped, it had almost ceased to do any duty. In order to spare their horses, which were not replaced, the gendarmes no longer protected the roads; they were infested by robbers, who abound after civil wars. They broke into country-houses, and frequently penetrated into the towns, plundering and murdering with unheard-of audacity.

Such then was the internal state of France. The particular character of this new crisis was the poverty of the government amidst the improved circumstances of private individuals. The Directory subsisted entirely on the wrecks of the paper, and a few millions which its armies sent to it from abroad. General Bonaparte had already remitted thirty millions, and sent it one hundred fine carriage-horses to contribute a little to its pomp.

It now became necessary to destroy the whole system of paper-money. To this end it was requisite that its circulation should no longer be forced, and that the taxes should be received in real value. It was therefore declared on the 28th of Messidor (July 16), that every one might bargain in whatever money he pleased; that the mandats were in future to be taken only at their real currency, and that this currency should be daily ascertained and published by the treasury. At length, the government ventured to declare that the taxes should be paid in specie or in mandats at the current value. The only exception made was for the land-tax. Ever since the creation of the mandats, it had been required to be paid in paper and no longer in kind. It was now felt that it would have been better to continue to levy it in kind, because, amidst the fluctuations of the paper, articles of consumption would at least have been obtained. It was therefore decided, after long discussions and several plans successively rejected by the Ancients, that, in the frontier departments or those contiguous to the armies, the taxes might still be demanded in kind; that in the others they should be paid in mandats, at the current price of corn. Thus corn was valued in 1790 at ten francs the quintal; it was valued at the present time at eighty francs in mandats. Every ten francs assessed, representing a quintal of corn, was now to be paid at

eighty francs in mandats. It would have been much more simple to require payment in specie, or in mandats at the current value; but this the government durst not yet venture upon; it began therefore to return, but with hesitating steps to reality.

The forced loan was not yet entirely raised. The supreme authority had no longer that arbitrary energy requisite to ensure the prompt execution of such a measure. There remained nearly three hundred millions to be collected. It was decided that, in payment of the loan and taxes, mandats should be received at par, and assignats at the rate of one hundred for one, but for a fortnight only; and that, after the expiration of this term, paper should be taken only at the current value. This was one way of encouraging those who were backward in paying up.

The fall of the mandats being declared, it was no longer possible to take them in integral payment for the national domains which were appropriated to them. The bankruptcy predicted to them, as to the assignats, became inevitable. Notice was actually given that, as the mandats issued for two thousand four hundred millions had fallen far below that value, and were not worth more than two hundred or three hundred millions, the state would no longer give the promised value in domains, namely, two thousand four hundred millions. The contrary had been maintained, in the hope that the mandats would keep up to a certain value; but, one hundred francs falling to five or six, the state could no longer give land, worth one hundred francs in 1790, and thirty or forty francs at that time, for five or six francs. It was the same kind of bankruptcy that the assignats had experienced, and the nature of which we have already explained. The state then did what is done at the present day by a sinking fund which redeems at the currency of the Exchange, and which, in case of an extraordinary fall, would redeem perhaps at fifty what might have been placed at eighty or ninety. In consequence, it was decided on the 8th of Thermidor, that the last fourth of the national domains appropriated by the law of the 26th of Ventose (that which created the mandats) should be paid for in mandats at the current value, and by six equal instalments. It had appropriated to the amount of eight hundred millions. This fourth was, of course, two hundred millions.

Paper-money was, therefore, drawing near to its end. It may be asked why the government had made this second trial of assignats, which had had so short a duration and so little success. In general, we are too apt to judge of all measures independently of the circumstances which have commanded them. Fear of the want of specie had no doubt contributed to the creation of the mandats, and, had there been no other reason, the government would have been egregiously mistaken, for there cannot be any want of specie; but it had been particularly im-

pelled by the imperative necessity of living upon the produce of the domains, and of anticipating upon their sale. It was necessary to put their price in circulation before receiving it, and for this purpose to issue it in the form of paper. The resource had indeed not been great, because the mandats had fallen so speedily, but at any rate the government had lived upon it for four or five months. And was that nothing? The mandats must be considered as a new discount of the value of the national domains, as a makeshift till these domains could be sold. We shall see what moments of distress the government had still to go through, before it could realize their sale in specie.*

The treasury was not deficient in resources demandable by it; but these resources were in the same predicament as the national domains; they had to be realized. It had yet to receive three hundred millions of the forced loan; three hundred millions of the land-tax for the year, that is to say, the whole amount of that tax; twenty-five millions of the tax on moveable property; the whole rent of the national domains, and the arrears of that rent, amounting together to sixty millions; various military contributions; the price of the moveable property of the emigrants; divers arrears; lastly, eighty millions in paper on foreigners. All these resources, added to the two hundred millions of the last fourth of the price of the domains, amounted to one thousand one hundred millions, an enormous sum, but difficult to realize. To complete its year, that is, to go on till the 1st of Vendémiaire, it wanted only four hundred millions. It would be saved if out of the one thousand one hundred it could realize four hundred. For the following year, it had the ordinary contributions which it hoped to raise all in specie, and which, amounting to some five hundred millions, covered what were called the ordinary expenses. For the war expenses, if a new campaign were necessary, it had the remainder of the one thousand one hundred millions just mentioned, and of which it was to absorb this year about four hundred; lastly, it had the new appropriations of the national domains. But the difficulty still was how to get in those sums. Ready money never consists of any thing but the proceeds of the year; now it was difficult to raise them at once by the forced loan, by the tax on land and moveables, and by the sale of the domains. The government fell to work afresh to collect the contributions, and the Directory was invested with the extraordinary faculty of pledging Belgian domains for one hundred millions in specie. The rescriptions, of the nature of royal *bons*, having for their object to discount

* "The mandats completed the revolutionary cycle of assignats of which they formed the second period. They procured the Directory a momentary supply, but they also in turn lost their credit, and insensibly led the way to bankruptcy, which was the transition from paper to cash payments."—*Mignet*. E.

the proceeds of the year, had shared the fate of all the paper. Being unable to avail himself of this resource, the minister settled with the contractors by orders which were to be paid out of the first receipts.

Such were the distresses of this government, which was so glorious abroad. At home, parties were still at work. The submission of La Vendée had greatly abated the hopes of the royalist faction; but the Paris agents felt only the more convinced of the merit of their old plan, which consisted in not having recourse to civil war, but in corrupting opinions, and in gaining an influence by degrees over the Councils and the authorities. At this they laboured in their journals. As for the patriots, they had arrived at the highest point of indignation. They had favoured the flight of Drouet, who had found means to escape from prison, and they meditated new plots, notwithstanding the discovery of Babœuf's. Many old Conventionalists and Thermidorians, heretofore connected with the government, which they had themselves formed, began immediately after the 13th of Vendémiaire to be discontented. A law enjoined, as we have seen, the ex-Conventionalists not re-elected and all dismissed functionaries to quit Paris. The police, by mistake, sent orders for apprehending four Conventionalists, members of the legislative body. These orders were denounced with acrimony in the Five Hundred. Tallien, who, at the time of the discovery of Babœuf's plot, had loudly declared his adhesion to the system of the government, inveighed bitterly against the police of the Directory, and against the distrust of which the patriots were the object. Thibaudeau, his habitual opponent, answered him, and, after a very warm discussion and some recriminations, each fell back into sullen silence. Cochon, the minister, his agents, his spies, were particular objects of the hatred of the patriots, who had been the first that were galled by his vigilance. For the rest, the course to be pursued by the government was clearly marked out; and, if it was decidedly hostile to the royalists, it was equally unconnected with the patriots, that is, with that portion of the revolutionary party which was desirous to return to a more democratic republic, and deemed the present system too mild for the aristocrats. But, setting aside the state of the finances, this situation of the Directory, detached from all parties, curbing them with a strong hand, and supported by admirable armies, was very cheering and very brilliant.

The patriots had already made two attempts, and been twice foiled, since the installation of the Directory. They had endeavoured to recommence the club of the Jacobins at the Pantheon, and had seen it shut up by the government. They had then hatched a mysterious plot under the direction of Babœuf; they had been discovered by the police and deprived of their new chiefs. Still they were restless, and thought of making a

last attempt. The opposition, in once more attacking the law of the 3rd of Brumaire, excited in them redoubled rage, and impelled them to a final struggle. They had already striven to corrupt the police legion. That legion had been dissolved, and changed into a regiment, which was the 21st dragoons. They conceived the design of trying the fidelity of that regiment, and hoped, in gaining it, to gain the whole army of the interior, encamped in the plain of Grenelle. They purposed at the same time to excite a commotion by firing muskets in Paris, by scattering white cockades in the streets, by shouting *Vive le Roi!* and by thus inducing a belief that the royalists were taking up arms to destroy the republic. They meant then to avail themselves of this pretext to run to arms, to seize the reins of government, and to make the camp of Grenelle declare in their favour.

On the 12th of Fructidor (August 29) they executed part of their plan, fired petards, and threw white cockades about in the streets. But the police, being forewarned, had taken such precautions that they found it impossible to excite any commotion. They were not however disheartened, and some days afterwards, on the 23rd of Fructidor (September 9), they resolved to carry their plan into effect. Thirty of the principal assembled at the Gros Caillou, and resolved that very night to collect a mob in the quarter of Vaugirard. That quarter, near the camp of Grenelle, was full of gardens, and intersected by walls; it afforded lines behind which they could assemble and make resistance, in case they should be attacked. Accordingly, in the evening, they collected, to the number of seven or eight hundred, armed with muskets, pistols, swords, and sword-sticks. This assemblage comprehended all the most determined men of the party. There were among them some dismissed officers, who headed the mob, in their uniforms and with their epaulettes. There were also some ex-Conventionalists, in the costume of representatives, and also, it was said, Drouet, who had been concealed in Paris ever since his escape. An officer of the guard of the Directory, at the head of ten horse, was patrolling in Paris, when he was informed of the concourse collected at Vaugirard. He hastened thither with his little detachment, but, on coming up, was received with a discharge of musketry, and attacked by two hundred armed men, who obliged him to retreat at full gallop. He went immediately to order the guard of the Directory to be put under arms, and sent an officer to the camp of Grenelle to give the alarm. The patriots lost no time, and, the alarm being given, repaired in all haste to the plain of Grenelle, to the number of some hundreds.* They proceeded towards the quarters of

* "The camp at Grenelle had retired to rest when the conspirators arrived. When the sentinels demanded, 'Who goes there?' they replied, 'Long live the republic! Long live the constitution of Ninety-three!' The sentinels immediately gave the alarm. The conspirators relying upon the assistance of a battalion of the guard which had been reduced, marched

the 21st dragoons, lately the police legion, and endeavoured to gain it over by saying that they had come to fraternize with it. Malo, *chef d'escadron*, who commanded that regiment, immediately left his tent, mounted his horse half dressed, rallied around him some officers and the first dragoons whom he met with, and charged with drawn swords those who proposed to him to fraternize. This example decided the soldiers; they ran to their horses, dashed upon the mob, and soon dispersed it. They killed and wounded a great number of persons, and apprehended one hundred and thirty-two. The noise of this combat roused the whole camp, which was instantly under arms, and filled Paris with consternation: but it soon subsided, when the folly and the result of the attempt became known. The Directory immediately ordered the prisoners to be shut up, and applied to the two Councils for authority to make domiciliary visits, for the purpose of securing in certain quarters many of the rioters whose wounds had prevented them from leaving Paris. Having formed part of an armed assemblage, they were amenable to the military tribunals, and were delivered up to a commission, which began by ordering a certain number of them to be shot. The organization of the high national court was not yet completed, and its installation was urged anew, that the trial of Babœuf might commence.

This rash enterprise was estimated at its real value, that is to say, it was considered as one of those indiscretions which characterize an expiring party. The enemies of the Revolution alone affected to attach great importance to it, that they might have a new occasion to raise an outcry against terror, and to excite alarm. People in general were not much frightened; and this vain attack proved more clearly than all the other successes of the Directory that its establishment was definitive, and that the parties must relinquish all hopes of destroying it.

Such were the events that were occurring in the interior. While fresh battles were about to be fought abroad, important negotiations were preparing in Europe. The French republic was at peace with several powers, but in alliance with none. The detractors who had asserted that it would never be recognised now said it would never have any allies. By way of replying to these malicious insinuations, the Directory thought of renewing the family compact with Spain, and projected a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, Venice, and the

towards the tent of Malo the commander, who ordered his men to sound to horse, and his dragoons who were half-naked, to mount. Surprised at this reception the insurgents made but a feeble resistance. They were put to flight, leaving a number of dead, and many prisoners on the field of battle. This unfortunate expedition was almost the last of the party; at each successive defeat it lost its energy and its leaders, and at length acquired the secret conviction that its reign was at an end."—*Mignet*. E.

Porte. By these means, the quadruple alliance, composed of all the powers of the South, against those of the North, would control the Mediterranean and the East, give uneasiness to Russia, threaten the rear of Austria, and raise up a new maritime enemy against England. It would moreover procure great advantages for the army of Italy, by ensuring to it the support of the Venetian squadron and of thirty thousand Sclavonians.

Spain was the easiest of the three powers to decide. She had grievances against England that dated from the commencement of the war. The principal were the conduct of the English at Toulon, and the secrecy observed towards the Spanish admiral, at the time of the expedition against Corsica. The English had insulted her ships, detained supplies destined for her, violated her territory, taken posts threatening for her in America, infringed the custom-house regulations in her colonies, and openly excited them to revolt. These causes for discontent, added to the splendid offers of the Directory, which held out to her hopes of possessions in Italy, and the victories which authorized her to believe in the accomplishment of these offers, at length decided Spain to sign on the 2nd of Fructidor (August 19th), a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, on the bases of the family compact. By this treaty, those two powers mutually guaranteed to each other all their possessions in Europe and in the Indies; they reciprocally promised one another succours to the extent of eighteen thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, fifteen first rates, fifteen seventy-fours, six frigates and four cutters. These succours were to be furnished on the first requisition of either of the two powers that should be at war.

Instructions were sent to our ambassadors to represent to the Porte and to Venice the advantages which they would derive from concurring in such an alliance.

The French republic, therefore, was no longer solitary, and she had raised up a new foe against England. Every thing indicated that a declaration of war by Spain against England would soon follow the treaty of alliance with France. The Directory was preparing for Pitt perplexities of a different nature.

Hoche was at the head of one hundred thousand men spread along the coast of the Atlantic. La Vendée and Bretagne were quelled; he was impatient to employ these forces in a manner more worthy of himself, and to add new exploits to those of Weissenburg and Landau. He suggested to the government a plan which he had long meditated, that of an expedition to Ireland. Now, said he, that we have driven civil war from the coasts of France, we must carry that scourge to the shores of England, and, by exciting an insurrection of the Catholics in

Ireland, repay the mischief which she did us in raising the Poitevins and the Bretons. The moment was favourable. The Irish were more incensed than ever against the oppression of the English government; the people of the three kingdoms were suffering severely from the war; and an invasion, added to the other evils which they were already enduring, was likely to goad them to the last degree of exasperation. Pitt's finances were tottering; and the enterprise directed by Hoche might be productive of the most important consequences. The plan was at once approved. Truguet, minister of the marine, seconded it by all means in his power. He collected a squadron in the harbour of Brest, and made every effort which the state of the finances permitted to equip it in a suitable manner. Hoche selected all the best troops from his army, and marched to Brest to embark. Care was taken to spread various reports: sometimes they were intended for an expedition to St. Domingo, at others for an expedition to Lisbon, in order to drive the English out of Portugal, aided by Spain.

England, suspecting the object of these preparations, was seriously alarmed. The treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Spain and France foreboded new dangers to her; the defeats of Austria caused her to apprehend the loss of this powerful and last ally; her finances were in a state of great embarrassment; the Bank had contracted its discounts; capital began to fail; and the loan opened for the emperor had been stopped to prevent further funds from leaving the country. The ports of Italy were closed against English ships; so were those of the Ocean as far as the Texel; and those of Spain were to be closed also. Thus the commerce of Great Britain was singularly threatened.

To all these difficulties were added those of a general election; for the parliament, approaching its seventh year, had to be wholly re-elected. The elections took place amidst shouts of malediction against Pitt and the war.

The Empire had almost entirely abandoned the cause of the coalition. The states of Baden and Wirtemberg had just signed a definitive peace, allowing the belligerent armies a passage through their territories. Austria was alarmed on seeing two French armies on the Danube, and a third on the Adige, which seemed to close Italy against her. She had sent Wurmser, with thirty thousand men, to collect several reserves in the Tyrol, to rally and reorganize the wrecks of Beaulieu's army, and to descend into Lombardy with sixty thousand men. In this quarter she thought herself least in danger, but she was in great apprehension with respect to the Danube, and turned all her attention in that direction. To prevent alarming reports, the Aulic Council* had forbidden public events to be talked of at Vienna.

* "The Aulic Council at Vienna (that pernicious tribunal which, in the

It had organized a levy of volunteers, and laboured with extraordinary activity to equip and arm fresh troops. Catherine, who always promised and never performed, had rendered one service; she had guaranteed Galicia to Austria, and this arrangement had enabled the latter to withdraw her troops from that country, and to march them towards the Alps and the Danube.

Thus France every where affrighted her enemies, and people waited with impatience to see what the fortune of arms would decide along the Danube and the Adige. On the immense line extending from Bohemia to the Adriatic, three armies were about to encounter three others, and to decide the fate of Europe.

During the suspension of hostilities, negotiations had been going on in Italy. Peace had been made with Piedmont, and the armistice had been succeeded, two months afterwards, by a treaty. It stipulated the definitive cession of the duchy of Savoy and of the county of Nice to France; the destruction of the forts of Susa and Brunetta, situated at the outlet of the Alps; the occupation during the war of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria; a free passage for the French troops through the states of Piedmont; and the supply of necessaries for these troops during their march. The Directory, at the instigation of Bonaparte, proposed moreover an offensive and defensive alliance with the King of Sardinia, that it might have ten or fifteen thousand men of his excellent army. But this prince wished for Lombardy, which France could not yet give away, and which she still meant to employ as an equivalent for the Netherlands. This concession being refused, the king would not consent to an alliance. The Directory had not yet settled any thing with Genoa: discussions were still going on relative to the recal of the exiled families, to the expulsion of the feudatory families of Austria and Naples, and to the indemnity for the Modeste frigate. The relations were friendly with Tuscany; but the means employed towards the Leghorn merchants, to obtain a declaration of the merchandise belonging to the enemies of France, had sown the seeds of dissatisfaction. Naples and Rome had sent agents to Paris in conformity with the armistice; but the negotiation for peace was attended with considerable delay. It was evident that the powers were waiting to see what turn the war would take before they concluded it. The people of Bologna and Ferrara were still as enthusiastic for liberty, which they had received provisionally. The regency of Modena and the Duke of Parma were immoveable. Lombardy awaited with anxiety the result of the campaign. Urgent solicitations had been addressed to the senate of Venice, with the double view of inducing it to

Seven Years' War, called Laudohn to account for taking Schweidnitz without orders) has destroyed the schemes of many an Austrian general, for though plans of offensive operations may be concerted at home, it is impossible to frame orders for every possible contingency."—*Gentz.* E.

concur in the plan of a quadruple alliance and of securing a useful auxiliary to the army of Italy. Besides direct overtures, our ambassadors at Constantinople and Madrid had made indirect proposals, and had earnestly pressed the matter upon the legations of Venice, for the purpose of demonstrating to them the advantages of the plan; but all these efforts had proved fruitless. Venice, since she had the French in her territory and had witnessed the rapid extension of their political ideas, had conceived a hatred for them. She no longer stopped at an unarmed neutrality. On the contrary, she armed with activity. She had given orders to the commandants of the islands to despatch the disposable ships and troops into the lagoons; and she had sent for the Sclavonian regiments from Illyria.* The proveditore of Bergamo was secretly arming the superstitious but brave peasants of the Bergamasco. Funds were collected by the twofold way of taxes and voluntary donations.

Bonaparte thought that, for the moment, his course was to dissemble with all, to protract the negotiations, to suffer affairs to remain *in statu quo*, and to appear ignorant of all hostile proceedings, till fresh battles should have decided in Italy either our establishment or our expulsion. He deemed it prudent to desist from agitating the questions which were under discussion with Genoa, and to persuade her that the French were content with the satisfaction obtained, in order that they might find in her a friend in case of retreat. He conceived also that it was wrong to displease the Duke of Tuscany by the conduct that was pursued at Leghorn. He was no doubt of opinion that a brother of the emperor's ought not to be left in that duchy, but he wished to avoid alarming him yet. Garreau and Salicetti, the commissioners of the Directory, having issued an order for the departure of all the French emigrants from the environs of Leghorn, Bonaparte wrote a letter to them, in which, without any regard to their quality, he severely reprimanded them for having overstepped their powers, and affronted the Duke of Tuscany by usurping the sovereign authority in his dominions. With respect to Venice also, he was desirous of maintaining the *status quo:* though he complained loudly of some murders committed on the high-roads, and of the preparations which he saw making around him. His object in keeping the quarrel open was to continue to compel the republic to supply his wants, and to reserve a motive for fleecing it of a few millions, if he should conquer the Austrians. "If I am victorious," he wrote, "a mere express will be sufficient to put an end to all the difficulties that are raised up against me."

The citadel of Milan had fallen into his hands. The garrison

* "Venice had still fifty thousand men at her command, and those of a fierce and courageous description, chiefly consisting of Sclavonians; the mistress of the Adriatic therefore was an enemy not to be lightly provoked."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

had surrendered; all the artillery had been sent off and added to the considerable train before Mantua. He would fain have brought the siege of that fortress to a conclusion before the new Austrian army should come to its relief, but this he had little hope of accomplishing. He employed in the blockade only just the number of troops that was indispensably necessary, on account of the fevers that raged in the environs. He had, nevertheless, pressed the place very closely, and was preparing to attempt one of those surprises which, according to his own expression, *depend on a goose or a dog;* but the waters of the lake were too low to admit of the passage of the boats that were to carry his disguised troops. He then renounced for the moment the intention of making himself master of Mantua. Besides, Wurmser was coming, and it was requisite to attend to that which was most urgent.

The army, which had entered Italy with some thirty thousand men, had received but small reinforcements to repair its losses. Nine thousand men had been sent to it from the Alps. The divisions drafted from Hoche's army had not yet been able to traverse France. Owing to this reinforcement of nine thousand men, and to the sick who had left the depots of Provence and the Var, the army had retrieved its losses and even gained an accession of strength. It numbered nearly forty-five thousand men, distributed upon the Adige and around Mantua, at the moment when Bonaparte returned from his march into the Peninsula. The diseases which attacked the soldiers before Mantua reduced it to about forty or forty-two thousand men. This was its number in the middle of Thermidor (the end of July). Bonaparte had left merely depots at Milan, Tortona, and Leghorn. He had already driven out of the field two armies, one of Piedmontese and the other of Austrians, and now he had to fight a third, more formidable than the preceding.

Wurmser arrived at the head of sixty thousand men. Thirty thousand were drawn from the Rhine, and were composed of excellent troops. The remainder was formed of Beaulieu's wrecks, and of battalions from the interior of Austria. Upwards of ten thousand men were shut up in Mantua, exclusively of the sick. Thus the whole army comprehended more than seventy thousand men. Bonaparte had nearly ten thousand around Mantua, and had therefore no more than about thirty thousand to oppose to the sixty who were about to debouch from the Tyrol. With such an inequality of force, it required extraordinary bravery in the soldiers, and a most fertile genius in the general, to restore the balance.

The line of the Adige, to which Bonaparte attached such value, was about to become the theatre of the struggle. We have already stated the reasons for which Bonaparte preferred it to every other. The Adige was not so long as the Po, or as those rivers which, falling into the latter, blend their line with

that of the Po; after a course of small extent it ran directly to the sea; it was not fordable, neither could it be turned by the Tyrol, like the Brenta, the Piave, and the rivers higher up towards the extremity of Upper Italy. It has been the theatre of such magnificent events that we must describe its course with some care.

The rivers of the Tyrol form two lines, those of the Mincio and the Adige, nearly parallel, and supporting themselves upon one another. Part of these waters forms in the mountains an extensive and elongated lake, called the Lake of Garda; issuing from it, they traverse the plain of the Mantuan to Peschiera, become the Mincio, form another lake around Mantua, and, pursuing their course, at length fall into the Lower Po. The Adige, formed by the streams from the upper valleys of the Tyrol, runs beyond the preceding line. It descends through the mountains in a direction parallel to the Lake of Garda, debouches into the plain in the environs of Verona, then runs parallel to the Mincio, scoops out for itself a wide and deep bed as far as Legnago, and a few leagues beyond that town ceases to be cramped between banks, and can spread itself out into impassable inundations, which intercept the whole space comprised between that point and the Adriatic. Three routes presented themselves to the enemy. One, crossing the Adige as high as Roveredo, before the commencement of the Lake of Garda, turned round that lake, and led behind it to Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia. Two other routes running from Roveredo, followed the two banks of the Adige, in its course along the Lake of Garda. The one on the right bank ran between the river and the lake, passed through the mountains, and entered the plain between the Mincio and the Adige. The other, following the left bank, and running outside the Adige, debouched into the plain towards Verona, and thus led to the front of the defensive line. The first of the three, crossing the Adige before the origin of the Lake of Garda, afforded the advantage of turning at once the two lines of the Mincio and of the Adige, and leading to the rear of the army that was guarding them. But it was not very practicable; it was accessible to mountain artillery only, and therefore it might serve for a diversion, but not for a principal operation. The second, which descended from the mountains between the lake and the Adige, crossed the river at Rivalta or Dolce, a point where it was scarcely at all defended; but it ran into the mountains, through positions easily defended, those of La Corona and Rivoli. The third, running beyond the river to the middle of the plain, debouched outside, and led to the best defended part of its course, that from Verona to Legnago. Thus all three routes presented very great difficulties. The first could be occupied by a detachment only; the second, passing between the lake and the river, came upon the positions of La Corona and Rivoli; the third abutted upon the Adige, which has a wide,

deep bed from Verona to Legnago, and is defended by two fortresses, eight leagues distant from one another.

Bonaparte had placed General Sauret, with three thousand men, at Salo, to guard the road which debouches on the rear of the Lake of Garda. Massena, with twelve thouand, intercepted the road which runs between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, and occupied the positions of La Corona and Rivoli. Despinois, with five thousand, was in the environs of Verona; Augereau, with eight thousand, at Legnago; Kilmaine, with two thousand horse and light artillery, as a reserve, in a central position at Castel Novo. There Bonaparte had fixed his head-quarters, to be at an equal distance from Salo, Rivoli, and Verona. As he attached great importance to Verona, which had three bridges over the Adige, and distrusted the intentions of Venice, he resolved to make the Sclavonian regiments quit that place. He pretended that they were in hostility with the French troops; and, upon pretext of preventing quarrels, he insisted on their leaving the city. The proveditore complied, and the French garrison alone was left in Verona.

Wurmser had carried his head-quarters to Trent and Roveredo. He detached twenty thousand men, under Quasdanovich, to take the road that turns the Lake of Garda and debouches upon Salo. He took forty thousand with him, and distributed them upon the two roads that run along the Adige. Some were to attack La Corona and Rivoli, others to debouch upon Verona. He thought in this manner to envelop the French army, which, being attacked on the Adige and on the rear of the Lake of Garda, would be in danger of being forced on its front, and of being cut off from its line of retreat. Rumour had anticipated the arrival of Wurmser. Throughout all Italy his coming was expected, and the party hostile to Italian freedom was full of joy and boldness. The Venetians manifested a satisfaction which they could no longer repress. The Sclavonian soldiers ran about the public places, holding out their hands to the passengers, and demanding the price of the French blood which they were going to spill. In Rome, the agents of France were insulted; the Pope, imboldened by the hope of speedy deliverance, ordered the carriages laden with the first instalment of the contribution imposed upon him to turn back; he even despatched his legate to Ferrara and Bologna. Lastly, the court of Naples, still as senseless as ever, trampling upon the conditions of the armistice, sent off troops to the frontiers of the Roman States. The most painful anxiety prevailed, on the contrary, in all the towns devoted to France and to independence. Tidings from the Adige were awaited with impatience. The Italian imagination, which magnifies every thing, had exaggerated the disproportion of the forces. It was said that Wurmser was coming with two armies, one of sixty, the other of eighty thousand men. People asked one another how that handful of French could possibly with-

stand such a mass of foes;* and they repeated the famous proverb, that *Italy was the grave of the French.*

On the 11th of Thermidor (July 29) the Austrians found themselves in presence of our posts, and surprised them all. The corps which had turned the Lake of Garda debouched upon Salo, whence it repulsed General Sauret. General Guyeux was left alone there with a few hundred men, and shut himself up in an old building, which he refused to quit, though he had neither bread nor water, and scarcely any ammunition. Along the two roads which border the Adige the Austrians advanced with similar advantage: they forced the important position of La Corona, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda; they proceeded with equal facility by the third road, and debouched before Verona. Bonaparte, in his head-quarters at Castel Novo, received all these tidings. Couriers succeeded one another without intermission, and on the following day, the 12th of Thermidor (July 30), he was apprized that the Austrians were marching from Salo upon Brescia, and that thus his retreat upon Milan was intercepted; that the position of Rivoli was forced, as well as that of La Corona; and that the Austrians were about to cross the Adige at all points. In this alarming situation, having lost his defensive line and his line of retreat, he could scarcely escape being taken. It was his first taste of misfortune. Whether struck by the enormity of the danger, or, ready to adopt a daring determination, he was desirous of sharing the responsibility with his generals; he assembled a council of war, and for the first time asked their opinion. All recommended retreat. Without any point of support before them, having lost one of the two roads to France, there was not one who deemed it prudent to maintain their ground, excepting Augereau. He alone, to whom these days were the most glorious of his life, strongly insisted on trying the fortune of arms. He was young and ardent; he had learned in the faubourgs to speak with fluency the language of camps, and he declared that he had good grenadiers who would not retire without fighting. Without capacity for judging of the resources which the situation of the armies and the nature of the ground yet presented, he listened only to his courage,† and warmed by his military ardour the genius of Bonaparte. The latter dismissed his generals, without expressing his own opinion, but his plan was formed.

* "Nothing but the greatest ability on the part of the French general could have compensated for his inferiority in numbers; but the genius of Napoleon proved adequate to the task. His success was mainly owing to the vicious plan of attack adopted by the Austrians, which like all the others framed by the Aulic Council, was exposed to defeat from the division of their forces."—*Jomini.* E.

† "Augereau was a man very decided in action, and not very capable of reasoning—two qualities which rendered him an excellent instrument of despotism, provided the despotism assumed the name of revolution."—*Madame de Staël.* E.

Though the line of the Adige was forced, and that of the Mincio and the Lake of Garda turned, the ground was so favourable that it still offered resources to a resolute man of genius.

The Austrians, divided into two corps, were descending along the two shores of the Lake of Garda: their junction was to be effected at the point of the lake, and, on their arrival there, they would have sixty thousand men to overwhelm thirty thousand. But, by concentrating himself at the point of the lake, Bonaparte might prevent their junction. If, then, he were to form with sufficient rapidity a principal mass, he might overwhelm the twenty thousand who had turned the lake, and then return to the forty thousand who had filed between the lake and the Adige. But, in order to occupy the point of the lake, he must call away all the troops from the Lower Adige and the Lower Mincio towards the Lake of Garda; he must withdraw Augereau from Legnago, and Serrurier from Mantua, for it was impossible to guard so extended a line. It was a great sacrifice, for he had been besieging Mantua for two months, he had brought thither a great train, the place was about to surrender, and, by allowing it to revictual itself, he should lose the fruit of long toil and an almost certain prey. Bonaparte did not hesitate. He had the sagacity to seize the most important of two objects, and to sacrifice the other—a simple resolution, which indicates not the great captain, but the great man. It is not only in war, but also in politics and in all situations, that men meet with two objects; they wish to attain one as well as the other, and miss both. Bonaparte possessed that force, so great and so rare, which is requisite for making the choice and the sacrifice. Had he attempted to keep the whole course of the Mincio, from the point of the Lake of Garda to Mantua, he would have been broken; and if he had concentrated himself upon Mantua to cover it, he would have had to fight seventy thousand men at once, sixty thousand in front and ten thousand in rear. He sacrificed Mantua, and concentrated himself at the point of the Lake of Garda. Orders were immediately sent to Augereau to quit Legnago, and to Serrurier to leave Mantua, and to concentrate themselves towards Valleggio and Peschiera, on the Upper Mincio. During the night of the 13th of Thermidor (July 31), Serrurier burned his gun-carriages, spiked his cannon, buried his projectiles, and threw his powder into the water, before he started to join the active army.*

Bonaparte, without losing a single moment, resolved to march first upon that corps of the enemy which was most forward, and the most dangerous from the position which it had taken. This

* "Napoleon despatched Louis in the greatest haste to Paris, with an account of what had taken place. Louis left his brother with regret on the eve of the battle, to become the bearer of bad news. 'It must be so,' said Napoleon, 'but, before you return, you will have to present to the Directory the colours which we shall take to-morrow.'"—*Louis Bonaparte.* E.

was the corps of Quasdanovich, who, with twenty thousand men, had debouched by Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia, on the rear of the Lake of Garda, and threatened the communication with Milan. On the same day that Serrurier left Mantua, the 13th (July 31), Bonaparte made a retrograde movement for the purpose of falling upon Quasdanovich, and recrossed the Mincio at Peschiera, with the greater part of his army. Augereau crossed at Borghetto, over the same bridge which had witnessed a glorious action at the time of the first conquest. Rear-guards were left to watch the march of the enemy who had passed the Adige. Bonaparte ordered General Sauret to go and release General Guyeux, who had shut himself up in an old building with seventeen hundred men, without either bread or water, and who had been fighting most heroically for two days. He himself resolved to march upon Lonato, whither Quasdanovich had just pushed forward a division; and he ordered Augereau to march upon Brescia to reopen the communication with Milan. Sauret succeeded in extricating General Guyeux, and drove back the Austrians into the mountains, taking some hundred of them prisoners. Bonaparte, with the German brigade, was not in time to attack the Austrians at Lonato: he was anticipated. After a very brisk action, he repulsed the Austrians, entered Lonato, and took six hundred prisoners. Augereau was, meanwhile, marching upon Brescia. He entered it on the 14th (August 1), without striking a blow, released some prisoners who had been taken from us, and forced the Austrians to fall back into the mountains. Quasdanovich, who calculated on coming upon the rear of the French army and surprising it, was astonished to find imposing masses every where, making head with such vigour. He had lost only a few men either at Salo or at Lonato; but he thought it right to halt, and not to advance farther, till he knew what had become of Wurmser, with the principal Austrian mass. He therefore halted.

Bonaparte likewise halted. Time was precious. He was aware that there is a point beyond which an advantage ought not to be pushed. It was enough to have awed Quasdanovich. He now resolved to turn back to make head against Wurmser. He retrograded with Massena's and Augereau's divisions. On the 15th (August 2), he placed Massena's division at Pon San Marco, and Augereau's division at Monte Chiaro. The rear-guards which he had left on the Mincio became his advanced guards. He had not arrived a moment too soon, for Wurmser's forty thousand men had crossed not only the Adige but the Mincio also. The division of Bayalitsch had masked Peschiera by a detachment, and passed the Mincio; and it was advancing upon the road to Lonato. Liptai's division had crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and driven General Valette from Castiglione. Wurmser had proceeded with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to raise the blockade of Mantua. On seeing our gun-carriages in ashes,

our cannon spiked, and all the signs of extreme precipitation, he discovered in these objects not the calculation of genius but the effect of fear: overjoyed, he entered the place in triumph which he came to relieve. He entered it on the 15th (August 2).

Bonaparte, on returning to Pon San Marco and Monte Chiaro, did not stop for a moment. His troops had marched without ceasing; he had himself been constantly on horseback: he resolved to make them fight the very next morning. He had before him Bayalitsch at Lonato, and Liptai at Castiglione, presenting between them a front of twenty-five thousand men. It was requisite that he should attack them before Wurmser returned from Mantua. Sauret had for the second time abandoned Salo; Bonaparte sent Guyeux to recover the position, and to keep back Quasdanovich. After these precautions on his left and on his rear, he resolved to march forward to Lonato with Massena, and to throw Augereau upon the heights of Castiglione, which had been abandoned on the preceding day by General Valette. He broke that general at the head of his army, to impress upon all his lieutenants the necessity for firmness. On the following day, the 16th (August 3), the whole army was in motion; Guyeux re-entered Salo, which rendered any communication between Quasdanovich and the Austrian army still more impossible. Bonaparte advanced upon Lonato; but his advanced guard was beaten back, some pieces of cannon were taken, and General Pigeon was made prisoner. Bayalitsch, proud of this success, advanced with confidence, and extended his wings around the French division. He had two objects in this manœuvre—in the first place to envelop Bonaparte, and, in the second, to extend himself on his right for the purpose of entering into communication with Quasdanovich, whose cannon he heard at Salo. Bonaparte, undismayed as regarded his rear suffered himself to be enveloped with imperturbable coolness. Throwing some tirailleurs on his threatened wings, he took the 18th and 32nd demi-brigades of infantry, ranged them in close column, gave them a regiment of dragoons to support them, and rushed headlong upon the enemy's centre, which had weakened, in order to extend itself. With this brave body of infantry he overturned all before him, and thus broke the line of the Austrians. The latter, divided into two corps, immediately lost their courage; one part of the division of Bayalitsch fell back in all haste towards the Mincio; but the other, which had extended itself, in order to communicate with Quasdanovich, was driven towards Salo, where Guyeux was at the moment. Bonaparte caused it to be pursued without intermission, that he might place it between two fires. He sent Junot* in pursuit of it, with a regiment of

* "Andoche Junot was born of humble parents in the year 1771. At a very early period he enlisted in the army; but of his military exploits

cavalry. Junot dashed off at a gallop, killed six horsemen with his own hand, and fell, having received several sabre-wounds. The fugitive division, pressed between the corps at Salo and

nothing is known until the siege of Toulon when he was a simple grenadier. Here he was fortunate enough to attract the notice of the young commandant of the artillery. During a heavy cannonade, Bonaparte having occasion to dictate a despatch, inquired if any one near him could write. Junot stepped out of the ranks, and, while penning the despatch, a shot struck the ground close by his side, and covered both with dust. 'This is fortunate, sir,' observed the grenadier laughing, 'I was in want of sand.'—'You are a brave fellow,' said Napoleon, 'how can I serve you?'—'Give me promotion, I will not disgrace it.' He was immediately made a sergeant; not long afterwards he obtained a commission; and in 1796 was nominated aide-de-camp to his benefactor. In the campaign of Italy Junot exhibited daring courage, and it is said, great rapacity. In Egypt he served with distinction as general of brigade, and soon after his return was placed over a division. Into the Legion of Honour he entered as a matter of course; but to the particular favour of Napoleon he owed the governorship of Paris, and the embassy to Lisbon, which was a most lucrative mission. He entered Portugal at the head of a powerful army in 1807, levied oppressive contributions, punished all who ventured to speak against his measures, and allayed partial revolts by bloody executions. About this time he was created Duke d'Abrantes, but being soon after defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley at the battle of Vimeira, he was compelled to evacuate Portugal, and remained until 1812 in complete disgrace. In the Russian campaign he headed a division, but could not obtain the marshal's truncheon. On his return a protracted fever seized him, which ended in settled derangement. He died at his father's house in 1813. In his person, Junot was eminently handsome; in his manners, coarse; in his character, rapacious and cruel. He had, however, a considerable share of moral as well as physical energy."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

The following is the portrait given of Junot by his wife, the Duchess d'Abrantes: "Junot had a superior mind; he was a stranger to falsehood, and was endowed with a generosity which his enemies have endeavoured to represent as a vice. He possessed in an eminent degree the qualities of a good son, a warm friend, and an excellent father. I recollect Mr. Fox telling me one day how he was struck, the preceding evening, when leaving the Opera, on seeing Junot paying as much attention and respect to his mother, as he would have done to the first peeress in England. Having begun life with the Revolution, Junot was absolutely one of its children. He was scarcely twenty when the first roll of the drum was heard. A war-cry rang throughout the kingdom; the most sober panted for combat; all were tired of repose. Had not Junot been my husband, I should tell how all at once he became a young Achilles. During the whole of the campaigns in Italy, he acccompanied Bonaparte in those fields of glory, and was not sparing of his blood. To a brilliant and creative imagination, Junot joined an acute understanding. He learned every thing with inconceivable rapidity. He was ready at composing verses, was an excellent actor, and wrote wonderfully well. His temper was warm, sometimes passionate; but never was he coarse or brutal." E.

"Of the considerable fortunes which the Emperor had bestowed, that of Junot, he said, was one of the most extravagant. The sums he had given him almost exceeded belief, and yet he was always in debt; he had squandered treasures without credit to himself, without discernment or taste, and too frequently, the Emperor added, in gross debauchery. The frequent incoherences which had been observed in Junot's behaviour, towards the close of his life, arose from the excesses in which he had indulged, and broke out at last into complete insanity. They were obliged to convey him to his

that which was pursuing it from Lonato, was broken, routed, and lost at every step thousands of prisoners. During this successful pursuit, Bonaparte proceeded to Castiglione, on his right, where Augereau had been fighting ever since the morning with admirable bravery.* It was requisite to take the heights on which Liptai's division had placed itself. After an obstinate combat, several times renewed, he had at length accomplished his object, and Bonaparte, on his arrival, found the enemy retreating on all sides. Such was the combat called the battle of Lonato, fought on the 16th (August 3rd).

Its results were considerable. The French had taken twenty pieces of cannon and three thousand prisoners from the division cut off and driven back upon Salo, and they were still pursuing the scattered remnant of it in the mountains. They had made a thousand or fifteen hundred prisoners at Castiglione, and killed or wounded three thousand men.† They had struck terror into Quasdanovich, who, finding the French army before him at Salo, and hearing it in the distance at Lonato, believed that it was every where. They had thus nearly disorganized the divisions of Bayalitsch and Liptai, which fell back upon Wurmser. That general actually arrived with fifteen thousand men to rally the two beaten divisions, and began to extend himself in the plains of Castiglione. Bonaparte saw him on the morning of the following day, the 17th (August 4th), put himself in line to receive battle. He resolved to attack him again, and to have another and a final engagement with him. This was to decide the fate of Italy; but for this purpose it was requisite that he should collect all his disposable troops at Castiglione. He therefore deferred this decisive battle till the 18th (August 5th).‡ He started at full gallop for Lonato, to accelerate in person the movement of his troops. In a few days he had killed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust any one with the execution of his orders; he was determined to see every thing, to verify every thing, to animate all by his presence. It is thus that a superior mind communicates itself to a vast mass, and fills it with its own ardour. He arrived about mid-day at Lonato. His orders were already put in execution; part of the troops were marching upon Castiglione; the rest were proceeding towards Salo and Gavardo. There remained at most a thousand men at Lonato. Scarcely had Bonaparte entered the place, when an Austrian flag of truce presented itself; and the bearer summoned him to surrender. The

father's house, where he died miserably, having mutilated his person with his own hands."—*Las Cases*. E.

* "That day was the most brilliant of Augereau's life; nor did Napoleon ever forget it."—*Montholon*. E.

† Bonaparte, in his despatch to the Directory, states the loss of the Austrians at from two to three thousand killed, and four thousand prisoners. Jomini says, "three thousand killed, wounded, or prisoners." E.

general, surprised, could not comprehend at first how it was possible that he should be in presence of the Austrians. He was soon enabled to account for the circumstance. The division, separated on the preceding day in the battle of Lonato, and driven back upon Salo, had been partly taken; but a corps of nearly four thousand men had been wandering all night in the mountains, and, seeing Lonato almost abandoned, wanted to enter the place, in order to open for itself an outlet to the Mincio. Bonaparte had but a thousand men to oppose to it, and, besides, he had no time to fight a battle. He immediately made all the officers about him mount their horses. He ordered the bearer of the flag of truce to be brought before him, and his eyes to be uncovered. "Wretched man!" said Bonaparte to him, "you know not then that you are in the presence of the general-in-chief, and that he is here with his whole army. Go, tell those who have sent you, that I give them five minutes to surrender, or I will put them to the sword to punish the insult which they have dared to offer me." He immediately ordered his artillery to be drawn up, and threatened to fire upon the advancing columns. The messengers went and carried back his answer; and the four thousand men laid down their arms before one thousand.* Bonaparte, saved by his presence of mind on this occasion, gave his orders for the conflict that was about to ensue. He added fresh troops to those which had already been despatched upon Salo. The division of Despinois was united with that of Sauret, and both, taking advantage of the ascendency of victory, were to attack Quasdanovich, and throw him back definitively into the mountains. He led all the rest to Castiglione. In the night he arrived there, and, without taking a moment's rest, mounted a fresh horse, and hastened to the field of battle, to make his dispositions. The coming day was to decide the fate of Italy.

It was in the plain of Castiglione that this battle was to be fought. A series of heights, formed by the last range of hills belonging to the Alps, extends from Chiesa to the Mincio, by Lonato, Castiglione, and Solferino. At the foot of these heights lies the plain that was to serve for the field of battle. The two armies were there in presence of each other, perpendicularly to the line of the heights on which both supported one wing; Bonaparte his left, Wurmser his right. Bonaparte had at most twenty-two thousand men; Wurmser thirty thousand. The latter had another advantage: his wing, which was in the plain, was covered by a redoubt placed on the knoll of Medolano. Thus it was supported on both sides. To counterbalance these advantages of number and position, Bonaparte reckoned upon

* This fact has been questioned by one historian, M. Botta, but it is confirmed by all the accounts; and I have received an attestation of its authenticity from M. Aubernon, quarter-master-general of the active army, who reviewed the four thousand prisoners.

the ascendency of victory, and upon his manœuvres. Wurmser would naturally strive to extend himself on his right, which was supported upon the line of the heights, in order to open a communication towards Lonato and Salo. This was what Bayalitsch had done two days before, and this was what would scarcely fail to be done by Wurmser, all whose wishes must tend to a junction with his great detachment. Bonaparte resolved to favour this movement, from which he hoped to derive important advantage. He had now at hand Serrurier's division, which, pursued by Wurmser ever since it had left Mantua, had not yet been able to enter into line. It was coming by way of Guirdizzolo. Bonaparte ordered it to debouch towards Cauriana, on Wurmser's rear. He waited for his fire to begin the combat.

By daybreak the two armies were in action. Wurmser, impatient to attack, moved his right along the heights; Bonaparte, to favour this movement, drew back his left, formed by Massena's division: he kept his centre immoveable in the plain. He soon heard Serrurier's fire. Then, while he continued to draw back his left, and Wurmser to prolong his right, he ordered the redoubt of Medolano to be attacked. At first he directed twenty pieces of light artillery upon that redoubt, and, after briskly cannonading it, he detached General Verdier, with three battalions of grenadiers, to storm it. That brave general advanced, supported by a regiment of cavalry, and took the redoubt. The left flank of the Austrians was thus uncovered, at the very moment when Serrurier, arriving at Cauriana, excited alarm upon their rear. Wurmser immediately moved part of his second line upon his right, deprived of support, and placed it *en potence* to make head against the French who were debouching from Medolano. The rest of his second line he moved back to cover Cauriana, and thus continued to make head against the enemy. But Bonaparte, seizing the moment with his wonted promptness, immediately ceased to refuse his left and his centre; he gave Massena and Augereau the signal which they were impatiently awaiting. Massena, with the left, Augereau with the centre, rushed upon the weakened line of the Austrians, and charged it with impetuosity. Attacked so briskly on its whole front, and threatened on its left and its rear, it began to give way. The ardour of the French redoubled. Wurmser, seeing his army compromised, gave the signal for retreat. He was pursued, and some prisoners were taken. To put him completely to the rout, it would have been necessary to make double haste, and to push him in disorder upon the Mincio. But, for six days,* the troops had been marching and fighting without

* "It has been said that during these extraordinary six days, Bonaparte never once took off his boots, nor lay down upon a bed."—*Bourrienne.* E.

intermission; they were unable to advance farther, and slept on the field of battle. Wurmser had on that day lost only two thousand men, but he had nevertheless lost Italy.

On the following day, Augereau proceeded to the bridge of Borghetto, and Massena before Peschiera. Augereau commenced a cannonade, which was followed by the retreat of the Austrians; and Massena fought a rear-guard action with the division which had masked Peschiera. The Mincio was abandoned by Wurmser; he again took the road to Rivoli between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, to regain the Tyrol. Massena followed him to Rivoli and to La Corona, and resumed his old positions. Augereau appeared before Verona. The Venetian proveditore, in order to give the Austrians time to evacuate the city and to save their baggage, demanded a respite of two hours before opening the gates; Bonaparte ordered them to be broken open with cannon-balls. The Veronese, who were devoted to the cause of Austria, and who had openly manifested their sentiments at the moment of the retreat of the French, dreaded the wrath of the conqueror, but they experienced at his hands the utmost lenity.

Towards Salo and La Chiesa, Quasdanovich was effecting an arduous retreat behind the Lake of Garda. He halted and attempted to defend a defile called La Rocca d'Anfo; but he was beaten and lost twelve hundred men. The French had soon recovered all their old positions.

This campaign had lasted six days; and in that short space of time some thirty thousand men had put sixty thousand *hors de combat*.* Wurmser had lost twenty thousand men, seven or eight thousand of whom were killed and twelve or thirteen thousand prisoners. He was driven into the mountains, and it was utterly impossible for him to keep the field. Thus had this redoubtable expedition vanished before a handful of brave men. These extraordinary results, unexampled in history, were owing to the promptness and vigour of resolution of the young commander. While two formidable armies covered both shores of the Lake of Garda, and the courage of all was shaken, he had known how to reduce the whole campaign to a single question —the junction of the two armies at the extremity of the Lake of Garda. He had known how to make a great sacrifice, that of the blockade of Mantua, in order to concentrate his forces at the decisive point; and, dealing tremendous blows to each of the enemy's masses in turn, at Salo, at Lonato, and at Castiglione, he had successively disorganized them, and driven them back into the mountains from which they had issued.

The Austrians were struck with consternation; the French

* "In the different engagements between the twenty-ninth of July and the twelfth of August, the French army took 15,000 prisoners, 70 pieces of cannon, and nine stand of colours; and killed or wounded 25,000 men. The loss of the French army was 7000 men."—*Montholon*. E.

transported with admiration of their young chief. Their confidence in and devotion to him were at their height. One battalion could put three to flight. The old soldiers, who had made him corporal at Lodi, promoted him to sergeant at Castiglione. In Italy, the sensation was profound. Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, the towns in the duchy of Modena, and all the friends of liberty, were transported with joy. Grief pervaded the convents and all the old aristocracies. Venice, Rome, and Naples, the governments which had committed imprudences, were terror-stricken.

Bonaparte, judging soundly of his position, did not consider the struggle as at an end, though he had deprived Wurmser of twenty thousand men. The old marshal was retiring into the Alps with forty thousand. He was going to rest, to rally, to recruit them, and it was to be presumed that he would pounce once more upon Italy. Bonaparte had lost a few thousand men, in prisoners, killed, and wounded; he had a great number in the hospitals: he thought it best to continue to temporize, to keep his eyes constantly upon the Tyrol, and his feet upon the Adige, and to content himself with overawing the Italian powers until he should have time to chastise them. He therefore merely took care to apprize the Venetians that he was informed of their armaments, and continued to make them furnish him with supplies at their own cost, still postponing the negotiations for an alliance. He had learned the arrival at Ferrara of a papal legate who had come to resume possession of the legations. He summoned him to his head-quarters. This legate, who was Cardinal Mattei,* fell at his feet, saying, *Peccavi.* Bonaparte put him under arrest in a seminary. He wrote to M. d'Azara, who was his go-between with the courts of Rome and Naples, complained to him of the imbecility and of the insincerity of the papal government, and declared his determination to turn back very soon upon it, if he were obliged to do so. With regard to the court of Naples, he assumed the most threatening language. "The English," said he to M. d'Azara, "have persuaded the King of Naples that he was something; I will soon prove to him that he is nothing. If he persists, in despite of the armistice, in arraying himself against us, I solemnly engage, before the face of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men with six thousand grenadiers, four thousand horse, and forty pieces of cannon."

He wrote a polite but firm letter to the Duke of Tuscany, who had suffered the English to occupy Porto Ferrajo, and told him that France had certainly had it in her power to punish him for this negligence by occupying his dominions, but that she forbore

* "Cardinal Mattei was born at Rome in 1744. Compelled in the year 1810 to repair to France with his colleagues, he was banished by Napoleon to Rhetel, for refusing to be present at his marriage with Maria Louisa. The Cardinal died in 1820."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

to do so for old friendship's sake. He changed the garrison of Leghorn, in order to awe Tuscany by a movement of troops. To Genoa he was silent. He wrote a strong letter to the King of Sardinia, who tolerated the Barbets in his territories, and despatched a column of twelve hundred men, with a roving military commission to seize and shoot all Barbets found on the roads. The people of Milan had shown the most amicable dispositions towards the French. He addressed to them a delicate and noble letter, expressing his thanks.* His recent victories gave him the strongest hopes of retaining Italy. He thought that he might proceed further with the Lombards; he granted them arms, and permitted them to raise a legion in their own pay, in which a great number of Italians, and the Poles wandering over Europe since the last partition, enrolled themselves. Bonaparte testified his satisfaction to the people of Bologna and Ferrara. Those of Modena desired to be emancipated from the regency established by the duke; Bonaparte had already some motives for breaking the armistice, for the regency had transmitted supplies to the garrison of Mantua. He resolved however to wait a while. He solicited reinforcements of the Directory to repair his losses, and remained at the entrance of the gorges of the Tyrol, ready to rush upon Wurmser and to destroy the remains of his army, as soon as he should learn that Moreau had crossed the Danube.

During these important events in Italy, others were in progress on the Danube. Moreau had pushed the archduke foot by foot, and had arrived in the middle of Thermidor (the first days of August), on the Danube. Jourdan was on the Naab, which falls into that river. The chain of the Alb, which separates the Neckar from the Danube, is composed of mountains of middling height, terminating in a plateau, crossed by defiles, narrow as fissures in rocks. It was by these defiles that Moreau had debouched upon the Danube, in an unequal country, intersected by ravines, and covered with wood. The archduke, who entertained the design of concentrating himself on the Danube, and recovering strength on that powerful line, suddenly formed a resolution which had well nigh compromised his judicious plans. He received intelligence that Wartensleben, instead of falling back upon him as near as possible to Donauwerth, was falling back towards Bohemia, under the foolish idea of covering it. He was apprehensive lest, profiting by this false movement, which uncovered the Danube, the army of the Sambre and Meuse should attempt to cross it. He resolved, therefore, to cross it himself, in order to file rapidly along the other shore, and to go

* "After the victory of Castiglione, Bonaparte returned his thanks to the Milanese in the name of the republic. 'Your people,' he said, 'render themselves daily more worthy of liberty, and they will, no doubt, one day appear with glory on the stage of the world.'"—*Moniteur*. E.

and make head against Jourdan. But the river was encumbered by his magazines, and it would take him some time to clear them out. He had, besides, no intention to execute the passage before the face of Moreau and within reach of his blows, and he conceived the idea of removing him by giving him battle with the Danube at his back—a bad idea, for which he has since severely censured himself, since it rendered him liable to be thrown into the river, or at least not to reach it entire, an indispensable condition for the success of his ulterior designs.

On the 24th of Thermidor (August 11), he halted before Moreau's positions, to make a general attack upon him. Moreau was at Neresheim, occupying the positions of Dunstelkingen and Dischingen by his right and his centre, and that of Nordlingen by his left. The archduke, wishing in the first place to remove him farther from the Danube, in the next to cut him off, if possible, from the mountains by which he had debouched, and lastly, to prevent him from communicating with Jourdan, attacked him in order to attain all his ends on all the points at once. He succeeded in turning the right of Moreau and in dispersing all his flankers; he advanced to Heidenheim, almost close to his rear, and excited such alarm that all his artillery fell back. At the centre he attempted a vigorous attack, but it was not sufficiently decisive. On the left, towards Nordlingen, he made threatening demonstrations. Moreau was not intimidated either by the demonstrations made upon his left, or by the excursion behind his right; and, judging very correctly that the essential point was at the centre, did the reverse of what is done by ordinary generals, who are always alarmed when their wings are threatened: he weakened his wings to strengthen the centre. His precaution was judicious, for the archduke, redoubling his efforts at the centre towards Dunstelkingen, was repulsed with loss. Both armies passed the night on the field of battle.

Next day Moreau found himself greatly embarrassed by the retrograde movement of his parks, which left him without ammunition. He nevertheless conceived that he ought to make amends by daring, and to affect an intention to attack. But the archduke, in a hurry to recross the Danube, had no mind to renew the combat; he retreated with great firmness to the Danube, repassed it unmolested by Moreau, and broke down the bridges as far as Donauwerth. There he learned what had passed between the two armies which had operated by the Mayn. Wartensleben had not thrown himself into Bohemia, as he feared, but had remained on the Naab, in presence of Jourdan. The young Austrian prince then formed an admirable resolution, which was the consequence of his long retreat, and which was calculated to decide the campaign. His aim, in falling back upon the Danube, had been to concentrate himself there, that he might have it in his power to act upon one or

other of the two French armies with a superior mass of forces. The battle of Neresheim might have thwarted this plan, if, instead of being uncertain, it had been positively disastrous. But, having retreated unhurt to the Danube, he could now take advantage of the separation of the French armies, and fall upon one of the two. He consequently resolved to leave General Latour, with thirty-six thousand men, to occupy Moreau, and to proceed himself with twenty-five thousand towards Wartensleben, in order to overwhelm Jourdan by this junction of forces. Jourdan's army was the weaker of the two. At so great a distance from his base, he numbered little more than forty-five thousand men. It was evident that he could not resist, and that he was even likely to be exposed to great disasters. Jourdan being beaten and driven back to the Rhine, Moreau, on his part, could not remain in Bavaria, and the archduke might even proceed to the Neckar, and anticipate him on his line of retreat. This conception has been considered the most judicious of any that the Austrian generals have to boast during these long wars. Like those which at the same moment shed lustre on the genius of Bonaparte in Italy, it belonged to a young man.

The archduke set out from Ingoldstadt on the 29th of Thermidor (August 16), five days after the battle of Neresheim. Jourdan, placed on the Naab, between Naabburg and Schwandorf, was not aware of the storm that was gathering over his head. He had detached General Bernadotte* to Neumarkt, on

* "Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte was born in 1764. His father was a lawyer. In 1780 the son entered the military profession, and was still a sergeant in 1789. When the Revolution broke out he embraced its principles with enthusiasm, and obtained quick promotion in the army. In 1794 he was general of division at the battle of Fleurus; and in 1796 he served in Jourdan's army. He afterwards led reinforcements to the army of Italy; and shortly before the 18th of Fructidor, Bonaparte chose him to carry to the Directory the banners taken at the battle of Rivoli. After the treaty of Campo Formio, Bernadotte was appointed ambassador of the French republic to the court of Vienna. He was next placed in the ministry of war, but, being speedily removed from office, retired into private life till the 18th of Brumaire, when Napoleon called him to the council of state. Here he opposed the establishment of the order of the Legion of Honour, which gave great umbrage to the First Consul. In 1804, on the establishment of the Empire, Bernadotte was created a marshal, and soon afterwards received the grand decoration of the Legion of Honour. He greatly distinguished himself at the battle of Austerlitz, and in the same year the Emperor created him Prince of Ponte-Corvo. From the close of 1807 to 1809 he commanded the French army which remained in the north of Germany. At the battle of Wagram he led the Saxon allies who fought with great skill and bravery. In consequence, however, of an altercation with the Emperor, he quitted the service, and went to Paris. In 1810 he was appointed successor to the Swedish throne, by the name of Charles John. In 1813 he issued a formal declaration of war against Napoleon, placed himself at the head of the Swedish army in Germany, and contributed greatly to the victory of the allies at Leipsic. In the following year he obtained the cession of Norway to Sweden. In 1818 he succeeded to the throne by the title of Charles XIV.; and since his accession has done every thing in his power to promote the welfare and happiness of his subjects, with

his right, with a view to put himself in communication with Moreau—an object which it was impossible to accomplish, and for which a detached corps was uselessly compromised. With this detachment, the archduke, coming from the Danube, must necessarily fall in. General Bernadotte, attacked by superior forces, made an honourable resistance, but was obliged rapidly to recross the mountains by which the army had debouched from the valley of the Mayn into that of the Danube. He retired to Nuremberg. The archduke, having despatched a corps in pursuit of him, proceeded with the rest of his forces against Jourdan. The latter, having received intelligence that a reinforcement was coming, and being apprized of the danger which Bernadotte had incurred, and of the retreat which he was obliged to make upon Nuremberg, resolved to recross the mountains himself. At the moment when he was commencing his march, he was attacked at once by the archduke and Wartensleben; he had a difficult combat to sustain at Amberg, and lost his direct route to Nuremberg. Thrown, with his artillery, his infantry, and his cavalry, into cross-roads, he incurred the greatest dangers, and was eight days in making a most difficult but a most honourable retreat, both for the troops and for himself. He found himself once more on the Mayn, at Schweinfurt, on the 12th of Fructidor (August 29), purposing to proceed to Wurtzburg, to halt there, to rally his corps, and to try the fortune of arms.

While the archduke was executing this admirable movement upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse, he afforded Moreau occasion to execute a similar one, equally masterly and equally decisive. An enemy never attempts any daring stroke without uncovering himself and opening favourable chances to his adversary. Moreau, having no more than thirty-eight thousand men opposed to him, might easily have overwhelmed them by acting with a little vigour. He might have done still more (in the opinion of Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles), he might have made a movement, the results of which would have been immense. He should himself have followed the march of the enemy, have fallen upon the archduke, as that prince was himself falling upon Jourdan, and have got unawares

whom he is deservedly popular. His son, Oscar, the crown prince, who was born in 1799, is said to be a young man every way worthy of his father. It is remarkable that Bernadotte is the only sovereign who has retained a throne acquired during the late wars in Europe."—*Encyclopædia Americana.* E.

"Bernadotte," said Napoleon, "was ungrateful to me, as I was the author of his greatness; but I cannot say that he betrayed me; he in a manner became a Swede, and never promised that which he did not intend to perform. I can accuse him of ingratitude, but not of treachery. Neither Murat nor he would have declared against me, had they thought it would have lost me my throne. Their wish was, to diminish my power, but not to destroy me altogether. Bernadotte is a Gascon, a little inclined to boasting."—*A Voice from St. Helena.* E.

upon his rear. The archduke, caught between Jourdan and Moreau, would have incurred incalculable dangers. But for this purpose he must have executed a very extensive movement, suddenly changed his line of operation, and thrown himself from the Neckar upon the Mayn; he must, moreover, have disobeyed the instructions of the Directory, which ordered him to support himself upon the Tyrol, with a view to turn the enemy's flanks and to communicate with the army of Italy. The young conqueror of Castiglione would not have hesitated to take this bold step and to have committed such a disobedience, which would have decided the campaign in a victorious manner; but Moreau was incapable of such a determination. He remained several days on the banks of the Danube, ignorant of the departure of the archduke, and leisurely exploring a position that was then but little known. Being at length apprized of the movement which had taken place, he was alarmed for Jourdan; but, not daring to take any vigorous determination, he resolved to cross the Danube and to advance into Bavaria, to try to draw the archduke back upon him, while adhering to the plan prescribed by the Directory. It was, however, easy to judge that the archduke would not quit Jourdan till he had put him *hors de combat*, and that he would not suffer himself to be diverted from the execution of a vast plan by an incursion into Bavaria. Moreau, nevertheless, crossed the Danube after Latour, and approached the Lech. Latour showed an intention to dispute the passage of the Lech; but, too much extended to support himself there, he was obliged to abandon it, after being worsted in an action at Friedberg. Moreau then approached Munich: on the 15th of Fructidor (September 1) he was at Dachau, Pfaffenhofen, and Geisenfeld.

Thus Fortune began to be less favourable to us in Germany, owing to a vicious plan, which, separating our armies, rendered them liable to be beaten singly. Other results were preparing in Italy also. We have seen that Bonaparte, after he had driven back the Austrians into the Tyrol, and resumed his old positions on the Adige, meditated fresh designs against Wurmser. Not content with having destroyed twenty thousand of his men, he wished to ruin his army entirely. This operation was indispensable for the execution of all his plans in Italy. Wurmser destroyed, he could make a push as far as Trieste, ruin that port, so important for Austria, then return to the Adige, give law to Venice, Rome, and Naples, whose ill-will was still as manifest as ever, and at length throw out the signal of liberty in Italy, by constituting Lombardy, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and perhaps even the duchy of Modena, an independent republic. In order to accomplish these plans, he resolved to ascend into the Tyrol, certain of being now seconded by the presence of Moreau, on the other slope of the Alps.

While the French troops were taking about three weeks' rest,

Wurmser had reorganized and reinforced his. New detachments from Austria and the Tyrolese militia enabled him to increase his army to nearly fifty thousand men. The Aulic Council sent him a new chief of the staff, General Lauer, of the engineers, with fresh instructions respecting the plan to be pursued for taking the line of the Adige. Wurmser was to leave eighteen or twenty thousand men under Davidovich, to guard the Tyrol, and to descend with the rest, by the valley of the Brenta, into the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. The Brenta rises not far from Trent, recedes from the Adige in the form of an arch, again becomes parallel to that river in the plain, and discharges itself into the Adriatic. A causeway, commencing at Trent, leads into the valley of the Brenta, and, running through Bassano, terminates in the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. Wurmser would have to pass through this valley, in order to debouch in the plain and to attempt the passage of the Adige between Verona and Legnago. This plan was not better conceived than the preceding, for it was still attended with the inconvenience of dividing him into two corps and placing Bonaparte between them.

Wurmser entered into action at the same moment as Bonaparte. The latter, ignorant of Wurmser's designs, but foreseeing, with rare sagacity, that, during his excursion to the extremity of the Tyrol, the enemy might possibly try the line of the Adige, from Verona to Legnano, left General Kilmaine at Verona, with a reserve of nearly three thousand men, and with all the means of resisting for two days at least. General Sahuguet remained, with a division of eight thousand men, before Mantua. Bonaparte set out with twenty-eight thousand, and ascended by all the three roads of the Tyrol, that which runs behind the Lake of Garda and the two which border the Adige. On the 17th of Fructidor (September 3), Sauret's division, now become Vaubois', after passing behind the Lake of Garda, and fighting several actions, arrived at Torbole, near the upper extremity of the lake. On the same day, Massena's and Augereau's divisions, which at first proceeded along both banks of the Adige, and afterwards formed a junction on one bank by means of the bridge of Golo, arrived before Seravalle. They fought an advanced-guard action, and took some prisoners from the enemy.

The French had now to ascend a narrow and deep valley. On their left they had the Adige, on their right lofty mountains. In places, the river, running close to the foot of the mountains, left only the breadth of the causeway, and thus formed frightful defiles to pass. In penetrating into the Tyrol, there was more than one of this kind to encounter. But the French, daring and active, were as fit for this kind of warfare as for that which they had just been carrying on in the extensive plains of the Mantuan.

Davidovich had placed two divisions, one in the camp of

Mori, on the right bank of the Adige, to make head against Vaubois' division, which was advancing along the causeway from Salo to Roveredo, behind the Lake of Garda; the other at San Marco, on the left bank, to guard the defile against Massena and Augereau. On the 18th of Fructidor (September 4th), the French and Austrians found themselves in presence of each other. It was Wukassovich's division that defended the defile of San Marco. Bonaparte, instantly adopting the kind of tactics suited to the situation, formed two corps of light infantry, and distributed them on the right and left on the surrounding heights. Then, after he had fatigued the Austrians for some time, he formed the 18th demi-brigade into close column by battalions, and ordered General Victor* to force the defile with it. A violent combat ensued; the Austrians at first kept their ground, but Bonaparte decided the action by directing General Dubois to charge at the head of the hussars. That brave general rushed upon the Austrian infantry, broke it, and fell pierced with three balls. He was borne away expiring. "Before I die," said he to Bonaparte, "let me know if we are conquerors." The Austrians fled on all sides and retired to Roveredo, a league distant from Marco. They were pursued at a run. Roveredo is at some distance from the Adige; Bonaparte directed Rampon, with the 32nd, towards the space between the river and the town; and Victor, with the 18th, upon the town itself. The latter entered

* "Perrin Victor was born in 1766. In his fifteenth year he entered the army as a private soldier, and by his good conduct at Toulon obtained the rank of general of brigade. From the breaking out of the Revolution to the battle of Friedland he was almost constantly in the field, and his gallantry in that great action procured him his marshal's baton. On the peace of Tilsit Victor was appointed governor of Berlin, but he had been only fifteen months there when he was sent to Spain, where he remained from 1808 to 1812, while his troops on more than one occasion disgraced themselves by shameful excesses. At the battle of Talavera, Victor was defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley with the loss of about ten thousand men. After an unsuccessful, though tedious, siege of Cadiz, the marshal, whom the Emperor had now created Duke of Belluno, was summoned to the Russian campaign. At the Beresina, Dresden, Leipsic, and Hanau, Victor fought nobly, and equally so on the invasion of France by the allies in 1814. After incredible efforts at Nangis and Villeneuve, and seeing his son-in-law killed before his face, he took a few hours' rest at Salins. This greatly enraged Napoleon, who had commanded him to pursue the allies to Montereau without intermission, and he told him that his command was given to another, and that he might go about his business. The tears streamed down the marshal's cheeks as he replied, 'No, sire, I will not leave the service. Victor was once a grenadier, and has not forgotten how to use the musket. I will take my place in the ranks with the soldiers of the guard.' The Emperor, affected by this proof of fidelity, stretched out his hand to the marshal, and said, 'I cannot return you your command, since another has it, but you may head two brigades of my guard.' The veteran did so, and throughout the remainder of the campaign, fought with the most determined bravery. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, Victor followed Louis to Ghent, and on the second restoration was made a French peer, and minister of war in 1821. At a subsequent period, he was sent as ambassador to Vienna."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

the main street of Roveredo at the charge step, swept the Austrians before him, and reached the other extremity of the town at the very moment when Rampon was completing the exterior circuit of it. While the principal army was thus carrying San Marco and Roveredo, Vaubois' division arrived by the other bank of the Adige. The Austrian division of Reuss had disputed with it the camp of Mori, but Vaubois had just carried it, and all the divisions were now united about noon, on both banks of the river, near Roveredo. But the most difficult task was yet to be performed.

Davidovich had rallied his two divisions upon his reserve, in the defile of Calliano—a formidable defile, and dangerous in a very different way from that of Marco. At this point, the Adige, running close to the mountains, left but the width of the causeway between its bed and their foot. The entrance of the defile was closed by the castle of La Pietra, which connected the mountain with the river and was crowned with artillery.

Bonaparte, persisting in his tactics, distributed his light infantry on the right upon the declivities of the mountain, and on the left, upon the banks of the river. His soldiers, born on the banks of the Rhone, the Seine, or the Loire, equalled the hunters of the Alps in boldness and agility. Some, climbing from rock to rock, attained the summit of the mountain, and poured down a perpendicular fire upon the enemy; others, not less intrepid, glided along the river, venturing wherever they could find a footing, and turned the castle of La Pietra. General Dommartin placed a battery of light artillery in a situation where it produced the best effect: the castle was taken. The army then passed through it, and advanced in close column upon the Austrian army, crowded together in the defile. Artillery, cavalry, infantry, were intermingled, and fled in frightful disorder. Young Lemarois, aide-de-camp of the general in chief, with a view to prevent the flight of the Austrians, dashed away at full gallop at the head of fifty hussars, passed through the whole length of the Austrian mass, then suddenly facing about, attempted to stop the van. He was struck from his horse, but he spread terror in the Austrian ranks, and gave the cavalry which hastened after him, time to pick up several thousand prisoners. Thus ended that series of actions which made the French army master of the defiles of the Tyrol, the town of Roveredo, the whole of the Austrian artillery, and four thousand prisoners, exclusively of killed and wounded. Bonaparte called this affair the battle of Roveredo.

On the following day, the 16th of Fructidor (September 5th), the French entered Trent, the capital of the Italian Tyrol. The bishop had fled. Bonaparte, in order to appease the Tyrolese, who were strongly attached to the house of Austria, addressed to them a proclamation, in which he exhorted them to lay down their arms and not to commit hostilities against his army, pro-

mising that, on this condition their property and public establishments should be respected. Wurmser was no longer at Trent. Bonaparte had surprised him at the moment when he was marching to execute his plan. On seeing the French enter the Tyrol, for the purpose of communicating perhaps with Germany, Wurmser was only the more disposed to descend by the Brenta, in order to possess himself of the Adige during their absence. He even hoped, by means of this rapid circuit, which would bring him to Verona, to enclose the French in the upper valley of the Adige, and at once to envelop them and to cut them off from Mantua. He had set out two days before, and must already have reached Bassano. Bonaparte immediately formed one of the boldest of resolutions. He determined to leave Vaubois to guard the Tyrol, and to hasten himself, through the gorges of the Brenta, after Wurmser. He could not take with him more than twenty thousand men, and Wurmser had thirty; he might be cooped up in those frightful gorges, if Wurmser should make head against him; he might also come too late to fall upon the rear of Wurmser, and the latter might have time to force the Adige. All this was possible, but his twenty thousand men were as good as thirty; if Wurmser attempted to oppose him and to shut him up in the gorges, he would cut his way through his army; if he had twenty leagues to go, he would perform that distance in two days and reach the plain as soon as Wurmser. He would then drive him back either upon Trieste or upon the Adige. If he drove him upon Trieste, he would pursue him and burn that port before his face; if he drove him upon the Adige, he would hem him in between his army and the river, and thus envelop the enemy who thought to catch him in the gorges of the Tyrol.

This young man, whose conceptions and resolutions were prompt as lightning, ordered Vaubois, on the very day of his arrival at Trent, to proceed to the Lavis, and to take that position from the rear-guard of Davidovich. He made Vaubois execute this order before his face, pointed out to him the position which he was to occupy with his ten thousand men, and then set out with twenty thousand to dash through the gorges of the Brenta.

He started on the morning of the 20th (September 6th), and passed the night at Levico. Next morning, the 21st (September 7th), he resumed his march, and arrived before another defile called the defile of Primolano, where Wurmser had placed a division. Bonaparte employed the same manœuvres as before, threw tirailleurs upon the heights and upon the bank of the Brenta, and then ordered a column to charge upon the road. The defile was taken. There was a small fort beyond it; this was surrounded and carried. A few intrepid soldiers, running forward along the road, outstripped the fugitives, stopped them, and gave the army time to come up and secure them. Three

thousand prisoners were taken. Bonaparte arrived in the evening at Cismona, after marching twenty leagues in two days. He would have advanced farther, but the soldiers were unable to proceed; he was himself exhausted with fatigue. He had distanced his head-quarters, and had neither attendants nor victuals. He partook of the ammunition bread of one of the soldiers,* and lay down to wait with impatience for the morrow.

This daring and unexpected march filled Wurmser with astonishment. He could not conceive how his foe could have ventured into those gorges, at the risk of being shut up there. He was at Bassano, which closed the outlet, and he resolved to bar the passage with his whole army. If he succeeded in the attempt, Bonaparte would be taken in the bend of the Brenta. He had already sent the division of Mezaros to try Verona; but he recalled it that he might combat here with all his forces; it was not probable, however, that the order would arrive in time. The town of Bassano is seated on the left bank of the Brenta. It communicates with the right bank by a bridge. Wurmser placed the two divisions of Schlotterndorf and Quasdanovich on the two banks of the Brenta, in advance of the town, and six battalions as an advanced guard in the defiles which precede Bassano and close the valley.

On the morning of the 22nd (September 8th), Bonaparte left Cismona and advanced towards Bassano. Massena marched on the right bank, Augereau on the left. The defiles were carried, and the French debouched in presence of the enemy's army, drawn up on both banks of the Brenta. Wurmser's soldiers, disconcerted by their audacity, did not resist with the courage which they had shown on so many other occasions. They gave way, were broken, and entered Bassano.† Augereau appeared

* "Napoleon, in his eagerness to pursue the enemy, outrode all his suite, and passed the night alone, wrapped in his cloak, on the ground, in the midst of a regiment of infantry who bivouacked round the town. A private soldier shared with him his rations, and reminded him of it, after he became emperor, in the camp at Boulogne."—*Alison.* E.

† "Napoleon the same night visited the field of battle at Bassano, and he told this anecdote of it at St. Helena: 'In the deep silence of a beautiful moonlight night,' observed the Emperor, 'a dog leaping suddenly from beneath the clothes of his dead master, rushed upon us, and then immediately returned to his hiding-place, howling piteously. He alternately licked his master's face, and again flew at us; thus at once soliciting aid, and threatening revenge. Whether owing to my own particular mood of mind at the moment, the time, the place, or the action itself, I know not, but certainly no incident on any field of battle ever produced so deep an impression on me. I involuntarily stopped to contemplate the scene. This man, thought I, must have had among his comrades friends; and yet here he lies, forsaken by all, except his dog! What a strange being is man, and how mysterious are his impressions! I had without emotion ordered battles which were to decide the fate of armies; I had beheld with tearless eyes the execution of those operations in the course of which numbers of my countrymen were sacrificed; and here my feelings were roused by the mournful howling of a dog! Certainly at that moment I should have been easily moved by a suppliant

at the entrance of the town. Massena, on the opposite bank, resolved to penetrate by the bridge. He carried it in close column, like that of Lodi, and entered the place at the same time as Augereau. Wurmser, whose head-quarters were still there, had only to escape, leaving us four thousand prisoners and an immense *matériel*. Bonaparte's plan was thus realized. He had reached the plain as soon as Wurmser, and it was now his business to envelop him by driving him backward upon the Adige.

Wurmser, in the disorder of so hurried an action, found himself separated from the remains of Quasdanovich's division This division retired towards the Friule; and he, pressed by Massena's and Augereau's divisions, which cut him off from the road to the Friule, and drove him towards the Adige, formed the resolution of forcing a passage across that river and throwing himself into Mantua. He had been rejoined by the division of Mezaros, which had made vain efforts to take Verona. He now numbered no more than fourteen thousand men, eight of which were infantry, and six excellent cavalry. He proceeded along the Adige, seeking a passage every where. Luckily for him, the post which guarded Legnago had been removed to Verona, and a detachment which was to come and occupy the place had not yet arrived. Wurmser, profiting by this accident, took possession of Legnago. Certain of being now able to regain Mantua, he gave some rest to his troops, who were overwhelmed with fatigue.

Bonaparte followed him without intermission. He was deeply mortified on hearing of the negligence which had saved Wurmser; he did not, however, despair of still preventing him from reaching Mantua. He transferred Massena's division to the other bank of the Adige by means of the ferry of Ronco, and directed it upon Sanguinetto, to bar the road to Mantua. He directed Augereau towards Legnago itself. Massena's advanced guard, outstripping his division, entered Cerea on the 25th (September 11), at the moment when Wurmser was arriving there from Legnago with his whole *corps d'armée*. This advanced guard of cavalry and light infantry, commanded by Generals Murat and Pigeon, made a most heroic resistance but was overthrown: Wurmser forced his way through it and continued his march. Bonaparte arrived alone at a gallop, at the moment of this action: he narrowly escaped being taken, and rode off in the utmost haste.*

enemy, and I could very well imagine Achilles surrendering up the body of Hector at the sight of Priam's tears."—*Las Cases*. E.

* "The Austrians fought with the courage of despair, and their cavalry, which was unbroken, and whose spirit had not suffered by disaster, proved irresistible to their enemies. Napoleon himself, who had come up during the engagement, had great difficulty in saving himself by flight; and Wurmser, who arrived a few minutes after, deemed himself so secure of his antago-

Wurmser passed through Sanguinetto; then, being informed that all the bridges over the Molinella were broken down excepting that of Villimpenta, he descended to that bridge, crossed the Molenilla, and marched for Mantua. General Charton attempted to oppose him with three hundred men formed into a square. Those brave fellows were all killed or taken. Thus Wurmser arrived at Mantua on the 27th (September 13). These slight advantages served to soothe the old and brave marshal under his disasters. He spread himself over the environs of Mantua, and for a moment kept the field, owing to his numerous and excellent cavalry.

Bonaparte arrived breathless and enraged against the negligent officers, who had caused him to lose so important a prize. Augereau had re-entered Legnano, and had made the Austrian garrison prisoners. It consisted of sixteen hundred men. Bonaparte ordered Augereau to proceed to Governolo on the Lower Mincio. He then commenced a series of petty actions with Wurmser, to draw him out of the place, and in the night between the 28th and 29th (September 14 and 15) he took a backward position to induce Wurmser to show himself in the plain. The old general, enticed by his slight successes, actually deployed outside Mantua, between the citadel and the suburb of St. George. Bonaparte attacked him on the 3rd, complementary day (September 19). Augereau, coming from Governolo, formed the left; Massena, starting from Due Castelli, formed the centre; and Sahuguet, with the blockading corps, formed the right. Wurmser still had twenty-one thousand men in line. He was forced back every where, and driven into the place with the loss of two thousand men. Some days afterwards he was entirely shut up in Mantua. The numerous cavalry which he had brought back with him was useless, and served only to increase the number of unprofitable mouths; he therefore ordered the horses to be killed and salted. He had some twenty thousand men in garrison, several thousand of whom were in the hospitals.

Thus, though Bonaparte had partly lost the fruit of his most daring march to the Brenta, and had not forced the marshal to lay down his arms, he had entirely ruined and dispersed his army. Some thousand men were driven back into the Tyrol under Davidovich; and some thousand were fleeing into the Friule under Quasdanovich. Wurmser, with twelve or fourteen thousand, had shut himself up in Mantua. Thirteen or fourteen thousand were prisoners, six or seven thousand slain or wounded. Thus this army had lost about twenty thousand men, besides a

nist that he recommended to his dragoons to take him alive. Having missed so brilliant a stroke, the old marshal continued his march, passed the Molenilla, cut to pieces a body of eight hundred infantry which endeavoured to interrupt his progress, and entered Mantua in a species of triumph which threw a ray of glory over his long series of disasters."—*Alison*. E.

considerable *matériel*, in ten days. Bonaparte had lost seven or eight thousand, fifteen hundred of whom were prisoners. and the rest killed, wounded, or sick. Thus to the armies of Colli and Beaulieu, destroyed on entering Italy, was to be added that of Wurmser, destroyed twice over, in the plains of Castiglione and on the banks of the Brenta. To the trophies of Montenotte, Lodi, Borghetto, Lonato, and Castiglione, were to be added those of Roveredo, Bassano, and St. George. At what period of history had such great results been seen, so many enemies slain, so many prisoners, colours, and cannon, taken! These tidings diffused fresh joy in Lombardy, and terror in the farthest extremities of the Peninsula. France was transported with admiration for the commander of the army of Italy.

Moreau had advanced upon the Lech, as we have seen, in the hope that his progress in Bavaria would bring back the archduke and extricate Jourdan. This hope was not well founded, and the archduke would have ill appreciated the importance of his movement had he relinquished its execution to return towards Moreau. The whole campaign depended on what was about to take place on the Mayn. If Jourdan were beaten and driven back upon the Rhine, the progress of Moreau would serve only to compromise him still more, and to expose him to the risk of losing his line of retreat. The archduke, therefore, contented himself with despatching General Nauendorf, with ten regiments of cavalry and some battalions to reinforce Latour, and continued his pursuit of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

That brave army retired with the deepest regret, retaining the entire consciousness of its strength. It was this army that had performed the greatest and the most brilliant exploits during the first years of the Revolution. It was this army that had conquered at Watignies, at Fleurus, on the banks of the Ourthe and of the Roer. It had a warm esteem for its general and a strong confidence in itself. This retreat had not disheartened it, and it was persuaded that it yielded solely to superior combinations and to the mass of the hostile forces. It ardently desired an occasion for measuring its strength with the Austrians, and re-establishing the honour of its flag. Jourdan desired it too. The Directory wrote to him that he must at all hazards maintain his ground in Franconia on the Upper Mayn, in order to take up his winter-quarters in Germany, and more particularly not to uncover Moreau, who had advanced to the very gates of Munich. Moreau, on his part, had acquainted Jourdan, by a despatch dated the 8th of Fructidor (August 25), with his march beyond the Lech, the advantages which he had gained there, and his intention of advancing still farther with a view to bring back the archduke. All these reasons induced Jourdan to try the fortune of arms, though he had before him a very superior force. He would have deemed it derogatory to his honour had he quitted Franconia without fighting, and left his colleague by

himself in Bavaria. Misled, moreover, by the movement of General Nauendorf, Jourdan conceived that the archduke had set out again for the banks of the Danube. He halted, therefore at Wurtzburg, a place which he judged it important to preserve, but of which the French retained the citadel alone. He there gave some rest to his troops, made some changes in the distribution and the command of his divisions, and declared his intention to fight. The army displayed the greatest ardour in carrying all the positions which Jourdan deemed it advisable to occupy before he gave battle. He had his right supported upon Wurtzburg, and the rest of his line upon a series of positions extending along the Mayn to Schweinfurth. The Mayn separated him from the enemy. Part of the Austrian army only had crossed that river, which confirmed him in the idea that the archduke had gone back to the Danube. He left at the extremity of his line Lefebvre's division at Schweinfurth, to secure his retreat upon the Saale and the Fulda, in case the result of the battle should cut him off from the road to Frankfurt. He thus deprived himself of a second line and of a corps of reserve; but he conceived that he owed this sacrifice to the duty of securing his retreat. He determined to attack on the morning of the 17th of Fructidor (September 3).

During the night between the 16th and 17th, the archduke, apprized of the plan of his adversary, caused the rest of his army quickly to cross the Mayn and deployed a very superior force before Jourdan's face. The battle commenced, at first with advantage to us; but our cavalry being attacked in the plains extending along the Mayn by the powerful cavalry of the Austrians, was broken, rallied, was again broken, and sought shelter behind the lines and the steady fire of our infantry. Jourdan, if his reserve had not been at too great a distance from him, might have won the victory; he sent to Lefebvre officers who could not penetrate through the numerous squadrons of the enemy. He hoped, nevertheless, that Lefebvre, seeing that Schweinfurth was not threatened, would march to the place of danger; but he waited in vain, and made his army fall back in order to withdraw it from the formidable cavalry by which it was assailed. The retreat was made in good order upon Arnstein. Jourdan, the victim of the vicious plan of the Directory and of his attachment to his colleague, was now under the necessity of retiring to the Lahn. He continued his march without intermission, ordered Marceau to retire from before Mayence, and arrived behind the Lahn on the 24th of Fructidor (September 10). His army, in its arduous march to the very frontiers of Bohemia, had not lost more than five or six thousand men. It sustained a sensible loss in the death of young Marceau, who was struck by the ball of a Tyrolese rifleman, and who could not be removed from the field of battle. The Archduke Charles caused every attention to be paid to him, but he soon expired. The young hero, regretted by

the two armies, was buried under a discharge of the artillery of both.*

During these occurrences on the Mayn, Moreau, still beyond the Danube and the Lech, was waiting with impatience for tidings from Jourdan. None of the officers sent to bring him intelligence had arrived. He hesitated, without venturing to take any resolution. Meanwhile, his left, under the command of Desaix, had to sustain a most violent attack from the cavalry of Latour, which, united with Nauendorf's, debouched unawares by Langenbrück. Desaix made such judicious and such prompt dispositions, that he repulsed the numerous squadrons of the enemy, and dispersed them in the plain, after inflicting upon them a considerable loss. Moreau, still left in uncertainty, at length decided, after a delay of about three weeks, to attempt a movement for the purpose of gaining intelligence. He resolved to approach the Danube, in order to extend his left wing to Nuremberg, and to obtain tidings of Jourdan, or to afford him succour. On the 24th of Fructidor, he directed his left and his centre to recross the Danube, and left his right alone on the other side of the river, near Zell. The left, under Desaix, advanced as far as Aichstett. In this singular situation, he extended his left towards Jourdan, who at the moment was sixty leagues distant from him: he had his centre on the Danube, and his right beyond it, exposing one of those three corps to the risk of being destroyed, if Latour had been capable of taking advantage of their separation. All military men have censured Moreau for this movement, as one of those half means which have all the danger of grand measures without any of their advantages. Moreau, having in fact missed the opportunity of briskly falling upon the archduke when the latter was falling upon Jourdan, could only expose himself to danger by thus placing himself *à cheval* upon the Danube.

At length, after waiting four days in this singular situation, he became aware of the danger, moved back beyond the Danube, and thought of ascending it in order to approach his base of operation. He then received intelligence of the forced retreat of Jourdan on the Lahn, and he had no doubt that the archduke, after forcing back the army of the Sambre and Meuse, would fly to the Neckar to cut off the retreat of the army of the

* "During the night of the 16th, after an obstinate engagement, the republicans sounded a retreat under cover of a thick fog, which long concealed their movements from the Austrians; and when it cleared away on the following morning, they found all their positions abandoned. The pursuit was continued with vigour, and on the 19th a serious engagement took place with the rear-guard at Altenkirchen, where General Marceau was severely wounded, and fell into the hands of the Imperialists. The archduke, who admired his great military qualities, paid him the most unremitting attention; but, in spite of all his care, he died a few days after, and was buried with military honours, amidst the tears of his generous enemies."—*Jomini.* E.

Rhine. He was likewise informed of an attempt made by the garrison of Mannheim upon Kehl, with a view to destroy the bridge by which the French army had entered Germany. In this state of things, he hesitated no longer to march for the purpose of regaining France. His position was perilous. In the heart of Bavaria, having to recross the Black Mountains to return to the Rhine, having in front Latour with forty thousand men, and likely to find the Archduke Charles with thirty thousand on his rear, he could not help foreseeing incalculable dangers. But, if he had not that vast and ardent genius which his rival displayed in Italy, he was endowed with a resolute mind, inaccessible to those alarms with which impetuous dispositions are sometimes seized. He had a superb army, some sixty thousand strong, whose courage had not been shaken by any defeat, and which placed extreme confidence in its leader. Duly appreciating such a resource, he was not frightened at his position, and resolved quietly to regain his route. Thinking that the archduke, after forcing Jourdan to fall back, would probably return to the Neckar, he was apprehensive lest he should find that river already occupied: he therefore ascended the valley of the Danube, to proceed direct to that of the Rhine by way of the forest towns. These passes being the most distant from the point where the archduke then was, appeared to him to be the safest.

He remained, therefore, beyond the Danube, and ascended it quietly, supporting one of his wings upon the river. His artillery, and his baggage marched before him, without confusion; and every day his rear-guard bravely repulsed the enemy's advanced guards. Latour, instead of crossing the Danube, and striving to prevent Moreau from entering the defiles, was content to follow him step by step, without daring to attack him. On reaching the lake of Federsee, Moreau thought fit to halt. Latour had divided his forces into three corps; he had given one to Nauendorf, and sent him to Tübingen on the Upper Neckar, through which Moreau did not mean to pass; he was himself with the second at Biberach; and the third was at a great distance, at Schussenried. Moreau, who was approaching the Höllenthal, by which he intended to retreat, who wished not to be too closely pressed in the passage of that defile, who saw Latour by himself before him, and who was aware that a victory must impart firmness to his troops during the rest of the retreat, halted on the 11th of Vendémiaire (October 2) in the environs of the lake of Federsee, not far from Biberach. The country was hilly, wooded, and intersected by valleys. Latour was ranged on several heights, which it was possible to cut off from one another and to turn, and which, moreover, were backed by a deep ravine, that of the Riss. Moreau attacked him at all points, and cleverly contriving to penetrate through his positions, attacking some in front and turning others, he drove him back

to the Riss, threw him into it, and took from him four thousand prisoners. This important victory, called after the town of Biberach, drove back Latour to a great distance, and remarkably increased the courage of the French army. Moreau resumed his march and approached the defiles. He was already past the roads which run through the valley of the Neckar and lead into that of the Rhine. The road which passes through Tuttlingen and Rothweil was yet left to him, towards the very sources of the Neckar, follows the valley of the Kintzig, and terminates at Kehl, but this Nauendorf had already occupied. The detachments which had come from Mannheim had already joined the latter, and the archduke was approaching him. Moreau preferred to ascend a little higher, and to pass through the Höllenthal, which, running through the Black Forest, formed a longer elbow, but led to Breisach, much farther from the archduke. Accordingly, he placed Desaix and Ferino, with the left and the right, towards Tuttlingen and Rothweil, to cover himself on the side next to the outlets where the principal Austrian forces were; and he sent the centre, under St. Cyr,* to force the Höllenthal. At the same time, he made his heavy artillery file off for Huningen by way of the forest towns. The Austrians had surrounded him with a multitude of petty corps, as if they had hoped to envelop him, and had not left themselves strong enough any where to resist him. St. Cyr found scarcely a detachment in the Höllenthal, proceeded without difficulty to Neustadt, and arrived at Freiburg. The two wings immediately followed, and debouched through that frightful defile into the valley of the Rhine, rather with the attitude of a victorious army than with that of an army in retreat.

Moreau reached the valley of the Rhine on the 21st of

* "Gouvion St. Cyr was born in the year 1764. In his youth he was designed for a painter, and he even travelled through Italy to perfect himself in his art. But his predilection for the profession of arms was irresistible; so that when the Revolution broke out he entered into a company of volunteers, and was soon sent to join the French armies on the Rhine. In 1795 he commanded a division, and fought under Pichegru, Moreau, and Massena, by all of whom he was esteemed, not only for his extensive knowledge of tactics, but for his virtues. With Bonaparte, however, he was never a favourite. There was, in fact, a downright simplicity about him, and as for flattery, he knew not what it meant. The Legion of Honour was open to him, and he was appointed colonel-general of the cuirassiers, but, though one of the ablest officers in the army, he was not for many years made a marshal. He expected that dignity as a reward for reducing some fortresses in Spain, but he was soon afterwards superseded by Augereau, and punished with two years' exile from the imperial presence. At the close of the Russian campaign, St. Cyr at length marshal, commanded the corps of Oudinot, who had been severely wounded. He fought at the battle of Dresden, and was left in that city when Napoleon fell back on Leipsic. On the restoration, Louis received him favourably, and raised him to the chamber of peers. During the Hundred Days he retired into the country, and on the King's return, was rewarded with the portfolio of war. In 1819 he quitted office, and went into retirement."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

Vendémiaire (October 12). Instead of recrossing the Rhine at the bridge of Breisach, and ascending along the French bank to Strasburg, he resolved to ascend the right bank to Kehl in the face of the whole hostile army. Whether he thought to give more *éclat* to his return, or hoped to maintain himself on the right bank and to cover Kehl by proceeding directly thither, these reasons have been deemed insufficient for risking a battle. Had he recrossed the Rhine at Breisach, he might have ascended unmolested to Strasburg, and then debouched again by Kehl. That *tête de pont* was capable of maintaining a resistance long enough to give him time to arrive. To determine, on the contrary, to march in face of the hostile army, the whole of which was again assembled under the archduke, and thus to expose himself to a general engagement, with the Rhine at his back, was an inexcusable imprudence, now that he had no longer the motive either of taking the offensive or of protecting a retreat. On the 28th of Vendémiaire (October 19), both armies were in presence, on the banks of the Elz, from Waldkirch to Emmendingen. After a sanguinary and varied conflict, Moreau perceived the impossibility of proceeding to Kehl along the right bank, and resolved to cross over the bridge of Breisach. Conceiving, however, that he could not pass his whole army over this bridge without the risk of encumbering it, and being anxious to send a force as speedily as possible to Kehl, he ordered Desaix with the left wing to cross again at Breisach, and returned towards Huningen with the centre and the right. This determination has been deemed not less imprudent than that of fighting at Emmendingen; for Moreau, weakened by the separation of one-third of his army, was liable to be compromised. He reckoned, it is true, upon a capital position, that of Schliengen, which covers the debouché of Huningen, and upon which he could halt and fight, in order to render his passage quieter and safer. Accordingly, he fell back to it, halted there on the 3rd of Brumaire (October 24), and fought an obstinate and drawn battle. Having, by means of this engagement, afforded time for his baggage to cross, he evacuated the position during the night, passed over to the left bank, and proceeded towards Strasburg.

Thus ended that celebrated campaign and that still more celebrated retreat. The result sufficiently indicates the faultiness of the plan. If, as Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini have demonstrated, the Directory, instead of forming two armies, advancing in separate columns, under different generals, in the petty view of attacking the enemy's flanks, had formed a single army of one hundred and sixty thousand men, a detachment of which, fifty thousand strong, should have besieged Mayence, while the other one hundred and ten thousand, united into a single corps, should have invaded Germany by the valley of the Rhine, the Höllenthal, and Upper Bavaria,

the imperial armies would have been forced to keep retiring, without being able to concentrate themselves with advantage against a too superior mass. The admirable plan of the young archduke would have been rendered impossible, and the republican flag would have been carried to Vienna itself. With the plan prescribed, Jourdan was a compulsory victim. Thus his campaign, always disastrous, was entirely one of obedience, as well when he first crossed the Rhine to draw the forces of the archduke upon him, as when he advanced into Bohemia and fought at Wurtzburg. Moreau alone, with his fine army, had it in his power to repair in part the vices of the plan, either by hastening to crush all that was before him at the moment when he debouched by Kehl, or by falling upon the archduke when the latter was following Jourdan. He either dared not, or had not the capacity, to do any thing of the kind; but, if he displayed not a spark of genius, if he preferred a retreat to a decisive and victorious manœuvre, at least he displayed in that retreat a great character and extraordinary firmness.* It was certainly not so difficult as it has been represented, but still it was conducted in the most imposing manner.

The young archduke was indebted to the vice of the French plan for a fine conception, which he executed with prudence; but, like Moreau, he lacked that ardour, that daring, which might have rendered the fault of the French government fatal to its armies. Only conceive what might have happened, had there been on either side that impetuous genius which had just destroyed three armies beyond the Alps! Had Moreau's sixty thousand men, at the moment when they debouched from Kehl, had the Imperialists, at the moment when they quitted the Danube to fall upon Jourdan, been led with the impetuosity displayed in Italy, most assuredly the war would have been terminated immediately in a disastrous manner for one of the two powers.

This campaign earned the young archduke a high reputation in Europe. In France, infinite obligation was felt to Moreau, for having brought back safe and sound the army compromised in Bavaria. Extreme anxiety had been felt on account of that army, especially after the moment when, Jourdan having fallen back, the bridge of Kehl being threatened, and a multitude of petty corps having intercepted the communications through Swabia, people knew not what had become or what was likely to become of it. But when, after these painful apprehensions, it was seen debouching into the valley of the Rhine with so firm

* "Moreau, however consummate a commander, had not the fire or energy by which his younger rival, Bonaparte, was actuated; he trusted for success rather to skilful combinations or methodical arrangements, than to those master-strokes which are attended with peril, but frequently domineer over fortune by the intensity of the passions which they awaken among mankind."—*Alison*. E.

an attitude, they were enchanted with the general who had so happily brought it back. His retreat was extolled as a prodigy of the art, and immediately compared with that of the Ten Thousand. People durst not, it is true, place any thing beside those brilliant triumphs of the army of Italy; but as there are always numbers of men, whom superior genius and extraordinary fortune offend, and who are better pleased with less brilliant merit, all these ranged themselves on Moreau's side, expatiated on his prudence, his consummate ability, and ranked it above the ardent genius of the young Bonaparte. From that day Moreau had in his favour all who prefer second-rate faculties to superior faculties; and it must be confessed that, in a republic we would almost forgive those enemies of genius when we observe what crimes genius is capable of committing against that liberty which has brought it forth, nourished, and raised it to the pinnacle of glory.

THE DIRECTORY.

STATE OF FRANCE AFTER THE RETURN OF THE ARMIES FROM GERMANY—COMBINATIONS OF PITT; OPENING OF A NEGOTIATION WITH THE DIRECTORY; ARRIVAL OF LORD MALMESBURY IN PARIS—PEACE WITH NAPLES AND GENOA; FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE; DEPOSITION OF THE DUKE OF MODENA; FOUNDATION OF THE CISPADANE REPUBLIC—MISSION OF CLARKE TO VIENNA—FRESH EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY; ARRIVAL OF ALVINZY; EXTREME DANGER OF THE FRENCH ARMY; BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

THE turn which the campaign in Germany had taken was prejudicial to the republic. Her enemies, who persisted in denying her victories, or in predicting severe reverses of fortune, saw their prognostics realized, and openly triumphed in consequence. Those rapid conquests in Germany had then no solidity. The Danube and the genius of a young prince had soon put an end to them. No doubt the rash army of Italy, which seemed so firmly established on the Adige, would be hurled from it in its turn and flung back upon the Alps, as the armies of Germany had been upon the Rhine. The conquests of General Bonaparte, it is true, seemed to rest upon a somewhat more solid foundation. He had not merely driven Colli and Beaulieu before him; he had destroyed them: he had not merely repulsed the new army of Wurmser; he had first disorganized it at Castiglione, and afterwards annihilated it on the Brenta. There was somewhat more hope, therefore, of remaining in Italy than of remaining in Germany; but people took delight in circulating alarming rumours. Numerous forces were coming, it was said, from Poland and Turkey to proceed towards the Alps; the imperial armies of the Rhine would now be able to send away fresh detachments, and General Bonaparte, having continually new enemies to fight, would, with all his genius, find an end to his successes, were it only from the exhaustion of his army. It was natural that, in the existing state of things, people should form such conjectures; for the imagination, after exaggerating successes, is sure to exaggerate reverses also.

The armies of Germany had retired without great losses, and occupied the line of the Rhine. In this there was nothing particularly disastrous; but the army of Italy was without support,

and that was a serious disadvantage. Moreover, our two principal armies, having returned to the French territory, would now be at the charge of our finances, which were still in a deplorable state: and this was the greatest calamity. The mandats, having ceased to have the forced currency of money, had fallen to nothing; besides, they were expended, and there were scarcely any remaining at the disposal of the government. They were in Paris, in the hands of a few speculators, who sold them to the purchasers of national domains. The amount due was still considerable, but it did not come in; the arrears of taxes and the forced loan were slowly collected; the national domains sold were partly paid for; the instalments still due were not demandable according to law; the sales that were still taking place were considerable enough to replenish the exchequer. For the rest, the government subsisted upon the produce of these sales, as well as upon the articles of consumption proceeding from the land-tax, and upon the promises of payment made by the ministers. The budget for the year V had just been made up. It was divided into ordinary and extraordinary expenses. The ordinary expenses amounted to four hundred and fifty millions, the others to five hundred and fifty. The land-tax, the customs, the stamp-duties, and all the annual proceeds, were expected to cover the ordinary expenditure. The five hundred and fifty millions of the extraordinary would be amply covered by the arrears of the taxes of the year IV and of the forced loan, and by the instalments yet to be paid for the domains sold. There was another resource still in the domains which the republic yet possessed; but all this required to be realized first, and therein lay the same difficulty as ever. The contractors, remaining unpaid, refused to continue their advances, and all the public services were aground at once. The public functionaries and the annuitants were not paid, and were perishing of hunger.

Thus the insulated state of the army of Italy and our finances were likely to give great hopes to our enemies. From the project of a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, the Porte, and Venice, formed by the Directory, nothing had resulted but the alliance with Spain. The latter, induced by our offers and our brilliant fortune in the middle of the summer, had decided, as we have seen, to renew the family compact with the republic, and she had just published her declaration of war against Great Britain. Venice, in spite of the solicitations of Spain and the invitations of the Porte, and in spite of Bonaparte's victories in Italy, had refused to ally herself with the republic. To no purpose it had been represented to her that Russia coveted her colonies in Greece, and Austria her Illyrian provinces; that her union with France and the Porte would secure her against these two ambitious enemies by associating her with powers who could not covet any of her possessions; that the reiterated victories of the French on the Adige must ensure her against a return of the

Austrian armies, and against the vengeance of the emperor; that the concurrence of her forces and of her navy would render that return still more impossible; that neutrality, on the contrary, would not gain her any friend, but leave her without protector, and perhaps even expose her to the danger of serving as a medium of accommodation between the belligerent powers. Venice, filled with hatred of the French, equipping armaments evidently destined against her, since she consulted the Austrian ministry on the choice of a general, refused a second time the alliance proposed to her. She clearly perceived the danger from the Austrian ambition; but the danger of French principles was greater, more urgent, in her estimation, and she replied that she should persist in the unarmed neutrality, which was false, for she was arming on all sides. The Porte, shaken by the refusal of Venice, by the suggestions of Vienna and of England, had not yet acceded to the project of alliance. There were left therefore only France and Spain, whose union could contribute to wrest the Mediterranean from the English, but might also compromise the Spanish colonies. Pitt had, in fact, conceived the idea of exciting them to insurrection against the mother country, and he already had intrigues on foot in Mexico. The negotiations with Genoa were not concluded; for they involved at once the payment of a sum of money, the expulsion of certain families, and the recal of certain others. With Naples they were not finished, because the Directory demanded a contribution, and the queen, who negotiated with despair, refused to comply. Peace with Rome was not made, on account of a condition required by the Directory: it insisted that the Holy See should revoke all the briefs issued against France since the commencement of the Revolution, which severely hurt the pride of the aged pontiff. He summoned a council of cardinals, which decided that the revocation could not take place.* The negotiations were broken off. They were renewed at Florence; a congress was opened. The envoys of the Pope having repeated that the briefs issued could not be revoked, and the French commissioners having replied on their part that the condition was a *sine qua non*, they separated in a few minutes. The hopes of succour from the King of Naples and from England supported the Pope in his refusals. He had just sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna, to implore the aid of Austria and to concert with her as to his resistance.

Such were the relations of France with Europe. Her enemies, on their part, were much exhausted. Austria was cheered, it is

* "The college of Cardinals having rejected the proposals of France as containing articles contrary to conscience, the Pope declared his determination to abide by the utmost extremity, rather than accede to conditions destructive, degrading, and in his opinion, impious. The Directory instantly determined on the total ruin of the Pope, and of his power, both spiritual and temporal."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

true, by the retreat of the armies which had advanced to the Danube; but she was very uneasy respecting Italy, and was making fresh preparations to recover it. England was reduced to an extremely deplorable situation: her footing in Corsica was precarious, and she saw herself likely soon to lose that island. The French wished to close all the ports of Italy against her, and one fresh victory gained by General Bonaparte would be sufficient to decide her entire expulsion from that country. War with Spain was about to close the Mediterranean against her and to threaten Portugal. The whole coast, as far as the Texel, was interdicted to her. The expedition which Hoche was preparing alarmed her for Ireland; her finances were in peril, the Bank was shaken, the people wished for peace; the Opposition had been strengthened by the recent elections. These were very urgent reasons for thinking of peace, and for taking advantage of the late reverses of France to induce her to accept it. But the royal family and the aristocracy had a strong dislike to treat with France, because in their estimation it was treating with the Revolution. Pitt, much less attached to aristocratic principles, and intent solely on the interests of the English power, would certainly have been glad of peace, but on one condition, indispensable with him, and inadmissible for the republic—the restitution of the Netherlands to Austria. Pitt, as we have already remarked, was wholly English in pride, ambition, and prejudices. The greatest crime of the Revolution was, according to his notions, not so much the giving birth to a colossal republic as the incorporation of the Netherlands with France.

The Netherlands were, in fact, an important acquisition for France. That acquisition gave her, in the first place, the possession of the most fertile and wealthy provinces of the continent, and, above all, of manufacturing provinces; it gave her the mouths of the rivers most important to the commerce of the North, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; it gave her a considerable increase of coast, and consequently of shipping; it gave her seaports of high importance, especially Antwerp; it gave her, lastly, a prolongation of our maritime frontier in a quarter the most dangerous to the English frontier, opposite to the defenceless coasts of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Yorkshire. Besides this positive acquisition, the Netherlands conferred on us another advantage: Holland must fall under the immediate influence of France when no longer separated from her by Austrian provinces. In this case, the French line would extend not only to Antwerp but to the Texel, and the English shores would be encompassed by a girdle of hostile shores. Add to this a family compact with Spain, then powerful and well organized, and we shall easily conceive that Pitt must have felt some uneasiness respecting the maritime power of England. It is, in fact, a principle with every Englishman thoroughly imbued with his national ideas, that England ought to have control

at Naples, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, in order to have a footing on the continent and to break the long line of coast which might be opposed to her. This principle was as deep-rooted in 1796 as that which caused any injury done to France to be considered as a benefit done to England. In consequence, Pitt, in order to procure a moment of respite for his finances, would gladly have consented to a temporary peace, but upon condition that the Netherlands should be restored to Austria. He thought, therefore, of opening a negotiation on this basis. He could not hope that France would admit such a condition, for the Netherlands were the principal acquisition of the Revolution, and the constitution did not even allow the Directory to treat for their alienation. But Pitt knew little about the continent. He sincerely believed that France was ruined, and he was in good earnest when he came to proclaim every year the exhaustion and the fall of the republic. He thought that if France had ever been disposed to peace, it was at that moment, as well on account of the fall of the mandats, as on account of the retreat of the armies from Germany. At any rate, whether he considered the condition admissible or not, he had a stronger reason for opening a negotiation. This was the necessity of complying with the public opinion, which loudly demanded peace. In fact, in order to obtain the levy of sixty thousand militia and fifteen thousand seamen, it behoved him to prove, by a signal step, that he had done his utmost to treat. He had another motive not less important. In taking the initiative, and opening a solemn negotiation in Paris, he had the advantage of concentrating there the discussion of all the European interests and preventing the commencement of any separate negotiation with Austria. This latter power was, in fact, much less intent on recovering the Netherlands than England was on restoring them to her. To Austria the Netherlands were a distant province, which was detached from the centre of her empire, exposed to continual invasions from France, and deeply imbued with revolutionary ideas; a province which she had several times thought of exchanging for other possessions in Germany or Italy, and which she had kept solely because Prussia had always opposed her aggrandizement in Germany, and because combinations admitting of her aggrandizement in Italy had not presented themselves. Pitt thought that a solemn negotiation opened in Paris, on behalf of all the allies, would prevent individual combinations and any private arrangement relative to the Netherlands. Lastly, he wished to have an agent in France who could judge of her from actual observation, and to obtain authentic information respecting the expedition preparing at Brest. Such were the reasons which, even without any hope of obtaining peace, decided Pitt to make an overture to the Directory. He did not confine himself, as in the preceding year, to an insignificant communication from Wickham to Barthelemy. He demanded

passports for an envoy invested with the powers of Great Britain. In this emphatic procedure of the most implacable foe of our republic there was something glorious for her. The English aristocracy was thus forced to ask peace of the regicide republic. The passports were immediately granted. Pitt selected Lord Malmesbury, son of the author of "Hermes." This nobleman had not the character of being a friend to republics: he had contributed to the oppression of Holland in 1787. He arrived in Paris, with a numerous retinue, on the 2nd of Brumaire (October 23, 1796).

The Directory appointed Delacroix, the minister, to represent it. The two negotiators met at the hotel of Foreign Affairs, no the 3rd of Brumaire (October 24). The minister of France exhibited his powers. Lord Malmesbury declared himself to be sent by Great Britain and her allies, in order to treat for a general peace. He then exhibited his powers, which were signed by England alone. The French minister then asked if he was commissioned by the allies of Great Britain to treat in their name. Lord Malmesbury replied that, as soon as the negotiation was opened, and the principle on which it could be based was admitted, the King of Great Britain was sure of obtaining the concurrence and the powers of his allies. His lordship then delivered to Delacroix a note from his court, stating the principle upon which the negotiation was to be based. This principle was that of compensations for conquests between the powers. England, it was stated in this note, had made conquests in the colonies; France had made conquests on the continent from the allies of England; there was, therefore, restitution to be made on both sides. But it would be necessary to agree upon the principle of these compensations, before entering into explanations concerning the objects that were to be compensated. We see that the English cabinet forbore to speak out positively concerning the restitution of the Netherlands, and submitted a general principle, lest it should cause the negotiation to be broken off as soon as it was opened. Delacroix replied that he would refer the matter to the Directory.

The Directory could not give up the Netherlands. This was not in its power, and it ought not, if it had been able. France had engagements of honour towards those provinces, and could not expose them to the vengeance of Austria by restoring them to her. Besides, she had a right to indemnities for the unjust war that had been made upon her; she had a right to compensation for the aggrandizements which Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had gained in Poland by the perpetration of a political outrage; it was her duty to tend invariably to give herself her natural limit; and, for all these reasons, it behoved her never to part with the Netherlands and to uphold the dispositions of the constitution. The Directory, firmly resolved to perform its duty on this point, had it in its power to break off immediately

a negotiation, the evident aim of which was to propose to us the cession of the Netherlands and to prevent an arrangement with Austria; but it would thus have given occasion to say that it was averse to peace; it would have fulfilled one of the principal intentions of Pitt, and furnished him with excellent reasons for demanding fresh sacrifices of the English nation. It replied on the very next day. France, it stated, had already treated with most of the powers of the coalition, without their having invoked the concurrence of all the allies; to render the negotiation general was to render it interminable; it was giving room to believe that the present negotiation was not more sincere than the overture made in the preceding year through the medium of Mr. Wickham. Besides, the English minister had not the powers of the allies, in whose name he spoke. Lastly, the principle of compensations was mentioned in a manner too general and too vague for it to be possible either to admit or to reject it. The application of this principle always depended on the nature of the conquests, and on the strength left to the belligerent powers for retaining them. "Thus," added the Directory, "the French government might spare itself the trouble of replying; but, to prove its desire of peace, it declares that it will be ready to listen to all the propositions as soon as Lord Malmesbury shall be furnished with the powers of all the other potentates in whose name he pretends to treat."

The Directory, which in this negotiation had nothing to conceal and could therefore act with the greatest frankness, resolved to make the negotiation public, and to insert in the newspapers the notes of the English minister and the replies of the French minister. Accordingly, it published immediately the memorial of Lord Malmesbury and the answer which it had returned. This mode of proceeding was of such a nature as somewhat to disconcert the crooked policy of the English cabinet, but, though deviating from ordinary practice, it was not at all derogatory to decorum. Lord Malmesbury replied that he would refer to his government. A singular plenipotentiary this, who had only such insufficient powers, and who, at every difficulty, was obliged to refer to his court! The Directory might have considered this as shuffling, and as indicating an intention to gain time by assuming the air of negotiating. It might even have taken umbrage at the presence of a foreigner, whose intrigues might be dangerous, and who came to discover the secret of our armaments: it nevertheless manifested no dissatisfaction; it permitted Lord Malmesbury to wait for the answers of his court, and while thus waiting, to see Paris, the parties, their strength, and that of the government. The Directory, indeed, could only gain by so doing.

Meanwhile our situation was becoming perilous in Italy, notwithstanding the recent triumphs of Roveredo, Bassano, and St. George. Austria redoubled her efforts to recover Lombardy.

In consequence of the guarantees given by Catherine to the emperor, for the security of Galicia, the troops which were in Poland had been marched towards the Alps. Owing also to the hope of maintaining peace with the Porte, the frontiers of Turkey had been stripped, and all the reserves of the Austrian monarchy directed towards Italy. A numerous and devoted population furnished, moreover, powerful means of recruiting the armies. The Austrian administration displayed extraordinary zeal and activity in enlisting fresh men, incorporating them with the old troops, and in arming and equipping them. A fine army was thus preparing in the Friule, with the wrecks of Wurmser, the troops from Poland and Turkey, the detachments from the Rhine, and the recruits. Marshal Alvinzy* was appointed to the command of it. It was hoped that this third army would be more fortunate than the two preceding, and that it would succeed in wresting Italy from the young conqueror.

During this interval, Bonaparte was perpetually demanding reinforcements, and recommending negotiations with the Italian powers who were in his rear. He urged the Directory to treat with Naples, to renew the negotiations with Rome, to conclude with Genoa, and to negotiate an alliance offensive and defensive with the King of Sardinia, in order to procure succour in Italy if none could be sent to him from France. He desired to be permitted to proclaim the independence of Lombardy, and that of the states of the Duke of Modena, that he might gain himself partisans and auxiliaries strongly attached to his cause. His views were correct, and the distress of his army justified his urgent entreaties. The rupture of the negotiations with the Pope had stopped a second time the contribution imposed by the armistice of Bologna. Only one instalment of it had been paid. The contributions levied upon Parma, Modena, and Milan were exhausted either by the expenses of the army or by the remittances made to the government. Venice supplied abundance of provisions, but the pay was in arrear. The amounts to be taken from foreign commerce at Leghorn were still in dispute. Amidst the richest countries in the world, the army began to suffer privations. But the greatest misfortune was the vacancy in its ranks, thinned by the Austrian cannon. It was not without great losses that it had destroyed so many enemies. It had been reinforced by nine or ten thousand men since the opening of the campaign, which made the number of the French who had entered Italy about fifty thousand; but at this moment it had at most thirty and some odd thousand; fighting and disease had reduced it to this small number. A dozen battalions from La Vendée had just joined, but they were singularly diminished

* "Marshal Alvinzi, an officer of high reputation, which was then thought merited, was at this time seventy years of age. The marshal died in the year 1810."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

by desertions; the other detachments which had been promised had not arrived. General Willot, who commanded in the South, and who was ordered to send several regiments to the Alps, detained them to quell the disturbances which his mismanagement and his bad spirit excited in the provinces under his command. Kellermann could not strip his line of troops, for he was still obliged to hold himself in readiness to curb Lyons and its environs, where the companies of Jesus were committing murders. Bonaparte asked for the 83rd and the 40th, forming nearly six thousand good troops, and undertook to answer for the result if they should arrive in time.

He complained that he had not been commissioned to negotiate with Rome, because he should have expected the payment of the contribution before signifying the ultimatum. "So long," said he, "as your general shall not be the centre of every thing in Italy, all will go wrong. It would be easy to accuse me of ambition, but I have only too much honour. I am ill; I can scarcely sit my horse; nothing is left me but courage, and that is insufficient for the post which I occupy. They can count us," added he; "the charm of our strength is dissolving. Troops, or Italy is lost!"

The Directory, feeling the necessity of depriving Rome of the support of Naples and of securing Bonaparte's rear, at length concluded a treaty with the court of the Two Sicilies. It desisted from any particular demand, and that court, which our recent victories on the Brenta had intimidated, which saw Spain making common cause with France, and was afraid of seeing the English driven from the Mediterranean, acceded, on its side, to the treaty. Peace was signed on the 19th of Vendémiaire (October 10). It was agreed that the King of Naples should withhold every kind of succour from the enemies of France, and that he should shut his ports against the armed vessels of the belligerent powers. The Directory then concluded its treaty with Genoa. One circumstance led to its conclusion. Nelson had taken a French ship within sight of the Genoese batteries. This violation of the neutrality deeply compromised the republic of Genoa; the French party there became bolder, the party of the coalition more timid; and it was resolved to enter into an alliance with France. The ports of Genoa were closed against the English. Two millions were paid to us as an indemnity for the Modeste frigate, and two more were furnished by way of loan. The feudatory families were not exiled, but all the partisans of France, expelled from the territory and from the senate, were recalled and reinstated. Piedmont was anew solicited to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive. The king was just dead; his young successor, Charles Emanuel, manifested very favourable dispositions towards France, but he was not content with the advantages offered to him as the price of his alliance.

The Directory offered to guarantee his dominions, which nothing in that general convulsion, and amidst all the republics that were ready to start up, no other power could guarantee to him. But the new king, like his predecessor, insisted on having Lombardy given to him. This the Directory could not promise, being obliged to reserve equivalents in order to treat with Austria. The Directory then permitted Bonaparte to renew the negotiations with Rome, and gave him full powers for that purpose.

Rome had sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna. She had reckoned upon Naples, and in her eagerness she had offended the Spanish legation. Naples failing her, and Spain manifesting her dissatisfaction, she was alarmed, and the moment was favourable for treating with her. Bonaparte, in the first place, wanted his money: in the next, though he was not afraid of her temporal power, he dreaded her moral influence over the people. The two Italian parties, engendered by the French Revolution, and developed by the presence of our armies, became daily more and more exasperated against one another. If Milan, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, Ferrara, were the seat of the patriotic party, Rome was the seat of the monastic and aristocratic party. She had it in her power to excite fanatic fury, and to do us great mischief, especially at a moment when the question with the Austrian armies was not yet resolved. Bonaparte deemed it right to temporize a little longer. As a man of a free and independent mind, he despised all the fanaticism that restrains the human understanding; but, as a man of action, he dreaded those powers which are not to be controlled by force, and he chose rather to elude than to combat with them. Besides, though educated in France, he was born amidst Italian superstition. He did not share that dislike of the Catholic religion, so strong and so common among us, ever since the eighteenth century; and he had not the same repugnance to treat with the Holy See, as was felt in Paris. He purposed, therefore, to gain time, to spare himself a retrograde march through the Peninsula, to spare himself fanatical denunciations, and if possible, to regain the sixteen millions carried back to Rome. He directed Cacault,* the minister, to disavow the demands made by the Directory in regard to matters of faith, and to insist on the purely material conditions alone. He selected Cardinal Mattei, whom he had confined in a convent, for the purpose of sending him to Rome: he set him at liberty, and commissioned him to go and speak to the Pope. "The court of Rome," he wrote to him, "desires war; it shall have war; but first I owe it to my nation and to humanity to make a final effort to bring back the

* The French envoy, Cacault, was born at Nantes in the year 1742. During the consulate, he was chosen a member of the senate. He published a translation of Lessing's Historical Sketch of the Drama. He died in the year 1805. E.

Pope to reason. You are acquainted with the strength of the army which I command. To destroy the temporal power of the Pope, I need but to will it. Go to Rome, see his holiness, enlighten him on the subject of his true interests; rescue him from the intriguers by whom he is surrounded, who wish for his ruin and for that of the court of Rome. The French government permits me still to listen to words of peace. Every thing may be arranged. War, so cruel for nations, has terrible results for the vanquished. Save the Pope from great calamities. You know how anxious I am to finish by peace a struggle which war would terminate for me without glory as without danger."

While he was employing these means *to cheat the old fox*, as he said, and to screen himself from the fury of fanaticism, he thought of kindling the spirit of liberty in Upper Italy, in order to oppose patriotism to superstition. All Upper Italy was in a state of great excitement. The Milanese, wrested from Austria; the provinces of Modena and Reggio, impatient of the yoke with which their old absent duke oppressed them, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, withdrawn from the Pope; loudly demanded their independence and their organization into republics. Bonaparte could not proclaim the independence of Lombardy, for victory had not yet positively decided its fate; but he continued to give it hopes and encouragement. As for the provinces of Modena and Reggio, they were immediately contiguous to the rear of his army, and bordered on Mantua. He had a complaint to make against the regency, which had sent provisions to the garrison; he had recommended to the Directory not to give peace to the Duke of Modena, but to confine itself to the armistice, that it might be able to punish him if occasion required. As circumstances were daily becoming more difficult, he decided upon a vigorous stroke, without giving previous notice of it to the Directory. It was ascertained that the regency had again been in fault, and that it had violated the armistice by supplying Wurmser with provisions. He immediately declared the armistice broken, and, by virtue of the right of conquest, he expelled the regency, declared the Duke of Modena deposed, and the provinces of Reggio and Modena free. The enthusiasm of the Reggians and the Modenese was extraordinary. Bonaparte organized a municipal government to administer the country temporarily till it should be constituted. Bologna and Ferrara had already constituted themselves republics, and began to raise troops. Bonaparte resolved to unite those two legations with the states of the Duke of Modena, and to form with them a single republic, which, situated entirely on this side of the Po, should be called the *Cispadane Republic*. He thought that, if it were necessary at the peace to restore Lombardy to Austria, it might not be so to restore the Modenese and the legations to the Duke of Modena and the Pope; that there might thus be erected a

republic, the daughter and friend of the French republic, which would be beyond the Alps the focus of French principles, and the asylum of the compromised patriots, whence liberty might some day spread over all Italy. He conceived that the enfranchisement of Italy was not to be accomplished at a single stroke: he considered the French government as too much exhausted to effect it at that moment, and he thought that it was requisite to sow at least the seeds of liberty in this first campaign. To this end, it was advisable to unite Bologna and Ferrara with Modena and Reggio. Local interests were adverse to this plan; but he hoped to conquer that opposition by his all-powerful influence. He repaired to those cities, was received with enthusiasm, and decided them to send to Modena one hundred deputies from all parts of their territory, to form a national assembly, which should be charged to constitute the Cispadane Republic. This assembly met on the 25th of Vendémiaire (October 16th), at Modena. It was composed of lawyers, landed proprietors, and mercantile men. Restrained by the presence of Bonaparte, and directed by his counsels,* it showed the greatest discretion. It voted the incorporation of the two legations and of the duchy of Modena into a single republic; it abolished the feudal system, and decreed civil equality; it appointed a commissioner to organize a legion of four thousand men, and ordained the formation of a second assembly, which was to meet on the 5th of Nivose (December 25th), to deliberate upon a constitution. The Reggians displayed the greatest zeal. An Austrian detachment having quitted Mantua, they ran to arms, surrounded it, made it prisoner, and conducted it to Bonaparte. Two Reggians were killed in the action. They were the first martyrs of Italian independence.

Lombardy was jealous and alarmed at the favours conferred on the Cispadane Republic, and regarded them as a sinister omen for herself. She conceived that, as the French were constituting the legations and the duchy without constituting her, they intended to restore her to Austria. Bonaparte cheered the Lombards anew, represented to them the difficulties of his situation, and repeated that they must gain independence by seconding him in this arduous struggle. They resolved to increase to twelve thousand men the two Italian and Polish legions, the organization of which they had already commenced.

Bonaparte had thus surrounded himself with friendly governments, which were about to exert their utmost efforts to support

* "Never forget," said Bonaparte, in reply to the address of the Assembly, announcing its new form of government, "that laws are mere nullities without the force necessary to support them. Attend to your military organization, which you have the means of placing on a respectable footing; you will then be more fortunate than the people of France, for you will arrive at liberty, without passing through the ordeal of revolution."—*Montholon*. E.

him. Their troops, to be sure, were of no great account; but they were capable of undertaking the police of the conquered country, and in this manner they rendered disposable the detachments which he employed there. Supported by a few hundred French, they would be able to resist a first attempt of the Pope, if he were mad enough to make one. Bonaparte strove at the same time to cheer the Duke of Parma, whose states bordered on the new republic, whose friendship might be useful, and whose relationship with Spain commanded attention. He held out to him the possibility of gaining a few towns amidst the dismemberment of territories. He thus availed himself of all the resources of politics to make amends for the forces with which his government could not furnish him; and in this he did his duty to France and to Italy, and did it with all the skill of a veteran diplomatist.

Through his exertions, Corsica had just been emancipated. He had collected the principal refugees at Leghorn, given them arms and officers, and daringly thrown them upon the island to second the rebellion of the inhabitants against the English.* The expedition had been successful; his native country was delivered from the English yoke, and the Mediterranean was soon likely to be. There was ground to hope that the Spanish fleet, united with that of France, would in future close the Straits of Gibraltar against the English squadrons, and command the whole of the Mediterranean.

He had therefore employed the time which had elapsed since the occurrences on the Brenta in improving his position in Italy; but, if he had rather less to fear from the princes of that country, the danger from Austria was only augmented, and his strength was still inadequate to ward it off. The 83rd and the 40th demi-brigade were still detained in the South. He had twelve thousand men in the Tyrol under Vaubois, drawn up in front of Trent, on the bank of the Lavis; about sixteen or seventeen thousand, under Massena and Augereau, on the Brenta and Adige; lastly, eight or nine thousand before Mantua; which made his army amount to about thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand. Davidovich, who had remained in the Tyrol after Wurmser's disaster, with a few thousand men, had now eighteen thousand. Alvinzy was advancing from the Friule upon the Piave, with about forty thousand. Bonaparte was therefore in a critical situation, for, to oppose sixty thousand men, he had only thirty-six thousand, worn out by a campaign which comprehended three;

* "Gentili and all the refugees landed in October, 1796, in spite of the English cruisers. The republicans took possession of Bastia and all the fortresses. The English hastily embarked. The King of England wore the Corsican crown only two years. This whim cost the British treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been worse employed."—*Napoleon's Memoirs.* E.

and daily thinned by the fevers which they contracted in the rice-grounds of Lombardy. He wrote with grief to the Directory, and told them that he was on the point of losing Italy.*

The Directory, observing Bonaparte's danger, and unable to come soon enough to his assistance, thought of suspending hostilities immediately by means of a negotiation. Malmesbury was in Paris, as we have seen. He was waiting for the answer of his government to the communications of the Directory, which insisted that he should have the powers of all the governments, and that he should express himself more clearly on the principle of compensation for conquests. The English ministry, after a lapse of nineteen days, at length answered, on the 24th of Brumaire (November 14th), that the pretensions of France were unusual; that it was common for an ally to apply to treat in the name of her allies, before she had their formal authority; that England was sure of obtaining it, but it was first requisite that France should speak out distinctly respecting the principle of the compensations, the only basis upon which the negotiation could be opened. The English cabinet added that the reply of the Directory was full of very indecorous insinuations respecting the intentions of his Britannic majesty, that it was beneath him to answer them, and he should take no notice of them, that he might not impede the negotiation. On the same day, the Directory, wishing to be prompt and categorical, replied to Lord Malmesbury that it admitted the principle of compensations, but that it expected him to state immediately the objects to which that principle was to be applied.

The Directory could give this answer, without proceeding too far, since, while refusing to cede Belgium and Luxemburg, it could cede Lombardy and some other small territories. But for the rest this negotiation was evidently illusory; the Directory could not promise itself any benefit from it, and it resolved to frustrate the tricks of England by sending direct to Vienna a negotiator commissioned to effect a separate arrangement with the emperor. The first proposal which the negotiator was to

* Napoleon's letter to the Directory was in these terms: "Mantua cannot be reduced before the middle of February; you will perceive from that, how critical our situation is, and our political system is, if possible, still worse. The emperor has thrice reformed his army since the commencement of the campaign. Every thing is going wrong in Italy. The *prestige* of our forces is dissipated. The enemy now count our ranks. It is indispensable that you take into your instant consideration the critical situation of the army in Italy. The influence of Rome is incalculable. You did wrong in breaking with that power; I would have temporized with it, as we have done with Venice and Genoa. Whenever the general in Italy is not the centre of negotiation as well as military operations, the greatest risks will be incurred. You may ascribe this language to ambition; but I am satiated with honours, and my health is so broken, that I must implore you to give me a successor. I can no longer sit on horseback. My courage alone is unshaken." E.

make was, that of an armistice in Germany and Italy, which was to last for at least six months. The Rhine and the Adige were to separate the armies of the two powers. The sieges of Kehl and Mantua were to be suspended. The provisions requisite for the daily consumption were to be sent every day into Mantua, so that, at the conclusion of the armistice, the two parties might be replaced in the situation in which they then were. France would thus gain the retention of Kehl, and Austria that of Mantua. A negotiation was to be opened immediately to treat for peace. The conditions offered by France were the following. Austria was to cede Belgium and Luxemburg to France; France was to restore Lombardy to Austria, and the Palatinate to the Empire; she would thus renounce on the latter point the line of the Rhine; she would consent moreover to indemnify Austria for the loss of the Netherlands by the secularization of several bishoprics of the empire. The emperor was not to interfere in any way in the affairs of France with the Pope, and she was to employ her influence in Germany to procure indemnities for the stadtholder. This was an indispensable condition, to ensure the quiet of Holland, and to satisfy the King of Prussia, whose sister was the wife of the stadtholder. These conditions were extremely moderate, and proved the desire of the Directory to put an end to the horrors of war, and to the alarm which it had felt for the army of Italy.

For the bearer of these proposals the Directory chose General Clarke,* who was employed in the war-office under Carnot. His

* "The father of Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke, who was born in 1765, was an Irish adventurer, and colonel in the French army. Young Clarke received his education at the military school of Paris. In 1793 he was made general of brigade, but was soon afterwards imprisoned as a noble. On his release he introduced himself to Carnot, advocated extreme revolutionary doctrines, and was placed over the board of Topography. On the establishment of the Directory, he was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, and ultimately to Italy, to act as a spy on Bonaparte, who, however, found means to attach him to his interests. After the 18th of Brumaire, Clarke became the tool of the Consuls, and was employed on several important missions. In 1805 he was governor of Vienna, and afterwards of Erfurth and Berlin. In the latter city his conduct is said to have been distinguished by rapacity. After the peace of Tilsit he was appointed minister of war, obtained the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, and the ducal title of Feltre. On the restoration he attached himself to the Bourbons, and in return was ranked among the new peers, and received the portfolio of war, from which, however, he was dismissed in 1817. He died in 1818, leaving behind him a large fortune."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte.* E.

"Clarke," said the Emperor, "is not a man of talent, but he is laborious and useful in the bureau. He is moreover incorruptible, and saving of the public money. He is not a soldier, nor do I believe that he ever saw a shot fired in his life. He is infatuated with his nobility. He pretends that he is descended from the ancient kings of Scotland or Ireland. I sent him to Florence as ambassador, where he employed himself in nothing but turning over the old musty records of the place, in search of proofs of the nobility of my family, for you must know that they come from Florence. He plagued me

instructions were signed on the 26th of Brumaire (November 16th). But it took time before he could set out, arrive, be received, and heard; and during this interval events succeeded one another in Italy with extraordinary rapidity.

On the 11th of Brumaire (November 1st), Marshal Alvinzy had thrown bridges over the Piave, and advanced upon the Brenta. The plan of the Austrians, this time, was to attack at once by the mountains of the Tyrol and by the plain. Davidovich was to drive Vaubois from his positions, and to descend along both banks of the Adige to Verona. Alvinzy, on his part, was to cross the Piave and the Brenta, to advance upon the Adige, to enter Verona with the main body of the army and there form a junction with Davidovich. The two Austrian armies were to start from this point, and to march in concert, to raise the blockade of Mantua and to deliver Wurmser.

Alvinzy, after crossing the Piave, advanced upon the Brenta, where Massena was posted with his division. The latter, having reconnoitred the enemy's force, fell back. Bonaparte marched to his support with Augereau's division. At the same time he directed Vaubois to make head against Davidovich in the valley of the Upper Adige, and to take from him, if possible, his position of the Lavis. He marched himself against Alvinzy, resolving, in spite of the disproportion of strength, to attack him impetuously, and to break him at the very outset of this new campaign. On the morning of the 16th of Brumaire (November 6th), he came in sight of the enemy. The Austrians had taken position in advance of the Brenta, from Carmignano to Bassano; their reserves had remained behind on the other side of the Brenta. Bonaparte directed his whole force against them. Massena attacked Liptai and Provera before Carmignano; Augereau attacked Quasdanovich before Bassano. The action was hot and bloody; the troops displayed great bravery; Liptai and Provera were driven beyond the Brenta by Massena; Quasdanovich was repulsed upon Bassano by Augereau. Bonaparte intended to enter Bassano the same day, but was prevented by the arrival of the Austrian reserves. He was obliged to defer the attack till the following day. Unfortunately, he received intelligence in the night that Vaubois had just experienced a reverse on the Upper Adige. That general had gallantly attacked the positions of Davidovich, and had at first obtained some advantages, but a panic had seized his troops, notwithstanding their tried bravery, and they had fled in disorder. He had rallied them in the famous defile of Calliano, where the army had

with letters on this subject, which caused me to tell him to attend to his business, and not trouble his head or mine with his nonsense about nobility; that I was the *first* of my family. When I returned from Elba he offered me his services, but I sent him word that I would not employ traitors, and ordered him to his estates."—*Voice from St. Helena.* E.

deployed so daringly in the invasion of the Tyrol: he hoped to maintain his ground there, when Davidovich, sending a corps to the other bank of the Adige, had fallen upon Calliano and turned the position. Vaubois added that he was retiring, in order to avoid being cut in two, and he expressed his fear that Davidovich would get before him to the important positions of La Corona and Rivoli, which cover the road to Tyrol, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda.

Bonaparte was aware of the danger of proceeding farther against Alvinzy, while Vaubois, who was with his left in the Tyrol, was liable to lose La Corona, Rivoli, and even Verona, and to be driven back into the plain. Bonaparte would then have been cut off from his principal wing, and placed with fifteen or sixteen thousand men between Davidovich and Alvinzy. He consequently resolved to fall back immediately. He ordered a trusty officer to fly to Verona, to collect there all the troops he could find, to hasten with them to Rivoli and La Corona, in order to anticipate Davidovich, and to give Vaubois time to retire thither.

On the next day, the 17th of Brumaire (November 7), he marched back and passed through the city of Vicenza, which was astonished to see the French army retiring, after the success of the preceding day. He proceeded to Verona, where he left his whole army. He repaired alone to Rivoli and La Corona, where, very fortunately, he found Vaubois' troops rallied, and able to make head against a new attack of Davidovich. He resolved to give a lesson to the 39th and 85th demi-brigades, which had given way to a panic terror. He ordered the whole division to be assembled, and, addressing those two demi-brigades, he reproached them for their want of discipline and their flight. He then said to the chief of the staff, "Let it be inscribed on the colours that the 39th and the 85th no longer form part of the army of Italy." These expressions produced the keenest mortification in the soldiers of those two demi-brigades. They surrounded Bonaparte, told him that they had been fighting one against three, and asked to be sent to his advanced guard, to show whether they had ceased to belong to the army of Italy. Bonaparte compensated them for his severity by a few soothing words, which transported them, and left them in a disposition to avenge their honour by desperate bravery.*

* "The two brigades appeared before him with dejected countenances, and Napoleon upbraided them with their indifferent behaviour. 'You have displeased me,' he said; 'you have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor bravery. You have suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men might have arrested the progress of a large army. You are no longer French soldiers. Let it be written on their colours—*They are not of the army of Italy!*' Tears, and groans of sorrow and shame answered this harangue. The rules of discipline could not stifle their sense

Vaubois had only eight thousand men left out of the twelve thousand that he commanded before this rash enterprise. Bonaparte distributed them in the best manner that he could, in the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, and, after he had made sure that Vaubois could maintain his ground for a few days, and cover our left and our rear, he returned to Verona to operate against Alvinzy. The causeway leading from the Brenta to Verona, skirting the foot of the mountains, passes through Vicenza, Monte-Bello, Villa Nova, and Caldiero. Alvinzy, surprised to see Bonaparte fall back the day after he had gained an advantage, had followed him at a distance, doubting whether the progress of Davidovich could alone have induced him to retire. He hoped that his plan of a junction at Verona was about to be realized. He halted about three leagues from Verona, on the heights of Caldiero, which command the road to that city. These heights presented an excellent position for making head against an army leaving Verona. Alvinzy established himself there, placed batteries, and omitted nothing to render them impregnable. Bonaparte reconnoitred and resolved to attack them immediately; for the situation of Vaubois at Rivoli was very precarious, and left him not much time to act against Alvinzy. He marched against him on the evening of the 21st (November 11), repulsed his advanced guard, and bivouacked with Massena's and Augereau's divisions at the foot of Caldiero. At daybreak, he perceived that Alvinzy, deeply intrenched, meant to accept battle. The position was assailable on one side, that which abutted upon the mountains, and which had not been defended with sufficient care by Alvinzy. Bonaparte sent Massena thither, and directed Augereau to attack the rest of the line. The action was brisk. But the rain fell in torrents, which gave a great advantage to the enemy, whose artillery was placed beforehand in good positions, while ours, obliged to move along roads rendered impassable, could not be brought to suitable points, and was wholly ineffective. Massena, nevertheless, succeeded in climbing the height neglected by Alvinzy. But the rain suddenly changed to a cold sleet, which a violent wind blew in the faces of our soldiers. At the same instant, Alvinzy ordered his reserve to march to the position which Massena had taken from him, and recovered all his advantages. In vain did Bonaparte persist in renewing his efforts. They were attended with no better success. The two armies passed the night in

of mortification; and several of the grenadiers, who had deserved and wore marks of distinction, called out from the ranks, 'General, we have been misrepresented; place us in the advance, and you may then judge whether we do not belong to the army of Italy.' Bonaparte, having produced the intended effect, spoke to them in a more conciliatory tone; and the regiments which had undergone so severe a rebuke, redeemed their character in the subsequent part of the campaign."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

presence of each other. The rain never ceased falling, and our soldiers were in a miserable plight.* On the next day, the 23rd of Brumaire (November 15), Bonaparte returned to Verona.

The situation of the army now became desperate. After having uselessly driven the enemy beyond the Brenta, and lost without benefit a great number of brave men, after having lost on the left the Tyrol and four thousand men, after having fought an unsuccessful battle at Caldiero to drive off Alvinzy from Verona, and again weakened him to no purpose, every resource seemed to fail. The left, now consisting of no more than eight thousand men, was liable every moment to be hurled from La Corona and Rivoli, and then Bonaparte would be enveloped at Verona. The two divisions of Massena and Augereau, which formed the active army opposed to Alvinzy, were reduced by two battles to fourteen or fifteen thousand men. What were fourteen or fifteen thousand men against nearly forty thousand? The artillery, which had always served to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy, could no longer move along through the mud. There was, therefore, no hope of fighting with any chance of success. The army was in consternation. Those brave soldiers, tried by so many hardships and dangers, began to murmur. Like all intelligent soldiers, they were subject to fits of ill-humour, because they were capable of judging. "After destroying," said they, "two armies which were opposed to us, we are expected, forsooth, to destroy those too which were opposed to the troops of the Rhine. After Beaulieu came Wurmser, after Wurmser comes Alvinzy. The struggle is renewed every day. We cannot do the work of all. We have no business to fight Alvinzy, any more than we had to fight Wurmser. If every one had done his duty as well as we have, the war would be over. Well and good," they added, "if they had but sent us succours proportioned to our dangers! but here we are abandoned in the farthest corner of Italy, here we are left by ourselves to tackle two innumerable armies. And when, after spilling our blood in thousands of fights, we are led back to the Alps, we shall return without honour and without glory, like runaways who have not done their duty." Such was the talk of the soldiers in their bivouacs. Bonaparte, who shared their spleen and their mortification, wrote on the same day, the 24th of Brumaire (November 14), to the Directory. "All our superior officers, all our best generals, are *hors de combat*. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, of Lodi, of Castiglione, of Bassano, have died for their country, or are in the hospital. Nothing is left to

* "The rain fell in torrents; the ground was so completely soaked, that the French artillery could make no movement, while that of the Austrians, being in position, and advantageously placed, produced its full effect."—*Montholon.* E.

the corps but their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Ménard, Chabrand, are wounded. We are abandoned at the extremity of Italy. The brave men who are left me have no prospect but inevitable death, amidst chances so continual and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, is near at hand. Then, what will become of these brave fellows! This idea makes me reserved. I dare no longer confront death, which would be a subject of discouragement to any one exposed to my anxieties. If I had received the 83rd, numbering three thousand five hundred men known to the army, I would have answered for the result. Perhaps in a few days forty thousand may not be enough!—To-day," added Bonaparte, "rest for the troops; to-morrow, according to the movements of the enemy, we shall act."

While he was addressing these bitter complaints to the government, he affected the greatest security in the presence of his soldiers. He desired his officers to repeat to them that another effort must be made, and that that effort would be the last; that, if Alvinzy were destroyed, the means of Austria would be exhausted for ever, Italy conquered, peace secured, and the glory of the army immortal.* His presence, his words, roused the courage of the men. The sick, consumed by fever, on hearing that the army was in danger, left the hospitals in a throng, and hastened to take their places in the ranks. The keenest and the deepest emotion was in every heart. The Austrians had that very day approached Verona, and were showing the ladders which they had prepared to scale the walls. The Veronese manifested their joy at the idea of seeing in a few hours Alvinzy joined in their city with Davidovich, and the French destroyed. Some, who were compromised on account of their attachment to our cause, sauntered sorrowfully about, counting the small number of our brave fellows.

The army awaited with anxiety the orders of the general, and hoped every moment that he would order a movement. The day of the 24th had nevertheless passed off, and the order of the day had, contrary to custom, not intimated any thing. But Bonaparte had not lost time; and, after meditating on the field of battle, he had taken one of those resolutions with which despair inspires genius.† Towards night, orders were issued for

* "We have but one more effort to make, (said Bonaparte to his soldiers,) and Italy is our own. The enemy is, no doubt, more numerous than we are, but half his troops are recruits; when he is beaten, Mantua must fall, and we shall remain masters of all. From the smiling, flowery bivouacs of Italy you cannot return to the Alpine snows. Succours are on the road. Only beat Alvinzi, and I will answer for your future welfare."—*Montholon.* E.

† "Napoleon's movements and tactics on this critical occasion were those

the whole army to get under arms; the strictest silence was recommended; the command to march was given, but, instead of moving forward, the army fell back, recrossed the Adige by the bridges of Verona, and left the city by the gate leading to Milan. The troops conceived that they were retreating, and that all idea of keeping Italy was relinquished. Sorrow pervaded the ranks. However, at some distance from Verona, it turned to the left; instead of continuing to recede from the Adige, it began to descend close to the river, and followed its course for four leagues. At length, after a march of some hours, it arrived at Ronco, where a bridge of boats had been thrown across by direction of the general. The troops recrossed the river, and at daybreak found themselves beyond the Adige, which they imagined that they had quitted for ever. The plan of the general was extraordinary. He was about to astonish both armies. The Adige, on issuing from Verona, ceases for a short distance to run perpendicularly from the mountains to the sea, and turns obliquely towards the east. In this oblique movement it approaches the road from Verona to the Brenta, on which Alvinzy was encamped. Bonaparte, on reaching Ronco, consequently found himself on the flanks, and nearly on the rear, of the Austrians. By means of this point, he was placed amidst extensive marshes. These marshes were traversed by two causeways, one of which, on the left, running along the Adige, through Porcil and Gombione, was continued to Verona; the other, on the right, passing over a small stream, called the Alpon, at the village of Arcole, rejoined the Verona road near Villa Nova, in the rear of Caldiero.

Bonaparte was therefore master at Ronco of two causeways, both of which ran to the high-road occupied by the Austrians, the one between Caldiero and Verona, the other between Caldiéro and Villa Nova. His calculation was as follows: Amidst these marshes the advantage of number was absolutely annulled; it was impossible to deploy unless upon the causeways, and on the causeways the courage of the heads of columns must decide every thing. By the causeway on the left, he could fall upon the Austrians if they attempted to scale Verona. By that on the right, which crossed the Alpon, at the bridge of Arcole, and terminated at Villa Nova, he might debouch upon the rear of Alvinzy, take his artillery and baggage, and intercept his retreat. He was therefore unassailable at Ronco, and he clasped his two arms about the enemy. He had ordered the gates of Verona to

of a consummate master of the art of war; and among all those ordered by the most renowned captains, both of ancient and modern times, I can find none more worthy of praise and admiration. They were conceived and executed with the rapidity of lightning, nor had the Austrians any notion of what he was doing, until Bonaparte had chosen his own ground, and entirely changed the state of the campaign."—*Carlo Botta.* E.

be closed, and had left Kilmaine* there, with fifteen hundred men, to withstand a first assault. This combination, so daring and so profound, struck the army, which immediately guessed the intention of it, and was filled with hope.

Bonaparte placed Massena on the left-hand dike, with directions to proceed to Gombione and Porcil, and take the enemy in the rear, if he should march upon Verona. He sent Augereau to the right, to debouch upon Villa Nova. It was just daybreak. Massena placed himself in observation on the left-hand dike. Augereau, in advancing along that on the right, had to cross the Alpon by the bridge of Arcole. Some battalions of Croats had been detached thither to watch the country. They bordered the river, and had their cannon pointed at the bridge. They received Augereau's advanced guard with a brisk fire of musketry, and forced it to fall back. Augereau hastened up, and led his troops forward again; but the fire from the bridge and the opposite bank again stopped them. He was obliged to yield to this obstacle, and to order a halt.

Meanwhile Alvinzy, who had his eyes fixed upon Verona, and who conceived that the French army was still there, had been surprised on hearing a very brisk fire amidst the marshes. He did not suppose that General Bonaparte could choose such a field, and imagined that it was a detached corps of light troops. But his cavalry soon returned, to inform him that the action was serious, and that reports of musketry proceeded from all quarters. Still his eyes were not opened. He despatched two divisions: one, under Provera, followed the left-hand dike, the other, under Mitrowski, took that on the right, and advanced upon Arcole. Massena, seeing the Austrians approaching, suffered them to advance upon a narrow dike, and when he judged them to be far enough, he dashed upon them at a run, drove them back, threw them into the marsh, and killed and drowned a great number. Mitrowski's division arrived at Arcole, debouched by the bridge, and followed the dike, as Provera's had done. Augereau rushed upon it, broke it, and threw part of it into the marsh. He pursued, and attempted to cross the bridge at its heels, but the bridge was still more strongly guarded than in the morning. A numerous artillery defended the approach to it, and all the rest of the Austrian line was deployed on the bank of the Alpon, firing on the dike, and taking it crosswise. Augereau seized a pair of colours, and carried them upon the bridge. His men followed, but a tremendous fire drove them back. Generals Lannes, Verne, Bon, and Verdier, were severely wounded. The column fell back, and the men descended to the side of the dike, to shelter themselves from the fire.

* Kilmaine was born at Dublin in the year 1754. He distinguished himself at Jemappes and in La Vendée, and was selected to command the army of England, but died in Paris in 1799. E.

Bonaparte saw from Ronco the whole hostile army set itself in motion. Apprized, at length, of its danger, it hastened to quit Caldiero, that it might not be taken in the rear at Villa Nova. He saw with vexation great results slipping from his grasp. He had, indeed, sent Guyeux with a brigade to attempt to cross the Alpon below Arcole; but the execution of that attempt would take several hours; and it was of the utmost importance to cross the Arcole immediately, in order to arrive in time on the rear of Alvinzy and to obtain a complete triumph. The fate of Italy depended upon it. He hesitated no longer. Starting off at a gallop, he rode to the bridge, sprang from his horse, went to the soldiers who were lying on the borders of the dike, asked them if they were still the conquerors of Lodi, revived their courage by his words, and, seizing a pair of colours, cried, "Follow your general!" At this command, a number of soldiers went up to the causeway and followed him. Unfortunately, the movement could not be communicated to the whole column, the rest of which remained behind the dike. Bonaparte advanced carrying the colours, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot. All his generals surrounded him. Lannes, who had already received two wounds from musket-shots during the battle, was struck by a third. Young Muiron, the general's aide-de-camp, striving to cover him with his body, fell dead at his feet.* The column was nevertheless on the point of clearing the bridge, when a last discharge stopped it and threw it back. The rear abandoned the head. The soldiers who still remained with the general then laid hold of him, carried him away amidst the fire and smoke, and insisted on his remounting his horse. An Austrian column debouching upon them, threw them in disorder into the marsh. Bonaparte fell in, and sunk up to the waist. As soon as the soldiers perceived his danger, "Forward," cried they, "to save the general." They ran after Belliard and Vignolles to extricate him. He was pulled out of the mud, set upon his horse, and returned to Ronco.†

* "This was the day of military devotedness. Lannes who had been wounded at Governolo, had hastened from Milan; he was still suffering; he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, and received three wounds, Muiron, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering the general with his own body. Heroic and affecting death!"—*Napoleon's Memoirs.* E.

† We subjoin Napoleon's own account of the battle at the bridge of Arcole, as dictated by him to Las Cases at St. Helena.

"It was five o'clock in the morning, and the enemy knew nothing of our proceedings. The first shots were fired on the bridge of Arcole, where two battalions of Croats, with two pieces of cannon, were in bivouac as a corps of observation, to guard the rear of the army, where were all the parks, and to watch the parties which the garrison of Legnago might detach into the plain. That place was only three leagues off; the enemy had been so negligent as not to advance any posts to the Adige; they looked on this space as impracticable marshes. The interval between Arcole and the Adige was not

At this moment, Guyeux had succeeded in crossing below Arcole, and in taking the village by the other bank. But he was too late. Alvinzy had already made his artillery and his baggage file away; he had deployed in the plain, and was enabled to frustrate the intentions of Bonaparte. All his heroism and genius were thus rendered useless. Bonaparte might, indeed, have avoided the obstacle of Arcole by throwing his

guarded; the enemy had contented themselves with sending some patrols of hussars, who thrice a day rode over the dikes, and reconnoitred the Adige. The road from Ronco to Arcole meets the Alpon two miles from Ronco, and then reascends the right bank of that little stream for a mile, up to the bridge, which turns perpendicularly to the right, and enters the village of Arcole. Some Croats were bivouacked, with their right supported on the village, and their left towards the mouth of the rivulet. This bivouac had in front the dike, from which it was separated only by the rivulet; by firing in front they took the column, the head of which was advancing on Arcole, in flank. It was necessary to fall back hastily to that point of the road, the side of which was no longer exposed to the left bank. Alvinzi was informed that some firing had taken place at the bridge of Arcole, but he paid little attention to the circumstance. However, at daybreak, the movement of the French could be distinguished from Caldiero and the neighbouring steeples. Already the reconnoitring parties of hussars, which every morning rode along the banks of the Adige, to ascertain the events of the night, were received with a fire of musketry on all the dikes, and pursued by the French cavalry. Alvinzi then received from all quarters certain intelligence that the French had passed the Adige, and were in force on all the dikes. It seemed to him folly to suppose that a whole army could thus have been thrown into impracticable morasses. He rather thought it must be a detachment placed there to harass him, whilst he should be attacked in force from the side of Verona. But his reconnoitring parties on the Verona side, having brought him intelligence that all was quiet there, Alvinzi thought it necessary to repulse these French troops beyond the Adige, for the security of his rear. He ordered one division to advance by the dike of Arcole, and another towards the dike which runs parallel with the Adige, with orders to fall furiously on all they should meet, and drive them all into the river. Accordingly, towards nine o'clock, these two divisions made a brisk attack. Massena, who was intrusted with the left dike, having allowed the enemy to advance, charged them furiously, broke them, caused them considerable loss, and took a great number of prisoners. The same thing was done on the dike of Arcole; they waited until the Austrians had turned the elbow of the bridge; they then charged and routed them, and took many prisoners. It became of the utmost importance to gain possession of Arcole, because that was the point from whence to debouch on the rear of the enemy, before they could be formed. But this bridge of Arcole, by its situation, resisted all our attacks. Napoleon, in person, tried a last effort; he seized a standard, rushed towards the bridge, and fixed it there. The column he led had half cleared the bridge, when the flank fire caused their attack to fail. The grenadiers of the head of the column, abandoned by the rear, hesitated, they were disposed to retire, but they would not forsake their general; they seized him by his arms, his hair, and his clothes, and dragged him along with them, in their flight, amidst the dead, the dying, the fire, and the smoke. The general-in-chief was thrown into a marsh, where he sunk up to the middle; he was in the midst of the enemy; but the French perceived that their general was not amongst them. A cry was heard of 'Soldiers! forward, to rescue the general!' These brave men instantly turned, and rushed upon the enemy; they drove them beyond the bridge, and Napoleon was saved." E.

bridge over the Adige, a little below Ronco, that is, at Albanedo, the point where the Alpon falls into the Adige. But then he would have debouched in the plain, which it behoved him to avoid doing; and he would not have had it in his power to fly by the left-hand dike to the relief of Verona.* He was, therefore, right in doing what he had done; and, though the success was not complete, important results had been obtained. Alvinzy had quitted the formidable position of Caldiero; he had descended again into the plain; he no longer threatened Verona; he had lost a great number of men in the marshes. The two dikes had become the only field of battle between the two armies, which ensured the advantage to bravery and took it away from number. Lastly, the French soldiers, animated by the conflict, had recovered all their confidence.

Bonaparte, who had to think of all dangers at once, had to attend to his left, which was at La Corona and Rivoli. As it was liable every moment to be overthrown, he wished to have it in his power to fly to its assistance. He thought it best, therefore, to fall back from Gombione and Arcole, to recross the Adige at Ronco, and to bivouac on this side of the river, in order to be at hand to succour Vaubois, in case he should hear in the night of his defeat. Such was this first battle, on the 25th of Brumaire (November 15).

The night passed without any bad news. It was known that Vaubois still maintained his ground at Rivoli. The exploits of Castiglione covered Bonaparte on that side. Davidovich, who commanded a corps at the battle of Castiglione, had retained such an impression of that event, that he durst not advance to gain certain intelligence of Alvinzy. Thus the spell of Bonaparte's genius was where he was not himself. The fight of the 26th (November 16) commenced. The combatants met on the two dikes. The French charged with the bayonet, broke the Austrians, threw a great number of them into the marsh, and made many prisoners. They took colours and cannon. Bonaparte ordered a fire of musketry to be kept up on the bank of the Alpon, but he made no decisive effort to cross it. When night came on, he again drew back his columns, took them above the dikes, and rallied them on the other bank of the Adige, satisfied with having harassed the enemy the whole day, while awaiting more certain intelligence of Vaubois. The second night was passed like the preceding. The tidings from Vaubois were cheering. A third day might now be devoted to a definitive conflict with Alvinzy. At length, the sun rose for the third time on this frightful theatre of carnage. It was the 27th (November 17). Bonaparte calculated that the enemy must have

* I here repeat a remark often made to Bonaparte on this celebrated battle, and the answer which he has himself given to it in his "Memoirs."

lost at least one-third of his army, in killed, wounded, drowned, and prisoners. He judged him to be harassed and disheartened; and he saw his own soldiers full of enthusiasm. He then resolved to quit those dikes, and to transfer the field of battle to the plain beyond the Alpon. As on the preceding days, the French, debouching from Ronco, met the Austrians on the dikes. Massena still occupied the left dike. On that upon the right General Robert was directed to attack, while Augereau proceeded to cross the Alpon near its influx into the Adige. Massena at first encountered an obstinate resistance, but, putting his hat on the point of his sword, he marched in that manner at the head of his soldiers. As on the former days, many of the enemy were killed, drowned, or taken. On the right-hand dike, General Robert advanced at first with success; but he was killed, and his column repulsed nearly to the bridge of Ronco.

Bonaparte, who saw the danger, placed the 32nd in a wood of willows which borders the dike. While the enemy's column, victorious over Robert, was advancing, the 32nd suddenly sallied from its ambuscade, took it in flank, and threw it into frightful disorder. It consisted of three thousand Croats. The greater part of them were slain or made prisoners. The dikes thus swept, Bonaparte determined to cross the Alpon. Augereau had passed it on the extreme right. Bonaparte brought back Massena from the left to the right hand dike, despatched him upon Arcole, which was evacuated, and thus brought his whole army into the plain before that of Alvinzy. Before he ordered the charge, he resorted to a stratagem to frighten the enemy. A marsh, overgrown with reeds, covered the left wing of the Austrians: he ordered Hercule, *chef de bataillon*, to take with him twenty-five of his guides, to file away through the reeds, and to charge unawares with a great blast of trumpets. These twenty-five brave fellows started to execute the order. Bonaparte then gave the signal to Massena and to Augereau. These latter made a vigorous charge upon the Austrian line, which resisted; but all at once a loud sound of trumpets was heard. The Austrians, conceiving that they were charged by a whole division of cavalry, gave way. At that moment, the garrison of Legnago, which Bonaparte had ordered to move upon their rear, appeared at a distance, and increased their alarm. They then retreated, and, after a tremendous conflict of seventy-two hours, disheartened and worn out with fatigue, they yielded the victory to the heroism of a few thousand brave men and to the genius of a great commander.*

* "It was so apparent to all the Austrian army, that this last retreat was the result of a secret understanding with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now pending, that they loudly expressed their indignation. One colonel broke his sword in pieces, and declared he would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his

The two armies, exhausted by their efforts, passed the night in the plain. Next morning, Bonaparte renewed the pursuit upon Vicenza. On arriving at the causeway leading from the Brenta to Verona, through Villa Nova, he left his cavalry alone to pursue the enemy, and resolved to return to Verona, by way of Villa Nova and Caldiero, in order to relieve Vaubois. Bonaparte received intelligence on the road that Vaubois had been obliged to abandon La Corona and Rivoli, and to fall back to Castel Novo. He redoubled his speed, and arrived the same evening at Verona, passing over the field of battle which had been occupied by Alvinzy. He entered the city at the gate opposite to that by which he had left it. When the Veronese saw this handful of men, who had gone forth as fugitives by the Milan gate, re-entering as conquerors by the Venice gate, they were filled with astonishment.* Neither friends nor foes could repress their admiration of the general and the soldiers who had so gloriously changed the fortune of the war. It was no longer feared or hoped by any one that the French might be driven out of Italy. Bonaparte immediately ordered Massena to march to Castel Novo, and Augereau upon Dolce, along the right bank of the Adige. Davidovich, attacked on all sides, was quickly driven back into the Tyrol, with the loss of a great number of prisoners. Bonaparte contented himself with re-occupying the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, without attempting to ascend again to Trent and to recover possession of the Tyrol. The French army was exceedingly reduced by this last conflict. The Austrian army had lost five thousand prisoners, and eight or ten thousand in killed and wounded, but it was still upwards of forty thousand strong, including the corps of Davidovich. It retired into the Tyrol and upon the Brenta, to rest itself: it was far from having suffered so severely as the armies of Wurmser and Beaulieu. The French, exhausted, had been able only to repulse, not to destroy it. Their general was, therefore, obliged to relinquish all idea of pursuing it, until the promised reinforcements should arrive; and merely occupied the Adige from Dolce to the sea.

This new victory produced extreme joy both in Italy and in France. People every where admired that persevering genius, which, with fourteen or fifteen thousand men against forty thousand, had never thought of retreating; that inventive and profound genius, which had the sagacity to discover in the dikes of

troops. Certain it is that Alvinzy during this dreadful strife at Arcole, had neither evinced the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoleon."—*Alison.* E.

* "The French army re-entered Verona in triumph by the Venice gate, three days after having quitted that city almost clandestinely by the Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants."—*Montholon.* E.

Ronco a new field of battle, that rendered numbers of no avail and exposed the flanks of the enemy. They extolled in particular the heroism displayed at the bridge of Arcole, and the young general was every where represented with the colours in his hand, amidst fire and smoke.* The two councils, when declaring, according to custom, that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, resolved, moreover, that the colours which the two generals, Bonaparte and Augereau, had borne upon the bridge of Arcole should be given to them to be kept as heir-looms—an appropriate and a noble reward, worthy of an heroic age, and much more glorious than the diadem subsequently decreed by weakness to all-powerful genius.

* " By the battle of Arcole, where the loss on both sides was immense, the French gained every advantage proposed by their wonderful leader, who remained for two months the undisturbed possessor of Lombardy; while he had struck the Austrians with an idea of his invincibility from which they did not recover for years. This was the hardest fought battle in all the war, and the one in which Bonaparte showed most personal courage. Lodi was nothing to Arcole!"—*Bourrienne*. E.

THE DIRECTORY.

CLARKE AT HEAD-QUARTERS—RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH CABINET; DEPARTURE OF MALMESBURY—EXPEDITION TO IRELAND—RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OF THE YEAR V—CAPITULATION OF KEHL — LAST EFFORT OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY — VICTORY OF RIVOLI AND LA FAVORITA; REDUCTION OF MANTUA—CONCLUSION OF THE MEMORABLE CAMPAIGN OF 1796.

GENERAL Clarke arrived at the head-quarters of the army of Italy, whence he was to proceed to Vienna. His mission had lost its essential object, since the battle of Arcole had rendered an armistice useless. Bonaparte, whom General Clarke was ordered to consult, totally disapproved the armistice and its conditions. The reasons which he assigned were excellent. The armistice could now have but one object, that of saving the fortress of Kehl on the Rhine, which the archduke was besieging with great vigour; and for this very subordinate object, it sacrificed Mantua. Kehl was merely a *tête-de-pont*, which was not indispensable for debouching in Germany. The taking of Mantua would lead to the definitive conquest of Italy, and justify the demand in return of Mayence and the whole line of the Rhine. The armistice evidently compromised this conquest; for Mantua, full of sick, and reduced to half rations, could not defer opening its gates longer than a month. The provisions that would be introduced would restore health and strength to the garrison. Their quantity could not be accurately fixed: Wurmser might, by means of savings, lay up a store for renewing his resistance, in case of the resumption of hostilities. The effects of the battles fought to cover the blockade of Mantua would thus be done away with, and it would be necessary to begin again at a fresh cost. Nor was this all. The Pope could not fail to be included in the armistice by Austria, and then the French would be deprived of the means of punishing him and wringing from him twenty or thirty millions, which the army much needed, and which would serve to carry on a new campaign. Lastly, Bonaparte, penetrating into futurity, advised that, instead of suspending hostilities, they should be continued with vigour, but that the war should be transferred to its true theatre, and that a reinforcement of thirty thousand men should

be sent to Italy. He promised, on this condition, to march upon Vienna and to have in two months peace, the line of the Rhine, and a republic in Italy. This combination, indeed, would place in his hands all the military and political operations of the war; but, whether it was interested or not, it was just and profound, and the result proved its wisdom.

Nevertheless, in obedience to the Directory, letters were addressed to the Austrian generals on the Rhine and the Adige, to propose an armistice and to obtain passports for Clarke. The Archduke Charles answered Moreau that he could not listen to any proposal for an armistice, that his powers did not permit him to do so, and that he must refer the matter to the Aulic Council. Alvinzy returned the same answer, and sent off a courier to Vienna. The Austrian minister, secretly devoted to England, was not disposed to comply with the proposals of France. The cabinet of London had communicated to him the mission of Lord Malmesbury, and had taken pains to persuade him that the emperor would gain many more advantages by joining in the negotiation opened in Paris than by making separate conditions, since the English conquests in the two Indies would be sacrificed to procure for him the restitution of the Netherlands. Besides the insinuations of England, the cabinet of Vienna had other reasons for rejecting the proposals of the Directory. It flattered itself with the expectation of taking the fortress of Kehl in a very short time; the French, hemmed in along the Rhine, would then no longer be able to cross that river; it might then without danger withdraw new detachments and send them to the Adige. These detachments, joined to the new levies that were being raised throughout all Austria with wonderful activity, would admit of one more attempt being made upon Italy. Perhaps that terrible army, which had annihilated so many Austrian battalions, might itself succumb at last under reiterated efforts.

In this case, then, German perseverance was true to itself, and in spite of so many reverses it did not yet renounce the possession of fair Italy. It was in consequence resolved not to allow Clarke to come to Vienna. Besides, the Austrian cabinet was shy of admitting an observer into the capital, and it wished not for any direct negotiation. As for the armistice, it would have consented to it on the Adige, but not on the Rhine. Clarke was answered that, if he would repair to Vicenza, he would there find the Baron de Vincent, with whom he might confer. A meeting accordingly took place at Vicenza. The Austrian minister alleged that the emperor could not receive an envoy of the republic, because that would be equivalent to acknowledging it; and, as for the armistice, he declared that it was admissible in regard to Italy alone. This proposal was ridiculous, and it is inconceivable how the Austrian minister could make it, for it would save Mantua without saving

Kehl, and the French could scarcely have been supposed stupid enough to accept it. Nevertheless, the Austrian ministry, desirous of reserving to itself the means of a separate negotiation in case of emergency, directed its envoy to declare that, if the French commissioner had proposals to make relative to peace, he had only to proceed to Turin, and to communicate them to the Austrian ambassador at the court of Sardinia. Thus, owing to the suggestions of England and to the silly hopes of the cabinet of Vienna, the dangerous project of an armistice was foiled. Clarke went to Turin, in order to avail himself, in case of need, of the channel of communication offered to him at the court of Sardinia. But he had another mission—that was, to watch General Bonaparte. The genius of that young man had appeared so extraordinary,* his character so absolute and so energetic, that, without any precise motive, he was supposed to have ambition. He had insisted on conducting the war as he pleased, and had tendered his resignation when a plan that was not his own had been marked out for him; he had acted like a sovereign in Italy, granting to princes peace or war under the name of armistices; he had loudly complained because the negotiations with the Pope were not conducted by him alone, and had required that they should be left to his management; he had treated Garau and Salicetti, the commissioners, very harshly, when they ventured upon measures of which he disapproved, and had obliged them to leave the head-quarters; he had taken the liberty to transmit funds to the different armies, without any authority from the government, and without having recourse to the indispensable channel of the treasury. All these circumstances indicated a man who liked to do himself all that he thought himself alone capable of doing properly. It was as yet only the impatience of genius, which cannot bear to be thwarted in its operations: but it is in this impatience that a despotic will begins to manifest itself. On seeing him excite Upper Italy against its old masters, and create or destroy states, people would have supposed that he meant to make himself Duke of Milan. They had a foreboding of his ambition, and he had

* The following was the opinion entertained of Bonaparte's extraordinary genius by one of his most inveterate adversaries—M. Bertrand de Moleville, a stanch royalist, and formerly minister of the marine under Louis XVI. The observations were addressed to the Count Las Cases:

"Your Bonaparte, your Napoleon, was a very extraordinary man, it must be confessed. How little did we know of him on the other side the water! We could not, it is true, but yield to the conviction of his victories and his invasions; but Genseric, Attila, and Alaric were as victorious as he. Thus he produced on me an impression of terror rather than of admiration. But since I have been here, I have taken the trouble to look over the debates on the civil code, and I have ever since been imbued with profound veneration for him. But where in the world did he collect all his knowledge? I discover something new every day. Ah, sir, what a man you had at the head of your government! Really, he was nothing short of a prodigy." E.

himself a presentiment of the reproach. He complained of being accused, and then justified himself, though not a single word of the Directory furnished him occasion to do so.

Clarke then, was sent not only to negotiate, but also to watch him. Bonaparte was aware of his errand, and, acting in this instance with his habitual haughtiness and address, he suffered him to perceive that he was acquainted with the object of his mission, subdued him in a short time by his ascendency and his fascinating manner, not less overpowering, it is said, than his genius, and converted him into a devoted adherent. Clarke possessed ability, but he had too much vanity to be a clever and supple spy. He remained in Italy, sometimes at Turin, sometimes at head-quarters, and soon belonged more to Bonaparte than the Directory.

The negotiation opened in Paris had been protracted by the English cabinet as much as possible, but the French cabinet, by returning prompt and explicit answers, had at last obliged Lord Malmesbury to speak out. That minister had, as we have seen, insisted, at the outset, on the principle of a general negotiation and that of a compensation for conquests; the Directory, on its part, had demanded the powers of all the allies, and a clearer explanation of the principle of compensations. The English minister had taken nineteen days to reply; he had at length answered that application was made for the powers; but before they were produced it was requisite that the French government should positively admit the principle of compensations. The Directory had then required an immediate declaration of the objects to which the compensations related. At this point the negotiation had arrived. Lord Malmesbury again wrote to London, and, after the lapse of twelve days, replied, on the 6th of Frimaire (November 26th) that his court had nothing to add to what it had already said, and that it could not enter into any further explanation, so long as the French government did not formally admit the proposed principle. This was a quibble; for, in demanding a statement of the objects which were to be compensated for, France had evidently admitted the principle of compensation. To write to London and to take up twelve days more for this quibble was trifling with the Directory. It replied, as it always did, on the following day, and in a note of four lines it stated that its former note necessarily implied the admission of the principle of compensation, but at any rate it formally admitted that principle, and demanded immediately a statement of the objects to which it was to be applied. The Directory also asked if, upon every question, Lord Malmesbury would be obliged to write to London. Lord Malmesbury vaguely replied, that he should be obliged to write whenever the question required fresh instructions. He again wrote, and twenty days elapsed before he replied. It was evident this time that he must lay aside the vagueness in which he had enveloped

himself, and at length grapple with the formidable question of the Netherlands. To come to an explanation on that point was to break off the negotiation, and it is obvious that the English cabinet put off the rupture as long as possible. At last, on the 28th of Frimaire (December 18th), Lord Malmesbury had an interview with Delacroix, the minister, and delivered to him a note in which the pretensions of the English cabinet were stated. It insisted that France should restore to the powers of the continent all that she had taken from them; that she should give up to Austria Belgium and Luxemburg, and to the empire the German states on the right bank of the Rhine; that she should evacuate all Italy and replace it in the *status quo ante bellum;* that she should restore to Holland certain portions of territory, such as maritime Flanders, for example, in order to render her independent; and lastly that changes should be made in her existing constitution. The English cabinet promised to restore the Dutch colonies, but only on condition of the reinstatement of the stadtholder; and even in this case it proposed not to give up all; some it meant to keep as an indemnity for the war, among others, the Cape. For all these sacrifices it offered to return to us two or three islands which we had lost during the war in the West Indies, Martinique, St. Lucia, and Tobago, and again upon condition that we should not retain the whole of St. Domingo. Thus France, after an iniquitous war, in which she had all the justice on her side, in which she had expended enormous sums, and from which she had come off victorious—France was not to gain a single province, while the northern powers had just divided a kingdom among them, and England had recently made immense acquisitions in India! France, who still occupied the line of the Rhine, and who was mistress of Italy, was to evacuate the Rhine and Italy, at the bare summons of England! Such conditions were absurd and inadmissible. The very proposal of them was an insult, and they could not be listened to. Delacroix, nevertheless, did listen to them with a politeness which struck the English minister, and which even led him to hope that the negotiation might be continued.

Delacroix adduced a reason, which was a bad one, namely that the Netherlands were declared national territory by the constitution; and the English minister replied by a reason which was no better, that the treaty of Utrecht gave them to Austria. The constitution might be obligatory for the French nation, but it neither concerned nor was obligatory for foreign nations. The treaty of Utrecht was, like all other treaties in the world, an arrangement of force, which force was liable to change. The only reason which the French minister ought to have given was, that the incorporation of the Netherlands with France was just, that it was founded on all the natural and political expediencies, and that it was justified by victory. After a long discussion on all the subordinate points of the negotiation, the two ministers

parted. Delacroix went to refer the matter to the Directory, which, justly incensed, resolved to reply to the English minister as he deserved. The note of the English minister was not signed; it was merely enclosed in a signed letter. The Directory required, the very same day, that it should be clothed with the necessary forms, and demanded his *ultimatum* within twenty-four hours. Lord Malmesbury, embarrassed, replied that the note was sufficiently authentic, since it was enclosed in a signed letter, and, as to an *ultimatum*, it was contrary to all custom to demand one at so short a notice. Next day, the 29th of Frimaire (December 19th), the Directory caused it to be intimated that it never would listen to any proposal contrary to the laws and treaties which bound the republic, adding that, as Lord Malmesbury had to refer every moment to his government, and performed a purely passive part in the negotiation, his presence in Paris was useless; that, in consequence, he was ordered to depart, himself and his suite, within forty-eight hours; and that couriers would be sufficient for negotiating, if the English government adopted the bases laid down by the French republic.

Thus ended this negotiation, in which the French Directory, so far from violating forms, as it has been alleged, set a real example of frankness in its relations with hostile powers. In this case there was no violation of established usage. The communications of powers are stamped, like all the relations between individuals, with the character of the time, of the situation, of the persons who govern. A strong and victorious government talks differently from a weak and vanquished government; and it befitted a republic, supported by justice and victory, to express itself in language prompt, terse, and public.

During this interval, Hoche's grand attempt upon Ireland was carried into effect. This was what England dreaded, and what was liable, in fact, to place her in great jeopardy. Notwithstanding the reports adroitly circulated of an expedition against Portugal or America, England had rightly guessed the object of the preparations making at Brest. Pitt had caused the militia to be called out, and the coasts to be armed, and had given orders to evacuate every thing in the interior, if the French should effect a landing.

Ireland, whither the expedition was bound, was in such a state as to cause serious apprehension. The partisans of parliamentary reform and the Catholics formed in that island a mass sufficient to produce an insurrection. They would gladly have adopted a republican government under the guarantee of France, and they had sent secret agents to Paris to concert plans with the Directory.* Thus every thing led to the inference that

* "The Catholics of Ireland are 3,150,000, all trained from their infancy in an hereditary hatred and abhorrence of the English name. For these five

an expedition would throw England into cruel embarrassment, and force her to accept a very different sort of peace from that which she had just offered. Hoche, who had wasted the two best years of his life in La Vendée, and who saw the great theatres of war occupied by Bonaparte, Moreau, and Jourdan, burned with impatience to open one for himself in Ireland. England was as noble an adversary as Austria, and there was not less honour in fighting and conquering her. A new republic had sprung up in Italy, and was about to become the focus of liberty there. Hoche deemed it possible and desirable to erect such another in Ireland, by the side of the English aristocracy. He was very intimate with Admiral Truguet, minister of the marine, and a man of comprehensive views. Both promised themselves to give high importance to the navy, and to achieve great things; for at that time all heads were at work, all meditating prodigies for the glory and happiness of their country. The offensive and defensive alliance concluded with Spain, at St. Ildefonso, offered great resources, and admitted of vast projects. By uniting the Toulon squadron with the Spanish fleet, and concentrating them in the Channel with that which France had in the Atlantic Ocean, a very formidable force might be collected, and attempt to deliver the seas by a decisive engagement. It might at least set Ireland in flames, and then proceed to interrupt the successes of England in India. Admiral Truguet, sensible of the importance of sending speedy succours to India, proposed that the Brest squadron, without waiting for the junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Channel, should start immediately, land Hoche's army in Ireland, keep a few thousand men on board, then sail for the Isle of France, take on board the battalions of negroes which were being organized

years they have fixed their eyes most earnestly on France, whom they look upon with great justice as fighting their battles, as well as those of all mankind who are oppressed. Of this class I will stake my head there are five hundred thousand men who would fly to the standard of the republic, if they saw it once displayed in the cause of liberty and their country. The republic may also rely with confidence on the support of the Dissenters, actuated by reason and reflection, as well as the Catholics, impelled by misery and inflamed by detestation of the English name. It would be just as easy in a month's time to have an army in Ireland of 200,000 men as 10,000. The peasantry would flock to the republican standard in such numbers as to embarrass the general-in-chief. A proclamation should instantly be issued, containing an invitation to the people to join the republican standard, organize themselves, and form a National Convention, for the purpose of framing a government, and administering the affairs of Ireland, till it was put into activity. The first act of the Convention thus constituted should be to declare themselves the representatives of the Irish people, free and independent. The Convention should next publish a proclamation, notifying their independence and their alliance with the French republic, and forbidding all adherence to the British government, under the penalty of high treason."—*Wolfe Tone's Memorial to the French Directory.* E.

there, and proceed to India with these succours for Tippoo Saib. This grand expedition had one inconvenience, that of carrying to Ireland only part of the army destined for that island, and leaving it exposed to great risks, till the very precarious junction of Admiral Villeneuve's* squadron, which was to sail from Toulon, of the Spanish squadron, which was dispersed in the ports of Spain, and of Richery's squadron, which was returning from America. This expedition was not carrried into effect. Admiral Richery's arrival from America was waited for, and, notwithstanding the state of the finances, extraordinary efforts were made to complete the equipment of the Brest squadron. In Frimaire (December), it was in a condition to sail. It consisted of fifteen sail of the line, twenty frigates, six luggers, and fifty transports. Hoche could not agree with Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse. Morard de Galles was appointed to supersede the latter. The expedition was to land in Bantry Bay. Each of the captains of the ships of the line was furnished with sealed orders, specifying the direction which he was to follow, and the port for which he was to steer in case of accident.

The expedition sailed on the 26th of Frimaire (December 16). Hoche and Morard de Galles were on board a frigate. Owing to a thick fog, the French squadron escaped the English cruisers, and crossed the sea unperceived. But in the night between the 26th and 27th it was dispersed by a violent storm. One ship foundered. Rear-admiral Bouvet, however, manœuvred for the purpose of rallying the squadron, and succeeded in two days in collecting the whole of it, excepting one ship of the line and three frigates. Unfortunately, the frigate which had Hoche and Morard de Galles on board was one of the latter. The squadron doubled Cape Clear, and manœuvred there several days, waiting for the two commanders. At length, on the 4th of

* Villeneuve was a brave but unfortunate French admiral, who, in consequence of his total defeat by Nelson at Trafalgar, is supposed to have committed suicide. Napoleon in the Voice from St. Helena gives the following details of the catastrophe: "Villeneuve, when taken prisoner and brought to England, was so much grieved at his defeat, that he studied anatomy on purpose to destroy himself. With this view he bought some anatomical plates of the heart, and compared them with his own body, in order to ascertain the exact situation of that organ. On his arrival in France, I ordered that he should remain at Rennes, and not proceed to Paris. Villeneuve, afraid of being tried by a court martial for disobedience of orders, and consequently losing the fleet—for I had ordered him not to sail, or engage the English—determined to destroy himself, and accordingly took his plates of the heart, and compared them with his breast. Exactly in the centre of the plate, he made a mark with a large pin, then fixed the pin as nearly as he could judge, in the same spot in his own breast, shoved it in to the head, penetrated his heart, and expired. When the room was opened he was found dead, the pin in his breast, and a mark in the plate corresponding with the wound. He need not have done it, as he was a brave man, though possessed of no talent." E.

Nivose (December 24), it entered Bantry Bay. A council of war decided on landing, but this was rendered impossible by the bad weather. The squadron was again blown from the coasts of Ireland. Rear-admiral Bouvet, daunted by so many obstacles, apprehensive lest he should run short of provisions, and separated from the two commanders-in-chief, deemed it advisable to regain the coast of France. Hoche and Morard de Galles at length arrived in Bantry Bay, and were informed of the return of the French squadron. They followed it, amidst unparalleled dangers. Tossed by the sea, pursued by the English, they reached the French shores only by a sort of miracle. The Droits de l'Homme, Captain La Crosse, was separated from the squadron, and performed prodigies. Attacked by two English vessels, she destroyed one, and escaped the other; but, being much damaged, and having lost masts and sails, she could not withstand the violence of the sea. One part of the crew went to the bottom with her, another part was saved.

Thus ended that expedition, which excited great alarm in England and revealed her vulnerable point.* The Directory did not relinquish the idea of reviving this plan, but for the moment turned its whole attention towards the continent, with a view to force Austria to lay down her arms as speedily as possible. The troops of the expedition had suffered little; they were disembarked; a sufficient force was left on the coast to perform the police duty of the country, and the greater part of the army, which had been called the Army of the Ocean, was marched towards the Rhine. The two Vendées and Bretagne were, for the rest, perfectly quiet, through the vigilance and the continual presence of Hoche. An important command was provided for that general, to reward him for his arduous and ungrateful toils. The resignation of Jourdan, whom the unsuccessful issue of the campaign had disgusted, and who had been temporarily succeeded by Beurnonville, afforded an opportunity for offering Hoche a compensation which had long been due to his patriotism and to his talents.

The winter, already far advanced (it was now Nivose), had not interrupted this memorable campaign. On the Rhine, the Archduke Charles was besieging Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen: on the Adige, Alvinzy was preparing for a new and

* "It is a curious subject for speculation what might have been the result, had Hoche succeeded in landing with sixteen thousand of his best troops on the Irish shores. To those who consider indeed the patriotic spirit, indomitable valour, and persevering character of the English people, and the complete command they had of the sea, the final issue of such a conquest cannot appear doubtful; but it is equally evident that the addition of such a force and so able a commander to the numerous bodies of Irish malcontents would have engendered a dreadful domestic war, and that the whole energies of the empire might for a very long period have been employed in saving itself from dismemberment."—*Alison.* E.

last effort against Bonaparte. The interior of the republic was tolerably quiet. The parties had their eyes fixed on the different theatres of the war. The credit and the strength of the government increased or diminished according to the chances of the campaign. The late victory of Arcole had shed a great lustre, and counteracted the bad effect produced by the retreat of the armies of the Rhine. Still this effort of desperate bravery had not made people's minds quite easy respecting the possession of Italy. It was well known that Alvinzy was reinforcing himself, and that the Pope was equipping troops. The evil-disposed asserted that the army of Italy was exhausted; that its general, worn out by the toils of an unexampled campaign and consumed by an extraordinary disease, was unable to sit on horseback. Mantua was not yet taken, and great apprehensions were to be entertained for the month of Nivose (January).

The journals of the two parties, taking unbounded advantage of the liberty of the press, continued to launch out. Those of the counter-revolution, seeing spring, the period for the elections, approaching, strove to agitate opinion and to influence it in their favour. Ever since the disasters of the royalists in La Vendée, it was evident that their last expedient was to make use of liberty to destroy itself, and to obtain the control of the republic by carrying the elections. The Directory, witnessing their animosity, was seized with those movements of impatience, which even the most enlightened government cannot always repress. Though accustomed to liberty, it was alarmed at the language assumed in some of the journals; it did not yet thoroughly comprehend, that it is right to allow perfect freedom of discussion; that falsehood is never to be feared whatever publicity it may gain; that it expends itself by its violence; and that a government perishes by truth alone, and especially by truth repressed. It applied to the two councils for laws respecting the abuses of the press. An outcry was raised. It was alleged that, as the elections were at hand, the Directory wished to cramp the freedom of them. The laws which it solicited were refused: two propositions only were adopted; one relative to the repression of private slander, the other to the hawkers of newspapers in the streets, who, instead of crying them by their titles, announced them by detached and frequently very indecorous sentences. The hawkers of a particular pamphlet for instance, cried about the streets, "Give us back our myriagrammes, and d—n the camp if you cannot make the people happy." It was decided that, to obviate this scandal, the journals and other publications should be cried in future by their title only. The Directory recommended the establishment of an official journal of the government. The Five Hundred assented to this suggestion. The Ancients opposed it. The law of the 3rd of Brumaire, brought a second time under discussion in Vendémiaire, and made the

pretext for the ridiculous attack of the patriots on the camp of Grenelle, had been maintained after a solemn debate. It was, as it were, the post around which the two parties were incessantly running against one another. It was that clause, in particular, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public offices, that the right side wished to rescind, and it was that which the republicans were anxious to retain. After a third attack, it was decided that this clause should be maintained. Only one modification was made in this law. It excluded from the general amnesty granted for revolutionary misdemeanors offences connected with the 13th of Vendémiaire; that event was of too old a date not to extend the amnesty to those who might have taken part in it, and who, besides, had in fact all gone unpunished: the amnesty was therefore applied to the offences of Vendémiaire as to all the other purely revolutionary acts.

Thus the Directory, and all those who were in favour of the directorial republic, retained a majority in the Councils, in spite of the outcries of certain hotheaded patriots and of some intriguers sold to the counter-revolution.

The state of the finances produced the usual effect of poverty in families—it disturbed the domestic union of the Directory with the legislative body. The Directory complained that its measures were not always favourably received by the Councils; it addressed to them an alarming message, and published it, as if to throw the blame of the public misfortunes upon them, if they did not cheerfully adopt these suggestions. This message, of the 25th of Frimaire, was couched in these terms: "All departments of the service are distressed. The pay of the troops is in arrear; the defenders of the country are exposed to the horrors of nakedness; their courage is enervated by the painful feeling of their wants; the disgust, which is the consequence of it, leads to desertion. The hospitals are destitute of furniture, of fire, of drugs. The charitable institutions, a prey to the same penury, repel the poor and the infirm, whose sole resource they were. The creditors of the state, the contractors, who every day contribute to supply the wants of the armies, with difficulty obtain but small portions of the sums that are due to them; distress keeps aloof men who could perform the same services with more punctuality or for a less profit. The roads are cut up, the communications interrupted. The public functionaries are without salary: from one end of the republic to the other judges and administrators may be seen reduced to the horrible alternative either of dragging on with their families a miserable existence, or of being dishonoured by selling themselves to intrigue. The evil-disposed are every where busy; in many places murder is being organized, and the police, without activity, without energy, because it is without pecuniary means, cannot put a stop to these disorders."

The Councils were irritated at the publication of this message,

which seemed to throw the blame of the disastrous condition of the state upon them, and warmly censured the indiscretion of the Directory. They nevertheless immediately set about examining its propositions. Specie abounded every where, excepting in the coffers of the state. The taxes, which might now be collected in specie or in paper at the current value, came in but slowly. The national domains disposed of were partly paid for; the remaining instalments were not yet due. The government lived by expedients. The contractors received orders of the ministers, called *bordereaux de liquidation*, a sort of promissory notes, which were taken only for a very inferior value, and which caused a considerable rise in the price of the markets. It was, therefore, precisely the same situation that we have already so frequently described.

Great improvements were introduced into the finances for the year V. The budget was divided, as we have already seen, into two parts: the ordinary expenses of four hundred and fifty millions, and the extraordinary expenses of five hundred and fifty. The land-tax, estimated at two hundred and fifty millions, the sumptuary and personal contribution at fifty, the customs, the stamp and registration duties, at one hundred and fifty, were expected to furnish the four hundred and fifty millions for the ordinary expenditure. The extraordinary expenditure was to be covered by the arrears of the taxes and by the produce of the national domains. The taxes were now to be levied entirely in specie. There were still left some mandats and some assignats, which were immediately annulled, and taken at the current value for the payment of arrears. In this manner a final stop was put to the disorders of the paper-money.* The forced loan was definitively closed. It had produced scarcely four hundred millions, effective value. The arrears of taxes were to be paid up before the 15th of Frimaire (December 5) of the current year. The expedient of putting persons in possession was adopted to accelerate the collection. Lists were ordered to be made out, for the purpose of levying immediately one-fourth of the taxes for the year V. It yet remained to be decided how the value of the national domains was to be made available, as there was no longer any paper-money for putting it beforehand into circulation. The last sixth of the national domains disposed of was still to be received. It was decided that, in order to anticipate this last payment, there should be required of the purchasers obligations payable in specie, falling due at the same time that

* "Such was the end of the system of paper credit, six years after it had been originally commenced, and after it had effected a greater change in the fortunes of individuals than had perhaps ever been accomplished in the same time by any measure of government. It did more to overthrow the existing wealth, and to transfer moveable fortunes from one hand to another than even the confiscation of the émigrant and church estates."—*Alison*. E.

the law obliged them to acquit themselves, and entailing, in case of protest, the forfeiture of the domains sold. This measure was likely to bring in some eighty millions in obligations, which the contractors declared their willingness to discount. People had no longer any confidence in the state, but they had in private individuals; and the eighty millions of this personal paper had a value which a paper issued and guaranteed by the republic would never have had. It was resolved that the domains sold in future should be paid for as follows: One-tenth down in cash, five-tenths down in orders of ministers, or in *bordereaux de liquidation* delivered to contractors, and the other four-tenths in bills payable one per year.

Thus, having no longer any public credit, the government availed itself of private credit; being no longer able to issue paper-money upon mortgage of the domains, it required of the purchasers of those domains a kind of paper, which, bearing their signature, had an individual value; and, lastly, it allowed the contractors to pay themselves for their services out of the domains.

These arrangements induced a hope of a little order and some returns. To supply the urgent wants of the ministry of war, there was assigned to it immediately, for the months of Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose, and Germinal, months devoted to preparations for the new campaign, the sum of one hundred and twenty millions, thirty-three of which were to be taken from the ordinary and eighty-seven from the extraordinary. The registration, the posts, the customs, the patents, the land-tax, were to furnish these thirty-three millions: the eighty-seven of the extraordinary were to be composed of the produce of the woods, the arrears of the military contributions, and the obligations of the purchasers of national domains. These amounts were sure, and they would be paid up forthwith. All the public functionaries were paid in cash. It was decided that the annuitants should be paid in the same manner; but as there was not yet money to give them, the government gave them notes to bearer, receivable in payment for national domains, like the orders of ministers and the *bordereaux de liquidation* delivered to the contractors.

Such were the administrative operations of the Directory during the winter of the year V (1796-1797), and the means which it prepared, in order to provide for the ensuing campaign. The campaign of 1796 was not yet over, and every thing indicated that, notwithstanding ten months' hard fighting, notwithstanding ice and snow, there would still be fresh battles. The Archduke Charles was bent on taking the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Huningen, as if, in possessing himself of them, he should for ever prevent the return of the French to the right bank. The Directory had an excellent reason for occupying him there, namely to prevent him from proceeding to Italy. He spent nearly three months before the fortress of Kehl. The troops on

both sides signalized themselves by heroic courage, and the generals of division displayed an extraordinary ability. Desaix, in particular, immortalized himself by his intrepidity, his coolness, and his skilful dispositions around that miserably-intrenched fort. The conduct of the two commanders-in-chief was far from being so highly approved of as that of their lieutenants. Moreau was censured for not knowing how to profit by the strength of his army, and for not having debouched on the right bank to fall upon the besieging army. The archduke was blamed for having expended such efforts on a *tête-de-pont*. Moreau surrendered Kehl on the 20th of Nivose, year V (January 9th, 1797); it was a slight loss. Our long resistance proved the solidity of the line of the Rhine. The troops had suffered little; Moreau had employed the time in improving their organization; his army presented a superb aspect. That of the Sambre and Meuse, the command of which had devolved on Beurnonville, had not been usefully employed during these latter months; but it had rested and was reinforced with fresh detachments from La Vendée; it had received an illustrious leader, Hoche, who was at length called to conduct a war worthy of his talents. Thus the Directory, though not yet in possession of Mayence, and though it had lost Kehl, might still consider itself as powerful upon the Rhine. The Austrians, for their part, were proud of having taken Kehl, and now directed all their efforts against the *tête de pont* of Huningen. But the chief attention of the emperor and of his ministers was turned to Italy. The exertions of the administration for reinforcing Alvinzy's army, and in preparing for a final struggle, had been extraordinary. The troops had been sent off by post. The whole garrison of Vienna had been despatched towards the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the capital, devotedly attached to the imperial house, had furnished four thousand volunteers, who were formed into regiments and called Vienna volunteers. The empress had presented them with colours, embroidered with her own hands. A new levy had been made in Hungary, and some thousand of the best troops of the Empire had been drawn from the Rhine. Owing to this activity, worthy of the highest praise, Alvinzy's army had been reinforced by about twenty thousand men, so that it now amounted to upwards of sixty thousand. It had rested and reorganized itself, and, though it contained some recruits, it was chiefly composed of troops inured to war. The battalion of Vienna volunteers was formed of young men, strangers, it is true, to war, but filled with elevated sentiments, thoroughly devoted to the imperial house, and ready to display the greatest bravery.*

* "The citizens of Austria, though living under a despotic government, are little sensible of its severities, and are sincerely attached to their emperor. The nobility were as ready, as in former times, to bring out their vassals; and Hungary possessed still the high-spirited race of barons and cavaliers,

The Austrian ministers had made arrangements with the Pope, and prevailed upon him to resist the threats of Bonaparte. They had sent him Colli and some other officers to command his army, and had recommended to him to push it forward as near as possible to Bologna and Mantua. They had given Wurmser notice of speedy succours; they had instructed him not to surrender, but, if he should be reduced to extremity, to leave Mantua with all the troops, and especially all the officers, to throw himself across the Bolognese and the Ferrarese into the Roman states, to join the papal army, and to organize and carry it upon the rear of Bonaparte. This well-conceived plan had a chance of succeeding, with so brave a general as Wurmser. This old marshal still held out in Mantua, with great firmness, though his garrison had nothing to eat but salted horseflesh and polenta.

Bonaparte anticipated this last struggle which was to decide for ever the fate of Italy, and he prepared for it. It was reported in Paris by the malicious who wished for the humiliation of our armies, that he was afflicted with psora, which had been improperly treated, and which he had caught at Toulon, in charging a cannon with his own hands. This disease, misconceived, together with the excessive fatigues of this campaign, had weakened him extremely. He could scarcely sit on horseback; his cheeks were hollow and livid. His whole appearance was deplorable. His eyes alone, still bright and piercing as ever, indicated that the fire of his soul was not extinguished.* His physical proportions formed a singular contrast with his genius and his renown—a contrast amusing to soldiers at once jovial and enthusiastic. Notwithstanding the decline of his strength, his extraordinary energy supported him, and imparted

who, in their great convocation in 1740, rose at once, and drawing their sabres, joined in the celebrated exclamation, 'Moriamur pro rege nostro, Maria Teresa!'"—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

* We subjoin a characteristic letter addressed by Napoleon to Josephine at this period, as it conveys a vivid idea of his impassioned and energetic temperament, which fatigue and indisposition had no power to subdue.

"At length, my adored Josephine, I live again. Death is no longer before me, and glory and honour are still in my breast. The enemy is beaten at Arcole. To-morrow we will repair the blunders of Vaubois, who abandoned Rivoli. In a week Mantua will be ours, and then thy husband will fold thee in his arms, and give thee a thousand proofs of his ardent affection. I shall proceed to Milan as soon as I can. I am a little fatigued. I have received letters from Eugene and Hortense. I am delighted with the children. I will send you their letters as soon as I am joined by my household, which is now somewhat dispersed. We have made five thousand prisoners, and killed at least six thousand of the enemy. Adieu, my adorable Josephine! Think of me often. When you cease to love your Achilles—when your heart grows cold towards him—you will be very cruel, very unjust. But I am sure you will always continue my faithful mistress, as I shall ever remain your fond lover. Death alone can break the union which sentiment, love, and sympathy have formed. Let me have news of your health. A thousand and a thousand kisses."—*Josephine's Correspondence.* E.

an activity which was applied to all objects at once. He had begun what he called *the war against robbers*. Intriguers of all kinds had thronged to Italy, for the purpose of introducing themselves into the administration of the armies, and profiting by the wealth of that fine country. While simplicity and indigence prevailed in the armies of the Rhine, luxury pervaded that of Italy—luxury as great as its glory. The soldiers, well clothed and well fed, were every where cordially received, and lived in pleasures and abundance. The officers, the generals, participated in the general opulence, and laid the foundation of their fortunes. As for the contractors, they displayed a scandalous profusion, and purchased with the produce of their extortions the favours of the most beautiful actresses of Italy. Bonaparte, who had within him all the passions, but who at that moment was wholly engrossed by one passion, that of glory, lived in a simple and austere manner, seeking relaxation only in the society of his wife, to whom he was tenderly attached, and who had come, at his desire, to his head-quarters. Indignant at the disorders of the administration, he strictly scrutinized the minutest details, verified by personal inspection the accounts of the companies, denounced the dishonest administrators without mercy, and caused them to be prosecuted. He reproached them, in particular, with want of courage, and with leaving the army in days of danger. He recommended to the Directory to select men of tried energy; he proposed the institution of a syndicate, which, trying like a jury, should have power, on its mere conviction, to punish offences of which material proofs were never to be obtained. He willingly forgave his soldiers and his generals enjoyments which were not to prove for them the delights of Capua; but he bore an implacable hatred to all those who enriched themselves at the expense of the army, without serving it by their exploits or by their attention to its wants.

In his relations with the Italian powers he displayed the same attention and the same activity. Continuing to dissemble with Venice, whose armaments he saw preparing in the lagoons and in the mountains of the Bergamasco, he deferred all explanation till after the surrender of Mantua. He sent troops to occupy temporarily the citadel of Bergamo, which had a Venetian garrison, and assigned as a reason that he did not think it sufficiently guarded to resist a *coup-de-main* of the Austrians. He thus secured himself against treachery, and overawed the numerous enemies whom he had in Bergamo. In Lombardy and the Cispadane, he continued to favour the spirit of liberty, repressing the Austrian and papal party, and moderating the democratic party, which needs restraining in every country. He kept himself in amity with the King of Sardinia and the Duke of Parma. He went in person to Bologna, to terminate a negotiation with the Duke of Tuscany, and to awe the court of Rome. The Duke of Tuscany was annoyed at the presence of the French

in Leghorn. Warm discussions had arisen with the merchants of Leghorn, respecting the commodities belonging to traders enemies of France. These disputes produced violent animosity; besides, the commodities rescued with such difficulty, were sold to great disadvantage and by a company which had robbed the army of five or six millions. Bonaparte preferred an arrangement with the grand-duke. It was agreed that he should be paid the sum of two millions and evacuate Leghorn. This arrangement afforded the additional advantage of rendering the garrison which he had placed in that city disposable. His intention was to take the two legions formed by the Cispadane, to unite them with the garrison of Leghorn, to add to them three thousand of his troops, and to despatch this little army towards the Romagna and the March of Ancona. He meant to take possession of two more provinces of the Roman state, to seize the property of the Pope there and the produce of the taxes, to pay himself by these means for the contribution which had not been discharged, to take hostages selected from the party inimical to France, and thus to establish a barrier between the states of the Church and Mantua. He would thereby render the plan of a junction between Wurmser and the papal army impracticable; he would overawe the Pope, and oblige him, at last, to submit to the conditions of the republic. In his spleen against the Holy See, he even thought of not pardoning it, and contemplated an entirely new division of Italy. His plan was to restore Lombardy to Austria, to form a powerful republic, by adding the Romagna, the March of Ancona, and the duchy of Parma to the Modenese, the Bolognese, and the Ferrarese, and to assign Rome to the Duke of Parma, which would have given great pleasure to Spain, and have compromised the most Catholic of all the powers. He had already set about executing his project. He had proceeded to Bologna with three thousand men, and thence threatened the Holy See, which had already formed the nucleus of an army. But the Pope, now certain of a new Austrian expedition, hoping to communicate by the Lower Po with Wurmser, defied the threats of the French general, and even manifested a wish to see him advance still farther into his dominions. His Holiness, it was said at the Vatican, will quit Rome, if he is obliged to do so, and take refuge at the extremity of his territories. The farther Bonaparte advances, the farther he removes from the Adige, the more dangerous will be his situation, and the more favourable will be the chances for the holy cause. Bonaparte, who was quite as sharp-sighted as the Vatican, had no intention of marching to Rome; he meant only to threaten, and he kept his eye constantly upon the Adige, expecting every moment a new attack. On the 19th of Nivose (January 8th, 1797) he actually received intelligence that an action had taken place on all his advanced posts; he immedi-

ately recrossed the Po with two thousand men, and hastened in person to Verona.

Since the affair of Arcole, his army had received the reinforcements which it ought to have received before that battle. With the winter, his sick had left the hospitals; he had about forty-five thousand men present under arms.* Their distribution was still the same. Nearly ten thousand men were blockading Mantua, under Serrurier; thirty thousand were in observation on the Adige. Augereau occupied Legnago, Massena, Verona; Joubert, who had succeeded Vaubois, guarded Rivoli and La Corona. Rey, with a division of reserve, was at Desenzano, on the border of the Lake of Garda. The other four or five thousand men were either in the citadels of Bergamo and Milan, or in the Cispadane. The Austrians were advancing with sixty and some odd thousand men, and had twenty thousand in Mantua, at least twelve thousand of whom were under arms. Thus, in this struggle as in those which had preceded, the proportion of the enemy was as two to one. The Austrians had this time a new plan. They had tried all the routes for attacking the double line of the Mincio and of the Adige. At the time of the battle of Castiglione they had descended along both shores of the Lake of Garda, by the two valleys of the Chiese and of the Adige. Subsequently, they had debouched by the valley of the Adige and by that of the Brenta, attacking by Rivoli and Verona. They had now modified their plan agreeably to their arrangements with the Pope. The principal attack was to be made by the Upper Adige, with forty-five thousand men under the command of Alvinzy. An accessory attack, and independent of the former, was to be made with nearly twenty thousand men, under the command of Provera, by the Lower Adige, with a view to communicate with Mantua, La Romagna, and the army of the Pope.

Alvinzy's attack was to be the principal one; it would be strong enough to induce a hope of success on this point, and it was to be pushed without any consideration of what might happen to Provera. We have described the three routes which issue from the mountains of the Tyrol. That which turned behind the Lake of Garda had been neglected ever since the affair at Castiglione. The two others were now followed. The one, running between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, passed through the mountains which separate the lake from the river, and there came upon the position of Rivoli; the other, bordering the river exteriorly, debouched in the plain of Verona outside the French line. It was the one which passed between the river

* "After the battle of Arcole, the active French army amounted to thirty-six thousand three hundred and eighty; while ten thousand two hundred and thirty formed the blockade of Mantua."—*Jomini*. E.

and the lake, and which penetrated into the French line, that Alvinzy chose. It was at Rivoli, therefore, that the blow would be aimed. The situation of that ever-celebrated position is this. The chain of Monte Baldo separates the Lake of Garda and the Adige. The high-road runs between the Adige and the foot of the mountains, for some leagues. At Incanale the river washes the very foot of the mountains, and leaves no space whatever for proceeding along its bank. The road then leaves the banks of the river, rises by a kind of spiral stairs in the sides of the mountain, and debouches in an extensive plateau, which is that of Rivoli. It looks down upon the Adige on one side, and is encompassed on the other by the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo. An army in position on this plateau threatens the winding road which ascends to it, and sweeps by its fire both banks of the Adige to a great distance. This plateau is difficult of attack in front, since the narrow spiral ascent must be climbed in order to reach it. Accordingly, an enemy would not strive to attack it by that single way. Before arriving at Incanale, other roads lead to Monte Baldo, and ascending its steep acclivities terminate at the plateau of Rivoli. They are not practicable either for cavalry or for artillery, but they afford easy access to foot soldiers, and may be employed for directing a considerable force in infantry upon the flanks and rear of the corps defending the plateau. Alvinzy's plan was to attack the position by all the avenues at once.

On the 23rd of Nivose (January 12) he attacked Joubert, who held all the advanced positions, and forced him back upon Rivoli. The same day, Provera pushed two advanced guards, the one upon Verona, the other upon Legnago, by Caldiero and Bevilaqua. Massena, who was at Verona, went out to meet the advanced guard coming in that direction, overthrew it, and took nine hundred prisoners. At that very moment, Bonaparte arrived upon the spot from Bologna. He directed the whole division to return to Verona, to keep it in readiness for marching. In the night, he received intelligence that Joubert was attacked and forced at Rivoli, and that Augereau, before Legnago, had observed considerable forces. He could not yet judge upon what point the enemy was directing his principal mass. He still kept Massena's division ready to march, and ordered Rey's division, which was at Desenzano, and which had not seen any enemy debouching behind the Lake of Garda, to proceed to Castel Novo, the most central point between the Upper and the Lower Adige. Next day, the 24th (January 13), couriers rapidly succeeded one another. Bonaparte was informed that Joubert, attacked by immense forces, was likely to be surrounded, and that it was owing only to the obstinacy and the success of his resistance that he still retained the plateau of Rivoli. Augereau sent him word from the Lower Adige that a fire of musketry was kept up along

both banks, but that nothing of importance had occurred. Bonaparte had not more than about two thousand Austrians before him at Verona. From that moment he guessed the plan of the enemy, and saw clearly that the principal attack was directed against Rivoli. He conceived that Augereau would be sufficient to defend the Lower Adige; he reinforced him with a corps of cavalry, detached from Massena's division. He ordered Serrurier, who was blockading Mantua, to send his reserve to Villa Franca, that it might be placed intermediately with regard to all the points. He left a regiment of infantry and one of cavalry at Verona, and set out in the night between the 24th and 25th (January 13 and 14), with the 18th, 32nd, and 75th demi-brigades of Massena's division, and two squadrons of cavalry. He sent word to Rey not to stop at Castel Novo, but to proceed immediately to Rivoli. He himself pushing on before his divisions, arrived at Rivoli at two in the morning.* The weather, which had been rainy for some days, had now cleared up. The sky was serene, the moon shone brightly, and the cold was intense. On his arrival, Bonaparte beheld the whole horizon in a blaze with the enemy's fires. He reckoned him to have forty-five thousand men; Joubert had ten thousand at most: it was high time that succours should arrive. The enemy had divided his force into three corps. The principal, composed of a strong column of grenadiers, the whole of the cavalry, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage, under Quasdanovich, followed the high-road between the river and Monte Baldo, and was to debouch by the spiral ascent of Incanale. Three other corps, under the command of Ocskay, Koblos, and Liptai, composed of infantry only, had climbed the sides of the mountains, and were to descend to the field of battle by the steps of the amphitheatre formed by Monte Baldo about the plateau of Rivoli. A fourth corps, under the command of Lusignan, ascending the side of the plateau, was to place itself on the rear of the French army, to cut it off from the road to Verona. Lastly, Alvinzy had detached a sixth corps, which, from its position, was totally excluded from the operation. It marched on the other side of the Adige, and followed the road which runs along the river exteriorly through Roveredo, Dolce, and Verona. This corps, commanded by Vukassovich, could at most send a few balls upon the field of battle by firing from one bank upon the other.

* "Napoleon was especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding position of Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and cannon, as he hoped to bring on an engagement ere he was united with those important parts of his army. Accordingly, by forced marches he arrived at Rivoli at two o'clock in the morning, and from that elevated situation, by the assistance of a clear moonlight, he was able to discover that the bivouac of the enemy was divided into five distinct and separate bodies, from which he inferred that their attack the next day would be made in the same number of columns."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

Bonaparte instantly perceived that it behoved him to keep the plateau at any rate. He had in front the Austrian infantry descending the amphitheatre, without a single piece of cannon. On his right he had the grenadiers, the artillery, the cavalry, advancing along the road by the river, and ready to debouch by the spiral ascent of Incanale on his right flank. On his left, Lusignan was turning Rivoli. The balls of Vukassovich, fired on the other side of the river, reached his head. Placed on the plateau, he prevented the junction of the different arms. He played with his artillery upon the infantry deprived of its cannon, and drove back the cavalry and artillery, crowded together in a narrow winding road. The attempt which was making by Lusignan to turn him, and the balls which Vukassovich was throwing at him, gave him then but little concern.

His plan being formed with his accustomed promptness, he commenced the operation before daylight. Joubert had been obliged to keep his troops close together, that he might occupy only a space proportionate to his strength; and it was to be feared that the infantry, descending the declivity of Monte Baldo, would form a junction with the head of the column climbing up by Incanale. Bonaparte, long before daylight, ordered Joubert's troops, which, after forty-eight hours' fighting, were taking a little rest, to be roused. He directed them to attack the advanced posts of the Austrian infantry, drove them back, and extended himself more widely upon the plateau.

The action became extremely brisk. The Austrian infantry, without cannon, gave way before that of the French, armed with its formidable artillery, and fell back in semicircle upon the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo. But, at this moment, an unfortunate event happened on our left. Liptai's corps, which formed the extremity of the enemy's semicircle, fell upon Joubert's left, composed of the 89th and 25th demi-brigades, surprised them, broke them, and obliged them to retire in disorder. The 14th, coming immediately after these two demi-brigades, formed *en crochet* to cover the rest of the line, and resisted with admirable courage. The Austrians united their efforts against it, and were ready to overwhelm it. They strove particularly to take its cannon, the horses attached to which had been killed. They had already reached the pieces, when an officer exclaimed, "Grenadiers of the 14th, will you let your guns be taken?" Fifty men immediately rushed forward after the brave officer, repulsed the Austrians, harnessed themselves to the pieces, and drew them off.

Bonaparte, perceiving the danger, left Berthier on the threatened point, and set out at a gallop for Rivoli to fetch succours. Massena's first troops had only just arrived there, after marching all night. Bonaparte took the 32nd, which had become celebrated for its exploits during the campaign, and directed it upon

the left, in order to rally the two demi-brigades which had given way. The intrepid Massena* advanced at the head of the 32nd, rallied behind him the broken troops, and overthrew all before him. He repulsed the Austrians, and placed himself by the side of the 14th, which had not ceased to perform prodigies of valour. The combat was thus re-established on this point, and the army occupied the semicircle of the plateau. But the momentary check of the left wing had obliged Joubert to fall back with the right. He gave up ground, and already the Austrian infantry was a second time approaching the point which Bonaparte had been so anxious to compel it to relinquish to him, and had nearly reached the outlet of the winding road of Incanale, leading upon the plateau. At this moment, the column composed of artillery and cavalry, and preceded by several battalions of grenadiers, ascended the winding road, and, with incredible efforts of bravery, repulsed the 39th. Vukassovich poured a shower of balls from the other bank of the Adige, to protect this kind of escalade. The grenadiers had already climbed the summit of the defile, and the cavalry was debouching after them upon the plateau. Nor was this all. Lusignan's column, whose fires had been seen at a distance, and who had been perceived on the left, turning the position of the French, had moved upon their rear, in order to intercept the Verona road, and to stop the advance of Rey, who was coming from Castel Novo with the division of reserve. Lusignan's soldiers, finding themselves on the rear of the French army, already clapped their hands, and considered it as taken. Thus, on this plateau, closely pressed in front by a semicircle of infantry, turned on the left by a strong column, scaled on the right by the main body of the Austrian army, and harassed by the fire from the opposite bank of the Adige—on this plateau Bonaparte was pent up with Joubert's and Massena's divisions alone, amidst a host of enemies.† He, with sixteen thousand men, was surrounded by at least forty thousand.

In this extremely trying moment Bonaparte was not shaken. He retained all the fire and all the promptness of inspiration. On seeing Lusignan's Austrians, he said, *Those are ours!* and he allowed them to advance without giving himself any concern about their movement. The soldiers, guessing the meaning of their general, shared his confidence, and also repeated to one another, *They are ours!*

Bonaparte, at this instant, was attending only to what was passing before him. His left was covered by the heroism of the 14th and the 32nd. His right was threatened at once by the in-

* "It was after the battle of Rivoli that Massena received from Bonaparte and the army the title of 'Enfant chéri de la victoire.'"—*Thibaudeau.* E.

† "This day the general-in-chief was several times surrounded by the enemy; he had several horses killed under him."—*Montholon.* E.

fantry which had resumed the offensive, and by the column that was scaling the plateau. He immediately arranged decisive movements. A battery of light artillery and two squadrons, under two brave officers, Leclerc* and Lasalle, were directed upon the outlet by which the enemy were debouching. Joubert, who, with the extreme right, had this outlet at his back, suddenly faced about with a corps of light infantry. All charged at once. The artillery first poured a discharge upon all that had debouched; the cavalry and the light infantry then charged with vigour. Joubert's horse was killed under him. He sprang up more terrible than ever, and rushed upon the enemy with a musket in his hand. All that had debouched, grenadiers, cavalry, artillery, were hurled headlong down the winding road of Incanale, in the utmost disorder. Some pieces of cannon, firing down into the defile, augmented the terror and the confusion. At every step, the French killed and made prisoners. Having cleared the plateau of the assailants who had scaled it, Bonaparte again directed his blows at the infantry which was ranged in a semicircle before him, and threw upon it Joubert with the light infantry, and Lasalle with two hundred hussars. On this new attack, consternation seized that infantry, now deprived of all hope of junction. It fled in disorder. Our whole semicircular line then moved from right to left, drove back the Austrians against the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo, and closely pursued them into the mountains. Bonaparte then turned back, and proceeded to realize his prediction respecting Lusignan's corps. That corps, on witnessing the disasters of the Austrian army, soon perceived what would be its own fate. Bonaparte, after playing upon it with his artillery, ordered the 18th and the 75th demi-brigades to charge it. These brave demi-brigades moved off singing the song of departure, and pushed Lusignan along the Verona road, by which Rey was coming with the division of reserve. The Austrian corps at first resisted, then retired, and encountered the head of Rey's division. Terrified at this sight, it invoked the clemency of the conqueror, and laid down its arms, to the number of four thousand men. Two thousand had been taken in the defile of the Adige.

It was now five o'clock, and it may be said that the Austrian

* "Charles Emanuel Leclerc, a French general, entered the army while yet very young, and soon proved successful. Intrepid in the field and judicious in the council, he was employed in 1793 as adjutant-general in the army which besieged Toulon. In the armies of the North and the Rhine he increased his reputation; and in the campaign of Italy in 1796 he reaped fresh laurels. He next accompanied the expedition to Egypt, returned to France in 1799, and greatly contributed to the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire. Leclerc was afterwards commissioned to reunite St. Domingo, to the French government but in 1802 he fell a victim to the plague which had carried off many of his men. Napoleon held his character in such esteem that he gave him his own sister in marriage."—*Biographie Moderne.* E.

army was annihilated. Lusignan was taken; the infantry that had advanced from the mountains was fleeing across tremendous rocks; the principal column was pent up on the bank of the river; while the accessory corps of Vukassovich was a useless spectator of the disaster, separated by the Adige from the field of battle.

This admirable victory did not stun the mind of Bonaparte. He thought of the Lower Adige, which he had left menaced; he judged that Joubert, with his brave division, and Rey, with the division of reserve, would be sufficient to give the last stroke to the enemy, and to take from him thousands of prisoners. He rallied Massena's division, which had fought the preceding day at Verona, which had then marched all night, and again fought the whole of the 26th (14th), and set out with it, to march the whole of the following night and to hasten to new combats. These brave soldiers, with joyful faces, and reckoning upon fresh victories, seemed not to feel fatigue. They flew, rather than marched, to cover Mantua.* They were fourteen leagues from that city.

Bonaparte received intelligence by the way of what was passing on the Lower Adige. Provera, slipping away from Augereau, had thrown a bridge at Anghuiari, a little above Legnago; he had left Hohenzollern beyond the Adige, and marched upon Mantua with nine or ten thousand men. Augereau, apprized too late, had nevertheless followed him, taken him in rear, and made two thousand prisoners. But Provera himself, with seven or eight thousand men, was continuing his march towards Mantua, in order to join the garrison. Bonaparte learned these particulars at Castel Novo. He was apprehensive lest the garrison, apprized of the circumstance, might sally forth to give the hand to the corps which was coming, and that the blockading corps might thus be placed between two fires. He had marched the whole night between the 25th and 26th (14th and 15th) with Massena's division, and he made it march again the whole of the 26th (15th), that it might arrive in the evening before

* "Were I to name all those who have been distinguished by acts of personal bravery, I must send the muster-roll of all the grenadiers and carabiniers of the advanced guard. They jest with danger and laugh at death; and if any thing can equal their intrepidity, it is the gaiety with which, singing alternately songs of love and patriotism, they accomplish the most severe forced marches. When they arrive at their bivouac, it is not to take their repose as might be expected, but to tell each his story of the battle of the day, and produce his plan for that of to-morrow; and many of them think with great correctness on military subjects. The other day I was inspecting a demi-brigade, and, as it filed past me, a common chasseur approached my horse, and said, 'General, you ought to do so and so.'—'Hold your peace, you rogue!' I replied. He disappeared immediately, nor have I since been able to find him out. But the manœuvre which he recommended, was the very same which I had privately resolved to carry into execution."—*Napoleon's Letter to the Directory—Moniteur.* E.

Mantua. He likewise directed thither the reserves, which he had left in the intermediate distance to Villa Franca, and flew thither himself to arrange his dispositions.

On the very same day, the 26th, Provera who had arrived before Mantua, he presented himself before the suburb of St. George, in which Miollis with at most fifteen hundred men was placed. Provera summoned him to surrender. The brave Miollis replied by a discharge of his artillery. Provera, repulsed, moved to the side nearest to the citadel, hoping for a sortie by Wurmser; but he found Serrurier before him. He halted at the palace of La Favorita, between St. George and the citadel, and sent a boat across the lake, to desire Wurmser to debouch from the place on the following morning. Bonaparte arrived in the evening, placed Augereau on the rear of Provera, and Victor and Massena on his flanks, so as to separate him entirely from the citadel, by which Wurmser must attempt to debouch. He opposed Serrurier to Wurmser. Next morning, the 27th (January 16th), at daybreak, the battle commenced. Wurmser debouched from the place and attacked Serrurier with fury. The latter resisted with equal bravery, and kept him back along the lines of circumvallation. Victor, at the head of the 57th, which, on that day, received the name of *the Terrible*, rushed upon Provera, and overthrew all before him. After an obstinate conflict Wurmser was driven back into Mantua. Provera, hunted like a deer, inclosed by Victor, Massena, and Augereau, annoyed by a sortie of Miollis, laid down his arms, with six thousand men. The young Vienna volunteers formed part of them. After an honourable defence, they surrendered their arms, and the colours embroidered by the empress herself.

Such was the last act of that splendid operation, which is considered by military men as one of the most extraordinary recorded in history. News arrived that Joubert, pursuing Alvinzy, had taken from him seven thousand more prisoners; and six had been taken on the day of the battle of Rivoli, which made thirteen. Augereau had taken two thousand; Provera had surrendered six thousand; one thousand had been picked up before Verona, and several hundred in other places;* which

* "The following is a striking instance of the utter consternation and dispersion of the Austrians after this dreadful defeat. René, a young officer, was in possession of the village of Garda, and, while visiting his advanced posts, he perceived some Austrians approaching, whom he caused his escort to surround and take prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an imperial column of eighteen hundred men, which a turning in the road had concealed, till he was within twenty yards of them. 'Down with your arms!' said the Austrian commander, to which René answered with ready boldness, 'Do you lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners—so ground your arms, or no quarter!' and the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in the cry of 'Ground your arms.' The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed to enter into capitulation; but the French would admit

made the total number in three days amount to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men. Massena's division had marched and fought without intermission for four days, marching all night and fighting all day. Thus Bonaparte wrote with pride that his soldiers had surpassed the so much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions.* It is obvious why, at a later period, he attached the title of Rivoli to the name of Massena. The action of the 27th (January 14th), was called the battle of Rivoli, that of the 25th (16th), before Mantua, the battle of La Favorita.

Thus, in three days again, Bonaparte had taken or destroyed half of the enemy's army, and, as it were, stricken it with a thunderbolt. Austria had made her last effort, and now Italy was our's. Wurmser, driven back into Mantua was without hope. He had eaten all his horses; disease and famine were destroying the garrison. A longer resistance would have been useless, and contrary to humanity. The old marshal had given proof of a noble courage and a rare perseverance; he was justified in thinking of surrender. He sent one of his officers to Serrurier to parley. It was Klenau. Serrurier referred to the general-in-chief, who repaired to the conference. Bonaparte, wrapped in his cloak, without making himself known, listened to the conversation between Klenau and Serrurier. The Austrian officer expatiated at length on the resources which his general still had left, and declared that he had yet provisions for three months. Bonaparte, muffled up as before, approached the table, near which the conference was held, took the paper containing Wurmser's propositions, and, without saying a word, began writing on the margin, to the great astonishment of Klenau, who could not conceive what he was about. Then rising and throwing off his cloak, Bonaparte stepped up to Klenau. "There," said he, "are the conditions which I grant to your marshal. If he had but a fortnight's provisions and could talk of surrender, he would not deserve an honourable capitulation. As he sends you, he must be reduced to extremity. I respect his age, his valour,

of no terms but instant surrender. The dispirited Imperialist yielded up his sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his example. But the Austrian soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory, and refused to obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost apparent composure. 'You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour—you know the rules of war—you have surrendered—you are therefore my prisoner—but I rely on your parole; here, I return your sword; compel your men to submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of six thousand men who are under my command.' The Austrian was utterly confounded. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious compliance with the parole he had given him; and, speaking in German to his soldiers, he persuaded them to lay down their arms—a submission which he had soon afterwards the satisfaction to see had been made to one-twelfth part of their number."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.* E.

* "The Roman legions are reported to have marched twenty-four miles a day; but the French brigades, though fighting at intervals, marched thirty." —*Bonaparte's Letter to the Directory.* E.

and his misfortunes. Carry to him the conditions which I grant. Whether he leaves the place to-morrow, in a month, or in six months, he shall have neither better nor worse conditions. He can stay as long as it befits his honour."

By this language and this tone Klenau recognised the illustrious commander, and hastened back to Wurmser with the conditions which he offered. The old marshal was full of gratitude on seeing the generosity with which he was treated by his young adversary. He gave him permission to march freely out of the place with all his staff; he even granted him two hundred horse, five hundred men, chosen by himself, and six pieces of cannon, to render his departure the less humiliating. The garrison was to be conducted to Trieste and there exchanged for French prisoners. Wurmser hastened to accept these conditions; and, to show his gratitude to the French general, he informed him of a plan laid in the papal dominions for poisoning him. He was to leave Mantua on the 14th of Pluviose (February 2, 1797). His consolation was that, on leaving Mantua, he should deliver up his sword to the conqueror himself; but he found only the brave Serrurier, before whom he was oblige to file off with his whole staff. Bonaparte had already set out for the Romagna, to chastise the Pope and to punish the Vatican. His vanity, as profound as his genius, had calculated differently from the vanity of vulgar minds. He chose rather to be absent, than present at the place of triumph.*

Mantua having surrendered, Italy was definitively conquered, and this campaign at an end.

When we take a general view of it, the imagination is struck by the multitude of the battles, the fecundity of the conceptions, of the consequence and the immensity of the results. Bonaparte, entering Italy with some thirty thousand men, first separates the Piedmontese from the Austrians at Montenotte and Millesimo, completes the destruction of the former at Mondovi, then hastens after the latter, crosses before their face the Po at Placentia, the Adda at Lodi, possesses himself of Lombardy, stops there for a moment, again marches, finds the Austrians reinforced on the Mincio, and finishes their destruction at the battle of Borghetto. There, he seizes at a glance the plan of his future operations. It is on the Adige that he must establish himself to make head against the Austrians. As for the princes on his rear, he would content himself by curbing them with negotiations and threats. A second army is sent against him under Wurmser: he cannot beat it unless by rapidly concentrating himself, and alternately striking each of his separate masses. Like a resolute

* "Napoleon had too much grandeur of mind to insult the vanquished veteran by his own presence on this occasion; his delicacy was observed by all Europe, and, like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, was the more present to the mind because he was withdrawn from the sight." —*Alison.* E.

man, he sacrifices the blockade of Mantua, crushes Wurmser at Lonato and Castiglione, and drives him into the Tyrol. Wurmser is again reinforced, as Beaulieu had been. Bonaparte anticipates him in the Tyrol; ascends the Adige, overturns all before him at Roveredo, throws himself across the valley of the Brenta; cuts off Wurmser who hoped to cut him off, beats him at Bassano, and shuts him up in Mantua. This is the second Austrian army destroyed after being reinforced.

Bonaparte, still negotiating and threatening the banks of the Adige, awaits the third army. It is formidable. It arrives before he has received reinforcements; he is obliged to give way before it; he is reduced to despair; he is ready to succumb; when, amidst an impassable morass, he discovers two dikes debouching upon the enemy's flanks, and throws himself upon them with incredible audacity. He is again conqueror at Arcole. But the enemy is only checked—not destroyed. He returns, for the last time, stronger than ever. On the one hand he descends from the mountains; on the other he advances along the Lower Adige. Bonaparte discovers the only point where the Austrian columns, traversing a mountainous country, can form a junction, pounces upon the celebrated plateau of Rivoli, and from that plateau crushes the main army of Alvinzy; then resuming his flight towards the Lower Adige, surrounds the whole column that had crossed it. His last operation is the most brilliant, for here success is united with genius.

Thus, in ten months, besides the Piedmontese army, three formidable armies, thrice reinforced, had been destroyed by one, which, only thirty and a few odd thousand strong on taking the field, had received only about twenty thousand to repair its losses. Thus fifty-five thousand French had beaten more than two hundred thousand Austrians, taken more than eighty thousand,* killed and wounded more than twenty thousand. They had fought twelve pitched battles and more than sixty actions, and crossed several rivers, in defiance of the waves and the enemy's fire. When war is a purely mechanical routine, consisting only in driving and slaughtering the enemy whom you have before you, it is scarcely worthy of history; but when you meet with one of those conflicts in which you see a mass of men moved by a single vast conception, which develops itself amid the din of battle with as much precision as that of a Newton or a Descartes in the silence of the closet, then the sight is worthy of the philosopher, as well as of the statesman and the soldier: and if this identification of the multitude with a single individual, who produces

* "The trophies acquired in the course of January were 25,000 prisoners, twenty-four colours and standards, and sixty pieces of cannon. On the whole, the enemy's loss was at least 35,000 men. Bessières carried the colours to Paris. The prisoners were so numerous that they created some difficulty."—*Montholon.* E.

force at its highest degree, serves to protect, to defend, a noble cause, that of liberty, in this case the scene becomes as moral as it is grand.

Bonaparte now hastened to new plans. He hurried to Rome, to put an end to the shuffling at that court of priests, and to march, not for the Adige again, but for Vienna. He had by his successes brought back the war to its proper theatre, that of Italy, whence he could dash upon the emperor's hereditary dominions. The government, enlightened by his exploits, sent him reinforcements, to enable him to proceed to Vienna and to dictate a glorious peace in the name of the French republic. The conclusion of the campaign had realized all the hopes which its commencement had excited.

The triumph of Rivoli had raised the joy of the patriots to the highest pitch. Every body talked of those twenty-two thousand prisoners, and quoted the testimony of the authorities of Milan, who had reviewed them and certified their number, in order to silence all the doubts of malevolence. The surrender of Mantua soon followed to crown the general satisfaction. From that moment the conquest of Italy was regarded as definitive. The courier who brought these tidings arrived in the evening in Paris. The garrison was immediately assembled, and the intelligence published by torchlight, to the sound of trumpets, amid shouts of joy from all the French attached to their country. O days ever celebrated and ever to be regretted by us! At what period was our country ever greater and more glorious! The storms of the Revolution seemed to have subsided. The murmurs of parties sounded like the last moans of the expiring tempest. These remains of agitation were considered as the very life of a free state. Commerce and the finances were emerging from a tremendous crisis; the entire soil, restored to industrious hands, was about to be rendered productive, A government composed of citizens, our equals, ruled the republic with moderation. The best were selected to succeed them. All votes were free. France, at the height of power, was mistress of the whole extent of country from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and from the sea to the Alps. Holland and Spain were about to unite their fleets with her's, and to attack maritime despotism in concert. She was resplendent with immortal glory. Admirable armies waved her tricoloured banners in the face of kings, who had leagued to annihilate her. Twenty heroes, differing in character and talent, alike only in age and courage, led her soldiers to victory.* Hoche, Kleber, Desaix, Moreau,

* "Bonaparte's lieutenants, in particular, were themselves qualified to command, and had sufficient confidence in their own talents to take upon themselves the responsibility of a movement or a battle; and his army was composed of citizens, even of noble and cultivated minds, who were ambitious of performing memorable deeds, and passionately attached to the Revolution. With men like these a man of genius might do any thing. The

Joubert, Massena, Bonaparte, and a great number of others, advanced together. People weighed their different merits, but no eye, how piercing soever it might be, could distinguish in this generation of heroes the unfortunate or the guilty. No eye could distinguish him who should so soon expire in the flower of his age from the attack of an unknown disease, the man who should fall by the dagger of the Mussulman or the fire of the enemy, who should crush liberty, or who should betray his country. All appeared great, pure, happy, destined to future glory. This was for a moment only; but there are only moments in the life of nations, as in the life of individuals. We were about to recover wealth with repose; liberty and glory, we already possessed! "The country," said one of the ancients, "ought to be not only prosperous, but sufficiently glorious." This wish was accomplished. Frenchmen, let us, who have since seen our liberty strangled, our country invaded, our heroes shot or unfaithful to their glory—let us never forget those resplendent days of liberty, greatness, and hope!

remembrance of his earlier days, when he called liberty and intelligence around him, was calculated to make Bonaparte regret, at a later period of his life, that he had substituted mechanical armies in their place, and generals who knew nothing but how to obey."—*Mignet*. E.

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